

EXECUTIVE PATRONAGE.

From the National Intelligencer.

ABSTRACT OF MR. CALHOUN'S REPORT ON EXECUTIVE PATRONAGE.

This session of Congress has, so far as the Senate is concerned, been distinguished by some of the most elaborate and able reports ever made in either branch of the National Legislature. Conspicuous among them will stand the Report made by John C. Calhoun, from a Select Committee appointed, upon his motion, to inquire into the extent and operation of the constantly increasing patronage of the Executive of the United States. In presenting the Report, Mr. Calhoun said that it had the unanimous assent of the committee on every point of it but one, and on that one, a single member of the committee only dissented.

The Report sets out, very properly, with an effort to ascertain the present extent of the Executive patronage. For this purpose, the returns of the year 1834, not being complete, they take the year 1833, as the year affording the necessary data; which data are, first, the revenue of the General Government from all sources; secondly, the expenditures of the Government, exclusive of payment of the public debt; and thirdly, the number of persons who, as officers, agents, contractors, or in other forms, are in the receipt of the public money. The revenue of 1833, the Report states to have been over thirty-five millions of dollars; and the number of persons who are recipients of the public money, to have been sixty thousand two hundred and odd, of whom belong (as nearly as we could catch the numbers) to the Civil List 12,144; to the Military and Indian Departments 9,643; to the Navy (including Marine Corps) 6,499; and to the Post Office 31,917; all of whom derive their places directly or indirectly from the Executive; and, with the exception of the Judicial officers, are subject to removal from office at the will and pleasure of the President. If to these be added 30,549 pensioners, an aggregate appears of one hundred thousand and seventy-nine persons in the employ of the Government, or in the receipt of money from the public treasury. If to these be added the countless host of those who are seeking to displace the present recipients and beneficiaries, some idea may be formed of the extent of the influence in the country of the patronage resulting from such large disbursements of money, in which so many individuals are interested.

The Report then proceeds to show the great increase of the public expenditure in the eight years, from 1825 to 1833, inclusive, carrying with it a corresponding increase of the number and compensation of agents, officers, contractors, and others, depending for subsistence upon the Government, and of course upon the patronage of the Executive. Before instituting this comparison, however, the report adverts to the rapid increase, by Indian treaties, of reservations of lands to Indians, to be disposed of by them only with the consent of the Executive, than which it is difficult to imagine a device better calculated to enlarge the Executive patronage. The practice of removing from office persons who are well qualified for and have faithfully performed their duties, in order to introduce others in their stead, who are of the party in power—a practice of recent date—is also the subject of grave censure in this view of the Report. Cases, it is true, may be found in the early stages of this Government, in which removals from office have been made, but they are so few in number as to constitute instances rather than a practice; and it is only within a few years, that an opportunity has been afforded of testing the practice, as a system, by its effects.

Formerly, the patronage of the Executive was confined, in point of fact, to the power of nominating persons to fill occasional vacancies in the public offices. Under the contrary practice, the offices of the Government, instead of public trusts, whose faithful execution is mainly to be held in view, come to be considered as the spoils of victory after a political contest—the rewards for faithful service in the ranks of party, the recipients of which become the corrupt and supple instruments of power, &c.—and, by the hope of like reward, is created a host of hungry, greedy, and subservient partisans, ready for any service, however corrupt, &c. This practice, therefore, the Report goes on to say, is a system to encourage vice and discourage virtue, and must end, if not reformed, by overturning the Government and raising a despotism on its ruins. Faithful performance of duty being no longer a recommendation to continuance, the public officers consequently feel their dependence on the mere pleasure of the Executive, and resort to all those acts of compliance and subservience which they learn to consider as recommendations to his favor, &c.

The Report then adverts to the circumstances of the increased power which the Executive has acquired by the control which into events have given to him over the public funds. Without moaning here the question of the legality or illegality of the action of the Executive in removing the public moneys from deposit in the Bank of the United States, the Committee says that there can be no doubt upon the mind of any man that the removal of these public deposits has increased the power of the Executive, by placing the public funds at his sole and unlimited control, as they must continue to be until otherwise provided by some action on the part of Congress—if indeed any act of Congress can be passed of greater effect in this respect than that which, at the time the public moneys were removed, directed where they should be kept. The Report goes on to state some facts showing the extent of patronage exercised through this assumed power of controlling the deposits of the public money, &c. &c.

