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ENGLISH OPINION.

Secretary Seward issued on the 12th ult., a long diplomatic circular, "No. 39," announcing the speedy downfall of the rebellion, setting forth the causes of our long successful resistance, &c. &c.; all to be used abroad by the Ministers to whom it was sent for the benefit of Yankeeedom and the injury of the Confederacy. Its purport and its effect abroad may be gathered from the following British comment:

From the London Times, Sept. 4th.

Mr. Seward's diplomatic circular, which we published yesterday, consists of a proposition, an argument, and an application. His proposition is that the statesmen of England and France having conceived at the beginning of the American war a belief that the restoration of the Union was an impossibility, persist in that belief to the present hour. His argument resolves itself into a long narrative of the campaigns of the last twelve months, and this historical compendium is then applied to the purpose of correcting the prevailing belief, and impressing the two Western Powers with convictions more favorable to the Federal cause. In its object this State paper is certainly intelligible. Mr. Seward is perfectly accurate in his presumption that the Statesmen of France and England—he might have included, indeed, those of the rest of Europe—do consider to this very day that the old American Union can never be reconstructed. It is natural, too, that he should be desirous of removing this conviction, but the argument which he employs for this purpose is both ineffective and needless—needless, because we all knew beforehand every particle of his story, and ineffective because, even if we accept it exactly as it is presented to us, it leaves our conclusions just what they were.

The truth is, the course of the American war has taken us by surprise. When we first arrived at the conclusion that the South could never be coerced into reunion at the point of the sword we still anticipated prompt military success on the part of the North. The only reserve affecting our judgment was a doubt about the earnestness and unanimity of the South in claiming independence. That condition being satisfied, we considered that though twenty millions of men were certainly stronger than nine millions, they were not so much stronger as to have any chance of subjugating these nine millions, dispersed as they were over an almost illimitable territory. We hardly doubted the immediate superiority of the North in the field. The general expectation of Englishmen was that the South would soon be overrun, that its seaports would be all captured and occupied, and that strong Federal garrisons would hold its chief towns. In short, we anticipated that the first six months, or at any rate the first year of the war, would see the prostration of the Confederates thus far completed; but it was then that we thought the hopelessness of the work would begin to be felt.

If at that time we could have foreseen that the successes of the North after more than two years of desperate fighting would amount only to the achievements now recounted with so much complacency by Mr. Seward, we should have thought the task of the Washington Government more impracticable than ever. We venture to add that Mr. Seward himself would have been very much of the same opinion. We think it may be said with some truth, that if the Federal Government had, at the beginning of the year 1861, foreseen that in the middle of the year 1863 the seceding States would still be free, Richmond and Charleston still safe, and Washington in some little danger, the war would never have been undertaken at all. That Mr. Seward, at this period of the strife, should be reduced to sing a psalm over the deliverance of the North from the invasion of a Southern army, is about the strongest possible proof of the hopelessness of his cause.

The Federals thought to sweep the Southern States with their irresistible forces. At first they actually imagined that three months and 70,000 men would suffice for

the work. A single battle taught them the extent of this miscalculation; and though they still limited the time to "ninety days," they expanded the armament to 700,000 soldiers. The 700,000 did no more than the 70,000—in fact, they were defeated in the East, and evenly matched in the West. All that can be said at this moment of Northern exultation is that the Federals have taken two places on the Mississippi after sieges three times as tedious and as costly as they were expected to be, and that they have not had their own capital occupied by the enemy, as seemed highly probable two months ago. Mr. Seward, while coloring his history as favorable as he can, is compelled to talk of drawn battles as events creditable to the Federal arms; and the very paper which is designed to show the unquestionable ascendancy of the North speaks of the "necessity of covering the national capital," and the absolute equality of the belligerent forces in its immediate vicinity.

