

NEWS AND OBSERVER

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A. L. MORRIS, Editor.

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FRIDAY, JULY 27, 1888.

DEMOCRATIC NOMINEES.

ELECTION, TUESDAY, November 6th.

NATIONAL TICKET.

FOR PRESIDENT:

GROVER CLEVELAND,

of New York.

FOR VICE-PRESIDENT:

ALLEN G. THURMAN,

of Ohio.

FOR ELECTORS—STATE AT LARGE:

ALFRED H. WADDELL, of New Hanover.

FREDERICK N. STURDICK, of Orange.

DISTRICT ELECTORS:

1ST DIST.—JOHN E. WOODARD, of Wilson.

2D DIST.—CHARLES W. COLE, of Wayne.

3RD DIST.—EDWARD W. BOULDER, of Johnston.

4TH DIST.—J. H. DUNSON, of Johnston.

5TH DIST.—SAMUEL J. FLEMING, of Granville.

6TH DIST.—LESLIE CALDWELL, of Hertford.

7TH DIST.—THOMAS M. VANCE, of Caldwell.

8TH DIST.—

STATE TICKET.

FOR GOVERNOR:

Of Wake.

FOR LIEUT. GOVERNOR:

THOMAS M. HOLT,

of Alamance.

For Associate Justice of the Supreme Court—to fill the vacancy caused by the death of Thomas S. Ashe:

JOS. J. DAVIS,

of Franklin.

For Associate Justices of the Supreme Court under amendment to the Constitution:

JAMES E. SHEPHERD,

of Beaufort.

ALPHONSO C. AVERY,

of Burke.

FOR SECRETARY OF STATE:

WM. L. SAUNDERS,

of Orange.

FOR TREASURER:

DONALD W. BAIN,

of Wake.

FOR SUPERINTENDENT OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION:

SIDNEY M. FINGER,

of Catawba.

FOR ATTORNEY GENERAL:

THEODORE F. DAVIDSON,

of Buncombe.

FOR ADDITOR:

G. W. SANDERLIN,

of Wayne.

FOR CONGRESS.

FOURTH DISTRICT:

B. H. BUNN,

of Nash.

PUBLIC SPEAKING.

By the Democratic Candidates for Governor, Superintendent of Public Instruction, and Attorney-General.

Hon. Daniel G. Fowle, Maj. S. M. Finger and Col. T. F. Davidson, the Democratic candidates for Governor, Superintendent of Public Instruction and Attorney General, will address the people upon the issues of the campaign at the following times and places:

Newton, Saturday, July 28.

Statesville, Monday, July 30.

Taylorsville, Tuesday, July 31.

Wilkesboro, Wednesday, Aug. 1.

Spencer, Thursday, Aug. 2.

Jefferson, Friday, Aug. 3.

Boone, Saturday, Aug. 4.

Bakersville, Monday, Aug. 6.

Burnsville, Tuesday, Aug. 7.

Marshall, Wednesday, Aug. 8.

Waynesville, Thursday, Aug. 9.

Webster, Friday, Aug. 10.

Charleston, Saturday, Aug. 11.

Robbinsville, Monday, Aug. 13.

Murphy, Tuesday, Aug. 14.

Hayesville, Wednesday, Aug. 15.

Franklin, Friday, Aug. 17.

Highlands, Saturday, Aug. 18.

Brevard, Monday, Aug. 20.

Hendersonville, Tuesday, Aug. 21.

Columbus, Wednesday, Aug. 22.

Rutherfordton, Thursday, Aug. 23.

Shelby, Friday, Aug. 24.

The local committees are expected and urged to thoroughly advertise these appointments by handbills and otherwise.

SPHER WHITAKER,

Chm'n Dem. State Ex. Com.

APPOINTMENTS FOR HON. B. H. BUNN AND REV. G. W. SANDERLIN.

Hon. B. H. Bunn, Democratic candidate for Congress in the Fourth District, and Rev. G. W. Sanderlin, Democratic candidate for Auditor, will address the people at the following places on the dates indicated:

Poplar Spring, July 27.

