

the fire of the American, this same officer approached at the head of his brave grenadiers, amid the rolling fire of musketry from the lines of his unseen foes undaunted and untouched. "Advance my men," he shouted as he reached the edge of the fosse—"follow me!" and sword in hand, he leaped the ditch, and turning, amidst the roar and flame of a hundred muskets, to encourage his men, beheld to his surprise but a single man of his company upon his feet—more than fifty brave fellows whom he had so gallantly led on to the attack, had been shot down. As he was about to leap back from his dangerous situation, his sword was shivered in his grasp by a rifle ball, and at the same instant the daring Tennesseean sprang upon the parapet and levelled his deadly weapon at his breast, calmly observing "Surrender, stranger, or I may perform ye." "Chagrined," said the officer, at the close of his recital, "I was compelled to deliver to the bold fellow my mutilated sword, and pass over into the American lines."—*South West by a Yankee.*

Special Message.

SPEECH OF MR. CALHOUN
On Foreign Relations; delivered in the Senate on Monday, January 18, 1836.

Mr. Calhoun rose as Mr. Buchanan took his seat. I rise (said Mr. Calhoun) with feelings entirely different from those of the Senator from Pennsylvania. He said he never listened to any Message with greater satisfaction than the present. That which has excited such agreeable sensations in his breast, I have heard with the most profound regret. Never did I listen to a document with more melancholy feelings, with a single exception—the war message from the same quarter a few years since, against one of the sovereign members of this Confederacy.

I arrived here (said Mr. C.) at the beginning of the session, with a strong conviction that there would be no war. I saw indeed, many unfavorable and hostile indications; but I thought the cause of difference between the two nations was too trivial to terminate so disastrously. I could not believe that two great and enlightened nations, blessed with Constitutional Governments, and between whom so many beautiful recollections existed to bind together in mutual sympathy and kindness, would, at this advanced stage of civilization, plunge into a war for a cause so trivial as this. With this impression, notwithstanding all I saw and heard, I still believed peace would be preserved; but the Message, and the speech of the Senator from Pennsylvania, have dispelled the delusion. I will not undertake to pronounce with certainty war is intended; but I will say, that if the recommendations of the President be adopted, it will be almost inevitable.

I fear (said Mr. C.) that the condition in which the country is now placed has been the result of a deliberate and systematic policy. I am bound to speak my sentiments freely. It is due to my constituents and the country to act with perfect candor and truth on a question in which their interest is so deeply involved. I will not assert that the Executive has deliberately aimed at war from the commencement; but I will say that, from the beginning of the controversy to the present moment, the course which the President has pursued is precisely the one calculated to terminate in a conflict between the two nations. It has been in his power at every period, to give the controversy a direct issue, and to give the peace of the country what he preserved, without the least sacrifice of reputation or honor; but he has preferred the opposite. I feel (said Mr. C.) how painful it is to make these declarations; how unpleasant it is to occupy a position which might by any possibility be construed in opposition to our country's course; but, in my conception, the honor and interests of the country can only be maintained by pursuing the course that truth and justice may dictate. Acting under this impression, I do not hesitate to assert, after a careful examination of the documents connected with this unhappy controversy, that, if war must come, we are the authors—we are the responsible party. Standing, as I fear we do, on the eve of a conflict, it would to me have been a source of pride and pleasure to make an opposite declaration; but that sacred regard to truth and justice, which I trust, will ever be my guide under the most difficult circumstances, would not permit.

I cannot (said Mr. C.) but call back to my recollection the position which I occupied twenty-four years since, as a member of the other House. We were then, as I fear we are now, on the eve of a war with a great and powerful nation. My voice then was raised for war, because I then believed that justice, honor, and necessity demanded it. It is now raised for peace, because I am under the most solemn conviction that by going to war we would sacrifice justice, honor, and interest. The same motive which then impelled to war now impels to peace.

I have not (said Mr. C.) made this assertion lightly. It is the result of mature and deliberate reflection. It is not my intention to enter into a minute examination of that unhappy train of events, which has brought the country to its present situation, but I will briefly touch on a few prominent points, beginning with that most unfortunate negotiation which seems destined to terminate so disastrously for the country.

