

THE LONDON TIMES ON THE AMERICAN WAR.

The following is the leading article of the London Times on American affairs, taken from the latest issue of that paper received from Europe:

IMPOSSIBILITY OF RESTORING THE UNION.

Were England at this moment to announce to the world its intention to make the speediest possible conquest of France, or were France to make the same declaration as to England, the world would laugh at the egregious folly that had inspired the design and prompted the boast. The world would grant that, supposing either people to be infatuated enough and obstinate enough, it could inflict enormous and irreparable injuries on the other, but only at a cost of equal injuries to itself. The ball, once started, fortune might befriending this side or that; it might give to either great victories or periods of advantage; it might even place one eventually over the head of the other, but still only at a cost utterly out of proportion to the value of the miserable result. Now, that is the case of the two Confederates across the Atlantic, where the surviving half of an *effete* Federal Union has undertaken to reduce the other half to its Federal duties.

We say that this is the case, but before we proceed a step further, it is necessary to state that the case of the Northern Americans is in some important respects more difficult than ours would be. They are not so united as we have always found ourselves in war. Their border States feel a divided allegiance. They have to protect more than a thousand miles of land frontier, including one closely beleaguered position surrounded by foes or ill-affected adherents. Speaking the same language as their foe, they have no means of excluding spies from their lines, or even traitors from their ranks. They have to make a standing army and a fleet. They have to learn the first elements of tactics, and even military discipline. They are without soldiers, or officers to command and to train them. Their revenue, at its best, before the war, was only just sufficient to meet the interest of the debt likely to be incurred by two years of the war on the present scale. That revenue, however, is to begin with, maimed by the loss of the seacoasts and by the stoppage of traffic, so that it is questionable whether it will be possible to do more than repair that loss by the new taxes now imposed.

American credit is not so good as British, nor is the credit of a Federal Union in process of dissolution likely to be equal to that of a united people. Lastly, war, which changes its character according to circumstances, establishes special rules of probability for different localities. The one rule established by all American warfare is that the advantage is on the side of defense. Our offensive operations always failed against fortified positions; against breast-works thrown up in a night; against forests full of invisible foes; against heat, hunger and thirst; against the ever imminent flank attack; against the certainty that every step diminished the number, the strength and the munitions of our men, and increased those of the enemy. The present war, for its incidents, but a chapter of our own disastrous wars on that soil. The Northerners have advanced upon a fortified position, but a day's march from Washington. They have arrived at the point with a force nearly melting away, far short of the list on paper, beaten with heat, hunger, thirst, and a long march, and surprised on both flanks by the sudden outpourings of railways. While this has occurred in Virginia, almost within sight of Washington, a column of 8,000 Federalists, advancing against a foe thrice their number, has met with the same fate, no doubt for much the same reasons, at Springfield, four or five hundred miles to the west—as if in order to warn the Northern States that what has happened is no accident, no result of peculiar circumstances or personal failure, but by inevitable rule.

There is but one enterprise which can be compared to this, and that is the First Napoleon's gigantic, but infatuated, attempt upon Russia. That was a case of great political alliance, as grand as a Federal Union, comprising the best, the wealthiest, and the most populous part, and the best soldiers on the continent of Europe, advancing into a territory, the sparse and poor population of which scarcely surpassed that of the invading host. Winter might be the immediate cause, but it was also the apology of the tremendous rout that ensued. If any one will attempt to compare the means of the Federals with those of Napoleon, he will find them far inferior in every respect, while there is no doubt that the Southern States are far more able to defend every point, every position, every line in their territory than the Russians were in theirs. They have mountainous ranges instead of steppes; they have a population accustomed to carrying arms, and only too glad to use them; they have railways and abundance of food and other necessities of war. They are evidently superior in generalship, and in the social organization best adapted for war.

The result is that thus far they have shown they can dispute every inch, and keep the invader always under the apprehension of being either outflanked or driven back upon his own capital. Against all this it can only be said that the Northern States have the preponderance in white men, in money, and in credit. These, indeed, would be important considerations if the Southern States were invading the Northern, and seriously preparing to drive every armed northerner into the St. Lawrence. They would be important if this were the ordinary case of two countries at war with one another. But it is not. The northerners are engaged in the reduction of the southerners. They are acting on the offensive against a foe which, on its own land, is content to act on the defensive, expecting only that, should the opportunity occur, it would advance its line of defense to include the capital. Experience shows that, under ordinary circumstances, a comparative small population, with little money and means of war, is sufficient for a very good defense.

