Newspapers / The Lincoln Republican (Lincolnton, … / March 23, 1842, edition 1 / Page 2
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4 portion of the community from aggrandiz ' iitg or enriching hself at the expense of the Other, and to restrict tli6 -whole to the sphere intended by the framers of the Con stitution, lias it effected these objects? "Has it prevented oppression and usurpation on the part of the Government? lias it accomplished the objects for which the Governmant was ordained, as enumerated in the preamble of the Constitution ? Much, very much, certainly has been done, but not all. Many instances might be enu merated, in the history of the Government, of the violation of the Constitution of the assumption of powers not delegated to it of the perversion of those delegated to uses never intended and of their being wielded by the dominant interest, for the time, for its aggrandizement, at the expense of the rest of the community instances that may be found in every period of its existence, from the earliest to the latest, beginning with the Bank and bank connection at its outset, and ending with the Distribution act, at its late extraordinary session. How is this to be accounted for? What is the cause? The explanation and cause wi'l be found in the fact, that, as fully as the sense of the people is taken in the action of die Govern meat, it is not taken fully enough. For, respect, there are" but two organs through which the voice of the community acts di rectly on the Government, and which, taken separately, or in combination, constitute the elements of which it is composed, the one is the majority of the States regarded in their corporate character as bodies politic, which in its simple form constitutes the Senate; and the other is the majority of the Jeople of the States, of which, in its simple orm, the House of Representatives is com posed. These combined, in the propor tions already staled, constitute the Execu tive Department, and that department and the Senate appoint the judges, who consti tute the Judiciary. But it is only in their simple form in the Senate and the other House, that they have a steady and habitual control over the legislative acts of the Gov ernment. The veto of the Executive is rarely interposed; not more than about twenty times during the period of more than fifty years that the Government has existed. Their effects have been beneficially fslt, but only casually, at long intervals, and without steady and habitual influence over the action of the Government. The same remarks are substantially applicable to what, for the sake ofbrevny, may be called the veto of the Judiciary; the right of nega tiving a law for the want of constitutionali ty, when it comes in question, in a case before the courts. The Legislature, then, of the Union, be ing under no other habitual and steady con trol but these two majorities, acting through this and the other U ue, is, in fact, placed substantially under the control of the por tion of the community, which the united majorities of the two Houses represent for the time, and which may consist of but fourteen States, with a federal population of less itiau leu millions, against a liule more than six, as has been already explain ed. But as large as is the former, and as small as is the latter, the one is not large enough, in proportion, to prevent it from plundering, under the forms of law, and the other small enough from being plun dered; and hence the ninny instances of Violation of the Constitution, of usurpation, of powers perverted, and wielded for selfish purposes which the history of the Govern ment affords. They furnish proof conclu sive that the principle of plunder, so deep ly implanted in all Governments, has not been eradicated in ours by all the precaution taken by its framers against it. But in estimating the number of the con stituency necessary to control the majority in the two Houses of Congress at something less than ten millions, 1 have estimated it altogether too high, regarding the practical operation of the Government. To form a correct conception of its practical operation in this respect, another element, which has in practice an important influence, must be taken into the estimate, and which 1 shall next proceed ta explain. Of the two majorities, which, acting either separately or in combination, control the Government, the numerical majority is by far the most influential. It has the ex clusive control in the House of Represen tatives, and preponderates more than five to one in the choice of the president, as . sinning that the ratio of representation will be fixed at sixty-eight thousand, under the late census. It elso greatly preponderates in appointment nf the judges, the right of nominating having much greater influence in making appointments than that of advi sing and consenting. From these facts, it must he apparent that the leaning of the President will be to that element of power to which he mainly owes his elevation, and on which he must principally rtly, to' secure his re-election, or maintain the as eendancy of the party and sjstem of its policy, the head of which he usually h. This leaning of his, musi have a powerful effect on the inclination and tendency of the whole Government. In his hands are placed, substantially, all the honors