

dowd to the glory of that God whom, while on earth, it was his chief delight to honor and serve. And now, my dear aunt, shall we mourn for this loved one, as those who have no hope? Shall we not rather rejoice that a spirit so holy, and so pure and holy, that the breath of a diabolical would have wounded mortally;—to whom the toil and cares of struggling for a subsistence for those who were dependent on his daily exertions, were unobtrusive because they distracted his thoughts from Heaven;—the measure of those whose earthly fame was full—and whose tender affections had been wrung by the death of his beloved children, and uprooted from this earth—shall we not rejoice that all sorrow and suffering for him is at an end, all tears forever wiped from his eyes; and his delighted spirit, unfettered from this carbonaceous coil, is reveling in the beatitude of Heaven; bathing in the pure stream which flows around the throne of the Lamb; and that the mighty intellect whose grasp encompassed human science could not satisfy, is now ranging among worlds and adamantine spheres, commingling with the ages of classic days, and with the Patriarchs, Apostles, and the Fathers of the Church!

It is a striking coincidence, that the day of his death, the 18th of February, was also that of the great Luther.

There is a moral sublimity in his life, in his death, and in the assurance of where his spirit now is, that I pray God may sink deeply into the hearts of all he has left behind; and may we also be ready to join him when the summons shall come to us.

SUNDAY AFTERNOON.

We are in the midst of the confusion of preparing to leave this city—the scene, once, of so much happiness, lately of so much anguish. It will now ever be a consecrated spot to us; for here rest the mortal remains of him who was our earthly idol. The remains of my sister Agnes are to be brought from the vault in Baltimore, and placed by his side.

No doubt Judge Clayton has sent you all the papers containing accounts of the last hours paid him who was worthy of all honor.

This event has exhibited, perhaps more strikingly than any thing else could, the deep and universal attachment which he had excited. Young and old, rich and poor, learned and illiterate, noble and humble, all, all, crowded the house with kind and anxious inquiries until the last answer was given, which seemed to clothe the whole city and country in mourning. Unobtrusive as was his piety, it was yet so consistent and so mingled with all the affairs of life, that it could not but be manifest to all associated with him. A little anecdote illustrating this, occurs to me at this moment, which I will repeat. When we first arrived here, 11th January, and took up our lodgings, we were prevented by an accident from having our private table, as had been stipulated; and we took our meals with the family with whom we boarded—a very genteel one, by-the-by;—they are not in the habit of saying grace, which father bore several days without comment; but after the second day, he consulted us what was to be done about it, and, though there was a considerable struggle in his mind lest he should appear officious or over scrupulous, he at length came to the conclusion that it was his duty to bear this cross. On entering the breakfast room next morning, he greeted the family with his usual winning smile, and they stood respectfully for him to be first seated—he then spoke, and said: "Before we sit down, I wish to ask you, master and mistress of the house, if you have any objection to my saying grace at our meals? It has always been my habit in my own family, and I feel as if I could not enjoy my meals without it." Of course they gratefully assented to it; such an example, from one entitled to so much respect, I hope, they will imitate. I see him now vividly before me, as his manly and majestic form bent lowly over the table, his eloquent hand spread in supplication, while his waving curls were thrown back by the movement from his intellectual and beautiful forehead. Such a man, in such an attitude, might well impress every beholder with veneration and love!

When the undertaker came to perform his duty, I am told my father's weeping servants were giving him an account of his peaceful and glorious exit: "when the angels came down from Heaven to receive him," said one, "the sun shone out, and the bird began to sing." "Yes," said another, "I have been in his service these many years, and soon how he lived—the Bible and prayer were his daily food, and never was there a kinder master than I have had—it was right that he should die the death of the righteous, and I only hope my last end may be like his."

My mother sends you a sister's love; with the enclosed profile likeness of my father, which, in our opinion, is infinitely better than any which has been taken.—The features are exact, even to the last of his life, and it only wants the scintillation of genius and feeling to make the resemblance complete—no himself thought it so good, that he left each of his children one from the same plate.—When his works are completed, you, of course, my dear aunt, shall have the first copy.

We leave here in a day or two, for Baltimore, to wind up our affairs there as speedily as possible, and then proceed with our uncle, Judge C. (who writes us word he will meet us in Baltimore,) to our future home in Richmond.