Benson, Johnston county, Aug. 2.

Durham, at night, Aug. 6.

Hillsboro, Orange county, August 7th.

Leesville, Wake county, Aug. 11.

Smithfield, Johnston county, Aug. 14.

Graham, Alamance county, Aug. 18.

Siler City, Chatham county, August 23rd.

Mr. Pou will be present at Benson, Durham, Hillsboro and Smithfield.

Democratic papers in the district are requested to publish the announcements.

WAKE DEMOCRATIC CONVENTION.

The Wake County Democratic convention has been called for the 2nd Thursday in August to nominate the Legislative and county tickets.

The primaries will be held in the several townships on the 1st Saturday in August.

By the executive committee of the county.

A. D. JONES, Chairman.

NOTICE.

Pursuant to a resolution of the recent Democratic convention of the Second Congressional District held at Weldon, N. C., the delegates to said convention are hereby notified to meet at Wilson, N. C., on Friday, August 10th, at 2 p. m. to nominate a candidate for Congress for said district.

JOHN E. WOODARD, Chairman.

W. W. HALL, Secretary.

District papers please copy.

THE JURISDICTIONAL QUESTION.

We print today a matter of interest.

A communication from Mr. Walter H. Henry, embodying his brief on the jurisdictional point argued in the Superior Court.

With regard to that point we have heretofore said that we did not attach much importance to it, a though we know that good lawyers, among them Mr. Henry himself, think it will hold water.

The Supreme Court of the United States, in administering State laws, is usually governed by the interpretation given to those laws by the State court of the State.

Any State court administering a Federal law would be governed by the construction of the Federal Courts. But in cases where the United States have jurisdiction the jurisdiction of the State court usually does not exist.

Thus for offenses made penal in the National Bank act the State court cannot punish. But neither by that act, nor any other law of Congress, is the offense of forging a note deposited in a national bank made punishable by the Federal Court.

The Federal court has no jurisdiction to bear a charge of forgery based on forging an ordinary note. That is a distinct offense. It is triable at the instance of the State in the State court, and only there. In such a case the State is the prosecutor; in a prosecution in the Federal court, the United States is the prosecutor. Now says Mr. Henry's brief: an acquittal of the Federal prosecution for false entry. That is a very wide non sequitur. It will not hold water. There is nothing in that.

But the brief goes on to say: "And this is in accordance with the settled rule that a prosecutor by selecting a special and essential incident of an offense for prosecution is barred as to the aggregate offense by an acquittal of such incident."

The principle invoked here does not fit and is beside the case, because the prosecutors are different. In the case of a single prosecutor, he is bound by his choice; but here there are two sovereigns, the United States—and the State—and neither is bound by the action of the other in making a choice. That the principle relied on has no application is plain.

But even if the two offenses, making the false entry and forging a plain note, were cognizable in the same forum and were crimes against the same sovereignty, yet there are such distinct offenses that the rule just quoted could not be successfully invoked to prevent trials on each offense. The defendants might be tried for both offenses in the same court and acquitted of either and yet be convicted of the other, or acquitted or convicted of both.

That is so because forging a note is not an integral and essential part of making a false entry on the books of the bank; nor does making a false entry on the books of the bank constitute any element of the crime of forging a note of hand. The offenses are separate and distinct. In this case they happen to have an accidental connection; as if a burglar breaking into a house to rob finds himself confronted by a man, and slays him, and then takes the money and then burns down the house to conceal his crime. Such an offender would commit burglary, as well as murder and arson. Any minor offense of the same nature as either of these offenses would be ignored if the offender were put on trial for the higher crime embracing it. But the criminal could be arraigned and tried for all three of the principal crimes, and acquitted or convicted on either of them, or all of them. As it appears that the alleged federal question involved is based on a view of the law that seems to us untenable, we do not think that the Supreme Court of the United States is likely to grant a writ of error if the application receives the usual consideration.

