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NORTH CAROLINA POLITICS.

We copy under this head to-day, a very able and interesting Editorial from the Fayetteville Observer, to which we invite the attention of our readers.

The *Observer* is correct in saying that the real originators of party feeling are those who administered the State government in 1861, when our people determined to resist Mr. Lincoln's proclamation. But we go further and say, that this was only a part of the party programme that led to the dissolution of the Union, and which has governed the Confederate Administration from its inauguration at Montgomery to the present moment. When our people separated from the federal Union and united themselves with the government at Montgomery, they did so in the belief that men of all shades of opinions would thenceforth be political equals, and that the form of government adopted would be so administered as to preserve the rights of the sovereign States, and protect the free expression of thought and opinion. In this they have been grievously disappointed. The administration of Confederate affairs has been strictly partizan. No man who did not regard the election of Mr. Lincoln as good cause for dissolving the Union has been admitted to the Cabinet councils of the President. Proscription of such men, both in the field and council, has been the order of the day; and not only this, but when they have complained of such treatment, and endeavored to correct the errors and blunders of the administration, they have been assailed in venomous terms, and threatened with a "hideous mark" which would disgrace them and their children.

But even this could have been borne for the sake of the country, if the rights of the States and the liberty of the citizen had been respected. When North Carolina seceded the States were regarded as the masters of the system, and the government as the servant of the States to execute their will. How is it now? Under the operation of laws not warranted by the Constitution the war has ceased to be voluntary in its character, and the Governors of the States have become mere registers of the will of Congress and the Executive. The conscription and the tithing law leave nothing to the States, but the central government takes our fighting men with one hand, and the tenth of our substance with the other. If the first was really necessary, the States themselves could have enforced it, and each State could have kept its quota of men in the field in brigades, duly officered; and if provisions were needed, and could not be purchased, the States could have furnished them by a system of purchases of their own, and taken in exchange for them the currency of the government. Seizures of persons and property have become as common as they are in France and Russia. Personal liberty has been made dependent on the mere will of army officers appointed by the President. Hundreds have been arrested for opinion's sake, immured in dungeons, denied trials before the civil tribunals, and released only when the military power chose to do it. Our Courts, when they have interposed to protect these unfortunates and to uphold the law, have been disregarded in many instances, and their integrity reflected on in gross terms by the War Department at Richmond. The Confederate currency, which is the life-blood of the system, and the emanation of plighted public faith, has been to some extent repudiated as a matter of convenience; and a portion of it in one instance has been refused by a Cabinet officer, on the same ground, in open violation of a law of Congress. Our patient, uncomplaining, heroic soldiers have been placed in the van of every battle and in the rear of almost every retreat; and when they have fought with an ardor and a steadiness which would have reflected credit on the old guard of Bonaparte itself, just praise has been denied them by journals supposed to speak for the administration, and their fathers and brothers at home who are Conservatives, have been held up as disloyal and unfriendly to

the cause. Brigadiers and Major Generals from other States have been placed over them in many instances, and when such officers have been appointed from our State they have been almost invariably of the same politics with the administration. Proscription has thus been practiced over the very bones and blood of our people. Superadded to all this has been the appointment of surgeons, enrolling officers and the like from other States over our regiments and over our people at home, until the crowning outrage was reached by the appointment of Maj. Bradford, of Virginia, to collect the tithes. This led to the first public meeting held in this State; and but for this and other meetings, and the earnest remonstrances of Gov. Vance, Maj. Bradford would still be Tithingman for this State.