We are in a condition to offer advice. We can advise the Northern States of America, as we can advise the legitimate princes and the despotic courts of Europe. Let the statesmen at Washington only do what England has done before a hundred times, and what all Europe has done, is doing, and will still do. It is not "Old World" advice. It

is not of the heaven that Washington and Franklin felt their mission to extirpate. It is the very latest and newest lesson of human affairs; much newer than steam, the electric telegraph or Northern rifled cannon. Do the States really belong to the New World, or are they only a bit of the Old World, with all its pride, its bigotry, and its tyranny, stranded on the western shore of the Atlantic? The advice we give them is what they have taught us before, and we only say to them, as many a son may say to his father, "Practice what you teach." Let the Northern States "accept the situation," as we did eighty years ago upon their own soil; as Austria did two years ago at Villafranca and Zurich. Let them count the cost before they march to drive half a million armed men a thousand miles across their own country into the Gulf of Mexico. Let them consider whether they can do what Napoleon could not do in the plenitude of his power, with many times their number, their stores, their credit, and above all, their military skill and experience, his school of generals, and his supply of veterans. What they propose to do and be is not only to be as good as the southerner, or a little better, but overwhelmingly superior. Are they? Is not this an overwhelming opinion of themselves? Can they drive the southerners like a flock of sheep, smoke them out of their own nests like wasps, ferret them like rabbits, and bag them like game?

Let them just look forward a little, and consider the probable state of things next year, and the year after, and twenty years hence. Even we who sang songs of triumph in 1814 and 1815, felt that we and all Europe would have done much better to think what we were about in 1793. If a clear foresight shows, and most show, that there must be two federations, and that on no other footing will peace ever be made, it will be much better that it should come to pass after one year's war than ten or twenty. It is not as if the Union or two Unions were the only alternative. As the war proceeds, no man can tell what new powers and combinations may arise, and particularly how far the Western States will endure taxes and financial obligations necessary for the war. The advice we offer is only what the Americans have given to the world. It is a hank of their own cotton—a pipe of their own tobacco. Let them consider what they can do, and what neither they nor all the world can do. At present they are only giving a triumph to many a foe, for there is not a circle of old absolutist statesmen and diplomats who do not read the story of their difficulties and reverse with a bitter smile. They will hear with at least respect, perhaps with disappointment, that the North and South have agreed to part friends.

THE OHIO CONSERVATIVES.

We are indebted to Mr. Crockett, of the Powhatan Rifles, one of the twelve Rich Mountain soldiers, who returned here last Wednesday evening on parole, for a copy of the Columbus (Ohio) "Crisis" of the 26th September, from which we make the following extracts. The "Crisis" is conducted by Samuel Medary, who was for more than twenty years the editor of the Columbus "Statesman," and a distinguished leader of the Democratic party of Ohio. The articles in the "Crisis" doubtless express the views of the "conservative" men of Ohio:

PERTINENT QUESTIONS.

The Cincinnati "Gazette," speaking of affairs in Missouri, says: "In view of the situation in Missouri, the Federal forces having to contend against great odds, we may inquire why it is that Western troops continue to be ordered to Washington. Cannot the East defend the Capitol? When will Washington be considered 'safe'? Are our brave soldiers in the West to be sacrificed as they were at Springfield?" These are very pertinent questions, and deserve the notice of the Government. We are a little inclined probably to be captious, yet we are very slow to find fault with military Generals. Their labors are great and precarious, and a little jar, mistake, or failure in an order may derange or defeat the greatest of military projects. History is full of this, and history should not be overlooked at this time, and we have withheld our pen from the paper, often, when our mortification would have prompted us to expose the shortcomings, not of our military men, but of civilians, who, it seemed to us, were wholly ignorant of their duties, and suffered our soldiers to rest under mortifying results when the cause was not their own.

But as the "Gazette" has opened a very important question, we hope to be excused for intruding a remark that will be found in time to be not out of place. If Pennsylvania and New York alone cannot furnish soldiers enough to defend Washington City, then we are in a war that we are unable to prosecute successfully. This may seem like a bold expression, but is it not so?