From the accession of the present King, his Ministry avowed itself favorable to the settlement of our claims. It could scarcely be otherwise. The King had just been raised to the throne, under a revolution organizing in popular impulses, which could not but dispose him favorably towards us. Lafayette, at the time, possessed much power and influence, and had greatly contributed to elevate Louis Philippe to his present station. His feelings were known to be decidedly favorable to us. But with all this favorable inclination, the Ministry were fearful of concluding a treaty. They dreaded the Chambers; they knew how odious all treaties of indemnity were to the entire French nation, and how difficult it would be to bring the Chambers to agree to make an appropriation to carry a treaty of indemnity into effect, even with our country. With these impressions, they frankly stated to Mr. Rives, our Minister, that the difficulty was not with them, but with the Chambers; that if a treaty were made, it could not be carried into effect without a vote of appreciation from the Chambers; and it was very doubtful whether such a vote could be obtained. These declarations were not made once, or twice; they were repeated again and again, throughout every stage of the negotiation, and never more emphatically than in the very last, just before the conclusion of the treaty.

The President of the Council, M. Perrier, in a conversation with Mr. Rives, at that late period,

stated that there would be no difficulty in arranging the question, were it not that he feared opposition on the part of the Chambers, which might place the relation between the two countries in a more dangerous state, by refusing to make the appropriation. How prophetic! as if he had foreseen what has since come to pass. I do not profess to give his words; I did not anticipate the discussion, and have not come prepared with documents; but what I state is substantially what he said. With this apprehension, he asked our Minister to wait the short period of two months, for the meeting of the Chambers, that they might be consulted before the conclusion of the treaty, in order to avoid the possibility of the embarrassment which has since occurred, and which has so dangerously embroiled the relations of the two countries. Mr. Rives objected, and the treaty was concluded.

* Extract of a part of the correspondence between Mr. Rives and the French Minister during the negotiation, taken from the Report of the Committee of Foreign Relations during the last session:

"It appears from a despatch of Mr. Rives to the Secretary of State, under the date 18th of September, 1830, at his first interview with the French Secretary of Foreign Affairs, after the revolution which placed the present King of France on the throne, that this French Minister said, that he thought that the principle of indemnity would be admitted, but that the amount of the claims was a very complex question, depending on a great variety of considerations, and requiring minute and detailed examination; that he believed our claims would encounter much less opposition with the Government, (meaning the King and his Ministers,) than with the Chambers; that he had thought of an organization of a commission to examine the subject, consisting of members of both Chambers, as the best means of preparing those bodies for an ultimate decision; and he should submit the proposition at an early day to the Council." In a subsequent despatch of Mr. Rives, of the 9th of November, 1830, he says, "the dispositions of the King, as well with regard to this subject, [the American claims] as to the general relations between the two countries, are every thing we could desire. The difficulty exists in the extreme reluctance of the nation to pay any more indemnities, and the necessity which the Government feels itself under of consulting the Representatives of the nation, and of securing their approbation to any arrangement which may be ultimately concluded. The commission, of the formation of which I have already apprised you, has grown entirely out of this feeling."

On the occasion of an audience with the King, Mr. Rives, in his despatch of the 10th of January, 1831, says, that the King, in reply to his remarks, "reiterated the sentiments he had heretofore expressed to me, and referred the measures he had taken, with a view to bring the differences between the two countries to a conclusion." * * * * * "The King proceeded to say, that since the reading of the President's Message, he had 'remonstrated' against all unnecessary delays in the prosecution of the business, and assured me that every thing should be done, on his part, to bring it to the earliest termination, notwithstanding the disastrous state of their finances."

The commissioners appointed to examine our claims made their report. The majority of four rejecting our claims growing out of the Berlin and Milan decrees, as well as the Ranbouillet and other special decrees, estimated the sum to which they supposed the United States to be fairly entitled, according to Mr. Rives, at between ten and fifteen millions of francs, and the minority of two, admitting the claims rejected by their colleagues, at thirty millions. In an interview between the French Minister of Foreign Affairs and Mr. Rives, described in his despatch of the 28th of April, 1831, the Minister "spoke of the intrinsic difficulty of all money questions in a representative government, increased in the present instance by the almost unanimous report of the commission." In another interview with the President of the Council of Ministers, described in the same despatch of Mr. Rives, Mr. Perrier said: "He felt all the importance of cultivating good relations with the United States, and that he was sincerely desirous of adjusting this ancient controversy; but that their finances, as I saw, were exceedingly deranged, and that there would be great difficulty in reconciling the Chamber of Deputies to an additional charge on the exhausted resources of the State, for claims, too, which had not arisen from any wrong done by the present Government of France." In the same despatch, Mr. Rives reports; "The King expressed, as he has always done, very cordial sentiments for the United States; said he had frequently called the attention of his Ministers to the necessity of settling our reclamations; that they had always objected the embarrassed state of the finances; but he hoped they would yet find the means of doing justice."