and emoluments of the Government, and these, when greatly increased, as they are and ever must be when the powers of the Gov ernment are greatly stretched and increased, must give the President a corresponding in fluence over, not only the members of both Houses, but also public opinion, and through that, a still more powerful indirect influ ence over them; and thus they may be brought to sustain or oppose, through his influence, measures which otherwise they would have opposed or sustained, and the whole Government be made to lean in the tame direction with the Executive. From these causes the Government, in til of its department0, gravitates steadily towards the numerical majority, and has been moving slowly towards it from the beginning; sometimes, indeed, retarded, or even stopped or thrown back, but, taking any considerable period of time, always advancing towards it. That it begins to make tiear approach to that fatal point, ample proof may be found in the oft-repeat-ed declaration of the mover cf this , resolu tion, and of many of his supporters at the extraordinary f sion, that the late Presi dential electiri . pk!piI all the trrpat mau. ures which he so ardently pressed througlijl the senate, i es, even here in Wu cham ber, in the Senate, which is composed of the opposing element, and on which the only effectual resistance to this fatal tenden cy exists that is to be found in the Gov ernment, we are told that the popular will as expressed in the Presidential election is to decide not only the election, but every measure which may be agitated in the can vass in order to influence the result. When what was thus boldly insisted on comes to be an established principle of ac tion, the end will be near. As the Government approaches nearer and nearer to the one absolute and single power, the will of the greater number, its action will become more and more distur bed and irregular; faction, corruption, aud otism will daily decay, and aiT'CUon" and reverence for the Government grow weaker and weaker, until the final shock occurs, when the system will rush to ruin; and the sword lake the place of law and Constitu tion. Let me not be misunderstood. I object cot to that structure of the Government which makes the numerical majority the predominant element: it is, perhaps, ne cessary it should be so in all popular con stitutional Government like ours, which ex cludes classes. It is necessarily the expo nent of the strongest interest, or combination oi interests, in the community; ana it would seem to be necessary to give it the preponderance, in order to infuse into the Government the necessary energy to ac cornplish the ends for which it was insti toied. The great question is, flow indue preponderance to be given to it, without subjecting the whole, in lime, to its unlim ited sway? which brings up the question. Is there anywhere, in our complex system of Government. a'guard, check, or contri vance, sufficiently strong to anest so fear ful a tendency of the Uoverumrnl? (Jr. to express it in more direct and intelligible language. Is there any where in the sys tem a more full and perfect expression of the voice of the people of the Stales calcu lated to counteract this tendency to the concentration of all the powers of the Gov ernment in the will of the numerical ma jority, resulting from the partial and imper fect expression of their voice through its organs? Yes, fortunately, doubly fortunately, there is, not only a more full jml perfect, but a full and perfect expression to be found in the Constitution, acknowledged by all to be the fundamental and supreme law of me lami, it is run mi oerieci, lee.ina It is the eipresion of the voice of each Slate, adopted by the separate absent of each, bv itself, aud for itself, and i the voice of all by being that of each component part, uni ted and blended into one Imrmoiiiows whole. But it is not only full and perfect, but as jul as it ifull and perfect; for coHlining the seiuc of each, ami therefore all, there is nothing left tin which injustice, or op pression, or usurpation can operate. Anil, finally, it is as supreme as it is just, be cause, comprehending the will of all, by uniting that of each of the parts, there is nothing within or above to control it. It is indeed, the voxpopuli vox l)tit creating voice that called the system into existence, and of which the Government itself is but a creature, clothed with delegated powers to execute its high behests. .We are thus brought to a question of the deepest import, and on which the fate of the system uepends; How can this full, perfect, just, and supreme voice of ihe peo ple, embodied in the Constitution, be bronghtto bear habitually and steadily in counteracting the fatal tendency of the Government to the absolute and depotic conlrol of the numerical majority? Or, if 1 may be permitted to use so bold an ex pression, how is this, the deity of our po litical system, to be successfully invoked, to interpose us all powerful creating voice to save from perdition the creature of its will and the work of its hand? If it can not be done, ours, like all free Governments preceding it, must go the way of all flesh; but if it can be, its duration may be from generation to generation, to the latest pos terity. To this all important question, I will not attempt a reply at this time. It would lead me far beyond the limits pro perly belonging to this tfusrussinn. 