We have up to this time been incredulous as to the Confederates ever meaning to attack Washington. The Southern people may have desired it, but those who control military and civil matters South, certainly knew that they could make more out of the summer campaign by drawing all the forces of the North to that point, than by any other course. Time, with them, was everything; and have they not gained it, and at the same time literally overrun the Southwest?

The Western Virginia campaign is still more fruitless. It has been little else to either party than a conquest of mountains and deep valleys, from which both armies must retreat on the approach of winter, and that is now close upon us.

Gen. Lyon fully comprehended his expedition, as he was familiar with its importance, and had some attention been directed in that quarter in time, instead of to Fortress Monroe and Washington city, our Western affairs would now be in a very different attitude. It is true that Gen. Pillow made a demonstration on Bird's Point and Cairo, but it was easily to be seen that it was a mere feint to draw Gen. Fremont's attention, while Gen. Lyon and his brave band were made the victims. So sensible were we of this, for we know that country well, that we solicited some one here, whose word would have authority, to telegraph Fremont to let Bird's Point alone, and look after Gen. Lyon, adding that "any General who had sense enough to cross the Mississippi with his army had too much sense to attack Bird's Point and Cairo."

Some two weeks followed, and Gen. Lyon

was the victim, and his decimated army on the retreat. Bird's Point was not attacked, and Gen. Pillow retired to Tennessee.

Now where are we? We have scarcely the courage to tell our readers where we are. Had the money and time been spent in sending aid to Gen. Lyon, that have been spent in a humbug flotilla, Gen. Lyon would now be in possession of Fort Smith, holding all Missouri, Kansas and the whole Indian country in check, instead of in his grave in Connecticut. Now all is for the present lost, and Kentucky likely to give us as much as we want to do for a few weeks.

Less than two hundred thousand men cannot now do what twenty-five thousand might have done two months ago. As much as we have objected to the manner in which this war was brought upon us, and as great as was our desire to see the whole power, patriotism and intellect of the country put in motion to test, first, a peaceable solution of our most sad national troubles; yet, so far as we are concerned, and to the extent to which we may be forced into it, (and we should have persisted in being on the side of "being forced,") we desire it conducted so as to be creditable to our army and honorable to our people, for we have a reputation to preserve as well as acquire, and at the same time a country to save.

We should carry with us the power of public sentiment, as well as the power of our arms. The danger is in failing to do either, unless our authorities correct many mistakes they are frequently making. A little more freedom of the press will work good in some of these.

From Missouri we have the most exciting news. Gen. Price has, after a severe conflict, and with a loss on his side (so say the latest accounts) of 800 men, taken Lexington and the whole of Col. Mulligan's command—some 2,500 men. The Cincinnati "Gazette" says: "We should not forget that, besides prisoners, a large amount of material of war, a thousand horses, and two boats with ammunition which had been sent to his relief, have fallen into the hands of the rebels. The loss of this important point and of this army by an overwhelming force, when its march on Lexington was known in time to have re-inforced it, and when the means for re-inforcing it undoubtedly existed in the Western Department, demands a formal inquiry into the reason and responsibility of this disaster."

This is truly a great loss to us, and endangers Booneville and Jefferson City. General Price released on parole all but the commissioned officers, and 2,000 of them have passed home to Illinois, thus closing their campaign for this war, as they cannot again take up arms. How many of Col. Mulligan's men were killed of the 2,500 is not stated.

It is very difficult to tell where all the troops in Missouri are stationed, of either the Federal or Confederate armies, as all the news we get comes very scattering through St. Louis, and a vast amount of it coming from tip to lip until it reaches the newspapers, and vastly improved generally by the imagination, or diminished, as the case may be.

Kentucky, most unfortunately, has gone into the war troubles in great earnest. Her position of peace and neutrality has only, from all appearances, whetted her appetites for bitter contentions. Armed men are already forming in every part of the State, hostile to each other. Louisville is already a camp, and so with many other towns. We quote again from the "Gazette":

"If, as reported, Buckner and his forces are at Owensboro, Ky., they are in a position most threatening to the lower counties of Indiana, and should they not be driven out, can control the navigation of the Ohio river. Owensboro is the capital of Davies county, and lies not far from half way between Paducah and Louisville. Rockport, the nearest important town on the Indiana shore, is but nine miles distant. The present is no time for delay. The enemy is at our very doors."

