Th ttnitnty ofBtmocrmcy it tow.nl thfUrmtion ofthidm,triom, cl.n;tht inert ofth.ir torn fort, thfwrtlo oflh.tr diftty, I h, .,t.hlUhmnt of I AWrj.rm"
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VETO POWER.
SPEECH OF Mr. Cl-UOILY,
OF SOUTH CAROLINA.
7i Senate, February 28, 1342 On the
Veto Poer.
Mr. CALHOUN said: The Sen, tor
from Kentucky, in support of his amend
ment, maintained thai the people of these
States constitute a nation; that the nation
lias a will of Us own; that the numerical
majority of the whole was the approprin te
organ of us voice ; and that whatever de
rogated from it, to thai extent departed
from the genius of the Government, and
set up the will of the minority against the
majority. We !i ive thus presumed at the
very threshold of the discussion, a ques
tion of the deepest import, not only as it
regards the subject consideration, but the
nature and character of our Government ;
and that question is, are these prop.isiiions
of the Senators true ? If they be, then lie
admitted the argument against the veto
would be conclusive; not however, for the
reason assigned hy him, that it would make
the voice of a single functionary ol the Gov
ernment, (the President.) equivalent to that
of some mx Senator and forty members of
the other House; hut lor the far more de
cisive reason, according to his theory, that
the President is not chosen by the voice of
the numerical majority, and does not, there
fore, according to his principle, represent
truly tlie will of the nation.
It i a great mi-lake to suppose 'that he
it elected simply on the principle of mini
'bers. They constitute, i; is true, the prin
cipal element in his election ; but not the
exclusive. Each Slate i. -indeed, entitled
to as many votes in his election, as it is to
representatives in the other House; thai
is, to its Federal population; but to these,
two others are added, having no regard to
numbers for their representation in the
Sena-.c, which grealty increases the relative
1 nil tence of the ua!l States; compared to
the large, in the Presidential election-
What etivct tl is latter element may have
on the numbers necessary to elect a Presi
dent, may on made apparent by a very
short and simple calculation.
Tne population of the United Stales, in
Federal numbers, by the late census, is
45,908,376. Assuming that sixiy-eigni
thousand, the number reported by the -committee
of the other House, will be fixed on
fur the ratit of representation there, it will
give, according to the calculation of the
committee, two hundred and twentv-f nr
numbers to the other House. Add fil'iy
two, the tin nber .of the Senators, and the
electoral college will be found to consist of
two hundred an 1 seveniv-six. of which on
hundred and ihiriv-nine is a majority. If
nineteen of the smaller Siates, excluding
Maryland, be taken, beginning with IMa
Ava'rc an I ending with Kentucky inclusive,
they will be fumd to be entitled to one
hundred and forty votes, one more than a
majority, with a federal population of only
; while the s'vn ivh- r S afs,
.villi a population of 8. GS, 507, would b
entitled to but one hundred and thiny-sx
votes, three less than a majority, with a
population of al uost a million and a half
greatei than the others. Ul the one hun
dred and forty electoral votes of the smaller
States, tinriy-eigiit wouh! be on account of
the addition of two to each State lor ttietr
reofstaution in this b dy, while of the
larger there would be but fourteen on that
account; making a difference, of tvrenty-
f ur votes on that account, being two more
than the entire electoral votes of Ohio, the
Mr. Cut here interrupted Mr. Cai.houx, and
aid that he meant a majority according to the forms
of the Constitution.
Mr. Calhoun, in return, said he had taken down
the words of the Senator at the time, and would
vouch for the correctness of his statement. The
Senator not only laid down the propositions as
stated, but he drew conclusions from thein against
the President's veto, which could only be sustained
nn the nrincinal of the numerical majoriiy. In
fact his course at the extra session, and the
rounds assumed both lv him and his colleague in
this discussion, had their origin in the doctrines
tUcci! in that prcpcaticn.
third State in point of numbers in the
Union.
The Senator from Kentucky, with these
facts, but acts in strict conformity to his
theory of the Government, in proposing
the limitation he has on the veto power;
but as much cannot be said in favor of the
Mihstitute he has offered. The argument
is as conclusive against the one, as the oth
er, or any other modification of the veto
that could possibly be devised. It goes
farther, and is conclusive against the Exe
cutive department itself, as elected; f r
there can he no good reason offered why
the will of the nation, if theie be one,
should not be as fully and perfectly repr.