In a despatch of Mr. Rives, of the 7th of May, 1831, communicating the offer of twenty millions of francs, in full satisfaction of our claims, and his declining to accept, he states the French Minister to have replied "that the offer he had just made was one of extreme liberality; that it would subject the Ministers to a severe responsibility before the Chambers; that he had been already warned, from various quarters, that he would be held to a strict account for his settlement of this affair." In the same despatch Mr. Rives details a conversation which he had had with the President of the Council, respecting the amount of our claims, in which he said "that it was particularly hard that the burden of their adjustment should now fall upon the existing Government, in the present crippled state of its resources, and when all its expenses were upon a war footing; and that it was certainly not the interest of either country to make an arrangement which the legislative authority here might refuse to carry into execution."

In another despatch of Mr. Rives, of the 29th of May, 1831, he relates a conversation in an interview with the President of the Council. That Minister, Mr. Rives states, "then said that but for the Chambers, there would be less difficulty in arranging this question, but that he apprehended a very serious opposition to it on their part, which might even more seriously embroil the relations of the two countries, by refusing to carry into execution any arrangement which should be made." He added, "that two months sooner or later could not be of much importance in the settlement of this question, and asked me if there would be any objection to adjourning its decision till the meeting of the Chambers, when the Ministers could have an opportunity of consulting some of the leading men of the two Houses." This postponement was

Now, I submit (said Mr. C.) to every man of integrity and honor, whether we, in accepting the treaty after these repeated declarations, did not accept it, subject to the condition which they implied; that is, whether, in point of fact, the stipulation of the French Executive ought not to be fairly construed with these declarations made at the formation of the treaty, to amount simply to an engagement to use his best endeavors to obtain the assent of the Chambers to the appropriation. Such would certainly be the understanding, in a similar case, between honorable and conscientious individuals; and such, I apprehend, will be the opinion hereafter, when passions shall have subsided, of every impartial inquirer after truth.

The question (said Mr. C.) is now presented, has the French Executive complied with his promise? Has he honorably, faithfully, and earnestly endeavored to obtain the assent of the Chambers? To these questions I shall not reply. I have the answer to our Executive and to our Ministers. They have explicitly and honorably acquitted the French Executive on this important point.

But (said Mr. C.) let us turn to the conduct of our own Executive, in relation to this important part of the controversy. If the implied obligation on the part of the French Executive was such as I suppose, there was a corresponding one, on the part of ours, to interpose no obstacle in obtaining the assent of the Chamber. How stands the fact? Mr. Rives, in communicating to our Executive the result of the negotiation, boasted of his skill, and the advantage which he had acquired over the French negotiators. I pass him by. It was, perhaps, natural for him to boast. What does the Executive do? With a full knowledge of all the facts, forewarned of the difficulty which the French Ministry would have to encounter in the Chambers, he publishes to the world this boastful communication, which produced a sensation which increased in the same proportion the difficulty of obtaining the assent of the Chambers to the appropriation. The next step increased the difficulty. Knowing, as he did, that the appropriations depended upon the Chamber, the then Secretary of the Treasury, without waiting for its action, drew a bill for the payment of the first instalment, before the appropriation was made, and before, of course, it could possibly be paid. A protest necessarily followed, accompanied with much irritation on both sides.

With these obstacles, created by our own acts, the treaty was submitted to the Chambers. Every effort was made to obtain the appropriation. The Minister displayed uncommon zeal and abilities in defence of the treaty; but in vain, under these multiplied difficulties. The bill was rejected by a majority of eight votes; a number so small in so large a body, that it may be fairly presumed, without any violence, that had not Mr. Rives's letter been published, and the draft drawn before the appropriation was made, the majority would have been on the other side, and all the unhappy train of consequences which have since followed would have been prevented. So earnest was the French Ministry in their efforts to carry the bill, that their defeat dissolved the Administration.

With these facts before us, who can doubt where the responsibility rests? We had thrown the impediments in the way—we, who had been so urgent to obtain the treaty, and we who had to profit by its execution. It matters not, in the view in which I am considering the question, to what motives the acts of our Executive may be attributed—whether to design or thoughtlessness, it cannot shift the responsibility.