Having thus shown, by a variety of facts and arguments, of which the above can afford but a very faint idea, the enormous extent of the Executive power, the Report takes some philosophical views of the subject. Patronage, in a Government, says the report, is at best but a necessary evil; the tendency of which, even when comparatively restricted in its extent, is to debase and corrupt the morals of the community. In all well regulated free governments, therefore, no more of it will be retained than is necessary to their beneficial existence. The idea that a large Executive patronage is necessary to give efficiency to the Government is combated as a fallacy, demonstrated to be such by a comparison of the present with the past extent of that patronage in this Government. For this comparison, the Committee select the years 1825 and 1833, the former year being one in which the extent of the Executive patronage already began to be thought too great, and the latter, because it is the latest of which they can obtain correct re-

turns. From this comparison it appears that the income of the Government, including the Post Office, was, in 1825, \$25,147,000; in 1833, \$36,667,000 (rejecting fractions). That the expenditure of the Government, (exclusive of the public debt) was, in 1825, \$12,710,000; in 1833, \$25,685,000; and that the number of persons receiving emolument or compensation from the Government, was, in 1825, fifty-five thousand seven hundred and seventy-seven; and in 1833, one hundred thousand and seventy-nine persons.

Measuring the extent of the public patronage by these elements, combined with that of the gross expenditure, without advertent to other circumstances which have been shown still further to enlarge it, the result is as sixty-five to eighty-nine, shewing an increase of patronage between those years of thirty-six per cent. The progressive increase having been much greater within the last four years than within the four years preceding.

Anticipating the answer to this statement, that the increase of patronage, &c., has not been greater than the increase in the growth and population of the country, the Report goes on to show, by the operation of the several causes already enumerated, that the patronage of the Government has more than doubled, within a space of time wherein the growth and population of the country have not probably increased more than 24 per cent. But, whilst showing this, the Report denies that there is any substantial reason why the patronage of the Government should increase in proportion to its increase of population. This idea, the report goes on to show, is an assumption dangerous as well as erroneous. The danger of a patronage, thus increasing with the growth of a country, arises from the great advantage of an organized, over an unorganized mass; the great advantage which, in a populous country, power thus acquires over liberty. The Report dilates on the power which such a swelling patronage, all wielded by a single individual, gives him to corrupt the people and seize on their liberties, &c. Under a continued progressive increase of patronage, keeping pace with the increase of our population, liberty itself must certainly be lost. Nothing but reform can save it. The action of the Government must, then, be moderated. This, the Report maintains, is the principle on which our political existence depends.

The Report says, that the Committee are aware that it may be urged against their statement, that since 1833 there has been a great decrease in the public revenue by the operation of the last tariff law. But the revenue is yet as great, now that the public debt is extinguished, as it was when the public debt amounted to a hundred millions of dollars. The difference between that time and the present is, that the surplus revenue then went to pay the public creditors; whereas it now goes into the pockets of those who live upon the Treasury.

The Report next proceeds to examine into the effect of this enormous extension of Executive patronage. The Committee says, it has tended to sap the foundations of the Constitution, to throw a cloud of uncertainty over the future; to substitute a degrading subservience to power for the attachment to liberty and our free institutions, for which the American People have been heretofore distinguished. There never was a period in our history, in short, in which the prospects were more gloomy for liberty, and devotion to party and to power stronger. With this increase of patronage, the whole structure of the Government is undergoing a change. Admitting the necessity of a strong Executive, the Report enters into an argument to show that an Executive has become too strong, when it begins to regard itself as the paramount power in the Government. Nor, in our case, could the aid of the several States be successfully invoked to resist the approach of despotic power in this form. So far from opposing it, they will be more likely to aid and strengthen the Executive and, acting in conjunction with it, constitute a joint force difficult to be resisted by any other authority.

For these evils, present and prospective, the Report says, there can be but one effectual remedy, and that is, a prompt and great reduction of Executive patronage, into the most expedient mode of effecting which the Committee next proceed to inquire. They begin by laying down, as a general principle, that it is the duty of a Government to leave the money, as far as practicable, in the pockets of the people, from which they say it cannot be removed by the Government, except for its essential wants, without a violation of the highest trust of the Government, and manifest injustice to the people.