M,-iai:Uiu that department as in the Legisla
tive. But it does not stop there. It would be
still more conclusive, if possible, against'
this branch of the Government. In con
stituting die Senate, numbers are totally
disregarded. The smallest State stands
on a perfect equality with the largest;
Delaware,, with her seventy-seven thou
sand, with New York with her twomil
liousand a half. Here a majority of States
control, without regard to population ; and
fourteen of the smallest States, with a fed
eral population of but 4,031,457, little less
that a fourth of the whole, can, if they unit,
overrule the twelve others, with a popula
tion of 11.814,919. Nay, more; "they
could virtually destroy the Government,
and put a veto on the whole system, by re
fusing to elpct Senators; and yet this equal
ity among Siates, -without regard to num
bers, including the branch where it prevails,
would seem to be the favori e with the Con
stitution. It is its provision that cannot
be altered without the consent -of every
Slate, and this branch of the Government
where it preva Is, is the only one that -participates
in the powers of all the others.
As a part of the Legislative Department, it
has full participation with the other, in all
matters of legislation, except originating
money bills, while it participates with the
Executive in two of its highest functions,
that of appointing to office and making
tieaties, and in that the Judiciary, in being
the high court before which all impeach
ments are tried.
Hut we have not yet got to ihe end of
the consequences. The argument would
as conclusive against th? Judiciary as a
gainst the Senate, or the Executive and his
veto. The judges receive their appoint
ments trout the executive and the Senate;
the ot:e no ninaiiug, and the other consent
ing to Bnd advising the appointment;
neither of which departments, as has been
shown, 13 chosen by iho numerical majori
ty. In addition, they hold their oliice
during good behavior, and can only be
turned out by impeachment, 'and yet they
have the power, in all ca?es in law and
equity brought befirre them, in which an
act of Congtess is involved, to decide on
its constitutionality that is in effect, to
pronounce an absolute veto.
If, then, the Senator's theory be correct,
its clear and certain result, if carried out in
practice, would be to sweet) away, rot only
the veto, but the Executive, tint Senate,
and the Judiciary, as now consumed, and
to leave nothing standing in the midst of
the rnins but the House of Representatives,
where only, in the whole range of the
Government numbers exclusively prevail.
Hut as desolating as wonl I bt its sweep, in
pnssing over the Government, it would be
fir mora destructive in its whirl over the
Constitution. There it would not leave a
fragment standing amidst the ruin in its
rear.
Im approaching this topic, let me pre
mise, what Il will rea lily admit, that if
the voice of the psop'e may bo sought for
any where with confidence, it may be in
the Constitution, which is conceded by all
to he the fun lamental and paramount law
ofthe land. If, then, the people of these
States do really constant nation, as the
Senator supposes; if the nation has a win
of its own, and if the numerical majority
of the whole is the only appropriate and
true organ of that will, we may lairly ex
pect to tiod that will, pronounced through
the absolute majority, perva -ling every pan
of that ir.irnmeni. and stamping its au
thority or. ihe whole. I such the fact?
The very reverse. Throughout the whole
from first to last from beginning to the
end- in irS formation, adoption, ar.d a
mendmpnt. there is nn the slightest evi
dence, trace, or vestige of the existence of
the fact, on which the Senator's theory
rests : neither of the nation, nor its wdl,
nor of the numerical nsjority of the whole,
as its organ, as I shall next proceed to
show.
The convention which formed it was
called by a portion of the States ; it' mem
bers were all appointed by the Stales ; re
ceived their authority from their separate
States; voted by Slates in formin? ihe
Constitution; agreed to it, when formed,
by S:ate; transmitted it lo Congress to be
submitted to th? Slates for their ratific-aion;
it ratified bv the people of each State
in convention, each tanfying by itself, for
itself, and bound exclusively by its own
ratification, and by express provision il
was not to go into operation, miles nine
out of the twelve Stales should ratily, anu
then to be bindin? onlv between the States
LIXCOLNTOX, X.
ratifying. It was thus put in th power
of any four States, large or small, wiihonT
without regard lo numbers, to defeat its
adoption, which might have b een done by a
very small proportion of the whole, as will
appear by reference to the first census.
That census was taken very shortly afier
the .adoption of the Constitution, at which
lime the Federal population of the then
twelve States was 3.462,279, of which the
four smallest, Delaware, Rhode Island,
Georgia, anil New Hampshire, with a
population of only 241,490. 'something
more than the fourteenth p irt of the whole,
could have defeated the ratification. Sich
toa. ilm ittiul disregard of piipula'jxui in (fie
adoption and formation of the Constitution.