If it will interest you, my dear aunt, I will continue to write you an account of our family and proceedings.

This is indeed a long letter, but the interest of the subject will justify it with you, I am sure.

Dear mother, Ross, and Ellen, unite in warm affection for you, together with,

Respectfully and affectionately,

Your young Niece,

CATHARINE G. WIRT.

Mrs. Eliza Clarton, Augusta, Ga.

CHARLOTTE, (N. C.) April 5, 1834.

Rich Ore.—We are informed that the mine owned by the Messrs. Lewis, sixteen miles south-east of this place, is now yielding, with the work of four hands and a one-horse mill, from seven to nine hundred dwts. of gold, in the quicksilver, per day—averaging from two to three hundred dwts. of pure gold. On Friday week, they obtained from one day's grinding, eleven hundred dwts. of gold in the quicksilver—making 366½ dwts. of pure gold for that day's work. Pifer's mine, in the same neighborhood, and with the same force, is yielding about the same.

A Royal Abstinence.—The Crown Prince of Sweden has lately presided at a Temperance Meeting, and declared himself the Patron of the Stockholm Temperance Society.

THE PRESIDENT'S PROTEST.

(Sent to the Senate on Thursday the 17th April, 1834.)

To the Senate of the United States:

It appears, by the published journal of the Senate, that on the 26th of December last, a resolution was offered by a member of the Senate, which, after a protracted debate, was, on the 28th day of March last, modified by the mover, and passed by the votes of twenty-six Senators out of forty-six, who were present and voted, in the following words, viz.

"Resolved, That the President, in the late Executive proceedings in relation to the public revenue, has assumed upon himself authority and power not conferred by the Constitution and laws, and in derogation of both."

Having had the honor, through the voluntary suffrages of the American people, to fill the office of President of the United States during the period which may be presumed to have been referred to in this resolution, it is sufficiently evident that the censure it inflicts was intended for myself.—Without notice, unheard and untried, I thus find myself charged, on the records of the Senate, and in a firm hitherto unknown in our history, with the high crime of violating the laws and Constitution of my country.

It can seldom be necessary for any Department of the Government, when assailed in conversation, or debate, or by the strictures of the press or of popular assemblies, to step out of its ordinary path for the purpose of vindicating its conduct, or of pointing out any irregularity or injustice in the manner of the attack. But when the Chief Executive Magistrate is, by one of the most important branches of the Government, in its official capacity, in a public manner, and by its recorded sentence, but without precedent, competent authority, or just cause, declared guilty of a breach of the laws and Constitution, it is due to his station, to public opinion, and to a proper self-respect, that the officer thus denounced should promptly expose the wrong which had been done.

In the present case, moreover, there is even a stronger necessity for such a vindication. By an express provision of the Constitution, before the President of the United States can enter on the execution of his office, he is required to take an oath or affirmation in the following words: "I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the office of President of the United States; and will, to the best of my ability, preserve, protect, and defend, the Constitution of the United States."

The duty of defending, so far as in him lies, the integrity of the Constitution, would indeed have resulted from the very nature of his office; but by thus expressing it in the official oath or affirmation, which, in this respect, differs from that of every other functionary, the founders of our republic have attested their sense of its importance, and have given to it a peculiar solemnity and force.—Bound to the performance of this duty by the oath, I have taken by the strongest obligations of gratitude to the American people, and by the ties which unite my every earthly interest with the welfare and glory of my country, and perfectly convinced that the discussion and passage of the above-mentioned resolution were not only unauthorized by the Constitution, but in many respects repugnant to its provisions and subversive of the rights secured by it to other co-ordinate departments, I deem it an imperative duty to maintain the supremacy of that sacred instrument, and the immunities of the department entrusted to my care, by all means consistent with my own lawful powers, with the rights of others, and with the genius of our civil institutions. To this end, I have caused this, my most solemn protest against the aforesaid proceedings, to be placed on the files of the Executive Department, and to be transmitted to the Senate.

It is alike due to the subject, the Senate, and the people, that the views which I have taken of the proceedings referred to, and which compel me to regard them in the light that has been mentioned, should be exhibited at length, and with the freedom and firmness which are required by an occasion so unprecedented and peculiar.

