

of assembly, that they cannot be executed with the powers of the State governments. To sustain the doctrine here laid down, which I think incontrovertible, I will appeal to my authorities for support. The 11th amendment says: "The enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people."

"The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."—These two amendments settle clearly the principle of separation of the powers granted and retained. The second paragraph of the 6th article of the Constitution is in these words:

"This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any thing in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding."

To show the pertinency more clearly of the doctrine I have laid down to these authorities, I will quote the language of the Supreme Court in the case of Gibbons vs. Ogden. Alluding to the power to regulate commerce, the Chief Justice in delivering the opinion of the court says: "We are now arrived at the enquiry, what is this power? It is the power to regulate; that is, to prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be governed.—This power like all others vested in Congress, is complete in itself. It has always been understood, that the sovereignty of Congress, though limited to specified objects, is plenary as to those objects."

This doctrine can only mean that the powers granted to Congress by the people in the constitution are full or plenary powers over the subjects committed to its agency, and consequently exclusive powers. The word sovereignty, as applied to Congress, as it signifies has been, would be improper. Congress is not the sovereign power of the country, but an agency with powers plenary *quod hoc* over particular subjects. Its powers are delegated only, they are therefore of necessity subordinate, and not sovereign powers. We all agree that the sovereign power is in the people, if this be so, having never alienated, they still retain it. The constitution itself is an act of fundamental legislation by this very sovereignty, delegating through this power of attorney, secondary powers of legislation, agreed on all hands to be not only delegated but limited and enumerated. Again the court says: "A full power to regulate a particular thing, implies the whole power. A grant of the whole is incompatible with the existence of a right in another to any part of it."

This language is appropriate and clear, and taken in connexion with the evident sense and meaning of the foregoing authorities, establishes the principle, that neither government can interfere with the appropriate and constitutional powers of the other. Let us recapitulate. All the powers vested in Congress are plenary powers—they are then of necessity exclusive powers. And, if any they cannot intermingle or be made concurrent, or conjoint with the powers of the State legislatures—and it follows as a matter of course, that within their proper sphere of action, when confined to their proper and constitutional purposes, the powers of the State governments are equally plenary and exclusive. Both are to be in their proper place, neither as out of it. Accordingly then, to the foregoing doctrine, the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, among the several States and with the Indian tribes, being like all the other constitutional powers of Congress, a full power over the subject, must be exclusive and cannot be participated. This being true, it utterly precludes the idea of the right of Congress to effect in whole or in part, by means of a system of internal improvement, within the jurisdictional limits of a State, the State government, undoubtedly having the right. The only works or edifices in the character of improvements which Congress is authorized to erect or fabricate within any of the States, are provided for, in the latter part of the 8th section of the first article of the constitution. In order to enable Congress to erect needful buildings for the operations of the legislative and executive departments, and that the federal government might have a local habitation as well as a name, it was provided that Congress should have power to exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatever, over such district, (not exceeding ten miles square) as may by cession of particular States and the acceptance of Congress become the seat of the government of the United States, and to exercise like authority over all places purchased by the consent of the legislature of the State in which the same shall be, for the erection of forts, magazines, dock-yards, arsenals and other needful buildings. The control of those subjects is entirely in Congress—they are the only objects in the character of improvements, or edifices within a State which Congress has the power to make, and not even these without the pre-requisite of acquiring, the whole and exclusive government, by purchase and cession over the places where erected; with which places after this, the authorities of the State in which they may be cannot interfere in any way. There is a great mistake in supposing that the improvement of rivers, bays, inlets, and harbors, and making roads and canals in the States, stand on the same footing.—They are no where provided for, either directly, or indirectly, in the Constitution. Does any one suppose that the States would or could cede to the General Government, the rivers, bays, and all the public highways up to which commerce is carried? If so, what would be left—what power would the State Governments have?

They would be utterly useless. The Constitution of North Carolina expressly says: "The property of the soil is a free Government, being one of the essential rights of the collective body of the people it is necessary in order to avoid future disputes, that the limits of the State should be ascertained with precision."