It may, however, be said, it is tru, that
the Constitution is the work of the States,
and that there was no nation prior to its
adoption; but that its adoption fused
the people of the States into one, so
as to make a nation of what before consti
tuted separate and independent sovereign
lies. Such an assertion would be directly
in the teeth of the Constitution,, which
says ihat, when ratified, "it should be
binding, (not over the States ratifying, for
that would imply that it was imposed by
some higher authority, nor between the
individuals composing the Sines, for that
would imply th hey were all merged in
one, but) between the Stales ratifying the
same;" and thws by the strongest implica
lion, recognising them as ihe parties to the
instrument, and as maintaining their sepa
rate and independent existence as States,
after its ad ipuou. Hut let that pass. 1
need it not to rebut the Senator's theory
to test the truth of the assertion, that ihe'
Constitution has formed a nation of the
people of these States. I go back to ihe
grands already taken, that if such be tne
fitct if they really torm a nation, since
the adoption of ihe Constitution, and .the
nation has a will, and the numerical ma
joriiy is its only proper organ, in that cae.
ihe mode prescribe f r the amendment of
the Coii-aituiiou would furnish abundance
and conclusive evidence of the fact. But
here again, as in ils formation and adoption,
there is not the slightest trace or evidence,
that such is the fact; on the contrary, most
conclusive to kustain the very opposite
opinion.
There are two modes in which amend
ments to the Constitution may be proposed.
The one, such as that now proposed, by a
resolution to be passed by two-thirds of
both houses; and the other by a call of a
convention, by Congress-, to propose a
men lirrents-, on the application of two
thirds r,f the Slates; neither of which 'give
the least co untenance to the theory of the
Senator. In both cases the mode of mod
ification, which is the material point, is the
same, and requires ihe concurring assent
of ihrse-fourths of the States, regardless of
population. V raitJ'y an amendment. LM
us now pause for a moment to trace the
effects of this provision.
There are now twenty six States, and
the concurring assent, of course, of twenty
States, is sufficient to ratify an amendment.
It then results thai twen'V of the smaller
States, of which Kentucky would be the
largest, are sufnViem for thai p.irpoe, with
a population in federal numhsrs of only
7,652097, less by several hundred thou
sand than lire numerical m-ijority of the
whole-, against the ti'dted voice of th dther
six. with a population of 8,$IG,279, ex
ceeding ihe firmer by more than half a
million. Ami yet this minority under the
amending power, may change, ahr, mod
ify or destrov every part of the Consiitti
tio'i. except that winch provides for an
qnality of Tep-esenta'iion of the States in
the Senate, while, as if in mockery and
deriion of the Senator's theory, nineteen
of the larger States, with a population, in
federal numbers, of 14,526.073. cannot,
even if united to a man, alter a letter in
the Constitution, against the seven others,
with a population of only 1,382.303; and
this, too, undvr the existing Constitution,
winch is supposed to form the people t
ihe.-e Slates into a nation. Finally, Del
aware, with a pop dation of hide more
than 77,000, can put her veto on till the
other States, tut a proposition lo destroy
ihe equality of the States in the Senate.
Can facts more clearly illustnie the total
dis-egard of the numerical majority, as
well in the process of amending, as in that
of forming and adopting the Constitution?
All this must appear anomalous, strange
and unaccountable, on the theory of the
Senator, but harmonious and . easily ex
plained on the opposite; that ours fs an
union, noi of individuals, united by what is
called a social compact, for that would
make it a nation; nor of Governments, for
that would have formed a mere Confedera
cy, like the one superseded by the present
Constitution; but an union of Slates, foun
ded on a wiitten positive compact, forming
a Federal Republic, with the same equali
ty of rights among the States composing
ihe Union, as among ihe citizens compo
sing the States themselves. Instead "f a
nation, e are in reality an assemblage of
nations, or peoples, (if the plural tioun
may t;e used where the language affords
none.) united in their sovereign character,
immediately and directly by their owu act.
C, MARCH 23, 1842.
Hut without losing thr-1 -cparaie and hide
pendent existvnee.
lt wilts trim all that has been stated.
that either the theory of the Senator is
wrong, nr that our political system is
threrghout a profound and radical error.