The North State says: "Why these statements are suppressed we do not know, unless it is because Mr. Stamps is a Democrat and is kept in an important official position by a Democratic State administration. Very certainly it had been a Republican the least intimation that he was corrupt would have been seized upon and published to the world."

That might be as to some papers; but the NEWS AND OBSERVER has never knowingly allowed its columns to be used merely to blacken the character of a man, and matter what his politics may be. There was no omission by us of any word from Mr. Cross's statement because of any political consideration, or because of the politics of any man; nor is it possible that there was any omission for the purpose of screening any man.

These statements were read in open court, and the information there contained was thus laid before the court and Solicitor Arge, in the presence of hundreds of people. Indeed, we have heard that copies of the statements were immediately obtained by the United States District Attorney to be laid before the Comptroller of the Currency.

The course of the NEWS AND OBSERVER in omitting matter that we did not think we were called on to print was based on an entirely different principle—a principle in journalism we have always practiced.

MR. CROSS'S STATEMENT.

Our neighbor the State Chronicle prints less than one half of Mr. Cross's statement read in court.

We regret that our enterprising neighbor did not print it entire. For several reasons we have hoped that the statement would find its way in full to the public, and we were told positively that it was to appear in full in one of our city weeklies. We suppose however that our enterprising neighbor could not well print more than it did. It printed two columns. The NEWS AND OBSERVER printed three columns, and still omitted a good deal.

We will thank anyone who has felt any interest in this matter to compare the Cross's statement as it appears in the three columns of the NEWS AND OBSERVER with the Cross's statement as it appears in the two columns of our enterprising neighbor.

The North State intimates that the principle of the Mills bill is an American; that it is in the interest of other countries. Well, now, who is the greatest man, the North State or President Grant? The principle of the Mills bill that is so objectionable.

To the North State, we suppose, is taking the tax off of raw material. This, we take it, is what makes our contemporary denounce it as being in the interest of foreign manufacturers. Now, President Grant discussed that matter in his message of 1875. He was talking about free raw materials when he said:

"I would mention those articles which enter into manufactures of all sorts. All duty paid on such articles is a direct tax on the consumer. These duties not only come from the consumers at home, but act as a protection to foreign manufacturers in our own and distant markets."

Gen. Grant was not much of a politician; but he was taught in the best school in the world and he reasoned with great accuracy. In studying this question he reached the truth and he stated it plainly, like the blarney of the honest soldier states the honest truth.

So he takes on raw material, he said, truly "act as a protection to foreign manufacturers in our own and distant markets." That is a plain, practical, sensible way of stating the fact. It is a true statement: a tax on foreign manufacture competing with the American manufacturer. It is therefore a most American interest. Will our contemporary discuss for the benefit of its readers this plain proposition laid down by the great Republican President, who, whatever his faults may have been, has never been assailed as wanting sense or as being antagonistic to the prosperity and glory of our country.

Two well known manufacturers of Massachusetts, Mr. Arthur T. Lyman and Mr. William Whiting, the latter being a member of Congress, and the former of whom was requested to prepare a woolen schedule for the House committee to be considered in connection with the preparation of the Mills bill, are here again discussing the principles involved in the Mills bill in the public prints of Massachusetts. Mr. Whiting charges Mr. Lyman with taking a local and selfish view of the matter; alleging that the changes proposed in the Mills bill will work for the interest of the factory of Mr. Lyman. Mr. Whiting insists that Mr. Lyman is advocating "a selfish and narrow policy." He says he thinks "that our New England people will make a grave political blunder if they seek to protect their own interests to the neglect of that of others." For himself he is so patriotic for that! His heart is so big that it takes in the whole country. He admits, however, that New England's interest is local and is in conflict with his policy.