Both the North and the South have passed laws confiscating the property of each other. The very thing of all others in the way of war measures they should never have done; for whatever may be the end of this most unfortunate conflict, those confiscation acts will leave the longest scars to settle, unless the war ends in the utter extermination of one party or the other, which few believe or few desire shall be the result, and which foreign nations evidently will not permit it both parties here should attempt such a closing up of the sorrowful scene.

Jeff. Thompson was called out by the citizens of Memphis on Wednesday evening last, and made a speech from the balcony of the Gayan House. He assured his hearers that a large majority of the people of Missouri would show themselves for the South whenever their voices could be heard, and that the ultimate political associations of the State with the Confederate States was to his mind a certainty. He also impressed upon his hearers that to aid the people of Missouri in their struggle with Federal power was the best means of securing Memphis and the lower Mississippi Valley from invasion.

From the New York Times, Sep. 20.

THE NAVIGATION OF THE OHIO THREATENED.

The rebel States of Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Texas, Arkansas and Tennessee, according to the official reports of their departments, have put into the field 140,000 men. Of these troops there are about 59,000 in Virginia, mostly in General Beauregard's army. This is a low estimate if he commands near 200,000 men, for it would require that he should have 141,000 drawn from the States of Georgia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Florida, Virginia and Maryland—a number they can hardly yield. But allowing for Virginia 59,000 men, drawn from the States of the lower Mississippi Valley, it will leave 81,000 troops in the field for home defence of the rebel States, and to operate upon Missouri and Kentucky, which the Confederates are striving to sever from the Union. Let us take off 30,000 for home service—for coast guard and garrison duty—and we have 51,000 rebel troops left for offensive operations against Missouri and Kentucky. A very large proportion of their force was recently in Missouri, under Pillow and Hardee. But these men have all been transported to Kentucky, leaving in Missouri only the regiments that accompany

Ben. McCulloch. It is not known how many he has, nor indeed is it known where he is at present. But it is, we think, an entirely reasonable calculation, that the Confederates have, either upon Kentucky soil or ready to be precipitated upon Kentucky, fifty thousand troops, in the main well drilled, equipped with artillery, and altogether formidable in the field. But as the collision in Kentucky becomes more sharp and absorbing, all possible reinforcements will be thrown forward by the Confederates. They well know that their homes must be protected on the Kentucky line, or not at all; and so every fighting man that can be spared from Mississippi, Louisiana, Arkansas, and elsewhere, will be pushed forward to Kentucky to prevent the invasion of their own homes. The Confederate army to be met and opposed in Kentucky, will amount, therefore, in a very short time, to not less than 80,000 men. It may, in any emergency, be run up easily to 100,000 men. And such an army in the hands of Gen. A. S. Johnston, will be a powerful and dangerous adversary, requiring the best strength and ablest generals of the government to oppose it successfully. If the invasion of Kentucky is not met with all promptness, and with all the power of the government, no earthly power can prevent the victorious march of General Johnston into the Ohio valley, and the wintering of the grand army in the cities of Louisville and Cincinnati.

Kentucky will be a giant in the fight; but Kentucky is not armed. Gen. Anderson is a hero, and will "die the death" in the field, if need be. But Gen. Anderson's health is exceedingly infirm, and many think him fatally impaired in vigor by his sufferings in Sumner. Under these circumstances it is incumbent on the Administration to look vigilantly into the movements of the enemy in Kentucky. What impends there is not a duel between loyal Kentucky and rebel Tennessee. It is a battle between the Titans—the fiercest fighting men of the Confederate States—in full force, under their very ablest generals, (Beauregard to the contrary notwithstanding,) against the most gallant and resolute race of men that the Union can boast of—the yeomanry of Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky and Ohio. But the rebel forces are in the field armed, drilled and in motion. The Unionists are not. They are just rallying, without arms, without discipline, and without a leader. They need the instant and powerful aid of the government. They must have it, or the Ohio river will be as effectually commanded by the rebels as the lower Mississippi is—and that before Christmas; and the provisions now carefully stored in the granaries of the Ohio valley will go to feed traitors.