Such are some of the causes that have roused the people of this State to a sense of their rights, and led to the meetings so much deprecated by the *Observer*. But there are other causes, growing out of the partizan policy referred to, and out of the inefficiency which must always characterize a party administration in the midst of a great revolution like the present. The arms of the whole country, it is true, have been dedicated to this struggle, but only half its mind, if so much as that, has been called into requisition. The counsels of every great statesman and good man who did not believe that Mr. Lincoln's election was sufficient cause for inaugurating civil war, have been as effectually excluded from the ear of the President in his practical administration of the government, as if they had been exiles in foreign lands. The idea that secession would be peaceable is the great mistake that underlies the whole movement. The President was urged at Montgomery to purchase the stock of cotton then on hand as a means of procuring ships, munitions of war, and other necessary supplies, and also as a basis for our paper currency; and also to call for and accept five hundred thousand volunteers. He declined to do it, and his Congress ordered fifteen thousand stand of arms, and borrowed fifteen millions of dollars! Seeing his mistake; but not admitting it by calling statesmen who had thus advised him to his aid, he adhered to his party policy, and ran to the other extreme of a general conscription of seven hundred thousand men, without due regard to the productive interests, on which a successful prolongation of the war must mainly depend. Under the lead of pet Generals, whose incompetency is now known to all, the great valley of the Mississippi has been lost to us—our own seacoast has been lost; and but for the genius of two or three of our Generals in Virginia, and the sublime courage of our veteran troops, the Confederate capital itself would have passed from our hands. Meanwhile the people have been deceived by the promise that cotton would bring peace; that France or England, or both, would interpose; that the Northern people themselves would divide and arrest the war; that invasions of the enemy's territory would so distress them that they would force their government to negotiate; that Providence, seeing our cause to be just, and our enemies altogether wicked, would speedily lead us out with His strong right hand into the light of independence. None of these hopes have been realized. On the other hand, our armies are not materially increasing, while our enemies are recruiting from twenty millions of their own people, from thousands of emigrants from Europe, and what is infinitely worse, from our slave population.

No one, it seems to us, who will look dispassionately at the facts, will deny that the foregoing is true. The *Observer* traces the "mischief" of division and ill-feeling in this State to the Ellis administration; we ascend to the main stream, and show that this "mischief," and many, if not all our misfortunes, originated in the policy inaugurated at Montgomery, and which has been continued to this day. Humble as we are, and feeble as is our judgment in public affairs, we would venture to sug-

gest some remedy for this condition of things, and some plan for the future; but we could not hope that any thing we might say would have any influence with the administration at Richmond.

The *Observer* reminds us that when this State seceded (for they would pass Mr. Craige's secession ordinance,) from the old government, that act was "final." So it was to all human appearances, and so we hope it may be. We hope the State acted "wisely," and we still think she acted "wisely." When two evils are before us, and there is no escape, true wisdom is shown in choosing the lesser evil. Our State did that. Her people did not desire to secede. They were willing to try the administration of Abraham Lincoln, and to rely meanwhile on the great body of the American people to rescue the government from sectional conflicts, to restore to it a national administration, and thus perpetuate it, if possible, for all time. They felt that, having with them both branches of the Congress and the Supreme Court, President Lincoln could not seriously injure their property in slaves, nor deprive them of their rights in the territories, even if he would. They intended, if he attempted such a thing, to resist him in the Union, and as they would have been by one million of national men in his own section. If, during his trial, he had driven our people with their slaves from the common territories, or attempted in any way by an overt act to impair our right to our slaves in the States, they would have succeeded, with the help of their Northern allies, not only in checking him, but in punishing him for such maladministration and corruption in office. But the precipitate and wicked action of the cotton States on the one hand, and the cruel and wicked policy of President Lincoln on the other, left us no alternative. We were obliged to fight our full brother of the South or our half brother of the North. We chose to do the latter, and we acted "wisely." If we had not done so, we should have been trampled by both armies—we should have had civil war among ourselves—the North would have despised us for our want of manhood, and the South would have regarded us as false to our own instincts and our own blood. We repeat, our State was not a free agent—she was obliged to pursue the course she did. Thoughtful and sagacious men, while they trod unshrinkingly the path of duty, saw before them the fires of civil war, but beyond these fires all was darkness and uncertainty. Acting "finally" as they hoped, they put everything on the arbitrament of arms. The result is partially before us. The abolitionists of the North and the original secessionists of the South, acting and reacting on each other, have in all probability "proved themselves the most skillful architects of ruin that any age has produced." Slavery has suffered more injury during the last two years than would probably have befallen it in the long sweep of fifty years under the old government. The peculiar champions of the institution have placed it, we fear, on the high road to extinction. And just here, we beg leave to say to the *Observer*, is the source of one of the most serious apprehensions of our people. The sudden emancipation of our slaves in our midst would be the greatest blow which could be inflicted on Southern society. It would ruin this generation beyond redemption, and its effects would be felt for ages to come. Nor would this ruin be partial. It would include the non-slaveholder as well as the slaveholder, and finally the slave himself. Subjugation, if it should be in reserve for us, would be emancipation. Hence our people, while they are for continuing the struggle, and while they are still anxious if possible to make good their "final" separation, are nevertheless disposed to pry into the future, to see if, in the last resort, something better than subjugation cannot be obtained. If the worst should stare them in the face, as it does not now, but as it may, they would have peace under certain circumstances; yet if the worst should come, and they could see no honorable mode of escaping

