INAUGURAL ADDRESS WILLIAM H. HARRISON.

the oaths which the Constitution prescribes, as a any sinister or unpatriotic motive. pressary qualification for the performance of its duties. And in obedience to a custom coeval with our Government, and which I believe to be your expectatibus, I proceed to present to you a summary of the brinciples which will govern me, in the discharge of the dates which I shall be called upon to perform.

It was the remark of a Roman Consul, in an early period of hat celebrated Republic, that a most striking contrast was observable in the conduct of candidates for offices of power and trust before and after obtaining them-they seldom carrying out in the latter case the pledges and promises made in the fermer. However much the world may have improved, in many respects, in the lapse of upwards of two thousand years since the remark was made by the virtuous and indignant Roman, I fear that a strict examination of the annals of some of the modern elective Governments, would develope similar instances of violated confidence.

proclaiming me the Chief Magistrate of this glo resus Umon, nothing upon their part remaining to be done, it may be thought that a motive may exist is keen up the dolumon inder which they may be supposed to have acted a relation to my principles and harmons; and perhaps there may be some in This was unity who have come here either prepared by controlling I shall now deliver, or, approving the in the destrict state statements with which they are stored. But the tables of a few months will conthe of despetation fears. The outline of principles with and opensaries to be adopted, by an Ad the ration and yet began, will soon be exchanged manufactor ustory; and I shall stand, either timeraled by my countrymen, or classed with the . . I have who promised that they might ded the erest with the intention to betray.

If we ver sit he may be my present purpose to this the expectations of a magnammous and considing copie, I too well understand the infirmies of human nature, and the dangerous temptanone to which I shall be exposed, from the magnitode of the power which it has been the pleasure of the people to commit to my hands, not to place my chief confidence upon the aid of that Almighty Power which has hitherto protected me, and ena hed me to bring to favorable issues other imporlant, but suit greatly interior trusts, heretolore confides to me by my country.

The broad foundation upon which our Constitu tion rests, being the people-a breath of theirs having made, as a breath can unmake, change, or in only it-it can be assigned to none of the great is more likely to produce such a state of mind than myet have Government but to that of Democra- the long continuance of an office of high trust. cy. It such is its theory, those who are called Nothing can be more corrupting, nothing more them to administer it must recognise, as its leading destructive of all those noble feelings which belong principle, the duty of shaping their measures so as to produce the greatest good to the greatest num | When this corrupting passion once takes possession ber. But, with these broad admissions, if we would of the human mind, like the love of gold, it becompare the sovereights acknowledged to exist in comes in-attable. It is the never-dying worm in the mass of our peo, ie with the power claimed by his bosom, grows with his growth, and strengthens other severeignties, even by those which have bee. with the declining years of its victim. If this is considered most purely Democratic, we shall find true, it is the part of wisdom for a republic to limit a most essential difference. All others lay claim the service of that officer, at least, to whom she to power inner only by their own will. The ma has intrusted the management of her foreign relaequal to that which has been granted to them by to prevent his forgetting that he is the accountable the parties to the national compact, and nothing agent, not the principal—the servant, not the maspercond. We admit of no Government by Divine ter. Until an amendment of the Consulution can rights-b-heving that, so far as power is concern- be effected public opinion may secure the desired ed, the beneficent Creator has made no distinction object. I give my aid to it, by renewing the amongst men, toat all are upon an equality, and pindge heratufore, given, that, under no circumthat, I e only legithmate right to govern is an ex- stances, will I consent to serve a second term. press grant of power from the governed. The Constitution of the United States is the instrument containing the grant of power to the several departments composing the Government. On an expaninground that instrument, it will be found to contain declarations of power granted, and of now or withheld. The latter is also susceptible of division, into power which the majority had the right to grant, but which they did not think proper tute the President a part of the legislative powerto mirust to their agents, and that which they It cannot be claimed from the power to recommend, could not have granted, not being possessed by memselves. In other words, there are certain rights possessed by each individual American citi-other citizen. And although there may be someto ver surrendered. Some of them, indeed, he is measures recommended in the one case than in

