

ly produce collisions;—that if we advise Congress to regulate the price of the public lands to suit the interests and prosperity of the old States only, so may the new States demand that their interests and their advancement shall be exclusively consulted. The right of the latter to give their instructions, is as perfect as ours. At last, then, it must devolve upon Congress to legislate upon this subject, with a view to the rights, interest, honor, and prosperity, of all the States.

The undersigned do not undertake to determine that the price of our public lands is too high, or too low; but, in either case, the reason assigned in this resolution of advice to Congress, is, in our judgment, unworthy of our State, and unsuited to the character she has always deserved and always maintained for her devoted and patriotic attachment to the Union of the States,—an union which cannot be preserved, if each member of it acts upon the principle that her individual interest and prosperity must be exclusively recognized by the national councils.

The injury to our prosperity, which it was mainly urged (in the debate on these resolutions) a reduction in the price of our public lands would produce, is, that it would increase emigration from North Carolina to the Western States. Now this may or may not be true. But if true, does it form a just consideration, by which the Congress of the United States are to be influenced in regulating the price of the public lands? And if it were so, who can pretend that it is one of such prominence as to shut out all others from their view? To us it appears almost self-evident, that, supposing the reason to be good, the conclusion which follows from it must be, that the price of the public lands ought to be increased, nay, that our Land Offices ought to be closed! Moreover, if it were conceded that the prosperity of the new States injuriously affects the interests of the old ones, by withdrawing a portion of their population, we more than doubt the honor or justice of instructing our Representatives in Congress, who convene to legislate for all the western as well as the eastern, northern, and southern States, to contract the sphere of their political observation within bounds narrower than the whole Union; and to look at the interest and prosperity of a part only. We deprecate such a course, as selfish and unpatriotic; and we protest against it, as having a tendency to create dangerous jealousies and kindle the most invidious feelings among the States. It treats the new States as if they were foreign governments; and by regarding their prosperity, their honor, and their glory, as so many impediments to our own elevation.

We do not indeed admit the propriety, ordinarily, of sacrificing the rights of North Carolina, for promoting the interest of other sections of the country; but we likewise protest against the envious demand of regarding our interest alone, without respect to the rights of others. Not to enlarge more upon this topic, we earnestly ask with what decency can the Representatives of North Carolina denounce the selfish motives upon which alone rests this unfounded claim of a new State to the exclusive enjoyment of the common property of the Union, whilst the very grounds upon which we require them to resist that claim are neither less ignoble nor more disinterested? If our representatives must regulate the price of the public lands so as to retard the settlement of the new States, because it is our interest to do it, will not the new States be exonerated for claiming the exclusive ownership of the lands, because it is their interest to do so?

Further, we protest against the second Resolution: Because, after asserting that the public debt is paid, it erroneously concludes that, therefore, a distribution of the public lands ought to be made among all the States: Because, it requires that distribution to be made absolutely, and without reference to the situation of our national finances.—No matter what may be the exigencies of the nation, no matter what the circumstances of the country, (so far as this resolution is concerned,) the stream of wealth which flows from this source of our National Treasury, and distributed among the States— even though there shall be a want for money to meet the legitimate expenditures of the Federal Government— it must not be applied from the proceeds of the public lands; these must go to the States, and the National Treasury must be replenished by additional taxes, or by creating a national debt! Because, some of our purest and ablest statesmen have well doubted the constitutional power of Congress to become in any form the dispensers of public money or other bounties to the States; and this resolution not only acknowledges the right, but enjoins it upon Congress to exercise the doubtful power. Hence, too, some States which esteem their political principles 'filthy lucre,' would be constrained to refuse an acceptance of its proportion, whilst those which entertain different opinions would take theirs; and others, again, might barter their principles to secure a share of the spoils.

The undersigned refer to the substitute which was offered by one of them as an amendment to this resolution; and they confidently rely upon the judgment of an impartial people, that it affords a double guaranty against the dangers of corruption, from the unnecessary accumulation of national revenue on the one hand, and the fear of usurpation in the exercise of ungranted or doubtful powers by the Federal Government, on the other.