Under the Constitution of the United States, the powers and functions of the various departments of the Federal Government, and their responsibilities for violation or neglect of duty, are clearly defined, or result by necessary inference. The Legislative power, subject to the qualified negative of the President, is vested in the Congress of the United States, composed of the Senate and House of Representatives. The Executive power is vested exclusively in the President, except that, in the conclusion of treaties and in certain appointments to office, he is to act with the advice and consent of the Senate. The Judicial power is vested exclusively in the Supreme and other Courts of the United States, except in cases of impeachment, for which purpose the accusatory power is vested in the House of Representatives, and that of hearing and determining, in the Senate. But although, for the special purposes which have been mentioned, there is an occasional intermixture of the powers of the different departments, yet with these exceptions, each of the three great departments is independent of the others in its sphere of action; and when it deviates from that sphere, is not responsible to the others, further than it is expressly made so in the Constitution. In every other respect, each of them is the coequal of the other two, and all are the servants of the American People, without power or right to control or censure each other in the service of their common superior, save only in the manner and to the degree which that superior has prescribed.

The responsibilities of the President are numerous and weighty. He is liable to impeachment for high crimes and misdemeanors, and, on due conviction, to removal from office, and perpetual disqualification; and notwithstanding such conviction, he may also be indicted and punished according to law. He is also liable to the private action of any party who may have been injured by his illegal mandates or instructions, in the same manner and to the same extent as the humblest functionary.—In addition to the responsibilities which may thus be enforced by impeachment, criminal prosecution, or suit at law, he is also accountable at the bar of public opinion for every act of his administration. Subject only to the restraints of Truth and Justice,

Years—Messrs. Bibb, Black, Calhoun, Clay, Clayton, Ewing, Frelinghuysen, Kent, Knight, Leigh, Mangum, Naudain, Poindexter, Porter, Prentiss, Preston, Robbins, Silsbee, Smith, Southard, Sprague, Swift, Tomlinson, Tyler, Waggoner, Webster.—20.

Days—Messrs. Benton, Brown, Forsyth, Grundy, Hendricks, Hill, Kane, King of Ala., King of Ga., Linn, McKean, Moore, Morris, Robinson, Shepley, Tallmadge, Tipton, White, Wilkins, Wright.—20.

the free people of the United States have the undoubted right, as individuals or collectively, orally or in writing, at such times and in such language and form as they may think proper, to discuss his official conduct, and to express and promulgate their opinions concerning it. Indirectly, also, his conduct may come under review in either branch of the Legislature, or in the Senate when acting in its Executive capacity, and, so far as the executive or legislative proceedings of these bodies may require it, it may be examined by them. These are believed to be the proper and only modes in which the President of the United States is to be held accountable for his official conduct.

Tested by these principles, the resolution of the Senate is wholly unauthorized by the Constitution, and in derogation of its entire spirit. It assumes that a single branch of the Legislative Department may, for the purposes of a public censure, and without any view to legislation or impeachment, take up, consider, and decide upon, the official acts of the Executive. But in no part of the Constitution is the President subjected to any such responsibility, and in no part of that instrument is any such power conferred on either branch of the Legislature.

The justice of these conclusions will be illustrated and confirmed by a brief analysis of the powers of the Senate, and a comparison of their recent proceedings with those powers.

The high functions assigned by the Constitution to the Senate, are in their nature either Legislative, Executive, or Judicial. It is only in the exercise of its Judicial powers, when sitting as a Court for the trial of Impeachments, that the Senate is expressly authorized and necessarily required to consider and decide upon the conduct of the President, or any other public officer. Indirectly, however, as has already been suggested, it may frequently be called on to perform that office. Cases may occur, in the course of its Legislative or Executive proceedings, in which it may be indispensable to the proper exercise of its powers, that it should inquire into, and decide upon, the conduct of the President or other public officers; and in every such case, its constitutional right to do so is cheerfully conceded. But to authorize the Senate to enter on such a task in its Legislative or Executive capacity, the inquiry must actually grow out of and tend to some Legislative or Executive action; and the decision, when expressed, must take the form of some appropriate Legislative or Executive act.

The resolution in question was introduced, discussed, and passed, not as a joint, but as a separate resolution. It asserts no legislative power; proposes no legislative action; and neither possesses the form nor any of the attributes of a legislative measure. It does not appear to have been entertained or passed, with any view or expectation of its issuing as a law or joint resolution, or in the repeal of any law or joint resolution, or in any other legislative act.