Then, after describing the boundary line on the south it says: "Therefore all the territories, seas, waters, and harbors, with their appurtenances, lying between the above described line, &c. and the southern line of Virginia, are the right and property of the people of this State to be held by them in full sovereignty." I believe, sir, no part of these things has been parted with or ceded, nor could they be, without a violation of the Federal Constitution, unless for such purposes, as have been provided for in the instrument.—Congress has power to build forts, dock-yards, &c. within a State, only upon the same principle that it could build the Capitol, the Executive Departments, Navy Yard and other needful buildings in the District of Columbia, not because Congress had the right to legislate, but because having first obtained, by the method pointed out in the Constitution by cession and purchase from Maryland and Virginia, full power over the District, it could then, and not till then, place or erect any such improvement as it might think proper. And so of the other subjects mentioned. It will be seen in the laws, first and second volumes, that immediately after the Government went into operation, provision was made for the cession of light houses, with the same views as seemed to have been applied to the subjects mentioned, and what then was deemed to be the construction, may be learned from the practice of the Government in regard to light houses, as acted on then and since,—as will appear by the following extracts from Gordon's digest of the laws: "No light house shall be built on any site previous to cession of jurisdiction over the same to the United States, &c. "If any person or persons within any fort, dock-yard, navy-yard, arsenal, armory or magazine, the site whereof is ceded to and under the jurisdiction of the United States, or on the site of any light house or other needful building belonging to the United States, the site whereof is ceded, &c. It will be thus seen that all these objects were classed together, and the same requisites necessary to enable Congress to erect them: even if admitted, that light-houses are needful buildings in aid of commerce or the navy, Congress could not make them within the jurisdictional limits of a State, without first obtaining exclusive government over the places or sites; as in case of forts, dock-yards, &c. with which they have been classed.

Mr. Speaker, I have thought proper thus to allude to light-houses, because they seem to have been a sort of stumbling block, and a kind of last rallying point of the friends of internal improvements or a hook or place to hang a doubt on—and particularly to call the attention of a friend who I see across the way, to the subject as he and myself have frequently in a sort of Committee of the Whole on the state of the Union, had this with other subjects, and particularly the Union itself, under consideration. But I think they have sufficient to distinguish them from the general class of objects, known as internal improvements. But they seem by many to be considered as a sort of mongrel, or thing of doubtful character. If gentlemen please they may consider them as a kind of political zoophytes, corresponding to that doubtful or intermediate class of beings which form the connecting link between the animal and vegetable kingdom; let gentlemen consider them as the intermediate link between the two governmental authorities; make them political zoophytes.

Mr. Speaker, the power to regulate commerce, like that to regulate the mail, so far as relates to our public highways—the ways on which commerce is carried on, and the mail transported, is merely a right to pass over them. The power to regulate commerce, and the mail, is a power over subject and vehicle, and does not affect the highways. Congress legislates over both these subjects, so as to prescribe the legal rules by which they are to be governed; and when the judicial power is required to act upon cases originating under these laws, in connexion with either of the subjects, the federal courts take cognizance of these cases. But does it not occur to the most uninformed, that any other cases, originating on those public highways, than such as are connected with the mail or with navigation and commerce, refer themselves to the jurisdiction of the State tribunals? If Congress has the right to make, alter, amend, or abolish our public highways within the States, none of which have been ceded to it, does not even a blind man see that the consequence must soon be an entire obliteration of all the power of the State authorities, and in that case our system of government is destroyed by consolidation?

It must, I think, be perfectly plain, according to the foregoing reasoning, that the exercise by Congress of the power to make internal improvements, either roads and canals, or those upon water courses, harbours, bays, &c. is entirely unauthorized by the Constitution. If Congress has not this power, then it has not the right to do so in any way or by any means, and of course it cannot do it by the use of money—if it has not the power, then it has not the right to use the means to arrive at the end. What, let me ask, is power, but the use of the means to accomplish any purpose—means in the use are power *de facto*—real practical power.—Even the consent of a State would not give the power. The consent of a State could no more give Congress a right to do that which it had not the right to do under the