Finally, we protest against these resolutions being considered as instructions to our Senators, which, in our judgment they would be, if disconnected from the circumstances under which they passed the House of Commons: Because, it was distinctly avowed in debate, by some of those who advocated the passage of the resolutions, that they were not "instructions to our Senators," and this was acquiesced in by the silence of nearly all, if not every other member of the majority. Because, a large proportion of the members of the House of Commons, who had, during this Session, denied the right of the General Assembly to instruct the Senators, yet voted in favor of these Resolutions. Because, these resolutions were introduced, and the vote was finally taken at a late period of the session, and after many members had obtained leave of absence, and many others were not present to vote.

House of Commons, 10th January, 1835.  
Signed, William H. Haywood, Jr., Philip Irion, Blake W. Braswell, John E. Brown, L. A. Gwyn, Isaac Carter, James M. Hutchison, Thomas Tatham, S. Register, Turner Bynum, J. L. Smith, G. R. Kean, Thos. J. Judkins, L. H. Marsteller, William Foushee.

Which Protest was ordered to be spread at large on the journals of the House.

## RELATIONS WITH FRANCE.

(Copied from the National Intelligencer.)

### ABSTRACT OF MR. CLAY'S REPORT

On the subject of the French Indemnity—presented to the Senate on the 6th instant.

The Report sets out with expressing the entire concurrence of opinion of the Committee with the President as to the justice of the claims for the payment of which the Treaty between the United States and France makes provision. They had their origin in flagrant violations of the law of Nations, and of our neutral rights for which the pretence alleged at the time afforded no justification. At the period of those aggressions, the Government of the United States would have been fully justified had it then appealed to arms to vindicate our outraged rights; and it was a fact known to those who were conversant with the history of the times, that the expediency of such a measure had been seriously considered in the councils of the United States. The election between the two belligerents, by which another Nation became the enemy at that time, arose not from any insensibility to the injuries received from France, but from considerations of a different nature. Restrained by prudential considerations from then making war upon France, the United States had yet resolved never to acquiesce in the wrong and injustice done to them, but to persevere in the demand of indemnity until it should be obtained. As early as 1812, one of our most distinguished citizens, appointed Minister to France, was instructed to demand reparation for these wrongs, and the demand had been persisted in by every Administration from that day down to the conclusion of the Treaty of 1831.

The report then goes on to say, that of these claims the amount had not previously to the Treaty been fully ascertained, and could not be exactly known until they were finally adjudicated; but the Committee concur entirely with the President in the opinion that the amount awarded by the Treaty, by way of indemnity, falls far short of the just claims of our citizens, including damages. The Treaty had nevertheless been received in this country with general satisfaction, for several reasons, but, more than all, for the reason that the People of the United States saw in it the removal of the only obstacle to perfect harmony between this country and a nation, the remembrance of whose ancient friendship was always dear to them. It had not been for a moment supposed that a Treaty between the two countries, being on the face of it a perfect obligation, would be violated by the failure of either party to perform the stipulations on its side, &c.; and so little did Congress apprehend such a state of things, that they passed several Acts founded upon the Treaty, one of which was to provide for the investment of the money to be received under the Treaty, in some productive fund, for the benefit of the claimants, until the adjudication of the claims should be completed. In consequence of this last provision, when the first instalment became due, a draft was drawn for the amount, the protest of which was the first notice of the non-execution of the Treaty. To the manner in which this draft was drawn, perhaps, on the score of formality or etiquette, some exception might be taken; but the Committee are unanimously of opinion that the mode adopted, of drawing for the money, was fully justified by the terms of the treaty. It is with profound regret, says the report, that the Committee have learnt the failure of the reasonable expectations of the Executive and of the country, as to the execution of the Treaty.

The report goes on to say, as the President in his message justly remarks, the idea of acquiescence in the refusal to execute the Treaty can never be for a moment entertained. The United States can never abandon their rights under it.—When negotiation for procuring the execution of the Treaty shall be exhausted, it will then be for the United States to consider what other measures are necessary to procure their rights to be respected. In the opinion of the President, that period has already arrived, and he has recommended to Congress to authorize Reprisals, in the event of a failure of France promptly to make payment, &c. The President, however, does not present the course of Reprisals as the only one open to Congress; but, by the admission of the alternative of waiting a further time for the action of the French Chambers, leaves to the choice of Congress the two courses, of further negotiation, or of a contingent measure which, in its consequence, may possibly lead to war. As to the latter course, if the habits, inclinations, and interests, of this People, are opposed to war when not unavoidable, with what added force do not all these objections apply to a war with an ancient ally, towards whom the People of the United States entertain the kindest sentiments.—Partaking of this sentiment themselves, the Committee extended their inquiry, first into the practicability and expediency of the peaceful alternative presented by the message.