The Report then enters upon an elaborate and comprehensive view of the finances of the country, to show to what extent the revenue of the country may be expected to exceed the amount necessary to the support of Government. In pursuing this inquiry, the Committee go on to show that, during the existence of the compromise law, so called, regulating duties on imports, and after all the reductions which may be made by reducing the duties on articles which do not interfere with protection, there will still be an unavoidable annual surplus in the Treasury of about nine millions of dollars.—They do not propose to reduce the income by reducing the price of the public lands, because to reduce the price would not only tempt great speculations therein, and affect the value of all other landed property in the Union, but would have the effect to increase instead of diminishing the income from their sale. As, therefore, it is deemed impossible, during the existence of the compromise act, and without disturbing that act, to prevent the annual receipt into the Treasury of a surplus of nine millions, even after reducing the expenditures of the Government within proper limits, the Committee go into an inquiry as to the most expedient mode of applying this sum. They protest against its remaining and accumulating in the Banks where it is deposited; and they do not recommend its application to the purposes of Internal Improvement, the difficulties in the way of which have been increased by the late Executive vetoes, refusing to sanction appropriations for that object.

The Committee, therefore, come to the conclusion that the only, and the least objectionable mode of disposing of the surplus revenue, is to make an annual distribution thereof among the several States and Territories, including the District of Columbia, to continue until the year 1842, which will terminate the existence of the present compromise Act, and leave Congress at liberty to reduce the income to the actual wants of the Government. The Committee propose to effect their object by an amendment of the Constitution, giving power to Congress to make such distribution, which a majority of the Committee deem not now within the competency of Congress. For that purpose they report a Joint Resolution, and propose to divide the annual surplus revenue into such number of shares as those

are Senators and Representatives, to be divided among the States in proportion to their representation, with two shares to each Territory and the District of Columbia.

The Committee propose, also, the enactment of a law, for which they report a bill, to regulate the Deposits of the public money; and the enactment of one of the bills reported by a Select Committee in 1826, to regulate the patronage of the Government.

Washington Correspondence of the Richmond Whig.

WASHINGTON, February 12, 1835.

Dear Sir:—I have just witnessed one of the most exciting scenes that ever occurred in the Senate.—The bills reported by the Committee on Executive patronage were the order of the day for yesterday. At an early hour the Senate was filled to overflowing. Ladies who could not obtain seats, stood on their feet for hours, anxiously expecting the debate. The bill from the Committee on Commerce intervened, and the Senate, after a long session; adjourned. This morning the bill repealing the four years' law came up, and Mr. Calhoun, in a few brief remarks, recurrd to the report of 1826, made by Mr. Benton, as chairman of a committee composed of Benton, Macon, Van Buren, White, Holmes, R. M. Johnson, Dickerson, Hayne, and one other not recollectcd.—stated that that committee had recommended the same provisions, and hoped that the bill would pass without opposition. Benton rose, and, with a small book of notes, said that he was about to supply what he had omitted to say on the introduction of the report on Monday, and asked the Senate to take it as part of that speech—indulged in a bold and unqualified denunciation of the report—asserted that it was a party paper, got up for political effect—characterized it as an attempt to buy the people by the bribe of four skillings, and six pence each, in paper money. Mr. Calhoun replied—defending the report and vindicating its details. In the course of his remarks, he said that nature had endowed the Senator with boldness—yes, boldness of assertion. This Benton chose to consider personal; and when he rose to reply, seized upon a part of the report, which speaks of the effect of rendering the office-holders dependant upon the Executive, and a remark of Mr. Calhoun's, in which he had alluded that Benton was the advocate of the official corps—denounced it as "a bold attack upon truth." On this he was called to order by Mr. Poindexter. The Chair decided, that as Mr. B. did not intend to impeach the personal veracity of Mr. Calhoun, it was not out of order. Mr. Webster took an appeal, upon the ground, that the words themselves used, not the intent of the Speaker, were to be considered. The opinion of the Chair was overruled, and then a scene occurred which disclosed the fiendish purpose of the attack. After having traveled out of the way, and out of order, to attack the report which was not under consideration—after having assailed the report, and denounced its conclusions as an evidence of hallucination; after having stigmatized it as unfair, unandid, deceptive, false, he pretended to consider Mr. Calhoun's defence of the report, in reply to his attack, as a premeditated attack on him, and assumed that Mr. Calhoun was bound to hold him to personal account for what he had said. During the enactment of this scene, there was a demoniac grin, which plainly disclosed Mr. Benton's purpose of bullying down all those who dared to expose the corruptions of the official corps, whom it was his purpose to rally around him as a Pretorian cohort, to enforce the purposes of corruption.