If e latter be the case, then that complex
system of ours, consisting of so many
paints, but blended, as was supposed, into
"i" Harmonious, and sublime whole, raising
iis iWvit on high and challenging the admi
ratio of ihe world, is but a misshapen and
disproportionate structure that ought to be
demJished to the ground, with the single
exc.-oiJ-m ef the apartment allotted to the
fiollM!. tf R .Jf -. I - -5
lor prepared to commence the work of de
molition? D es he believe that all other
parts ofihis complex structure are irregu
lar and ideformed appendages; ami that if
ihey wire taken down, and ihe Govern
ment ercted exclusively on the will of the
numerical mnj rity, would effect as well,
oi better1, the great objects for which it was
itistitutei: "to establish justice; ensure do
mesne tranquillity; provide for the com
mon defence; promote the general welfare;
and secure the blessings of liberty to our
selves and our posterity." Will the Sen
ator will any one can any one ven
ture l assert that? And if not, why. not?
There is the question, on the proper solu
tion of w hich hangs not only the explana
tion of the veto, but that ofthe real nature
and character of our complex, but beauii
I'ul and harmonious system of Government.
To give a full and systematic solution, it
wouid be necessary to descend to ihe ele
ments of political science, slid discuss
priuciplrs little suited to a discussion in n
deliberative assembly. I waive the attempt,
and ahull content myself with giving a
much nurre matter of fact solution.
Il is iiiflicient, for that purpose, to point
to Vie ;ctnal operation of the Government,
throng1! all the stages of its existe- ce, nd
ihe hi iy and important measures which
have tgitated il from the beginning; the
suecesi of which one portion of the people
regarded as essential to their prosperity
and tuppiness, while other portions have
viewed ihem a destructive of both. W hat
does tins imply, but a deep conflict of in
terests, real or supposed, between the dif
ferent portions of the community, m sub
jects ofthe first magnitude the currency, j
the finances, including taxation and dis
bursements; the Bank, the proiective tariff, :
distribution, and many others; on all of
which ihe most opposite and conflicting
views Inve prevailed? And what would
be the (-Sect of placing the powers of the
Government under the exclusive control of
the numerical majority- of 8,000,000 over
7,900,000; of six Stales over all the rest
but to fcive the dominant interest, or com
bination of interests, an unlimited and des
potic control over all others? What, but
to vest it with the power to administer the
Government for its exclusive benefit, re-ga.-dless
of all O hers, and indifferent to
their oppression and wretchedness? And
what, in a country of such vast extent and
diversity of condition, institutions, indus
try, and productions, would (hat be, bui lo
subject the ret to the most grinding des
potism and oppression? Hut what is ihe
remedy? Il would be but to increase the
evil, to transfer the power to a minriiy, to
abolish the Hoii-e of Representatives, and
place the control exclusively f. the hands
ofthe Senate in that of the lour million,
iusit-ad of itie eight. If one iddm he sacn
ficed to the taller, it is belter that ihe few
should be to the many, than the many to
the few.
IV tifet thefi i to be tlorie, if neither the
majority, nor ti e minority, the greater nor
les pari, can be salVly trusted with the
fxclusive control? What but to vest the
powers of the Government in the whole
the eirire people to make il in truth and
reality the Government of the prde, in
stead of the Government of a dominant
over a suVject part, be it greater or less
of the wt-ole people self-government-; and
if this should prove impossible in practice,
then to make I he nearer approach lo il,
by requiring ihe concurrence in the -action
of thj government of the greatest possible
uuinbeV consisleui with tiie great ends f ir
which Government was institute.! justice
and security, within and without. Dm
how is that to be effected? Not certainly
by considering the whole community as
on, and taking its sense ;is a whole by a
single process, which, instead ol" giving
tiro voice of all, can but give that of a pari.
There is but one way by which it can
possibly be accomplished; and that is by
a judicious and wise division and organiza
tion of the Government and community,
with reference to its different and conflict
ing interests, and by taking ihe sense of
each separately, and the concurrence of all
as ihe voice of the whole. Each may be
imperfect of itself, out if the construction
be good and all tl.c key skilfully touched,
ihern ill be given out in one blended and
harmonious - whole, the true and perfect
voice of ihe people.
Rut'on what principle is such a division
and organization lo be made lo effect ibis
great ohj-ct. without which it is impossible
to preserve free and popular institutions?
To this no general answer can be givtm.
it is the word of t)e wise and experienced.
having full and perfect knowledge of the
eotintry and the people tu every particular
for whom the Government is intended.