What wanting both the form and substance of a legislative measure, it is equally manifest that the resolution was not justified by any of the Executive powers conferred on the Senate. These powers relate exclusively to the consideration of treaties and nominations to office; and they are exercised in secret session, and with closed doors. This resolution does not apply to any treaty or nomination, and was passed in a public session.

It is not, therefore, in any way belong to the class of incidental resolutions which relate to the officers of the Senate, to their chambers, and other appurtenances, or to subjects of order, and other matters of the like nature—in all which, either House may lawfully proceed, without any cooperation with the other, or with the President.

On the contrary, the whole phraseology and sense of the resolution seem to be judicial. Its essence, true character, and only practical effect, are to be found in the conduct which it charges upon the President, and in the judgment it pronounces on that conduct. The resolution, therefore, though discussed and adopted by the Senate, in its legislative capacity, is, in its office, and in all its characteristics, essentially judicial.

That the Senate possesses a high judicial power, and that instances may occur in which the President of the United States will be amenable to it, is undeniable. But under the provisions of the Constitution, it would seem to be equally plain that neither the President nor any other officer can be rightfully subjected to the operation of the judicial power of the Senate, except in the cases and under the forms prescribed by the Constitution.

The Constitution declares that "the President, Vice President, any all civil officers of the United States, shall be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors"—that the House of Representatives "shall have the sole power of impeachment"—that the Senate "shall have the sole power to try all impeachments"—that "when sitting for that purpose, they shall be on oath or affirmation"—that when the President of the United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside"—that "that no person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of the members present"—and that "judgment shall not extend further than to removal from office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of honor, trust, or profit under the United States."

The resolution above quoted, charges, in substance, that, in certain proceedings relating to the public revenue, the President has usurped authority and power not conferred upon him by the Constitution and laws, and that in doing so he violated both. Any such act constitutes a high crime—one of the highest, indeed, which the President can commit—a crime which justly exposes him to impeachment by the House of Representatives, and upon due conviction, to removal from office, and to the complete and immutable disfranchisement prescribed by the Constitution.

The resolution, then, was in substance an impeachment of the President; and in its passages, amounts to a declaration by a majority of the Senate, that he is guilty of an impeachable offence. As such, it is spread upon the journals of the Senate—published to the nation and to the world—made part of our enduring archives—and incorporated in the history of the age. The punishment of removal from office and future disqualification, does not, it is true, follow this decision; nor would it have followed the like decision, if the regular forms of proceeding had been pursued, because the requisite number did not concur in the result. But the moral influence of a solemn declaration, by a majority of the Senate, that the accused is guilty of the offence charged upon him, has been as effectually secure as if the like declaration had been made upon an impeachment expressed in the same

terms. Indeed, a greater practical effect has been gained, because the votes given for the resolution, though not sufficient to authorize a judgment of guilty on an impeachment, were numerous enough to carry that resolution.

That the resolution does not expressly allege that the assumption of power and authority, which it condemns, was intentional and corrupt, is no answer to the preceding view of its character and effect. The act thus condemned, necessarily implies sedition and design in the individual to whom it is imputed, and being unlawful in its character, the legal conclusion is, that it was prompted by improper motives, and committed with an unlawful intent. The charge is not of a mistake in the exercise of supposed powers, but of the assumption of powers not conferred by the Constitution and laws, and in derogation of both, and nothing is suggested to excuse or palliate the turpitude of the act. In the absence of any such excuse or palliation, there is only room for one inference; and that is, that the intent was unlawful and corrupt. Besides, the resolution not only contains no mitigating suggestions, but, on the contrary, it holds up the act complained of, as a justly-objectionable example and reprobation; and thus as distinctly stamps it with imputations of motive, as if the strongest epithets had been used.

The President of the United States, therefore, has been, by a majority of his constitutional triers, accused and found guilty of an impeachable offence; but in no part of this proceeding have the directions of the Constitution been observed.