to mar a shield only against a petty provincial grants " are vested in the Congress of the United ruler, whilst the proof Democrat of Athens could States." It would be a solecom in language to say consede immedia under a sentence of death, for a that any portion of these is not included in the -up, osed violation of the national faith, which no whole. the understood, and which at times was the subject. It may be said, indeed, that the Constitution has noise, tas tamily, and his country, with or without of the legislative body, by refusing to them his asan alleged cause; that it is was the act, not of a sent. So a similar power has necessarily resulted of our severeignty. It can interfere with no one's is, it is true, this difference between these grants of correspond gods, the result of investigation under of want of conformity to the Constitution, whilst precious privileges, and those scarcely less impor | violate that instrument. But the decision of the with which he has endowed them.

theet, that most of the instances of alleged depart to suppose that a thought could for a moment have care from the letter or spirit of the Constitution, been entertained that the President, placed at the

have ultimately received the sanction of a majority of the people. And the fact, that many of our statesmen, most distinguished for talent and patriotism, have been at one time or other of their poslitical career, on both sides of each of the most warmly disputed questions, forces upon us the in-Called from a retirement which I had supposed ference that the errors, if errors there were, are ference that the errors, if errors there were, are the Chief Executive office of this great and free na- stances, of ascertaining the intentions of the framers tion, I appear before you, fellow-cutizens, to take of the Constitution, rather than the influ nce of

When the Constitution of the United States first came from the hands of the Convention which formed it, many of the sternest Republicans of the day were alarmed at the extent of the power which had been granted to the Federal Government, and more particularly of that portion which had been assigned to the Executive branch. There were in it features which appeared not to be in barmony with their ideas of a supple representative Democracy, or Republic. And knowing the tendency of ower to increase itself, particularly when exerused by a single individual, predictions were made that, at no very remote period, the Government would terminate in virtual monarchy, I: would not become me to say that the fears of these patriis have been already realized. But, as I sincerely believe, that the tendency of measures, and men's opinions, for some years past, has been in that direction, it is, I conceive, strictly proper that should take this occasion to rep. at the assurances Although the fiat of the people has gone forth, I have heretofare given of my determination to arrest the progress of that tendency, if it really exists, and restore the Government to its pristine health and vigor, as far as this can be effected by any legitimate exercise of the power placed it my hands.

I proceed to state, in as summary a manuer as I can, my opinion of the sources of the evils which have been so extensively complained of, and the correctives which may be applied. Some of the ormer are unquestionably to be found in the defects of the Constitution; others, in my judgment, are attributable to a misconstruction of some of its provisions. Of the former is the eligibility of the same individual to a second term of the Presidency. The sagacious min! of Mr. Jefferson early saw and lamented this error, and attempts have been made, hitherto without success, to apply the amendatory power of the States to its correction.

As, however, one mode of correction is in the wer of every President, and consequently in nine, it would be useless, and perhaps invidious, o enumerate the evils of which, in the opinion of our fellow citizens, this error of the sages who framed the Constitution may have been the source, and the bitter fruits which we are still to gather from it, if it continues to disfigure our system. It may be observed, however, as a general remark, that Republics can commit no greater error than to adopt or continue any feature in their systems of Government which may be calculated to create or increase the love of power, in the bosoms of those to whom necessity obliges them to commit the management of their affairs. And, surely, nothing to the character of a devoted republican patriot. sovereignly with an amount of power precisely of her armies and navies, to a period so short as