Referring to the bill which the Republican Senate committee may introduce as a substitute for the Mills bill, the North State says, at least, "it will provide for the protection of American industries, and the elevation and happiness of American labor." Our friends, the enemy, are full of promises. Their promises as to their bill remind us of the "Forty acres and a mule" business some years ago. How happy and prosperous we would all be under the wise and beneficent provisions of this bill! And yet it is to be feared that our friends, the enemy, are not going to let their bill see the light this season. It seems that they are going to withhold it. Do they not realize that what Col. Dockery calls "our agonized country" is suffering a terrible strain of agony because this very bill is not brought forward and passed? Is it possible that Col. Dockery's party is going to let "our agonized country" continue in her agony without even an effort at relief? It looks that way.

The independent thought of New England is struggling over this question: "if wise changes can be made through a revision of the tariff by which the advantage of the manufacturer and the people may go hand in hand—and until now this has not been questioned—shall they be denied to us?"

The Springfield Republican says that if they are so denied, what becomes of the principles which make the great good of the greatest number the proud boast of the republic? The effort to compass the greatest good of all comprehends the only true national view of this question, and political managers should be exceedingly careful not to seem to fit the wheel of classes above that of the masses.

It is often very difficult to draw the line as to what public interests require shall be printed and what justice to citizens in fair standing requires to be omitted. In such matters the NEWS AND OBSERVER does what its sense of justice prompts it to do. A misstatement once published cannot be corrected by any subsequent denial.

CHAIRMAN BARNUM has told the President that he has looked carefully and thoroughly over the field and is entirely satisfied that we will carry New York, New Jersey, Connecticut and Indiana, and he hopes for large gains in the northwest. He might have added in New England also. The Gove Up Party will soon have a rest.

The portraits of sundry secretaries of the navy have been painted for the Government; among them those of our North Carolina statesmen Hon. Wm. A. Graham and Hon. James C. Dobbin. There ought also to be portraits of Gov. Branch and Judge Badger, both of whom held that office.

PERHAPS after awhile, we may be able to see the entire Cross statement in print.

Attorney we have entered a pretty plain dissent from Mr. Walter Henry's conclusions in regard to the jurisdictional question—a point for which Col. Fuller, with that generosity that always characterizes his practice, gave him in open court the full credit—yet we know that it has received the endorsement of very high authority beyond the limits of this State; and certainly the argument is extremely clear, and is presented with unusual lucidity. The point is fully made by Mr. Henry and should largely enhance his reputation as a lawyer.

SENATOR COX is said to be on the open way to the majority of New York. May his sun never set.

Thus way of giving a synopsis of a statement may be convenient for publishers, but then—

Cross and White—State Court no Jurisdiction.

Raleigh, N. C., July 25, 1888.

Editor News and Observer:

In the present condition of the public mind I take it that everything connected with the great trial that has just closed will be of interest to your readers.

In that trial I raised a Federal question to wit, that the State court had no jurisdiction to try Cross and White for the forgeries for which they stood indicted.

It is true that Judge A. C. Avery of the State court, in the presence of the Federal court, but owing to the peculiar circumstances surrounding the case I did not expect that Judge A. C. Avery would do so.

Many of your readers seem to think that the point has been finally determined. Many have never understood either its importance or its object.

From the Judge's ruling on the point the defendants have appealed to the Supreme Court of North Carolina and then, if necessary, will apply to the Supreme Court of the United States for a writ of error.

The 25th section of the Judiciary Act, Sec. 709 of the Revised Statutes of the U. S., provides: Where is drawn in question the validity of a statute of, or an authority exercised under any State, on the ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States, and the decision is in favor of their validity, the decision shall be affirmed and reversed on appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States upon a writ of error, the citation being signed by the chief justice, judge, or recorder of the State court, or by a justice of the Supreme Court of the United States in the same manner and under the same regulations, and the writ shall have the same effect, as if the judgment or decree complained of had been rendered or passed in a Circuit court, and the proceedings upon reversal shall be the same except, &c.

But no other error shall be assigned or regarded as a ground of reversal in any case as aforesaid, than such as appears upon the face of the record, and immediately respects the before-mentioned question of validity of said statutes or authorities in dispute, &c.