constitution, than I could give another individual a right to do an unlawful act. If Congress, under the power to pass laws for the regulation of commerce—laws or legal rights to settle the *quod modo* of intercourse, and exchange—has the right to make the ways on which commerce is carried on—still more would it seem reasonable that it should make the vehicles; for, according to the doctrine assumed, that Congress has a right to do whatever will facilitate commerce, and if a power to regulate is a power to make, then Congress has the power to make or cause to be made, every thing having any relation to commerce not only the ways but vehicles such as merchant vessels, canal boats, carts, drays, and wheelbarrows, merchants ware-houses, wharfs, &c. and under the power to regulate commerce among the States, as a facility, they could make waggon, pedlar's carts and any thing else. Sir, as there is nothing which facilitates commerce more than articles, the exchange of which constitutes commerce in its most confined significance—Congress may appropriate money to make or encourage the making of every thing which is bought and sold, all things which enter into commercial exchange, either foreign or domestic. But if the improvements of the public highways are regulations of commerce, within the meaning of the constitution, what will gentlemen do with that part of it which says—"No preference shall be given, by any regulation of commerce or revenue, to the ports of one State over those of another." Whenever half a million is given to improve or make ports or harbors in one State, it must, to comply with the instrument, be given to all having any ports or harbors.

This, Mr. Speaker, is surely a most extraordinary power. In addition to the authorities already given, showing the exclusive and plenary nature of the power to regulate commerce, with foreign nations among the several States, and with the Indian tribes, the following is also given, from the opinion of one of the members of the Supreme Court, in the case of Gibbons vs. Ogden.

Speaking of this same power, vs. Ogden, he says—"and since the power to prescribe the limits to its freedom, necessarily implies the power to determine what remain unrestrained, it follows that the power must be exclusive." The same idea is expressed by Justice Baldwin in the case of the Indian Tamels, as may be seen in Pator's Reports.—The Chief Justice in Gibbons vs. Ogden, speaking of inspection laws, says—"They form a sort of that immense mass of legislation, which embraces every thing within the territory of a State not surrendered to the General Government; all which can be most advantageously executed by the States themselves.—Inspection laws, quarantine laws, as well as laws for regulating the internal commerce of a State. Now let me ask, are not all the rivers, bays, harbors, roads, canals, &c., within a State, included within the territorial, and jurisdictional limits of the State? And is not the legislation over them a part of that immense mass of legislation which the Chief Justice says embraces every thing within the State not surrendered to the General Government? Have all our public highways; have any of them been surrendered to the General Government? Have even Nags-head and the swash places already alluded to in this discussion? And if not, let me ask by what authority does Congress interfere with the rights of the States—with the rights and property of the people of North Carolina, without any sort of justification—against the Constitution of the United States, and against the express claim of the people of North Carolina, in their declaration of rights, which is a part of the Constitution of the State, reserving this very right and power to themselves? The words of this declaration are:—"That the people of this State ought to have the sole and exclusive right of regulating the internal government and police thereof." From the doctrine of plenary and exclusive powers which I have advocated, and which I think correct, Congress either has the whole power of internal improvement, or no part of it.—This all pervading power, the regulation of Commerce, is a broad mantle which hides a multitude of our political sins.—Sir, it leads to things of a most strange and fantastic character. I have said that commerce, in its most confined sense, is an exchange of equivalents—in this I am again borne out by the high authority upon which I have so frequently drawn for aid. From one of the opinions delivered, in the case of Gibbons vs. Ogden, we have the following:—"Commerce, in its simplest signification, means an exchange of goods; but in the advancement of society, labor, transportation, intelligence, care and various mediums of exchange become commodities, and enter into commerce; the subject, the vehicle, the agent, and the various operations, become the objects of commercial regulation. Mr. Speaker, I have been astonished at the extent, amplitude, and variety of action assumed under this power. Sir, the following sentence will disclose, what I venture to pronounce, neither yourself nor any member of this body, would ever have dreamed of.—Sir, it is a claim for Congress, of a most singular faculty. Nothing more or less, Sir, than under the power of regulating commerce, Congress may do what Mr. Speaker? You could not guess in a fortnight, Sir. Nothing more or less than propagate scamen—the things among others spoken of, as subjects of commercial regulation, are ship-building, the carrying trade, and propagation of scamen, &c. &c. Now, Sir, for a little philology: I believe it will be found, upon examining our Dictionaries, that the word propagate, means to continue by successive generations. Now, Sir, I believe it has been settled long since, by the metaphysical metaphysical philosophers, that there is no such thing as squiral generation. It must,

therefore be unequivocal; and thus, under the power to regulate commerce, Congress has the power, unequivocally, to propagate scamen. This is the consequence of the doctrine that Congress can do, or make, or cause to be made, any thing giving facility to commerce; but, Sir, I did not know that Congress had the right to regulate any but commerce between the U. S. and foreign nations, among the several States, and with the Indian tribes.