Let us now (said Mr. C.) proceed to the next stage of this most unfortunate affair.

I pass over the intervening period; I come to the opening of the next session of Congress. In what manner does the President, in his message at the opening of the session, notice the failure of the French Chambers to make the appropriation?—Knowing, as he must, how much the acts to which I have referred had contributed to the defeat of the bill, and that his Administration was responsible for these acts, it was natural to expect that he would have noticed the fate of the bill in the calmest and most gentle manner; that he would have done full justice to the zeal and fidelity of the French Executive in its endeavor to obtain its passage, and would have thrown himself with confidence on the justice and the honor of the French nation for the fulfillment of the treaty. In a word, that he would have done all in his power to strengthen the Executive Government in France in their future efforts to obtain the appropriation and carefully avoid every thing that might interpose additional obstacles. Instead of taking this calm and considerate course, so well calculated to secure the fulfillment of the treaty, and so befitting the dignity and justice of our Government, he sends a message to Congress, couched in the strongest terms, and recommending that he should be invested with authority to issue letters of marque and reprisal in the event of the appropriation not being made—a measure, if not tantamount to war, leading to it by almost a necessary consequence. The message was received in France with the deep feeling of irritation which might have been expected; and under this feeling, with all the impediments which it was calculated to create, the bill to carry the treaty into effect had the second time to make its appearance in the Chambers. They were surmounted. The bill passed; but not without a condition—a condition which causes the present difficulty.

I deeply regret (said Mr. C.) the condition. In my opinion the honor of France did not require it, and the only vindication that can be offered for the Ministry in accepting it, is, the necessity of the

objected to by Mr. Rives, and was not insisted upon.

During the progress of the negotiation, the principle of indemnity was early conceded. The French Minister first offered fifteen millions of francs. Mr. Rives demanded forty. The French Minister advanced to twenty, to twenty-four, and finally, with extreme reluctance, to twenty-five. At the point of twenty-four, Mr. Rives came down to thirty-two, as the medium between the two proposals. At that of twenty-five, the French Minister announced it as their ultimatum, and in a despatch of Mr. Rives of the 14th of June, 1831, he reports the French Minister to have said "that it was the opinion of the most enlightened and influential members of both Chambers, that the offer of twenty-four millions, heretofore made, was greatly too much; that ———, and other leading members of the one Chamber or the other, whom he mentioned, had already expressed that opinion to him, and emphatically warned him of the serious difficulties to which this affair would expose Ministers."

case; that it was indispensable to its passage. But surely, in the midst of the difficulties which it has caused, we ought not to forget that the acts of our own Executive were the cause of its insertion.

This (said Mr. C.) brings us to the present stage of this unhappy controversy. I shall not offer an opinion on the message and documents which have just been read, till I have had time to read them at leisure, and more fully comprehend their character and bearing. The Senator from Pennsylvania has probably had the advantage of me in knowing their contents. [Here Mr. Buchanan signified his dissent.] I will not (said Mr. C.) make the remarks that I intended, but I am not satisfied with much that I have heard in the reading of the message and the documents. I am, in particular, very far from being satisfied with the reasons assigned by the Secretary of State why he did not accept the copy of a letter from the Duke de Broglie to the French Charge d'Affaires here, which the latter offered to put in his possession. I regret exceedingly that we have not that document. It might have shed much light on the present state of this unhappy controversy. Much mystery hangs over the subject.

There is another point (said Mr. C.) which requires explanation. There is certainly some hope that the message at the opening of the session may be favorably received in France. The President has in it expressly adopted the explanation offered by Mr. Livingston, which affords some hope, at least, that it may prove to be satisfactory to the French Government. Why, then, send this message at this time? Why recommend preparations and non-intercourse till we have heard how the message has been received in France? Suppose its reception should be favorable, in the absence of a representative of our Government at the French court, nothing could be done till the message which we have just received shall have passed the Atlantic and reached Paris. How unfortunate would be the consequence! What new entanglements and difficulties would be caused in the relations of the two countries! Why all this? Who can explain? Will any friend of the Administration rise in his place and tell us what is intended?