THE POTOMAC BLOCKADE.

The correspondent of one of our Southern exchanges, from the seat of war near Manassas, writes on the subject of the Potomac blockade as follows:

The Yankees have discovered at last that the Potomac is blockaded, and that their piratical ships will not be able to prow and down that river as heretofore. They seem to think a great deal about it, and confess the navigation is stopped, unless they take the batteries. They will not find that so easy, and will hardly attempt such a hazardous enterprise. Their attention appears to be directed only to Mathias Point, below Arquia Creek. They will find there is another formidable battery between Arquia Creek and Washington, capable of arresting the progress of any fleet. They can neither get up nor down. We have the river closed for a distance of some forty miles. Our Maryland friends need not be afraid hereafter, in crossing the river, of the Pawnee, or any other of Lincoln's ships. Unless there be an army of occupation all along the shore, there will be free communication between Maryland and Virginia. These were masked batteries in reality, for they have been constructed secretly and behind a screen. The Yankees have talked so much about masked batteries where there have been none, that they will now realize the truth of the fable about the cry of wolf. The value of these works in a strategic point of view, as affecting the general operations of the war on the Potomac, and with reference to the liberation of Maryland, cannot be well over-estimated.

THE SHOOTING OF 400 LINCOLN TROOPS.

Nothing has come to confirm this incredible story, except that the Richmond Dispatch has received information from a "reliable source," that "four regiments were required to change their arms, whereupon they mutinied, and Gen. McClellan surrounded them with five regiments. A melee with stones and bricks then commenced, and to quell the riot McClellan gave the order to fire. The slaughter is represented to have been fearful."

The story probably grew out of a riot at Tenallytown, a few miles from Washington, where a drunken soldier was ejected from a drinking shop, and thereupon a great number of the 6th Pennsylvania regiment beat the shop keeper and threatened to burn or tear down his house. Three companies were called out to suppress the riot, and were several times ordered to fire, but did not. It is supposed that they might have killed 400 if they had fired.

Another great riot occurred at New York a few days ago, when Col. Lozier, of the Fire Zouaves, attempted to muster his regiment for transportation to Old Point. 500 of them assembled according to order, but without uniforms or arms. A meeting was held, at which a large majority determined that they would not go, whilst a few said they would go if first paid for their former service. The Colonel threatened to publish the names as deserters; and next threatened to punish them as deserters. But these threats had no effect. A scene of great confusion and disorder ensued; several persons, including one reporter, were tossed in a blanket, and then beaten severely. In consequence of some of the men accusing each other of cowardice at the Roll Run battle, a desperate fight resulted, which was quelled by the police. Several of the Zouaves had their heads and faces badly cut. The police deemed it useless to make any arrests.

Col. Lozier ordered all those who desired to serve their country to follow him to Pier No. 1, North river, where a steamer was in waiting to convey them to Old Point. About twenty-five followed the Colonel, while the remainder taunted them for having obeyed any orders till they were paid.

The Zouave attempted an attack upon the Elmira Regiment, but desisted when the men were ordered to charge upon them. The sentries were provided with ball cartridge, and ordered to shoot any person who forced the guard. The attack was not renewed.

This is the substance of the Tribune's account. It is a significant fact that the police made no arrests. The civil authority is prostrate even in New York.

THE WAR IN KENTUCKY—PROCLAMATION FROM GEN. JOHNSTON.

Gen. Johnston, having assumed command of the forces in Kentucky, has issued the following proclamation. Its tone is in keeping with the course marked out and strictly adhered to by the Confederates towards Kentucky in the position assumed by her:

Whereas, The armed occupation of a part of Kentucky by the United States, and the preparations which manifest the intention of their Government to invade the Confederate States through that territory, have imposed upon this State, as a necessity of self defence, to enter that State and meet the invasion upon the best line for military operations; and, whereas, it is proper that the motives of the Government of the Confederate States in taking this step should be fully known to the world; Now, therefore, I, Albert S. Johnston, General and Commander of the Western department of the army of the Confederate States of America, do proclaim that these States have thus marched their troops into Kentucky with no hostile intention toward its people, nor do they desire to seek to control their choice in regard to their union with either of the Confederacies, or to subjugate their State, or hold its soil against their wishes. On the contrary, they deem it to be but the right of the people of Kentucky to determine their own position in regard to the belligerents. It is for them to say whether they will join either Confederacy, or maintain a separate existence as an independent sovereign State. The armed occupation of their soil, both as to its extent and duration, will, therefore, be strictly limited by the exigencies of self defence on the part of the Confederate States. These States intend to conform to all the requirements of public law and international amity, as between themselves and Kentucky, and, accordingly, I hereby command all who are subject to my orders to pay entire respect to the rights of property and the legal authorities within that State, so far as the same may be compatible with the necessities of self defence.