The impeachment, instead of being preferred and prosecuted by the House of Representatives, originated in the Senate, and was prosecuted without the aid or concurrence of the other House. The oath or affirmation prescribed by the Constitution, was not taken by the Senators; the Chief Justice did not preside; no notice of the charge was given to the accused; and no opportunity afforded him to respond to the accusation, to meet his accusers face to face, to cross-examine the witnesses, to produce exonerating testimony, or to be heard in his defence. The solemnity and formalities which the Constitution has connected with the power of impeachment, were doubtless supposed, by the framers of that instrument, to be essential to the protection of the public servant, to the attainment of justice, and to the order, impartiality, and dignity of the procedure. These safeguards and formalities were not only practically disregarded, in the commencement and conduct of these proceedings, but, in their result, I find myself convicted, by less than two-thirds of the members present, of an impeachable offence.

In vain may it be alleged, in defence of this proceeding, that the form of the resolution is not that of an impeachment, or of a judgment thereupon; that the punishment prescribed in the Constitution does not follow its adoption; or that, in this case, no impeachment is to be expected from the House of Representatives. It is because it did not assume the form of an impeachment, that it is the more palpably repugnant to the Constitution; for it is through that form only that the President is judicially responsible to the Senate; and though neither removal from office nor future disqualification ensues, yet it is not to be presumed that the framers of the Constitution considered either or both of those results as constituting the whole of the punishment they prescribed. The judgment of guilty by the highest tribunal in the Union; the stigma it would inflict on the offender, his family and fame; and the perpetual record on the journal, handing down to future generations the story of his disgrace, were doubtless regarded by them as the bitterest portions, if not the very essence, of that punishment. So far, therefore, as some of its most material parts are concerned, the passage, recording, and promulgation of the resolution, are an attempt to bring them on the President, in a manner unauthorized by the Constitution. To shield him and other officers who are liable to impeachment, from consequences so momentous, except when really merited by official delinquencies, the Constitution has most carefully guarded the whole process of impeachment. A majority of the House of Representatives must think the officer guilty, before he can be charged. Two-thirds of the Senate must pronounce him guilty, or he is deemed to be innocent. Forty-six Senators appear, by the journal, to have been present when the vote on the resolution was taken. If, after all the solemnities of an impeachment, thirty of those Senators had voted that the President was guilty, yet would he have been acquitted; but, by the mode of proceeding adopted in the present case, a lasting record of conviction has been entered up, by the votes of twenty-six Senators, without an impeachment or trial; whilst the Constitution expressly declares that, to the entry of such a judgment, an accusation by the House of Representatives, a trial by the Senate, and a concurrence of two-thirds in the vote of guilty, shall be indispensably prerequisite.

Whether or not an impeachment was to be expected from the House of Representatives, was a point on which the Senate had no constitutional right to speculate, and in respect to which, even had it possessed the spirit of prophecy, its anticipations would have furnished no just grounds for this procedure. Admitting that there was reason to believe that a violation of the Constitution and laws had been actually committed by the President, still it was the duty of the Senate, as his sole constitutional judges, to wait for an impeachment from the other House should think proper to prefer it. The members of the Senate could have no right to infer that no impeachment was intended. On the contrary, every legal and rational presumption on their part ought to have been, that if there was good reason to believe him guilty of an impeachable offence, the House of Representatives would perform its constitutional duty by arraigning the offender before the justice of his country. The contrary presumption would involve an implication derogatory to the integrity and honor of the Representatives of the people. But suppose the suspicion thus implied were actually entertained, and for good cause, how can it justify the assumption by the Senate of powers not conferred by the Constitution?

It is only necessary to look at the condition in which the Senate and the President have been placed by this proceeding, to perceive its utter incompatibility with the provisions and the spirit of the Constitution, and with the plainest dictates of humanity and justice.

If the House of Representatives shall be of opinion that there is just ground for the censure pronounced upon the President, then will it be the solemn duty of that House to prefer the proper accusation, and to cause him to be brought to trial by the constitutional tribunal. But in what condition

would he find that tribunal? A majority of its members have already considered the case, and have not only formed but expressed a definite judgment upon its merits. It is the policy of our design-systems of jurisprudence, to secure, in all criminal proceedings, and even to the most trivial, litigious, a fair, unprejudiced, and impartial trial. And surely it cannot be less important that such a trial should be secured to the highest officers of the Government.

[To be concluded next week.]



Western Carolinian.

SALISBURY

SATURDAY, MAY 17, 1834.

Our We commence, to-day, the publication of the celebrated "Protest," which, on account of its great length, we are compelled to divide.