Phillips' Pr. Sup. Court of U. S. Writs of error to State courts have never been allowed as of right. It has always been the practice to submit the record of the State court to a judge of this court whose duty has been to ascertain upon examination whether any question cognizable here on appeal was made and decided in the proper court of the State and whether the case upon the face of the record will justify the allowance of the writ. (The record in the case of the State vs. Cross and White does show such a question.)

Twitwell vs. the Com.; 7 Wallace U. S. R. 321; Spiers vs. Illinois, 123 U. S. 131.

For procedure upon writs of error see Kinney's U. S. Digest; Daufsch's U. S. Digest; Bapshy's Federal Digest. It is too much involved to state here.

The case cannot be heard by the Supreme Court of the United States in a writ of error under four years, in the meanwhile the defendants will be out on bail.

They will be benefited that much even if the point prove without force, but it will not prove without force. My position on this point has been fully endorsed by the greatest jurist in America.

If the State court has no jurisdiction the defendants cannot be further prosecuted, for the United States Circuit Court here cannot proceed because of the agreement made by F. H. Busbee, Esq., with said defendants while in Canada.

I respectfully submit two propositions from my brief on the question of jurisdiction, so that your readers may determine the importance of the point for themselves.

Brief as to the jurisdiction of the State court in the cases of forgery against Charles E. Cross and Samuel C. White.

STATEMENT OF FACTS.

I appears from the record in the case of the State against Chas. E. Cross and Samuel C. White, that the said Cross was president, and the said White cashier of the "North Carolina Bank of Raleigh, North Carolina," at the alleged forged notes were executed by the said Cross and afterwards assented to by said White, not for the purpose of any personal gain whatever, but finding said bank in a rotten and tottering condition said notes were executed, placed among the assets of the bank, and entered upon the books of the bank for the purpose, and only for the purpose, of preventing a disgrace to the family and collapse of said bank by deceiving the United States bank examiner as to the condition and status of the bank.

Just prior to the execution of the said notes of Federal courts over misconduct by officers of national banks as such, rests on broad grounds of policy, which should be considered in construing statutes determining such offenses. The national bank system is on these grounds put on the same footing as the revenue system, and the reasoning which excludes State interference with offenses against the revenue system applies to offenses against the national bank system. Thus it has never been pretended that such incidents of smuggling as, if they were independent offenses, would be cognizable in State courts, could be taken cognizance of by State courts when they are so incidental to smuggling. Thus a State court cannot take jurisdiction of an assault on a

revenue officer, which is part of a smuggling adventure, though it would be otherwise if the assault was on a private individual and not incidental to a smuggling adventure. The reason is that, if the State courts had jurisdiction not only would we have many constitutional objections to statutes as we have States, but revenue prosecutions would be absorbed by State prosecutions. If, for instance, a State court took cognizance of the assault on the revenue officer, and if in such case the offender should be acquitted, this if the jurisdiction was conceded, would bar the federal prosecution, wherever such assault was an essential incident in the offense. It would not be necessary, therefore, in order to nullify an objectionable Federal revenue statute, for the State to pass a statute of nullification. All that would be needed would be for the State to prosecute for some integral element of the offense and then to have an acquittal. And even if there should be a conviction, serious difficulties would be in the way of a federal prosecution.

So would it be with prosecutions under the national bank law if integral incidents of such prosecutions could be taken possession of by a State court and then prosecuted to conviction or acquittal. The forgery of the notes here in question was but an integral incident to the entry of such notes as part of the assets of the bank. If the notes were not forged then the entries were correct; it is an essential element of the falsity of the entries that the notes should have been forged. Hence, if the State court had jurisdiction, an acquittal in the court of the forgery bars the Federal prosecution for false entry. And this is in accordance with the settled rule that a prosecutor by selecting a special and essential incident of an offense for prosecution, is barred as to the aggregate offense, by an acquittal of such incident, as for instance, if he prosecutes for assault, instead of an assault with intent to kill, the verdict in the former charge binds, if the court has jurisdiction, the latter charge.