Mr. Speaker, the Tariff has long been, and justly, a subject of complaint. It has departed quite as much as has been said of it. Yet, I must be permitted to tell the friends of State Rights, of the rights of the people; and to tell the people themselves, that a system of Internal Improvement, carried on, by the General Government, within the States, strikes more directly at the vitals of the sovereignty of the States—the sovereignty of the people—for they are the States—than even that canker of our peace and harmony, the Tariff itself. The term Internal Improvement, is most comprehensive. It is not necessarily confined to the making or improving public highways; but, by the facility of construction, may be made to apply to every possible relation of man to man, and thus place all the private as well as public concerns of the people under the management of this Government—acting as one great consolidated power upon the community. To the union of these two agents, the Tariff and Internal Improvement, the one the plunderer, the other the receiver, of the money of the people, we must owe, if no interposition can be had, to redeem us from this most unholy alliance, what, Sir, it makes my heart sick even to think of! Mr. Speaker, must it be so? Are we, like all other Empires, to have our rise, progress, and fall?—To run our brief race, too, in less than fifty years!

There is the moral of all human tales; 'Tis but the same rehearsal of the past—First freedom, and then glory: when that fails, Wealth, vice, corruption—barbarism at last!"

Mr. Speaker, we, the representatives of the people of this country, and the people themselves, are under a most awful responsibility! Are we not looked to as the guardians, not only of our own political and civil rights, but as the guardians of the rights and liberties of the human race? Shall we, faithless to ourselves, and to mankind, in our disgraceful scrambling for money and place, forget the trust reposed in us? Sir, if this is to be the case—if the idea of self-government is a dream—if man is ever to be the dupe of his fellow man—to be robbed, and cheated, and trampled on—why, all I have to say is—Then, let this world be, and continue still, One wide den of thieves, or what you will!

Another voice from the East.

At a meeting of those friendly to the present administration, and in favor of the re-election of Gen. Andrew Jackson as President, but opposed to the election of Martin Van Buren as Vice President, held in the Court House in Winton, Hertford county, N. C. on the 30th May, 1845, for the purpose of appointing delegates to the State Convention to be assembled in Raleigh on the 19th June, Gen. Bridges J. Montgomery was called to the Chair, and John A. Anderson appointed Secretary.

On motion, a committee was appointed, consisting of Elisha H. Sharpe, Kenneth Rayner, Rosina C. Borland, Kinsey Jordan, and David C. Cras, to draft resolutions expressive of the sense of the meeting, who, having retired a short time, reported the following, which were adopted: Whereas, from the political aspect of the times, a crisis is approaching in the political history of this country, which is to test the permanency of our institutions, and which will require that the Chief Magistrate of the nation should, in an eminent degree, possess those qualities which Mr. Jefferson recommended as the criterion of fitness for office—"honesty, capability and faithfulness to the Constitution"; and whereas we believe that Gen. Andrew Jackson, judging from the leading measures of his administration, has given an earnest that he is endowed with those essential requisites; and whereas we further believe that, owing to his extensive popularity, he is more capable of concentrating public sentiment throughout the Union, and thereby harmonizing those various conflicting interests which are distracting the country than any other man living.

Resolved, therefore, That we entertain great confidence in the integrity of his views, and the soundness of his leading political measures; and that we consider it of the most vital importance that he should be re-elected to the first office in the Republic.