To this, Mr. Calhoun replied, by a lucid illustration of the truth of his report, reasserting and reaffirming all that he had said, and showing that it was not so much what he had said, as the truth and consequence of the exposure that had given offence. There is but one opinion. All parties here admit, that unless Mr. Van Buren succeeds in rallying the party, and putting the report to death, by premature denunciation, the report will put an end to the party. It has brought to light such a mass of facts, and has arrayed them with a force that it is impossible to resist, unless the prejudice of party and the avarice of the office-holders can be enlisted. Their craft is in danger, and he who can brow beat J. C. Calhoun, or murder his report, will have rendered Mr. Van Buren an indispensable service.

The Senate was crowded to overflowing—many stood for hours, and did not note the flight of time. The debate was continued until it became so dark that Mr. Calhoun could scarcely read, and will be resumed to-morrow.

The efficacy of Mr. Calhoun's report, and the force of the alarming truths it discloses, are demonstrated by the "panic" it has caused among the office-holders. Its truth, its value, its unanswerable reasoning, are in the ratio of the consternation it has caused among the Treasury leeches. They are combining all their forces to crush him, and kill that. The People, whose interests Mr. Calhoun is endeavoring to protect—whose liberties he is laboring to guard against the inroads of corruption, far more to be dreaded than the open assaults of tyrants—ought to reward and animate him with their gratitude and confidence, and frown down the bravoes who are attempting to awe him into silence. His report ought to be placed in the hands of every citizen, as a beacon light in this moment of outer political darkness.

WASHINGTON, February 14, 1835.

In the Senate, after the usual morning business, one of the bills reported by Mr. Calhoun from the Select Committee on Executive patronage, came up as the special order. Mr. Clay rose and read to the Senate an amendment to the bill, which he laid on the table—the substance of which was that, whenever the President should remove any person from office, and nominate another to fill his place, he should state his reasons of the removal, to the Senate, and if that body should refuse to concur in them, by rejecting the person nominated, the person removed should continue in office. Mr. Clay said he was fully prepared to sustain his proposition, but he would postpone speaking on the subject until Monday, when he hoped the leaders of the Jackson party would come prepared to go into the subject.

In the House of Representatives, an animated debate took place, on a motion to print 3,000 copies of the Post Office Report and Documents, and 20,000 without the documents. Both motions were decided in the affirmative. During this debate, all sides admitted the foulest corruption in the Post Office; but attempts were made to screen the Postmaster General from his share of the blame. But this would not do; it was evident that he had evinced the most criminal negligence in the affairs of the Department, and had connived, in many instances, at acts of corruption. His friends are anxious that he should resign—and I have been informed, to-day, that he intended to do so.

(From the United States Telegraph, February 14.)

The debate on the report of the Committee on Executive Patronage, was resumed yesterday in the Senate. Mr. Benton, in a studied speech, which he begged the Senate to consider as a part of his speech upon the first reading of the report, again assailed it in the bitterest terms of denunciation; repeating his former declaration, that the report was made for party purposes; that it was a tissue of fallacies, intended for electioneering purposes. To this Mr. Calhoun replied, vindicating the truth of the report, and in the course of his remarks took occasion to say that nature endowed individuals differently—that she had given the Senator from Missouri boldness—yes, boldness of assertion. Mr. Benton coupled this declaration with the remark that he had identified himself with the official corps as their advocate, assuming that Mr. Calhoun had imputed falsehood and corruption to him, assumed a bullying tone and repeated his assault upon the report—read that part of it which speaks of the tendency of making the office holders, as a body, dependant upon the Executive, declared it to be "a bold attack upon the truth;" for this he was called to order by Gov. Poindexter, and the Vice President at the same time Gov. Poindexter having reduced the words to writing, the Chair decided that if it had been the intention of Mr. Benton to impeach the personal veracity of Mr. Calhoun, the words would have been out of order, but that inasmuch as they applied to a deduction of the report, they were not personal, and therefore not out of order. From this decision Mr. Webster took an appeal to the Senate, which was sustained by a vote of 24 to 20.