it, they would all die together with their slaves and their little ones, fighting with a desperation which the world has never witnessed.

The *Observer* is disposed to twit us on our declaration in May, 1861, that this State had pledged to the cause her "last man and last dollar." Let us see if this pledge has not been redeemed. This State has sent 95,000 men to the field. This comprises all her fighting population, (of course we did not mean to include the old men and yearling boys,) save those between 40 and 45, now being conscripted, and about 10,000 able-bodied original secessionists, who refuse to redeem the pledge which they authorized us to make in May, 1861. So much for the "last man." Our debt, County and State, is equal in amount to one-tenth of what the whole State would bring in market, in silver and gold. The "last dollar" in specie, or in convertible paper, has long since disappeared. The State could no doubt borrow Confederate money at a premium of two for one—that is, she could sell one of her one hundred dollar bonds for two hundred dollars; but ten dollars in gold will purchase one hundred dollars in Confederate money; and it follows that she could sell her bonds for only ten cents in the dollar in specie. So much for the "last dollar." We regret to have to make these statements, but we are obliged to do so in self-defence.

The *Observer*, very ingeniously, and very justly in one sense, says that negotiations for peace can be instituted only through the Confederate government. But we must look at things as they are, and not as we would have them. If Mr. Lincoln should so far recognize Mr. Davis as to open negotiations with him, he would surrender the whole question of the war. To treat with the Confederate government for peace is to recognize that government. Will Mr. Lincoln do that? No. Will he ever do it? Not unless the Northern Governors and Legislatures shall rise up and command him to do it. Is that probable? Not in the present status of things. We may worry the Northern people to such a point, or we might so interest foreign powers as to induce them to take steps which would lead to such a result; but are these things probable? Not just now—not, we fear, for some time to come. What then? Shall we again invade the Northern States, and so distress them by fire and sword as to compel them to sue for peace? Can we do that? Are we able to do it? We fear not. What then? If the Federal government will not hear the Confederate government, it may hear the sovereign States. The people of the States, North and South, by mutual co-operation, may obtain an armistice. If that can be done, the war will be at an end. Is it not worth the trial? If the two armies should once rest to listen to the voice of negotiation, our word for it hostilities would not be resumed. The whole question would pass, and pass finally into the hands of the statesmen of the two sections. "Grim-visaged war would smooth his wrinkled front"—the arbitrament of the sword would give place to the voice of discussion and negotiation—reason would be substituted for passion and revenge, and the exasperations of the two sections, cooled and sobered by reflection and a calm survey of the entire situation, past, present, and future, would leave the mind of the country in a condition to devise some means for restoring peace on terms honorable to all. Nor will these movements by the States depress or discourage our soldiers in the field. On the contrary, they will fight and endure with renewed cheerfulness when they know that their friends at home are omitting no steps that may promise to crown them with the reward of all their toils—a just and honorable peace. But it is said that some of the cotton States are already greatly distressed, and that they may soon indicate a wish for negotiations. But they are already subjugated, and at the mercy of the enemy. Mississippi and Louisiana are prostrate, sullen and silent. They have ceased, so far as their people at home are concerned, both to fight and talk for peace.