The report here proceeds to a critical analysis of the correspondence (between our Minister and the French Ministry) which preceded the formation of the Treaty, showing, by various quotations from it, that, throughout the negotiation, the King of France evinced the most friendly feelings towards the United States, and took an unusual interest in the adjustment of the question between the two countries. Our Minister had been reminded, ever and over again, of the difficulties which the Ministers would have to encounter from the Chambers in consequence of the Treaty, &c. To this history of the negotiation the Committee did not advert to justify the omission of the French Government to carry into effect the Treaty; the difficulty now experienced in the French Chambers being an affair between them and their own Government, and not between them and our Government.—But the Committee had recurred to this correspondence, because, after the warnings which were given of the difficulties which would have to be encountered, a fair construction ought to be put upon the course of the King and his Ministers in this matter. If the King has throughout acted with good faith, and is still laboring to effect the passage of a bill in the Chambers to carry into effect the Treaty, it would be not only unjust, as respects the French Government, but impolitic, and unwise, as respects the claimants themselves, to throw obstacles in the way of the success of the King's exertions, by the adoption of rash or hasty measures, even contingently, which might convert some of the warm friends in the Chambers into bitter enemies of the claims.

The report then proceeds to the consideration of what has transpired since the ratification of the Treaty; carefully reviewing and analyzing the correspondence which has since passed between

the Ministers of the two countries, &c. The Committee express the great pleasure they have in concurring with the President of the United States and Mr. Livingston in entire confidence in the good faith of the King, &c., as professed in several of the letters from our Secretary of State and our Minister in France; and they consider it due to candor to declare that they have seen no reason since to distrust the sincerity or perfect integrity of the King in this matter.

It having been arranged in the correspondence which followed the rejection of the bill by the Chambers, that this Government should await further action of the French Chambers before taking any other step, the Committee proceeded to examine on what ground the President now recommends action without waiting. They review the correspondence between the French Minister here and our Secretary of State, in reference to the supposed pledge of the French Minister for an extraordinary convocation of the Chambers. The Committee do not find such a pledge, though they find every assurance that the earliest practicable opportunity will be seized for pressing the bill upon the Chambers.

They find an expression of an expectation on the part of the President that the King will use his whole constitutional power, (which includes the power to convene the Chambers at any time,) but they do not find that expectation to have been responded to by the French Minister; or if it was, the document containing the response has not been communicated to Congress, &c. If the Chambers had been convened earlier than usual, though nothing should have been done by them, at the time that Congress met, it is not probable, says the Report, that the President would have held the language towards France which is contained in his Message: nor would he, if he had known what subsequent intelligence has disclosed, that the Chambers were to meet on the 1st of December.

The reasons assigned by the French Minister for not calling an extra meeting of the Chambers, were plausible at least; and if they do not command conviction, would justly acquiescence in the course of the King, if, as the Committee are entirely convinced, throughout the negotiation, and on all occasions, before the treaty and after the treaty, the King has invariably shown an anxious desire for the satisfactory adjustment of the differences between France and the United States.—The opposition to the execution of the treaty had not proceeded from the King of France or his Ministers, but from the Chamber of Deputies.—Whilst these exertions are making by the French Government, the policy of this Government is to strengthen them—to second them—and, above all, to do nothing to impair the force of them.

The refusal of one branch of a Government, it is true, (says the report) to execute a Treaty, may be regarded as the refusal of the whole Government; but, when the head of the Government evinces the earnestness which has been shown in this case by the political head of the French Government, such a conclusion ought not to be hastily drawn. Upon the whole, the Committee are of opinion that the time has not yet arrived when Congress is called upon to go into the consideration of the very serious question, whether they will enter into any measure for the purpose of taking into their own hands redress of wrongs by France. The Committee are of opinion that Congress ought to avoid any resort to war, or to the measures which may lead to it, and rather wait to see the result of the exertions which the French King is undoubtedly making to carry the Treaty into full effect.