I might ask (said Mr. C.) for like explanation, why our Charge was recalled from Paris at the time he was. Why not wait till the annual Message was received? Whom have we there to represent us on its reception, to explain any difficulty which might remain to be explained? All these things may have a satisfactory explanation. I cannot, however, perceive it. There may be some deep mystery in the whole affair, which those only who are initiated can understand.

I fear (said Mr. C.) that with the message which we have this day received, the last hope of preserving the peace of the country has vanished. This compels me to look forward. The first thing that strikes me, in casting my eyes to the future, is the utter impossibility that war, should there unfortunately be one, can have an honorable termination. We shall go into war to exact the payment of five millions of dollars. The first cannon discharged on our part would be a receipt in full for the whole amount. To expect to obtain payment by a treaty of peace would be worse than idle. If our honor would be involved in such a termination of the contest, the honor of France would be equally involved in the opposite. The struggle then would be, who should hold out longest in this unprofitable, and, were it not for the seriousness of the occasion, ridiculous contest. To determine this point, we must enquire, which can inflict on the other the greater injury, and to which the war must be most expensive. To both a ready answer may be given. The capacity of France to inflict injury upon us is ten times greater than ours to inflict injuries on her; while the cost of the war, in proportion to her means, would be in nearly the same proportion less than ours to our means. She has relatively a small commerce to be destroyed, while we have the largest in the world, in proportion to our capital and population. She may threaten and harass our coast, while her own is safe from the assault.—Looking over the whole ground, I do not (said Mr. C.) hesitate to pronounce that a war with France will be among the greatest calamities, greater than a war with England herself. The power of the latter to annoy us may be greater than that of the former; but so ours, in turn, greater to annoy England than France. There is another view connected with this point deserving the most serious consideration, particularly by the commercial and navigating portion of the Union. Nothing can be more destructive to our commerce and navigation, than for England to be neutral, while we are belligerents, in a contest with such a country as France. The whole of our commercial marine, with our entire shipping, would pass almost instantly into the hands of England. With the exception of our public armed vessels, there would be scarcely a flag of ours afloat on the ocean. We grew rich by being neutral while England was belligerent. It was that which so suddenly built up the mighty fabric of our prosperity and greatness. Reverse the position—let England be neutral while we are belligerent, and the sources of our wealth and prosperity would be speedily exhausted.

In a just and necessary war (said Mr. C.) all these consequences ought to be fearlessly met.—Though a friend to peace, when a proper occasion occurs, I would be among the last to dread the consequences of war. I think the wealth and blood of a country are well poured out in maintaining a just, honorable, and necessary war; but in such a war as that with which the country is now threatened—a mere war of etiquette—a war turning on a question so trivial as whether an explanation shall or shall not be given—no, whether it has, or has not been given, (for that is the real point on which the controversy turns,) to put in jeopardy the lives and property of our citizens, and the liberty and institutions of the country, is worse than folly—is madness. I say the liberty and institutions of the country. I hold them to be in imminent danger. Such has been the grasp of Executive power, that we have not been able to resist its usurpations, even in a period of peace; and how much less shall we be able, with the vast increase of power and patronage which a war must confer on that department? In a sound condition of the country, with our institutions in their full vigor, and every department confined to its proper sphere, we would have nothing to fear from a war from France or any other power; but our system is deeply diseased, and we may fear the worst in being involved in war at such a juncture.

I have (said Mr. C.) in conclusion, no objection to the message and documents going to the Committee on Foreign Relations. I have great confidence in the committee, and have no doubt that they will discharge their duty to the Senate and to the country with prudence and wisdom, at the present trying juncture. But let me suggest a caution

against the hasty adoption of the recommendations of the message. To adopt them, would be to change for the worse the position which we now occupy in this unfortunate controversy, and lead, I fear, directly to war. We are told that a French fleet has been sent to the West Indies, which has been considered as a menace, with the intention of frightening us into hasty measures. The French Government itself has said in its official journal that it acts on the defensive, and that there is no legitimate cause for war between the two countries. We would not be justified, with these declarations, connected with the circumstances of the case, were we to regard the sending the fleet as a menace.—We must not forget that we, in this controversy, are, as my colleague said the other day in debate, the plaintiff, and France the defendant. If there must be war, it must come from us, not France.—She has neither motive nor cause to make war. As we, then, must declare the war, it is not strange that France, after what has passed, should prepare for the worst; and such preparation ought fairly to be considered, not as a menace, but as a precautionary measure resulting from our own acts. But should we in turn commence arming, it must be followed on the part of France with increased preparation, and again on ours with a corresponding increase, till, at length, the pride and passions of both parties would be so wrought up as to burst out to open violence.