1 des cend from the digression nearer to the suh- jeci immediately al issue, in order to reply io an objection to the veto power, taken by the Senator from Virginia, on this side the chamber, QMr. Archer. He rests his support of this resolution on the ground thai the object intended to be effected by the veto has failed, thai the framers of the Constitution regard the le gislative department of the Government, as the one most to be dreaded, and that their motive for vesting the Executive with the veto, was to check its encroach ments on the other departments; but that the Executive, and not the Legislature, had proved to be the most dangerous, and thai the veto had become either useless or mis chievous by being converted into a sword to attack, instead of a shield to defend as was originally intended. 1 make no issue with the Senator, as to the correctness of the. statement. 1 assume ; the facts to be as he supposes; not becuase 1 I agree with him, but simply with the view ' of making my reply more brief. Assuming, then, that the Executive De partment has proved to be the more formi dable, and that it requires to be checkee", rather than Jo have the power of checking other, the first inquiry on that assumption, should be-into the cause of its increase of powerv in order uia.scfirlain . the seal and the nature of the danger; aud. the next, whether the means proposed that of di vesting it of the veto, or modifying it as proposed would guard against the danger apprehended. I begin with the first, and in entering on it, assert with confidence, that if the Ex ecutive has become formidable lo the liber ty or fo.r.iy 0f the country or other de partments of the o-rninent, the cause is not in the Constitution, but in the acts and omissions of Congress itself." According to ray conception. th pow ers vested in ths President by the Consti tution, are few and effectually guarded, and are not of themselves at all formidable: In order to have a just conception of tlia ex tent of his powers, it must be borne in niind that there are but two classes f pow ers known to the Constitution; and they are powers that are expressly granted, and those that are necessary to carry the jraui- 1 p vts:s into execution. Now, by pos itive provision of ihe Constitutioi, all powers necessary iir nit ext-t-mion of the graniud powers, are expressly debated to Congress, he they powers grantid to the Legislative, Executive or Jndiciil depart ment, and can only be exercisul by the authority of Congress, and in lh manner prescribed by law. This provtiion may he found in what is called the residuary clause, which declares that Congress shall have power "to make all laws winch shall be necessary and proper to carry lulo exe cution the foregoing powers," (those grant ed to Congress,) "and all other-powers vested by this Constitution in the Govern ment of the United Sta.-r in any de partment or orRce thereof," A mors com prehensive provision cannot be imagined. It carries with it all powers necessary and proper to the execution of the granted pow ers, be they lodged where they may, and vests the whole, iu terms not lens explicit, in Congresn; and here lei Me add, in pass im, that the provision U as wie as it is comprehensive. It deposites the right of deciding what powers are necessary lor the execution nf ihe granted powers, where, and where only it can be lodged witii safe ty, in the baud of the law-making power, and forbids any department or oliicer of the Government from exercising any pow er not expressly authorized by the Consti tution or the laws, thus making ouis em phatically a Government of law and Con stitution. Having now shown that the President is restricted by the Constitution to powers expressly granted to him, and lhat if any nf his granted powers be 6uch lint lhy require other powers to execute them, he cannot exercise them without the authori ty of Congress, I shall now show that there is not one power vested in hiwi that is any way dangerous, unless made by the acts or permission of Congress. I shall take them iu the order they suud in the Constitution. He is, in the first place, made Com-mamler-in-ehief of the army aod nvy of the United States, and the militia, when called into aetual service. Large sad ex pensive military and naval establishments and numerous corps of militis, called into service, would no doubt increase very dsn-jeronsly the power and patronage ol the President; but neither can take place but by the action of Congress Not a sol dier can be enlisted, a ship of war built, nor a militiaman called into service, with out its authority; and very fortunately our sitnatioii is such, that ihere is no neeessi ty, and, probably, will be none, why his power and patronage should be dangerous ly increased by either of those means. He is next vested with the power to make treaties and to appoint officers, with ihe advice and consent of the Senate; and here again his power can only be made dangerous by the action of one or both Houses of Congress. In the formation of treaties two-lhiids of the Senate must con- -cur; and it is iinnctm to conceive oi a trea ty that could materially enlarge his pow ers, that would not require an act of Con gress to carry it into