There might be some purpose in Mr. Seward's present exposition if either we in this country or the Americans in the Federal States had begun by regarding the belligerents as equally matched, and the war is likely to be protracted on even terms for a long series of years. This, however, was not the case, and we are therefore not much impressed with the moderate balance of success which Mr. Seward claims for his own side. In point of fact, taking one field with another, the South has had a greater share of victory than the North, its only conspicuous failure, indeed, was in an attempt to bring the war to a close by the capture of the Northern capital. Even now Gen. Lee is by all accounts more likely to resume the offensive than Gen. Meade, and though we do not hear that the Federals are preparing immediately to invade the territories of the Confederates, we do hear that the Confederates may be expected at any moment in the country of the Federals. This is not much of a case for a Power pretending so distinctly to superiority as to complain that the character of a belligerent is accorded to its rival. On that point indeed let any one read Mr. Seward's own descriptions, in this very document, of the strength, the numbers, and the bearing of the Confederate armies, and then say if the South be not entitled to the designation of a belligerent. Why, in recording the battle of Antietam, the Federal Secretary is actually compelled to expatiate on the identical qualities of the contending forces, and to add that the Northern soldiers were then proved, for the first time, to be not inferior in heroism and valor.

Practically, then, the very gist and essence of Mr. Seward's argument is fatal to its object. If all is true that he tells us that all is infinitely short of what we were prepared to take for granted two years ago, without being any the more sanguine of Northern success. We thought the North would overrun the South in a brief campaign, but would then find the difficulties begin. Mr. Seward tells us that after two years of mortal struggle the North has not overrun a quarter of the South—having the real difficulty still in prospect as before. We only conclude from this that the Federals have not even that superiority for which we gave them credit; and that the relative strength of the Confederates is by so much the greater. If Mr. Seward really wishes to make converts of French and English statesmen, he must adopt a very different form of argument. He must show us either that the South is evincing a readiness to yield, or that the North has a policy which will admit of the restoration of the Union without this submission. But he shows neither of these things. On the contrary, he tells us that the Southern President has just proclaimed a levy *en masse*, while of his own Government he says nothing, except that it is preparing to prosecute the war as before. But what is to be the end? Europe thinks that the reconstruction of the Union by force of arms is an impossibility, and a very great number of Americans are of the same opinion. Europe also sees distinctly that the South

gives not the slightest sign of concession, while even the fortunes of the war are not, upon the whole, very unevenly balanced. Not, therefore, without reason do we persist in our original opinions on the subject; but though Mr. Seward has thus lost his pains, we can console him with the assurance that, so far as we are concerned, they were needlessly expended. If his object was merely to deter us from intervention, it is safe in spite of the failure of this argument. In the "domestic controversies," which have cost upwards of 500,000 lives and at least five hundred millions of money in two years, we have not the least design of interfering. The "adjustment" of these little matters we are ready to leave to Americans themselves as "exclusively" as Mr. Seward can desire; and if we add another remark upon a point so certain, it is merely to suggest that people who thus busy themselves even superfluously in deprecating our intervention, might be a little less forward in threatening us with the extremities which would drive us to intervene.

From the Richmond Dispatch.

A SIGNIFICANT PAMPHLET.

One of those pamphlets which so often precede the consummation of a contemplated measure by the Emperor of the French has lately made its appearance in Paris, and has thrown the correspondent of the London News into a fever of apprehension. The writer is M. Chevalier, well known in literary and political circles as an author of great power. The correspondent has no doubt that the pamphlet is inspired by the Emperor, from the fact that it is in perfect harmony with the "known leanings" of that Monarch. In its general scope it argues that Mexico will be of infinite value to France, and that the expected value is only to be realized by an early recognition and intimate alliance with the Confederate States. The Southern cause is pleaded with so much fervor, and the institution of slavery defended with so much ingenuity, that the correspondent of the News thinks Mr. Slidell himself could not have done it better. At the same time, he thinks Mr. S. would not have urged the overthrow of the Monroe doctrine, (in which, we take it, he is much mistaken,) or made such a preachment about the Latin races. The pamphlet says the present condition of Mexico is the personal work of Napoleon; for while everybody else was considering the expedition as a mere military affair, he had already settled, in his own mind, "the basis of an entirely new policy." The imperial instructions to Gen. Forey contained the following very significant sentence:

"In the present state of civilization the prosperity of America is not indifferent to Europe; for it is America which feeds our manufactures and commerce. We are interested in seeing the United States powerful and prosperous; but it is not for our interest that she should get possession of the entire Gulf of Mexico, and from that basis of operations dominate over the Antilles and the South, and become the sole dispenser of the products of the New World."