If it be the desire of the people of Kentucky to maintain a strict and impartial neutrality, then the effort to drive out the lawless intruders, who seek to make their State the theatre of war, will aid them in the attainment of their wishes. If, as it may not be unreasonable to suppose, these people desire to unite their fortunes with the Confederate States, to whom they are already bound by so many ties of interest, then the appearance and aid of Confederate troops will assist them to make an opportunity for the free and unbiased expression of their will upon the subject. But if it be true, which is not to be presumed, that a majority of those people desire to adhere to the United States and become parties to the war, then none can doubt the right of the other belligerent to meet that war whenever and wherever it may be waged. But harboring no such suspicion, I now declare, in the name of the government which I serve, that its army shall be withdrawn from Kentucky so soon as there shall be satisfactory evidence of the existence and execution of a like intention on the part of the United States.

By order of the President of the Confederate States of America.

A. S. JOHNSTON,

General Commanding the Western Department of the army of the Confederate States of America.

Necessity of a Cotton Supply in England.

(From the London Times, August 30.)

The supply and the consumption of the last two years have been unexampled. All the markets are glutted with cotton goods. We are expecting an immense increase from India, and the extraordinary step of the detention of the next year's cotton crop in the United States need have no other effect than to reduce our consumption, for one year, to two-thirds of the late average.

The great fact we have to deal with is one independent of tariffs, of blockades, of combinations among merchants or manufacturers, and of every artifice for stemming or meeting the tide of calamity. It is the great fact of the war itself. That war must employ, on both sides together, at least half a million men. There is not far from that number already under arms, and the cry is continually for more men. The apology for every reverse, is the want of reserves to relieve the long engaged, to protect the guns, to save the position from being outflanked, and to keep up the numbers to the programme. Battles to decide the future of a whole continent, and to figure, as New York papers vainly boasted, among the decisive victories of the world, are not to be fought with a division of 20,000 men. Dominion is not so easy; glory is not so cheap.

The Americans have to screw up their scale of ideas much higher than this. How they are to raise the men and money is another question, but the men must be raised, and if the eloquence of the New York journals is worth the villainous paper upon which it is printed, the men will be raised, and we shall see every man capable of bearing arms responding to the call. But all that will be so much strength and so many hands taken away from all the productive industries of America, from cotton, sugar and tobacco, among the rest. Where the disarrangement of labor will stop it is not easy to say. England and the neighboring countries of Europe have seen trades and manufactures rise and fall; fly off to more tolerant shores, or better affected populations; flourish and disappear. Who shall say whether the United States we used to admire, and even envy, may not before long be a page of history?

It is not our province to appeal much to the enterprise of manufacturers and the cupidity of capitalists. We would advise our moneyed or mercantile readers to "hold" cotton, load indeed would be the insinuation, if cotton were to fall. We can appeal, however, as the Manchester Cotton Company has appealed, to the recognized