Whereas we believe that the office of Vice President is one of the greatest moment to the welfare of the country, and which should be filled by a man in all respects competent to discharge the duties of President; and whereas we further believe that the Tariff is a question of more importance to the south than any other which is agitating the country; that it is directly contrary to that spirit of compromise which adopted the constitution; that it imposes a heavy tax on southern industry, for the sole benefit of northern capitalists; that it is in fact the secret source of that distress which pervades the community:

Resolved, therefore, That we will support Mr. Van Buren for Vice President who is in favor of the Tariff, and opposed to southern interests.

candidate for Vice President; and whereas we believe that the people of the south should not endeavor to effect this by a sacrifice of their just rights; and whereas we view Martin Van Buren as the man who was chiefly instrumental in bringing upon us the tariff of 1828—as the principal instigator of the rupture between the two first officers of the government—as the prime mover of the dissolution of the late cabinet—and as a man whose political intrigues are entirely assented to the policy of this government:

Resolved, therefore, That we view with indignation the late nomination of Martin Van Buren in Baltimore as an attempt to palm upon us a high tariff Vice President, and as an effort to introduce that system of party proscription that prevails in New York, and which should be frowned upon by every patriot who is anxious to sustain the honor and dignity of his country.

And whereas we consider the Convention to be held in Raleigh on the 19th June next, for the purpose of nominating some suitable person for the Vice Presidency, to be run on the Jackson Electoral Ticket for the State of North Carolina, as the most effectual means of uniting the public sentiment of the State:

Resolved, therefore, That we highly approve of said convention, and that we will use our best exertions to carry its nomination into effect.

Resolved, That—be appointed delegates to represent the county of Hertford in said convention, and that they be instructed to vote for some man who is opposed to the Tariff, and whose political principles and interests accord with ours.

Resolved, That the chairman of this meeting be authorized to call a meeting of those friendly to the measures hereby recommended, whenever, in his opinion, the interests of our cause may require it.

Resolved, That the proceedings of this meeting be signed by the chairman and Secretary, and that the Editors of the Windsor Herald, Halifax Advocate, North Carolina Star, and United States Telegraph be requested to give them publication.

On motion, Bridges J. Montgomery, Elisha H. Sharpe and Kenneth Rayner were appointed delegates to represent the county of Hertford in the above mentioned State Convention, to be assembled on the 19th June next.

On motion, the thanks of the meeting were accorded to the chairman and Secretary; when on motion, the meeting adjourned.

B. J. MONTGOMERY, CHAIRMAN. JOHN A. ANDERSON, SECRETARY. [When the question was put on the adoption of the second resolution, an ineffectual motion was made to strike out that and all the following resolutions, and substitute the following:]

Resolved, That we disapprove of the proposed State Convention in Raleigh on the 19th June next, and believe that it had its origin in opposition to Gen. Jackson.

Resolved, That we will not, in a quixotic attempt to elect a Vice President of our own peculiar opinions, run the risk of electing Clay and Sergeant.]

Report of the Committee on Manufactures.

We have laid before the reader, this Document, drawn up, we suppose, by Mr. Adams. The doctrines which it avows, in regard to the powers of the General Government over the subjects of Manufactures, are such as no Republican can subscribe to. They contain the quintessence of Federalism. The construction which it places on that clause of the constitution which confers on Congress "the power to lay and collect taxes, duties, &c. &c. would, if it were true, destroy all the limitations of power contained in that instrument. It would effectually destroy the constitution as a grant of limited powers. According to such a construction, Congress would have the right to do any and every thing which is not expressly prohibited in the Constitution—a doctrine fraught with the most dangerous consequences. Jeffersonian.

COMMUNICATION

FOR THE WESTERN CAROLINIANS.

The "Union party" and "Nullification party" of South Carolina.

In what is it that these two parties differ from each other? Truly it is astonishing how little the points of difference between them are understood out of South Carolina. Do they differ as regards the Tariff? No.—Both parties unite in their zeal against the Tariff,—in pronouncing it unconstitutional and ruinous to the South, and both agree that it cannot be borne, but must be thrown off by some means or other and that speedily too.

About what is it, then, that they differ? The answer is—that they only differ as to the means necessary to accomplish this object: The "Union party" is for throwing off the Tariff in one way, and the "Nullification party" is for doing it in another way.

What are these different ways? We can only ascertain them from the declarations of the leaders of the two parties, and from the Resolutions adopted at their public meetings.

First as to the Union party:—The difference between the means proposed to be pursued by the two parties is strikingly illustrated in an answer recently given by a member of Congress from South Carolina (of the Union party) to a question put to him by a citizen of North Carolina.

Question.—In what is it that your party (the Union party) differ from the Nullification party?

Answer.—The answer is this—they (the Nullification party) are for resorting to the force of arms, and the (the Union party) are for resorting to the cartouch box.