Presenting the case to the State court, therefore, would if the State court had jurisdiction, oust the jurisdiction of the Federal court of its charge of false entry; but as the jurisdiction of the Federal court of its charge of false entry cannot be ousted, it follows that the State court has no jurisdiction of the forgery without which there could have been no false entry. The only mode of preserving Federal jurisdiction over the false entry is by denying the State jurisdiction over the question of falsity. If the State court conceded it the function of determining the falsity of the notes as false or true, the enforcement of defenses against our national bank system would pass from the Federal to the State courts, since the Federal courts would have to bow to the rulings of the State courts on the question whether the alleged incriminatory entry was false.

Even to prosecutions under the Crimes Act, where the jurisdiction existing in State courts is reserved, this rule is applied in all cases in which the offense is one against exclusively Federal policy.

A fortiori in this case where the statute creating the offense expressly excludes, as in the present case, State jurisdiction.

Supposing that the Federal and State courts have here concurrent jurisdiction, (which is denied) then, even on this view, the State court, by taking jurisdiction, would oust the Federal courts from a jurisdiction essential to Federal policy. For, in cases of concurrent jurisdiction, the court first seizing the offense has control.

But as the control of the State court in such a matter is inconsistent with the statutes and the policy of the United States, no such concurrence can be conceded, and hence the State prosecution must fail.

It may be said that when there is a Federal and a State aspect of a particular offense, the Federal Court may prosecute for the one aspect, and the State Court for the other. This, however, only applies to cases where an acquittal in the one case does not bar prosecution in the other.

2d Proposition: Of all offenses let enumerated in title 70, of the Crimes Act, Rev. Stat. of U. S., the Federal Court has exclusive jurisdiction by virtue of Sec. 711, Rev. Stat. of U. S., which is in the following words:

"The jurisdiction vested in the courts of the United States in the cases and proceedings hereinafter mentioned shall be exclusive of the courts of the several States—first of all crimes and offenses cognizable under the authority of the United States" (unless there be a saving clause in the statute giving the State concurrent jurisdiction).

Of all offenses enumerated in title 70 of the Crimes Act, Rev. Stat. of U. S., it is provided that the jurisdiction of the several State courts under the laws thereof shall not be taken away nor impaired.

It appears therefore, that if we can show that the forgeries for which the said offenders stand indicted in the State court were forgeries cognizable by the Federal court, under and by virtue of any section of the revised statutes of the United States not included in title 70 of said crimes act, or under and by virtue of any act not containing a clause saving the State's jurisdiction, then by force of section 711 revised statutes of the United States above set forth, and authorities cited, the Federal court has exclusive jurisdiction to try said prisoners for said forgeries.

By section 5,209 of the revised statutes of the United States said section not being included in title 70 of said crimes act, it is provided that:

"Every President, Director, Cashier, or any agent of any (banking) association, or any individual who makes any false entry in any book, report or statement of the association with intent in either cases to injure or defraud the association or any other company, body politic, or corporate, or any individual person, or to deceive any officer of the association, or any agent appointed to examine the affairs of any such association, and every person who with like intent aids or abets any officer, clerk or agent in any violation of this section, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall be imprisoned not less than five years nor more than ten."

The forging of the notes mentioned in this case, if nothing had been done but the "mere making" and if not made in pursuance of a plan to defraud the State National Bank,

would seemingly fall under section 5,479, title 70, of the said crimes act, the language of which, so far as it applies, is as follows:

"If any person shall falsely make, forge, or procure to be falsely made, any bond, security, affidavit or other writing for the purpose of defrauding the United States, that shall be punishable as follows."

But something was done besides the "mere making" of said notes; they were entered on the books of the bank, especially upon the journal and other books, thereby, in the language of section 5,209 cited above, "defrauding the association (and its depositors) and deceiving the agent appointed to examine the affairs of such association, and with intent so to do."

The making of false entries upon said bank books