It must be made to fit, and when it doss,
will fit no other, xnd will be incapable
of baing imitated or borrowed. Without,
then, attempting to do what cannot be
dime, I propose to point out, how that
which I have stated has been accomplished
in our system of Government, and ihe a
gency the vttu is intended to have in effect
ing it-
I begin with the House of Representa
tives. J here each Slate has a Represent
ative accordirtg to its federal numbers, and
of members controls its proceedings thus
giving to the numerical majoriiy the ex
clusive control throughout. The effect is
to place its proceedings in the power of
eight millions of people over all the rest,
and six ofthe largest States, if united, over
- - i
the other twenty; and the consequence, if
the House was the exclusive organ of the
people, would be the domination of the
snouger over the weaker interests of the
community, and the establishment ol an
intolerable and oppressive despotism. To
find the remedy against what would be so
great an evil, we must turn to this body
Here an entirely different process is adopt
ed to take the sense of the community.
Population is entirely disregarded, and
States,-without reference to the number of
people, are made the basis of representa
tion; the effect of which is to place the
control here in a maj any of the States,
which, had they the exclusive power,
would exercise it as despotically an I op
presively as would the lloise of Repre
seniatves.
Regarded, "then, separately, neither tru
ly represents the sense nf the community,
and each is imperfect of itself; but when
united, and the concurring voice of each is
made necessary io enact laws, the one cor
r els the defects of the other; and. instead
of the less popular derogating from the
more, popular, as is supposed by the Sena
tor, the two together give a more full and
perfect utterance to the voire of ihe peopln
than either could separately. Taken sep
arately, six Staies might control ihe II ou-,
and a hide upwards of four millions might
control the Senate, by a combination of the
fourteen smaller States; but by requiring
the concurrent votes of the two, the
largest States must add eight otlrers lo have
the control in both bodies. Suppose, for
illustration, they should unite with the
eight smallest, "which would give the least
numb-er by which an act could pass both
Houses, it will be found, by adding the
popoulation in federal numbers of the six
largest to the eight smallest States, that
ihe least number by which an act Can pass
both Houses, if the members should he
true to those they represent, would be 9,
7S8. 570 against a minority of 6.119.797,
instead of 8.000,000 f.gainst 7.1)000,000.
f ihe assent of the most popular branch
alone, was required.
This more full and perfect expression of
the votee of 'the people by the concurrence
ofthe two. rompared to either separately,
is a great advance towards a full and per
fect expression of iheir voice; but great as
il is, i' falls far short, and the framers of
ihe Con-lituvion were accordingly not sat
isfied with n. To rentier it stdl more per
ect, their next step was to requite the
assent 'of the President, b'fore an act of
Congress could become a law, and. if he
disapproved, to require two thirds of hoih
Houses io overrule Ins veto. We are thus
oroug'il to the point imiircdiaixly under
discussion, and which, on that account,
claims a full and careful examination.
One of th leading mo'ives for vesting
the President with this high power, was,
undoubtedly, to give him the means of pro
tecting the portion of the powers allotted
to him by the Constitution, against the en
croachment of Congress. To make a tlivi
si n of power effectual, a veto in one form
or another is indispensable. The right of
each to judge for itself of the extent ofthe
powT-r allotted to i:s share, and to pro ect
itself in its exercise, is what in reality is
meant by a division of power. U ithont it,
the allotment to each department would be
a meie partition, and no division l all.
Acting under this impresion, the framer
of the Constitution have carefully provided
that his approval should be necessary, not
only to the acts of Congress, but to every
resolution, vote ororder, requiring the con
sent of the two Houses, so as to render il
impossible to elude it by any conceivable
device. This of itself was an adequate mo
tive for the provision, and were there no
other, ought to be a sufficient reason for
the rejection of this resolution. Without
it, the division of power betweer, the legis
lative and Executive departments, would
have been merely nominal
But il is not the only motive. There is
another and deeper, to which the division
itself of the Government int. department
is subordinate; to enlarge the popular basis,
by increasing the number of voices neces
sary to its action. As numerous as are th
voices required to obtain the assent of ihe
people through the Senate and the House
lo an act, it was not thought by the framer
ofthe Constitution sufficient for the action
of the Governmeut in all cases. Nine
VOLUME V, NO, 43
j thousand eight hundred, as large as is the
numbar, were regarded as still loo few, and
six thousand one hundred too many lo re
move all motives for oppression; the latter
being not loo few to be plundered, and the
former not too large to divide the spoils of
plunder among. Till the increase of num
bers on one side, and the decrease on tha
other reaches tla: point, there is no security
for the weaker against the stronger, espe
cially in so extensive s country as ouis.