Mr. Benton was then permitted to proceed, when a scene, such as was never before witnessed in that body, ensued. It is manifest that Mr. Benton believes that he must kill the report, or the report will overthrow that corrupt state of things upon which he has placed his hopes of reaching, to use his own words, "THE THRONE." Towards Mr. Calhoun and Mr. Webster he endeavored to be particularly offensive, giving it distinctly to be understood that his purpose was to make a personal affair with Mr. Calhoun. To this bluster and bullying Mr. Calhoun replied, by defending, in a firm and dignified manner, the statements and details of the report. He said that he was aware of the responsibility he had assumed when he entered upon the duty of making war upon abuses of Executive patronage; he stood there as the advocate of American liberty, not to be intimidated or driven from his purpose—he reiterated all that he had said, affirming its truth, leaving others to apply its deductions.

POST-OFFICE CORRUPTIONS.

(From the National Intelligencer, of February 14.)

THE POST OFFICE.

In the House of Representatives, yesterday, the bill which passed the Senate (unanimously) for reforming the administration of the Post Office, received its first and second reading, and was referred to the Post Office Committee.

It was a concurrence of circumstances rather remarkable, that, on the same morning, the Committee appointed by the House of Representatives in June last, to examine into the affairs of the Post Office, should have brought in its report. The report was presented by Mr. Connor, the Chairman of the Committee, and, without reading, (because of its great length,) was ordered to lie on the table, and to be printed. Mr. E. Whittlesey, on behalf of the Minority of said Committee, who, he said, had not been able to take, in all particulars, the same view as the Majority of the Committee, offered a report on their part; which was also ordered to lie on the table, and to be printed.

We have not, of course, had it in our power to read any material portion of these important and voluminous documents. But, desirous to see to what conclusions the Majority of the Committee had arrived, as the result of their investigation, we turned to the last pages of the Report, and found them there stated in such frank and manly terms, as to do honor equally to the spirit and intelligence of the Committee, who have dared to be honest in the teeth of party. We copy the concluding paragraphs of the Majority Report (that of the Minority we have not yet examined)—to which there is no occasion to ask the attention of every reader.

The Committee, in concluding this brief analytical review of the results of a very patient and laborious investigation of the condition and proceedings of the Post Office Department, should not consider their duty as fully discharged to the House, and to the country, without frankly submitting the general conclusions, to which their minds have been brought. The propositions which follow, and which condense these conclusions, this Committee doubt not, if examined, in a spirit of candor and impartiality, will be admitted as just corollaries of this report.

1st. The finances of this Department have hitherto been managed without frugality, system, intelligence, or adequate public utility. The cardinal principles of an enlightened economy have been violated. Ignorance of the real fiscal ability of the Department has long prevailed. Expenses have not been kept within the limits of income.—Means have not been proportioned to the ends sought to be obtained; expenditures to the benefits to be purchased. The records of the Department, in this vital particular, have not been kept with method and accuracy: for the data they furnish conduct to widely varying results. The accounts of the receipts, expenditures, and losses of the Department do not, in fact, illustrate, with certainty, the actual fiscal condition of the Department. No common test or standard appears, at any time, to have been employed to detect such casual errors as might creep in to derange the balance between receipts and expenditures: and hence the existing unfortunate excess of the latter over the former. The absence of such a test produces the effects of incertitude and doubt upon the mind, as to the accuracy of the conclusion which it may reach by any ordinary process of investigation; and upon the practicable operations of the Department, of a perpetual liability to fall into error, without any certain mode of its detection. The evil is within the reach of legislation, and should be corrected by establishing a proper system of checks and balances.

2d. The negligent and unsystematic form of making and preserving the mail contracts, is such that no human mind could comprehend the whole, and maintain in order so vast and complicated a machine as the General Post Office. The contracts are now, and have, at all times which have fallen under the observation of the committee, been most loosely conducted. It is occasionally impossible to penetrate their obscurity; often difficult to decipher their interlineations and marginal notes; al-

ways to be doubted whether they are so framed and executed as to be available in law.—An accurate inspection of the Mail Contract Books can alone convey an adequate idea of the careless and confused state in which they are kept. Certain it is, that the experience of one generation of laborers in this branch of the business of the office, cannot be transmitted through him to another. Knowledge (if acquired) is to be obtained rather from those who keep the books, than the books themselves; and the consequence is, that the loss of the book keeper is the extinction of all certain light.

"The Head of the Department can alone apply the corrective to this evil.