This is an useful, specious paper, well calculated to mislead the understanding of some, and to operate upon the sympathy of others. We consider it, and so do all who are not more devoted to selfish purposes, and the service of one man, than to the integrity of the Government, a most flagrant attempt to bring odium upon the Senate, to prostrate that peculiar guardian of State Rights, destroy the main check upon the large States, and, with it, the principal barrier to a perfect consolidation of power in the hands of the Executive.

In this, its true light, it demands the serious attention of every American, and should be investigated in the same manner that a jury examines the charge of high crime against an individual, "without fear, favor, or affection."

What is the issue put before the country? This should be clearly understood before the trial commences. In few words, it is, whether "the President, in the late Executive proceedings in relation to the public revenue," (the removal of the depositories) has or has not assumed upon himself authority and power not conferred by the Constitution and Laws, but in derogation of both.

The Senate of the United States has said that he has assumed such power; the President denies the charge, appeals to the People, and, strange to say, in his very defence, (as it is improperly called) while denying that he has exercised unlawful power, he claims the right to possess *ex officio* more extensive than those he was charged with assuming; and, in the same breath that he accuses the Senate of unconstitutional conduct in entering upon their own Journals a resolution disapproving his acts, he demands of them to place upon the *Journal* his accusation against them!

We entreat our countrymen to ponder well this new and monstrous claim of power—to this bold attempt to degrade, and of course to destroy, the only feature of the General Government which proclaims the true origin and nature of our Confederation—that it is an union of Independent States. Be not misled by the desperate resort, worthy only of a miserable demagogue, to the abused maxim that a majority ought to govern! True it is that in the House of Representatives a majority of the People of the United States do decide all questions properly before that body, because there each State is represented according to its population. But not so in the Senate.—In that body the States are represented as equal Sovereigns, the smallest being entitled to as much power, in the Senate, as the largest. This is the great security of the small States; without it, the absolute majority in the House would run over them; without this, let it be remembered, our present Constitution never would have been adopted. The different States were supposed to have different interests; and therefore it was that equal power was reserved by them in one branch of Congress, where a majority of States, and not of People, decide political questions. Were it otherwise, five States might pass what laws they pleased—for, out of the 240 members in the House, five of the States send 121, which is a majority.

But, to justify himself, the President attempts to show that a majority of the States are in favor of his conduct. He cites resolutions of the Legislatures of three, to show that the Senators from those States did not represent the will of their constituents. Does he believe that a majority of members of the Legislatures always represent the will of a majority of the People? He and his party did not think so in reference to the last Virginia Legislature. That body passed resolutions disapproving his conduct, and instructing the Senators from the State to vote in opposition to it; one of those Senators was so confident the Legislature had misrepresented the will of the People, that he resigned his seat, and appealed to them; but they have sustained the Legislature. The President was evidently deceived there; and how does he know but he may be deceived as to public sentiment in Maine, New Jersey, and Ohio? But, suppose him to be right in that particular, is it becoming in him, as President of the United States, to arraign Senators before their constituents, charge them with infidelity to their trusts, and issue an *electioneering "Protest"* to put them down? What other President ever dreamed of such impudent interference in the concerns of the States! Who but Andrew Jackson would dare thus boldly to enter the lists and attempt to control the votes of Senators by intimidation!

If the President is to be the sole judge of the will of the People, and of the expediency and constitutionality of laws, let us at once abolish the mockery of Congress and the Judiciary, and proclaim him King in law, as he is in fact.

Fearful that he might not succeed, by argument, to get his arbitrary conduct approved by the People, he has made an appeal to their sympathies and to their feelings and passions. This is the last stale artifice of every usurper. Does he suppose that, in the contemplation of his scars, the Freemen of the United States can look with indifference upon the wounds he has inflicted upon the Constitution of their country? Did he fight their battles for the preservation of their liberty, or for his own glory and aggrandisement?

What does it matter, to the People, whether George or William of England, or Andrew of Tennessee, be their King? Would a yoke made of native Hecy bear more gently upon our necks than one manufactured out of the Royal Oak of England!

We conjure you, fellow-citizens, to look seriously and steadily upon the present aspect of your Government. It is ominous to your rights, to all the privileges you enjoy as Freemen, as Republicans; and it adma