effect. The appoint ed power may, indeed, dangerously in crease his patronage, if officers be useless! multiplied and loo highly paid; but if such should be the case, the fault would be in Congress, by whose authority exclusively they can be created or their compensation regulated. But much is said in this connection, of the power of removal, justly .accompanied by severe condemnation of the many and abusive instnnres of the use of the power, and the dangerous influence it gives the President, in all of which I fully concur. It is, indeed, a corrupting and dangerous power, when officers are greatly multipli ed, and highly paid, and when it is per verted from its legitimate object, to the ad vancement of personal or party purposes. But I find no such power in the list of powers granted to the Executive, which is proof conclusive that it belongs to the class necessary and proper to execute some oth er power, if it exists at all, which none can doubt; and. for reasons already assign ed, cannot be exercised without authority of law. If, then, it has been abused, ii must be because Congress has not done its duty in permitting it to be exercised by the Pre sident without the sanction of law authori zing its exercise, and guarding against the abuses to which it is so liable ' The residue of the list are rather duties than rights; that of recommending to Con gress such measures as he may deem ex pedient; of convening both Houses on ex traordiuary occasions; of adjourning them when they cannot agree on the lime; . of receiving- ambassadors and other ministers; of taking care that ihe' laws be faithtolly executed, and commissioning lbs officers of the United Sta.es. Of all these, there is but one which claims particular notice, in connection with the point immediately under consideration; and that is his power as the administrator of the laws. Bui whatever power he may have in that capa city depends on the action of Congress. If Congress should limit its legislation to the few great subjects confided to it; so frame its laws as to leave as tit le as possi' e to discretion, and to lake care to see that they are duly and faithfully executed, the administrative powers of the President would be proportionally limited, and di vested of all danger. Bui if, on the con trary, it should extend its legislation in ev ery direction; draw within its action sub jects never contemplated by the Constitu tion; multiply its acts, create numerous offices,' and increase the revenue and ex penditures proportionally, and, al the same time, frame its laws ?3gucly and loosely, and withdraw, in a great measure, its su pervising, care over their execution, his power would indeed become truly furmid able and alarming. Now I appeal to the Sen nor and his friend, the author of this resolution, whether the growth of Execu tive power has not been the result of such a course on the pari of Congress. I ask them whether his power has uot in fact increased, or decreased just in proportion to the increase and decrease of lite system of legislation, such as has been described? What was the period of ite maximum in crease, bul the very period which they have so frequently aud loudly denounced as ihe one most distinguished for the prev alence of Executive power and usurpation? Much of that power certainly depended on the remarkable man, then at the head of that Department, bul much far more, on the system of legislation, which the author of this resolution bad built up with so much zeal and labor, and which carried the powers of the Government to a point beyond that to which it had ever before at tained, drawing many and important pow ers into its vortex, of which the framers of the Constitution never dreamed. And here let me say lo both of the Senators, and the party of which they are prominer.l members, thai they labor in vain lo bring down Executive power, while they, sup port the system they so zealously advo cate. The power they complain of is but us necessary fruit. Be assured that as certain as Congress transcends lis assigned limits and usurps powers never conferred, or stretches those conferred beyond the proper limits, so surely will t!e fruits of us usurpation paws into the hands of tbe Executive. In seeking to become master, it but makes a master in the person of the President. It is only by conitniug itself lo its allotted sphere, sod a discreet use of its acknowledged powers, that it can retain ihsl ascendency in the Government which the Constitution intended to confer on it. Having now pointed out the cause of the great increase of the Executive power on which the Senator rested his objection to the veto power, and having satisfactorily shown, as 1 trust 1 have, that, if it it ax proved dangerous in fact, the fault is not in the Constitution, bul in Congress, 1 would next ask hnn, in what possible way could the divesting the President of his veto, or modifying it as he proposes, limit his power? Is it not clear, that so far from the veto being the cause of the increase of this power, it would act as a limitation toil ii it had been moie freely and frequently used? If the President had vetoed the ori ginal Bank the connection with Hie bank ing system the tariffs of '24 and '28. and the numerous acts appropriating money for roads, canals, harbors, and a long list of oilier measures