The committee agree in opinion with the President, that we cannot now go behind the Treaty, that the question of the fact of wrong and the amount of indemnity must be considered as closed by it. But, for all other purposes, the committee say, the door is still open to negotiation. The misapprehensions on the subject of this treaty, and the claims of the United States, which appear to have existed in the French Chambers, and prevented their legislative action on the Treaty, may be removed by explanations, &c., which the United States should be ready and willing to make. We might indeed proudly and coldly hold up the treaty in our hands, and say to France, for our only argument, Here is your bond! But it is due to the dignity and the character of this nation to satisfy France and the world that, though she has given her obligation to pay the money, we would scorn to accept it if it could be shown that it was not accorded in conformity to the principles of immutable justice.

Many cases have occurred in our history in which we have received from other nations injuries which, if so minded, the United States might have considered just cause of war, which might have been prosecuted at the expense of thousands of lives and millions of money. Other and better counsels, however, had prevailed, and peace preserved, with ultimate advantage to the country.—Even in the case of France, our claims, resisted for more than twenty years, have been at length acknowledged, as they ought to have been at first. We have the act of the treaty-making power for liquidating them, and, sooner or later, says the Report, the provisions of the Treaty must be fulfilled by the other branches of that Government.

Here the Report goes on to say, the committee might stop, having expressed their opinion in favor of the alternative discussed.—But they feel bound to say something on the other branch of the President's suggestion, that we ought to take redress into our own hands without further delay, should the approbation for the treaty not be forthwith made by the French Chambers. In regard to Reprisals, recommended by the Message as a pacific measure, the report says they are indeed not War, but they may lead to War. It is inconceivable that a powerful and chivalrous nation like France would quietly submit to the seizure of the property of its unoffending citizens pursuing a lawful commerce. In our own Constitution the power to grant letters of Reprisal is sufficiently classed among the powers of Congress, with the power to declare war; and the Committee are not satisfied that Congress can constitutionally delegate the power to make Reprisals. The committee cannot conceive, the Report says, any reason why an appropriation should not be made by the French Chambers to carry the Treaty into effect; but, even supposing it possible that their just expectation in this respect should be disappointed, the Committee, without entertaining an unreasonable distrust of the Executive, expresses the opinion that Congress ought to retain to itself the right of judging at what time, and upon what state of things, reprisals ought to be resorted to. For the present, the Committee are of opinion that Congress should

refrain from any action which would evince a doubt of the sincerity of the French Government. The President has, indeed, in his recommendation of Reprisals, sought to guard it from the imputation of being a menace. But, if followed up by an Act of Congress, that act might be liable to be viewed as a measure of intimidation. The French Government and People will look to our acts, and not to our professions, and Congress itself would do the same, were the present relations of France and the United States inverted, &c.

But, should the inquiry be made, if France persist in refusing to execute the Treaty, what shall then be done? The Report says the Committee will not anticipate such a result. They looked at things as they now exist, and will not attempt to anticipate the impetrate future. This Nation has shown, when less powerful in numbers and resources than at present, that it knows how to vindicate its rights, when a resort to measures of redress is expedient and proper. When necessary, we shall not shrink from what duty may again demand of us. Whenever the occasion may arise, it cannot be doubted that our united counsels will triumphantly maintain the rights, the honor, and the interests, of the country, by all the means within their power. As things now are, however, the Report concludes by saying that the Committee think it expedient to leave Congress unfettered and free to act according to circumstances as they may hereafter occur.

The Report concludes with the following resolution: Resolved, That it is inexpedient, at this time, to pass any law vesting in the President authority for making reprisals upon French property, in the contingency of provision not being made for paying to the United States the indemnity stipulated by the Treaty of 1831, during the present session of the French Chambers.

## POLITICAL MISCELLANY.

### STATE RIGHTS "GOING AHEAD."

From the New-York Advocate.

We are happy to see that the State Rights Association in this City have become organized, and are proceeding to business in earnest and in good faith. In this benighted section of our country, where the Administration is a party, and the Opposition are a party—where every thing is scouted and discountenanced, by the leaders and the servile press, that does not come in aid of, or chime in with, the views and calculations of the present moment, nothing like liberal speculation upon political subjects will be listened to by either class. In this respect (thanks to party machinery) the State of New York is about as far behind the rest of the Union and the age, as the French claims are of being paid—at least a quarter of a century. But the days of personal parties and partisans are numbered; they cannot control public opinion much longer; the People are beginning to inquire, "cui bono?" they are beginning to think, and, ere long, they will be willing to read, and understand their rights, they will soon discover the course that their duties require them to pursue. The party press too—slavish as its course has been and yet is in most cases—begins to flutter in the wind. Symptoms of restlessness appear in some quarters, and when the excitement progresses a little further, their interest, if not their principles, will decide the matter; they must advocate democratic principles, or the people will not support them.