I have (said Mr. CALHOUN) thus freely expressed my opinion upon this important subject, feeling a deep conviction that neither justice, honor, nor necessity impel to arms; and that a war with France, at all times, and more especially at the present, would be among the greatest calamities that could befall the country.

From the Raleigh Star.

THE VICE PRESIDENCY.

It is time the attention of the friends of Judge WHITE, in this State, should be drawn to this subject. It is known that in case of the death, resignation or removal from office of the President, the Vice President will be called upon to exercise the duties of the station. It is highly important, therefore, that the individual selected, should be a man of ability, integrity and sound principles. We want no such man as the nominee of the Baltimore Convention, selected without regard to his fitness or principles, because it was supposed he would give popularity to the ticket in the western States. In a late number, we published a communication on this subject, recommending the Hon. John Tyler, of Virginia, as a suitable person. We entirely concur in the propriety of his nomination. A republican of the old Jeffersonian school, his integrity is above suspicion. We believe that even the Editor of the Globe, whose mighty malice, and mighty mendacity, permit hardly any person to escape, has not been able to say any thing against this pure and distinguished individual. He is opposed to the Bank, to Internal Improvements by the Federal Government, to the Tariff, and to the financial attempts to interfere with our domestic institutions. His experience, as a statesman, is very great. We doubt not that the supporters of Judge White elsewhere will readily unite upon him. We would respectfully suggest to our friends, whilst holding meetings to nominate a Governor, that they nominate also a candidate for the Vice Presidency. We again urge the importance of speedy action and organization. Let a central committee be appointed in each county, and sub-committees in each Captain's district. The cause in which we are engaged merits an effort. It is a contest by the people themselves against dictation and patronage. It is a contest to preserve the voting privilege, the great pillar of free Governments, free from an impudent and unhalloed attempt to control its exercise.

From the N. Y. Courier and Enquirer.

THE NEXT PRESIDENCY.

An idea appears to have gone abroad, that the nomination of General Harrison in Pennsylvania and Maryland, may induce Mr. Webster to withdraw from the contest. But surely those who entertain such an opinion, have not calmly considered the consequence of Mr. Webster's withdrawal and its effect upon the prospects of Mr. Van Buren.—So far from the nomination of General Harrison having an injurious effect upon the prospects of the Whigs and the triumph of the cause of principles, in our estimation, it is destined to render our triumph morally certain.

We have frequently said that Mr. Van Buren has no hold on the affections of the people nor their leaders, and that his popularity is founded exclusively upon his being the candidate of the President, and the impression growing out of it that by reason of General Jackson's influence and the effects of Party discipline his success is morally certain.—Cold, calculating, and unfeeling,—ever ready to sacrifice those who have rendered him the greatest services in order to cancel his debt of gratitude,—and esteeming the success of the smallest intrigue of far greater importance than the feelings and reputations of those who have served him—it is not strange he should be surrounded by a set of politicians as heartless and calculating as himself, and between whom SELF-INTEREST constitutes the only bond of union. There is but one individual of all Mr. VAN BUREN'S friends (MR. BUTLER,) who does not firmly believe that he would sacrifice them at any moment it became his interest to do so; and conscious of this known and admitted trait in his character, they too, are ready to leave him to his fate whenever they discover that there is no longer any prospect of his success. From a set of men adhering to each other by such frail bands of union as self-interest and their ability to deceive the public, there is little to fear under any circumstances; and far less, when as in the present instance, their leader is in no way identified with any great event in the history of the country, and has no claims upon the affections, the sympathies, or the gratitude of the people.

We now state it as our deliberate opinion, that there is not only a reasonable prospect of defeating the election of Martin Van Buren, but that there exists a moral certainty of his defeat without even going to the House of Representatives. And to effect this great and important result, all that is necessary, is to preserve harmony and union among the Whigs of this State. No one, at least no well informed politician, doubts, that if the elements of opposition in this State can be united, Van Buren must lose the electoral vote. As an evidence of this, it is only necessary to remind the reader that he and Jackson together, only had a majority of thirteen thousand out of three hundred and fifty-four thousand votes polled in 1832—that many of the Jackson men were Clintonians and will never support Van Buren—that others are for Harrison, and will give him a preference over the nominee of