not less unconstitutional, would his power have been half as great as it now is? He has grown great and powerful, not because he used his veto, but because he abstained from using it. In fact, it is difficult to imagine a case in which ils application can . tend to enlarge his power, except it he ihe case of an act intended to repeal a law calculated to in crease his power, or to restore the authori ty of one which, by an arbitrary construc tion of Ins power, he has set aside. Now let me add, in conclusion, that this is a question, in its bearings, of vital im portance to that beautiful and sublime sys tem of Government, which our patriotic ancestors established, not so much by their wisdom, as wise and experienced as the' were, as by the guidance of a kind Provi dence, who, in his divine dispensation, so disposed events as to lead to the establish ment of a sysiem of government wiser than those who framed it. The veto, of itself, as important as it is, sinks into nothing compared to the ptinciple involved. It is but one, and that by no means the most considerable, of those many wise devices which 1 have attempted lo explain, and which were intended lo strengthen the popular basis of our Govdrnment, and re sist its tendency to fall under the control of the dominant interest, acting through the mere numerical majority. The intro duction of this resolution may be regaided as one of the many symptoms of that fatal tendency, and of which we had such fear ful indications in the bold. attempt at the late extraordinary session, of forcing thro a whole system of measures of the most threatening and alarming character, in the space ef a few weeks, on the ground thai they were all decided in the election of ihe late President; thus attempting lo substitute the will of a majority of the people, in the choice of a Chief Magistrate, as ihe legis laiive authority of ihe Union, in lieu of ihe beautiful and profound system established by the Cpnstitutian. - THK REPUBLICAN. LIXCCLXTOX, WEDSESDAV.JJIUCH 33, 1812 Democratic Republican Nomination. . For Governor, LOUIS D. HENRY, of Cumberland County. W E are authorized and requested to announce Col. T. N. Herndon as a candidate for Brigadier General of the 10th Brigade of North Car olina Militia, to supply the vacancy occa sioned by the resignation of Gen. Scagle. We are authorized and requested to an uounce Col. J. G. Hvxum. a candidate for the office of Brigadier General of the 10th Brigade of North Carolina Militia, to sup ply the vacancy occasioned by the resig nation of Gen. Seagle. CCT We are authorized six! requested to announce Col. J. J. Harrinser. of Lin coin County, as a candidate for Brigadier ueneraiot the lUth Urigade of North Car oliua Militia, to supply ihe vacancy ncca stoned by the resignation of Geu. Seagle. LINCOLN TON FIRE COMPANY. We are requested to remind the Mem bers of the Lincoln-ton Fire company, that the next regular meeting of their body will take place on the 1st Salunlay in Aprij next. It is hoped, that uo one will neg lect to at'end. Xiincolnton Female Academy. The examination of the pupils belong mg to this Institution, took place, on Thursday last, in the presence of a nuoier ous, respectable, and, we may add, highly graunea audience, l lie exercises were interesting, and reflected much credit both on the young ladies and misses, and the accomplished and indefatigable instructress at their bead. The exercises of the School will be re sumed on Monday the 4th of April next. MR. HENRY IN THE WEST. We learn fiom the last Western Caro linian, that Mr. Henry, the Republican can didate for Governor, will be in Salisbury this week, and will address the citizens of Kowsn in that place to-morrow, (Thurs, day.) He will also be at the Democratic meeting iu Lexington, Davidson county, on Saturday next. After which, our Whig friends in the mountains may look out for him. We don't know, that he will take that direction next, but think it prob hie; they had better, therefore, have all their big guns loaded, ready for him. MR. CALHOUN'S SPEECH. We publish to-day (says the Globe,) Mr. Calhoun's Speech on the Veto power in the Constitution. This point, raised by Mr. Clay's resolutions, has opened tip to discussion the whole structure of our f'on stitution, and the great principles of free go vernment, on which onr federative system is based. We ask the attention of our readers to the profound and philosophical analysis of both, which this speech pre sents. Some of us may not yet be too old or too wise to learn something from such a teacher; but of ihe young men of our country, especially, into whose hands our Government must soon fall for administra tion, as older men leave the stage of public life, we would ask a careful and repeated study of this great speech. Let them not be satisfied with one perusal. Let them put it aside, and again and again recur to it, and reflect on its great themes free govern ment to man, and (in the language of Mr. Calhoun) 'our wonderful and sublime Con stitution." fC? The Editor of the Rutherfordton In. telligencer promises to publish Mr. Henry's Letter when he has nothing betlpr (in his opinion, of course,) with which lo enter tain his readers. How very liberal ! And ice will renounce Democracy when convinced that it is wrong. NICE FEELINGS. Several months since, we