In the proceedings which follow, there is one resolution recommending a Convention of the States, for the purpose of amending the Constitution, which cannot be too soon or too earnestly pressed upon the consideration of the public. This is a very weighty and important political movement, and, under any circumstances, will require a considerable length of time to bring it to a consummation. That some amendment is required, is hardly doubted by any one.—The absurdity of permitting the doctrine of constructive or implied powers to be exercised by Congress, or by any officer of the Government, can no longer be tolerated in this country with safety. The pregnant instances of abuse, both in the Legislative and Executive departments of our Government, call aloud for reform. The Constitution must be so drawn as to be perfectly intelligible without a glossary; and especially no powers must be conceded or granted that are not "specified in the bond" of the Union: nothing should be left to construction or implication.

We have often alluded to the imperfections of the present Constitution of the United States; we never have, nor do we now, propose to specify them in detail, or to discuss the question at large; our object at present is merely to point to the following resolutions of the Association, as subjects worthy of the serious consideration of the public.

### STATES RIGHTS ASSOCIATION.

A special meeting of the "New York State Rights Association" was held on the 18th of December, 1834.

The Message of Governor Tazewell, to the Legislature of Virginia, having been read—

It was moved and carried, that a Committee be appointed by the Chair to draft resolutions and submit them to the Association.

The Committee, by their Chairman, reported the following resolutions, which were unanimously adopted:—

Resolved, That the political intelligence, sound republicanism, elevated feeling, and unwavering adherence to State Rights, which have ever characterized the ancient Commonwealth of Virginia, give her an honorable pre-eminence among her sister States; that the important exigency of the present time requires her to take the same lead in support of the asserted rights of the States and the People which she did in '76; and that every sincere democrat will be proud to follow, in the path of principle, one so well entitled to his utmost confidence.

Resolved, That the late message of Governor Tazewell is worthy of democratic Virginia, and will receive the hearty approbation of all whose democracy does not consist in the mere assumption of a name, or a servile adherence to the usages of a dominant party which has abandoned its fundamental principles, and relying upon its discipline and conscious of its power, now exhibits a reckless disregard for even the appearance of political consistency.

Resolved, That the obvious tendency to consolidation of the movements of the Federal Government; the encroachments of the Executive; the growing laxity of constitutional construction; the conflicting claims of State jurisdiction and Federal power, which are constantly agitating the country and threatening the ties of the Union—all proclaim the necessity and expediency of A CONVENTION OF THE STATES for the purpose of settling differences, securing rights, preventing future dissension, and perpetuating the existence of our Federal system.

Resolved, That, believing A CONVENTION OF THE STATES essential to the preservation of the reserved rights, the continuance of the delegated powers of the Federal Government, and the Union of the States, this Association doth recommend the same to the earnest consideration of the friends of State Rights, Union, and a true democratic construction of the Constitution.

Resolved, That this Association has no preference for men, except as connected with a maintenance of correct principles, and is therefore not inclined to endorse under the banner of any particular individual as a candidate for the Presidency, to gratify personal partiality or State pride—to enjoy the triumph of ambition or obtain the spoils of office; but it is decidedly opposed to any scheme of a party convention, in which a majority of nominal republicans and practical consolidationists may contrive to obtain a controlling influence, and by the aid of which, some aspiring politician, who is identified with anti-democratic doctrines and measures, may be presented to the people—perhaps under the democratic candidate, and succeed by the ingenious deception. Among the requisite accomplishments of the description of statesmen in whom democrats can confide, as fitted to discharge with fidelity and prudence the high and responsible duties appertaining to the Chief Magistracy of this Union, they recognize a consistency of democracy, proved not merely by professions, but developed in conduct, a known attachment to State Rights, and an "unqualified and uncompromising hostility" to every species of consolidation.

On motion, Resolved, That the proceedings of this meeting be published.

S. R. KIRBY, Recording Secretary.

From the Raleigh Star.