3d. The mode of preparing advertisements for mail contracts has practically perverted the ends of the law which enjoined it. The law designed it as a great safeguard against fraud and imposition, by bringing the salutary principle of competition into active and beneficial operation. The usage of the Department in conjunction with the highly reprehensible practice of receiving amalgamated bids, has frustrated the wisdom of this precaution, and rendered the system of letting, in regard to the more important routes, little more than an empty form or a bitter mockery.

"The interposition of the legislative power is, in the opinion of the Committee, unnecessary in this instance, as they deem the existing enactment adequate to their object."

4th. The practice of granting extra allowances, has at various dates in the history of this Department, run into wild excesses; some illegitimate, and therefore without an apology, and others legitimate, but very questionable as to their expediency. To this source may be ascribed, without hazard of error, much of the embarrassment of the Department; and, in whatever aspect this Committee has had opportunity to examine it, it strikes them that its practical operation has been fraught with much more of evil than of good. Among its other achievements, it has signalized, most eminently, the ready faith and too loose business method of the Department. The letter of a contractor, suggesting an improvement and soliciting an extra allowance, not infrequently has served the double office of an authority for the grant, and of a record of its existence. Some dark corner of a contract, or loose scrap of paper is commonly the only official evidence of the order for large disbursements of money under the name of extra allowances. It is a puzzling problem to decide whether this discretionary power throughout its whole existence, has done more mischief in the character of impost upon the Department, or seducer to contractors. It has, doubtless, been an evil doer in both views.

"The Committee have not deemed it within the scope of their authority to prepare a bill. This duty comes within the province of a Standing Committee of the House.

"The Committee, in surveying the wide field of their labors, regret only that their reward has not been discoveries of a more pleasing character. They had hoped that their researches would have brought to light the fruits of an enlightened and well directed labor, instead of proofs of error and neglect. But they have finished the task assigned them with an honest purpose and to the best of their ability. It remains for Congress to give a more perfect organization to this Department; and for those who administer it, to bring to its retention the most efficient and preserving application of practical talent and business like habit; with personal and vigilant personal superintendence."

The Committee consisted of Messrs. Connor, Stoddert, E. Whittlesey, H. Everett, Bardeley, Watmough and Hawes.

(From the National Intelligencer, Feb. 23.)

THE POST OFFICE REPORTS.

We have had, since our last, an opportunity of looking over the Report of the Minority of the Post Office Committee. It is a work of great labor, exhibiting evidence of unwearied industry, with the results of accurate research, so far as the Committee were allowed to carry it. The Report consists of a series of statements under various heads, exhibiting the particulars of abuses, such as have led the majority, as well as the minority of the Committee, to the withering conclusions which have been already published, statements of great interest, but which cannot be condensed or made the subjects of abstracts, without the consumption of more time and space than we are able now to give to the subject. We reserve, therefore, till after the adjournment, the details of which we shall then consider it our duty to present as ample a view as is practicable.

Notwithstanding the extent and enormity of the disclosures made by the Committee, it appears that there is much yet to be told, if the facts could be fully arrived at. Thus, the Minority say, at the outset of their Report: "It is doing no injustice to the Department to say, that they received no voluntary aid from any of its officers. What they have been able to find out they know; and from what is known, it may be inferred that much remains to be known."

The Report of the Minority further states: "It will be apparent, from the records of the Committee, that from an early day of their session, there was a majority and minority. The minority do not claim anything for themselves that they do not accord to the majority. They disclose all party views, in entering upon, or conducting the examination on their part, and shall give full credit to a similar disclaimer on the part of the majority. The fact, however, is mentioned, as accounting, in some degree, for the mode of bringing forward the examination, the prolixity and irrelevancy of portions of the testimony, and the manner in which it was taken. The minority believed it to be their duty to go forward, and examine into the proceedings of the Department, to see whether they were right or wrong. The majority were of opinion that it was not required to search for abuses, but to examine only where probable cause was alleged. This would, in fact, have limited the examination to abuses already discovered. The effect of this difference of opinion will be seen to have relation to the calls on the Department for information, and to the production of witnesses."

It appears, further, that the neglect of the Department to answer interrogatories, absolutely defeated, to a certain extent, the object of the inquiry instituted by the House of Representatives. Thus says the Minority Report: "It is but justice to themselves to state, the Minority are not responsible for the course the examination has taken; the direction of which was beyond their control, or that so little has been done, and so much has been left undone—they do not say which ought to have been, but which could not be done, on account of the neglect of the Department to answer the Resolutions of the Committee."