Acting in the spirit of these remarks, the
authors of ihe Constitution, although they
deemed the concurrence ofthe Senate and
the House as Fuffjcient, with the appproval
in ordinary cases, )et, when he dissented,
they deemep it a sufficient presumption
against the measure to require a still greater
enlargement of the popular basis for its
enactment. 'With this view, the assent of
two-thirds of both Houses were required
to overrule his veto, that is eighteen biaies
in the Senate, and a constituency of ten
wiliiors six hundred thousand in the other
Ifouse.
Out it may be said that nothiugis gained
towards enlarging the popular basis of the
Government by the veio power; because
the number necessary to elect a majority to
the two Houses, without which the act
could not pas, would be sufficient to elect
"'m. Thai i true. But he may have
been elected by a diffe,ent P"n ofthe
people, or if not, great chants inay take
place during his four 'ea"' bo,
Senate and the House. w,wc.f- n,ay ai,g
the majority that broug''1 h'vn ,M,o power
and wiih it the measure 8m- P-'cy to be
pursued. In either case 'ie "ht find it
nTessary o intrrpose his cto t maintain
bi views ofthe Constitution, or the olicy
of the party of which he is the head, and
which elevated him to power.
But a stiTl stronger consideration for vest
ing him with the power msy be fonnd in
the difference of the manner of his election,
compared with that of the members of
either House. The Senators are elected
bv the vote of tit Legislatures of the re
spective States, and the members of the
House by the people, who, in almost
all ihe Slates, elect by districts. In either
is there ihe least responsibility ofthe mem
bers of any one State, to the Legislature or
people of any oiher Stale. They are, as
far as ilieir responsibility may be concern-
.1, Mtl.tr l ioIn-ivciy-ttn4-r influ
ence of the States and people, who respec
tively elect them. No so the President.
The votes of the whole are counted in his
election, which makes him more or less
responsible lo every pari to those who
voted against him, as well fs those to
whom he owes his election, which he
must feel sensibly. If he shouM be ' an
apirarit for a re-election, he will desire to
gain the favorable opinion of Stales that
opposed him, as well as to Tetain that of
those which voted for him. Even if he
should not be a candidate for re-election,
the desire of having a favorite elected, or
maintaining the ascendency of his party,
may have, in a considerable extent, the
same influence over him. The effect, in
either case, would hp to make him look
more to ihe interest ofthe whole to soften
sectional feelings and asperity to be more
of a patriot, than the partisan of any paiti
cnlar intere-i; and throiigu ihe influence of
hpse cause to give a more general charac
ter to the politics of ilie coun'ry. & thereby
render the col ision bptwecn sectional in
tf.resn less fierce than it would be if legis
lation depended solely on the members of
the two Houses, who owe no responsibility
but to those who elected them. The same
influence acts even on the aspirants for ihe
Presidency, and is followed to a very con
siderable extent by the same softening and
generalizing effects. In the case of the
President, il may lead lo the interposing of
his veto against oppressive and dangerous
sectional measures, even when supported
by those to whom he owes his election.
But be the cause of interposing his veto
what it may, its effect in all cases is to
require a greater body of constituency,
through ihe legislative organs, to put tl.o
Government in action against it to require
another key lobe truck, and to bring out
a more full and perfect response iroin the
voice of the people.
There is still another impediment, if not
lo the enactment of a law, to its execution,
to be found in the Judiciary Department.
I refer to the right of the courts, in all cases
coming before them inlaw or equity, where
an act of Congress comes in question, m
dec.de on its unconstitutionality, which, if
decided against the law in the Supremo
Court, is in effect a permanent veto. But
here a difference must pe made between
decision against the constitutional!. f
law of Congress and that of States. Tu-
former acts as a restrie'iou on the powers
of this Government, bui the laiter as an en
largement. Such are the varions processes of taking;
the sense of the people through the divi
sions and organization of ihe different de
partments of ihe Government, all of which,
acting through their appropriate organ. ar -
. "i . i . . :.. u...: I ...I
Ill'-Pnueo to iTiucii ii auo iciiuer il
more popular, instead of less, by increasing
the number necessary to put it in action,
and luring far their object tv prevent ou