## PUBLIC LANDS.

The following proceedings in the House of Commons, took place on Saturday and Monday, the 2d and 5th instant, on the Resolutions in relation to the distribution of the proceeds of the Public Lands.

When the order of the day was announced, Mr. Henderson rose and stated the object in bringing them forward at this time; took a cursory glance at the present prospect of the country, and, in a fanciful and classic style, depicted the moral influence upon the country that could be effected, had we the funds to aid us in carrying out the desires of every patriot of the land. Mr. Henderson disclaimed any intention of making a speech on the subject; but only desired to throw the subject open to the House for discussion.

Mr. Norcum and Mr. Haywood both rose for the floor; but Mr. Norcum being in advance, succeeded in gaining it. He informed the House that he had risen to make a speech on the subject; and, as he believed it to be a subject of more importance than any subject which had engaged the attention of the House for many years, he would bring their attention to the reflections he had made upon it, and particularly that portion of its members who were opposed to the Resolutions; for he held he could convince any unbiased mind, or one open to conviction, that this measure was almost the last, if not the only hope, left North Carolina.

Mr. Norcum then entered into the history of the acquisition of these lands, from the time of Charles II, up to their cession to the General Government, and showed clearly that, since the object for which they were ceded had been answered, they of right should revert back to us. Having fixed the right, he went on to prove, from what had passed, that we did not secure them soon, or before the new census was taken, and the new members under it from the West had taken their seats, we never would get their proceeds; but they would ultimately pass into the hands of the Western States.

Mr. Norcum then described the present melancholy condition of North Carolina—asked if any had devised, or could devise, means to change her condition without this fund—argued that she could be regenerated only by a system of Internal Improvement so general in its character as to be felt throughout the State, and by Public Schools. Mr. N. then showed, by estimates, that it would take from four to six millions of dollars to effect these objects. That to attempt to tax the people in their present condition, to an amount necessary even to keep down the interest on this sum, would be impossible, even could she borrow the principal, which he doubted. Finally, that this project held out to his mind the only feasible scheme whereby the means could be raised to effect these desirable ends. Mr. N. held the floor about an hour; and, throughout his argument, was listened to with the greatest attention and respect by the House.

Mr. Haywood then followed with a short speech, professing not to understand the subject, and stating that, as it was a subject involved in great difficulty, he moved to refer it to a committee. Mr. Graham followed, and opposed the motion; and, to show that this question was not involved in any difficulty, but its history and bearing well known, entered into a discussion of the subject, in a speech about an hour's length, concurring in Mr. Norcum's views, and illustrating and embellishing the subject with a force of reason and eloquence not often heard here. Mr. Haywood then withdrew the motion, as the visible effects produced on the House by Messrs. Norcum and Graham had shown him the party was taken from the control of its leaders. They commenced a series of measures to gain time and rally the party against the resolutions.—A skirmishing was kept up until dark, when the House adjourned.

On Monday, the war commenced with a long party Jackson speech from Mr. Bragg. Saturday night, Sunday, and Sunday night, had been occupied in drilling the party; so that by this time they had grown from 8 or 10 to about 40. Mr. Haywood offered substitutes up to the last gasp; but the House voted down all motions for delay, and all substitutes offered.

During the day, Mr. Outlaw handled Mr. Bragg without gloves, and made a strong argument on the subject, which received much attention. By sun-down, the leaders of the party had been so completely demolished, as to give up the contest, and when the vote was called for, the party fled over to the support of the opposition. They could stick very well until the yeas and nays were called, where the people could see who were in fact for them, and who for party measures. Some ran, some dodged, but the mass came over and voted against Jackson's great land scheme—82 to 32.

It was amusing to by-standers, who were in the secret, to see what desperate efforts were made to rally the party, and to look on the writhings of the managers under the force of sound sense and reason. Had Mr. Haywood succeeded in getting the floor first, he would have cut off debate on their merits by moving to lay them on the table, and would thus have defeated them; but Mr. Norcum appeared, from some remarks that fell from him, to have anticipated that move, and so got the start of Mr. Haywood.

In the Senate, the party succeeded by getting the floor, moved to lay them on the table, cut off the debate, and, by a few votes, gained their end. But the people will look at the Journals, and see through this. They will show these gentlemen that their love for Jackson and party is not to, and shall not prevail in their public servants over, their love for the State.