France is not only determined to resist the absorption of South by North America, but she will support the Latin races in the Western Hemisphere. Forey's expedition is to be followed by an "army of merchants," and the "recognition of the Confederate States will be the consequence of the intervention." The fine climate of Mexico, its unrivalled fertility, the variety and exuberance of its productions, are dwelt upon with something very like rapture. Universal suffrage is recommended, on the ground that, in Mexico, the *plebs* are the friends of order, while the upper or aristocratic classes are the worst Anarchists. Emigration on a large scale, under French protection, is also recommended. Whether Maximilian accepts or not, emigrants will be protected by French influence.

So far, so well. But there is one idea broached in the pamphlet which we wish to bring prominently before the public. After intimating that the leaders of the revolution would be quite ready to yield its leading principle (slavery,) in reference to France, the pamphlet says: "The first

power which recognizes the Confederate States will have a right to obtain, in favor of negroes, much larger concessions than the Federal States would make in case of their restoring the Union by victory." It is as well to put a stop to all calculations of this character at once. If Napoleon means to interfere with the question of slavery in any way whatever, or to ask anything else in consideration of recognition, we can have nothing to do with him. We claim recognition as a right. We are entitled to it from every nation on earth, and we will pay nothing for it. We would, as a gratuity, give France great advantages in trade for a term of years; but we will never submit to have the game of Nice played upon us.

The pamphlet goes on to say that as soon as France recognizes us all the other States will do the same; the small States first, and finally England—that our force will be quintupled by the adhesion of Austria on Maximilian's account, of Spain on account of Cuba, and lastly it speaks of the French Navy as a powerful argument to dissuade the North from prosecuting the war any farther.

There can be little doubt that this pamphlet is one of the Emperor's feelers. It certainly indicates an early recognition, if we are to judge of people's intentions by what they profess to think right.

Whatever may be the issue—whether the pamphlet prove to be the veritable programme of the French Emperor or not—it is certain that the Yankees are very much alarmed. Already they have invented a story that Mr. Slidell has offered Texas as a bribe to France to secure her recognition, as if Mr. Slidell or anybody else had the right to make any such offer, and as if the Emperor does not know that he has no such right. Each State beyond the Mississippi is sovereign and independent—is a nation in itself—and can break off from this Confederacy and form any sort of connection with France or any other power it may think proper. This is the theory of our Constitution—the very groundwork of our revolution. But neither Mr. Slidell nor the Confederate Government, nor any other power on earth, save the people of those States in convention assembled, can transfer them to any other power. For these States themselves, it is proper to say that they evince not the least disposition to separate from us. On the contrary, at the late convention of their Governors, those high officers representing their opinions and wishes, declared their firm resolution to sink or swim with their sister States on the east of the Mississippi. This Yankee story, therefore, is simply a Yankee lie, and nothing more or less.

Does.—The Virginia Legislature is considering a plan to increase the supply of leather and reduce the price. A practical tanner has furnished one of the members with information in regard to the value of dog skins and dog oil. He says that one of the most valuable oils for dressing leather is the *neats foot* or cow-foot oil, and from experience he regards the oil extracted from the carcass of the dog as equal in quality to the cow-foot oil. He also says that dog-skins make first rate ladies' shoes and gentlemen's summer boots. From a medium sized dog nearly one and a half gallons of oil can be extracted, and the green skins are worth about eight dollars. Besides this, the carcasses will afford a valuable ingredient to the *nitre beds* of the government. It is estimated that there are 500,000 dogs in the State of Virginia, which, if turned into oil and leather, at present prices, would produce the handsome sum of thirty millions of dollars, to say nothing of the saving of bread and meat now consumed by these thousands of worthless animals.

Now, who is not in favor of squeezing all the dogs into oil and tanning their hides for leather? There are as many dogs in North Carolina as in Virginia, and, apart from the oil and leather, their destruction would prove a great public benefit. For our own part we confess that we are an enemy to dogs of all kinds. *Charlotte Dem.*