duties of the State, and to the public spirit which inspires and assists it. The St. Louis has accepted the office of collecting information for commerce, of smoothing its way, and rendering more substantial assistance where none is to be expected. Now is the time for straining every nerve to develop the cotton cultivation in India and other soils pronounced favorable. So long as this duty seemed to depend on the problematical and unfriendly assumption that America might one day keep her cotton to herself, in order to destroy our manufactures, Government might be excused from interfering in the matter. We are now called to act, not on a bare possibility or unwarrantable suspicion, but on a plain matter of fact. At this moment the export of cotton from the United States is actually prevented and effectively hindered by the presence of cruisers, as well as by measures taken by the belligerents directly for the purpose. Both sides believe it to be necessary to prevent the sale and export of cotton in order to starve out the foe. Into the wisdom and practical character of this proceeding it is useless to inquire. It is at least a notice to us to take care of ourselves, and if the Governments of North America are taking measures to keep all their cotton at home, the British Government surely has an equal obligation to procure it elsewhere. In concert with the Manchester Cotton Company, it is arranging for the immediate completion of roads, the construction of landing and shipping piers, the erection of cotton gin factories, pressing houses, offices and stores, the scientific investigation of the cotton districts, the opening up of the Godavery, and, by the way, an increase of the cultivation in Egypt. The Manchester people are strong in hope that India only wants a little attention to supply every possible gap in the American supplies. In behalf of the State, we think we may say that all the scruples against interference in mercantile affairs will be waived when the prosperity of the country and the subsistence of millions are at stake. If the merchants and manufacturers only know and say what ought to be done, there will be no lack of will to do on the part of the government.

Arrival of an Iron Clad Vessel with Munitions for the South.

A few days since we received private intelligence of an important fact in all respects similar to the following, (which we copy from the Forsythe, Ga., Journal,) but for prudential reasons, we declined to publish it at the time. As the matter has leaked out at last, however, no further harm can come of its republication:

"Several days since an iron-clad steamer from Liverpool, with 5,500 rifles and 18 cannon, blankets, and clothing for soldiers, landed safe at Savannah. The blockading vessels were not in sight. This is a new steamer, incased with sheet iron an inch thick, and is now the property of the Confederate States. Our informant saw the vessel himself, went on deck, talked with the captain, who told him that there were three or four more vessels of the same sort on the way; and as soon as the steamers could be manned under the Confederate Government the blockade of Abraham I. would be blown to the 'four winds.'"

"He said that the arrival of this vessel had caused considerable activity among the merchants in sending off the coffee, tea, salt, &c., to country merchants, while these articles are at a very high figure. He heard the opinion expressed by some 'knowing ones' that in less than forty days Rio coffee could be bought in Savannah at 12 cents. Large quantities are stored in Cuba, awaiting the removal of the blockade."

TESTING OF A COLUMBIAD AND SUBMARINE BATTERY AT NEW ORLEANS.

The New Orleans Picayune of the 24th ult., says: "There was a large crowd assembled yesterday afternoon at the Lake end of the Ponchartrain Railroad to witness the testing of an eight-inch columbiad, weighing about 12,000 pounds. This gun was cast at the Iron Works of Messrs. Bennett & Lorges, corner of Magnolia and Erato streets. It was cast solid, and afterwards placed in a lathe, turned by steam, the bit, or instrument with which it was bored, being stationary. It was cast under the supervision of Mr. Daniel Brasil, the foreman of Messrs. Bennett & Lorges, according to the most approved pattern, and is pronounced one of the finest pieces of ordnance that has yet been turned out in the South. The time occupied in boring this gun was two weeks."

It was tested under the direction of Lieut. Beverly Kenon, of the C. S. N., and Chief of the Naval Ordnance Department, with 64 pound shell under the general rules for testing cannon, and it was estimated the shell was thrown to a distance of two miles, without straining the gun. Lieut. Kenon expressed himself highly satisfied at the results.

The Charleston Courier says that preparations are making in that city to manufacture locomotives for the Southern roads on a large scale. It is a good move, and we wish it success. We sincerely hope that the South has paid her last dollar to locomotive builders in Philadelphia, Paterson, and other Northern towns. We can build them at home—if we can't, we don't deserve to have a home. Let Baldwin, Norris and others build for their own country—and let us build for ourselves. We suppose two millions of dollars are spent annually at the South for Northern made locomotive and stationary engines. Let this be kept at home. We hail with delight every effort making in the South to render us independent in fact as well as name. August Chronicle.

PAY YOUR SMALL DEBTS.—This is good advice, and there never was a time when it is a more solemn duty. When the small debts are paid, there is a general confidence among our home people, and the wheels of trade move on regularly and easily. Besides, it is the small debts which control all the big ones, and which most materially affect trade. None are paying to our enemies, but all should make a special effort to pay their small debts to their friends, if for no other reason that it diffuses good spirits, gives confidence and greases the wheels of trade, all which are necessary and indispensable at the present time. Let all pay up, and all will feel better and thus promote the common weal. Pay up, but especially pay all small debts.