That this is the true difference between the two parties may be further learnt from

the letters of Gen. Blair, and Col. Nichols (Union members of Congress) addressed to their constituents, and likewise from the Resolutions adopted at the "great meeting" of the Union party and long appeal in Sumpter District.

The "great meeting" held in Sumpter, proposes that a convention of the Southern and Anti-Tariff States be speedily convened; and that this Convention shall present to Congress the alternative—of a repeal of the restrictive system or, the secession of the Southern States.

This then is the plan of the Union party, more properly the *disunion* party.

Now, what is the plan of the Nullification party? This party holds, that the Federal Union is nothing more nor less than a confederacy of Sovereign States.—That the Federal constitution is the compact—the written articles of this confederacy, and that each State is a distinct party thereto; that the States in their Sovereign capacity, being parties to this compact, are the natural and legitimate judges of what the constitution requires and what the constitution forbids.

In the words of Chancellor Harper—"that where independent States form a compact, each not only may, but must determine the true meaning of the compact so far as it is to be carried into effect by itself, or within its own territory"—and if the States can or must determine what the constitution or compact requires it to do, then as a necessary consequence they also can, or must determine what the constitution or compact does not require it to do or submit to—or, in other words, that the duty of the States, as parties to the compact are two-fold.—1st. To do all things that the constitution requires, and lawfully, to resist the doing of every thing not required or authorized by the constitution, and of this, as Sovereign parties to the original compact, they are the natural and legitimate judges. The States are the tribunals of the Republic.

Looking on the Tariff system as not only destructive to the people of South Carolina, but as unconstitutional, the nullification party contends, that it is the duty of the State in its sovereign capacity, to say to Congress:—You have travelled beyond your powers; you have passed a law which you have no right to pass, and therefore, as one of the parties to the compact, we say, that this law is null and void in our State and we will disregard it. This they say cannot be done by any sectional part of the State, or by the legislature of the State, but it must be done by the Sovereign State itself, in solemn convention assembled—when a State thus meets in solemn convention, and nullifies an act of Congress, then three alternatives are set before Congress one of which must be chosen:

1st. Either to repeal the unconstitutional act, and thus restore harmony; or, secondly, call a convention of the States and submit the question to their decision,—such having been the manner, in which the constitution was framed &c. or, thirdly, Make use of physical force to compel South Carolina or the nullifying State into submission to the unconstitutional law.

If Congress adopts the first alternative all will be right—the constitution and the Union will be preserved. If they adopt the second alternative, the constitution will be amended, clearly defining the power of Congress, on these doubtful questions and all will move on right accounts; but, if they should only adopt the third alternative, then comes in the last resort, what the Union party wish to bring on in the first.

Now, after this simple exposition of the plans of the two parties in South Carolina, we ask every reflecting man this question—Which of the plans leads more directly to *disunion*—that of the Union party, or of the Nullification party? The answer is plain.

A gentleman, who has recently travelled through several of the upper counties in South Carolina, remarked that the people of South Carolina were united almost to a man against the Tariff, and that they only differed as to the means—the Union men were for measures leading directly to *disunion*—while the Nullification party was for trying a more moderate and pacific remedy. From all I can see or hear such appears to be the only difference.

The Union party, or rather, the *disunion* party are falling off every day, while the Nullifiers are every day gaining strength; and, if we judge from the remarks recently made in some of the Union papers, they intend now to make no further opposition, but to stand by and let the plan of Nullification take its course.

This brief sketch of the State, of things in our Sister State of South Carolina, Mr. Craige, is presented to your readers,—that they may no longer be misled by names,—but see clearly the approaching crisis. Yes—a great, and momentous crisis is rapidly approaching, and it is time, that every free man should diligently set himself to work to understand clearly, and distinctly the great principles that are involved in the contest now going in this Republic.

The people of North Carolina might not, any cannot be indifferent to the attitude of South Carolina. The movement, in S. C. whatever it may be, from the irresistible force of circumstances, must affect North Carolina, altogether as much as if we composed an integral part of that State; not to be sure in the first instance, but certainly in the consequence.

Every intelligent man then turn his attention to the Tariff, and study its operations, and let him not turn his mind from the subject until he fully understands the principles involved in the question.

A NORTH CAROLINIAN.