requested the Ed itor of the Rutherfoidton Intelligencer to publish the document eiving the items of the funeral expenses of Gen. Harrison. He reiused, and gave his reasons for so doing, in an article of some length. We copied hi? article in our paper, and showed conclusively, we thought, that ihe ground upon which he 'had placed his refusal was untenable. He then dropped the subject like a hot pctatoe, and we could, get noth ing more from him until last week, : when 9 all uncalled for, he comes out and gives a reason for his former silence, aud especial ly for ii oi copying our. article. He says, "As the gentleman had copied our arti cle in his, we fell a strong desire to recip rocate, by inserting his reply in onr col umns,' and we were only prevented by the employment of' language by him which from our feelings, Qoh dear, how nice!' we could not imitate in answering bis re ply; for we never have been in favor of the practice that prevails between the parties in tins country of using bard names in ridicule, of each other, instead of arguments such as 'Whiggery, 'Loco FocoV 'Fed eral, Monarchia1." &c :c" Now, it is unfortunate for "the gentle man's" reason, that the article which be neglected to copy was one of the roost re spectful, courteous and conciliatory ones that we ever penned. In it, we used no language" thai men of the nicest "feeling" could not "imitate;" and so far from apply ing to him any of the horrid epithets which be has named, - we called him in every instance in which we bad ' occasion to speak of him, our friend! In fact, neither of these epithets is any where io be met with in the article, applied to him or any oneelse. But what makes the ob jection to our article still more unfortunate, the very paper in which it is urged, con tains a communi cation crossly abusive of President Tyler, t'n which Ihe woid Loco foco occurs some three or four times. - Now, if "the gentleman's" -iice fetlings forbade tbe insertion of our article on ac count of the language eui ployed, how could be admit this communicatiou 1 We are inclined to think, that this excuse is an af-ter-thoufht, which has been hastily put forth without i recurrence to the facts. Belter would it have been for the Editor, if he bad remained silent, or come out with ' ihe truth: we believe that he did not copy our article because he could not answer it. AFRAID OF THE LIGHT! In our paper of week before last, we made a respectful request, of our two con temporaries in the Mountain district, the Ashville Messenger and Rutherfordton Intelligencer, to publish L. D. Henry's Letter, promising at ths same time, if they would comply, to insert any Whig docu ment of the same length, which they might designate. From tbe first named of lhee papers, we have as yet received no answer; but, mueh to our surpriie, the latter re- sJ 4 mr I ir pvfftotf ior, mnd for reasons so weak and unsatisfactory as lo have us grounds to suspect, that he is afraid afraid of the effect which that manly, eloquent and truth-telling document may produce in thai region, which it is the interest of his party io keep still in the dark. The right of the Editor to refuse it a place, is unquestionable; but he must place that refusal on higher and better grounds than he has done, before he can satisfy us or (if we understand them aright.) his readers, of its propriety. Mr. Henry appears before the people of North Caroli na as a candidate for the highest ofilce within their gift, and he boldly sets forth his principles and opinions, which he is not only willing but anxionh should be seen by every voter in the Sta'e; and as in the large and popnlous region embraced in the 12th Congressional district, he has no organ ihreugh which they can be made known, we thought we could ask it of the liberality, if not of ihe justice, of the two papers published there, to give him a bear ing. We are disappointed, so far as the Rutherford Intelligencer is concerned; the Editor of that paper refnses to publish The Letter, because, we think, he is afraid the effect of it may be disastrous to Whigge ryj P. S. Since the above was pot in type, we have received the Highland Messenger. The Editors of that paper meet us mora like men. We give below our request and their answer. A Fair Proposal. Will the Rutherford Intelligencer and the Highland Messenger publish Mr. Henry's letter? If they will we will insert any W hig document of eqnal length, which they may designate. Say, gentlemen, is it a bargain? Lincoln Re publican. W cannot speak for the Intelligencer, but we will certainly accommodate you provided you will publish the same amoont of matter, such as we shall designate, wl e ther it be in one or many articles. W have no "whig document" on bands of equal leng'h with Mr. Henry's letter, but if you will just publish as many columns ofmattet we shall mark and send yon in the Messenger, as the latter makes in your paper, yon may consider it a "bargain," and one too we very cheerfully lake. If you accept our terms, please send us a pa- per containing the letter, as we have given away all the copies we bad. Highland Messenger. We clieerfully nccept the terms of th$
The Lincoln Republican (Lincolnton, N.C.)
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March 23, 1842, edition 1
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