But if there is danger to public liberty from the acknowledged defects of the Constitution, in the want of limit to the continuance of the Executive power in the ame hands, there is I apprehend, not much less from a misconstruction of that instrument, as it regards the powers actually given. I cannot conceive that, by a fair construction, any or either of its provisions would be found to constisince, although enjoined as a duty upon him, it is a privilege which he holds in common with every 200, which, in his compact with the others, he has thing more of confidence in the propriety of the matic to surrender, being, in the language of our the other, in the obligations of ulti- ate decision there can be no difference. In the language of the The boasted privilege of a Roman citizen was Constitution, "all the legislative powers" which it

of the mockers of all, or of banishment from his given to the Executive the power to annul the acts storie tyrant, or hated aristocracy, but of his as from that instrument to the Judiciary; and yet the sembled countrymen. Far different is the power Judiciary forms no part of the Legislature. There bith, prescribe forms of worship for no one's ob power. The Executive can put his negative upon way made, infinit to punishment but after well as- the acts of the Legislature for other cause than that rules prescribed by the Constitution itself. These the Judiciary can only declare void those which boil, of groung expression to his thoughts and Judiciary is final in such a case, whereas, in every enter by writing or speaking, our estrain- instance where the veto of the Executive is applied, ed but by the lumbility for injury to others, and it may be overcome by a vote of two thirds of both that of a full participation in all the advantages Houses of Congress. The negative upon the acis which flow from the Government, the scknowl of the Legislative by the Executive authority, and edged property of all, the American critizen derives that in the hands of one individual, would seem to from no charter granted by his fellow man. He balan incongruity in our system. Like some others crames them because he is himself a man, hashioned of a similar character, however, it appears to be by the same Almighty hand as the rest of his highly expedient; and if used only with the forspecies, and entitled to a full share of the blessings' bearance, and in the spirit which was intended by its authors, it may be productive of great good, and Notwithstanding the limited sovereignty post be lound one of the best safeguards to the Union. sessed by the people of the United States, and the At the period of the formation of the Constitution, restricted grant of power to the Government which the principle does not appear to have enjoyed much they have adopted, enough has been given to ac- layor in the State Governments. It existed but in complish all the objects for which it was created. two; and in one of these there was a plural Execu-I has been found powerful in war, and hitherto, tive. If we would a arch for the motives which primes has been adminishered, an intimate union operated upon the purely patriotic and enlightened effected, demestic tranquisty preserved, and per assembly which framed the Constitution, for the somal hoerty secured to the citizen. As was to be adoption of a province so apparently repugnant to expected, however, from the detect of language, the leading Democratic principle that the majority and the necessarily sententions madner in which should govern, we must reject the idea that they the Constrution is written, disputes have arisen unficipated from it any benefit to the ordinary as to the amount of power which it has actually course of legislation. They knew too well the high granted, or was intermed to grant. This is more degree of mielingence which existed among the particularly the case in relation to that part of the people, and the enlightened character of the State matrument which treats of the legislative branch. Legislatures, not to have the fullest confidence that And not only as regards the exercise of powers the two bodies elected by them would be worthy claimed under a general clause, giving that body representatives of such constituents, and, of course, he authority to pass all laws necessary to carry that they would require no aid in conceiving and into effect the specified powers, but in relation to maturing the measures which the circumstances of the latter also. It is, however, consulatory to re the country might require; and it is preposterous

capitol, in the centre of the country, could better of the most approved writers upon that species of understand the wants and wishes of the people than mixed Government, which, in modern Europe, is their own immediate representatives, who spend a termed monarchy, in contradistinction to despotism, part of every year smong them, living with them, often laboring with them, and bound to them by the triple tie of interest, duty, and affection. To as monarchical character on our Government, but the sist or control Congre s, then, in its ordinary legislation, could not, I conceive, have been the motive for conferring the veto power on the President .-This argument acquires additional force from the act of its never having been thus used by the first six Presidents; and two of them were members of the Convention, one presiding over its deliberations, and the other having a larger share in consummaing the labors of that august body than any other person. But if bills were never returned to Concropposition of the officer to whose charge it had gress by either of the Presidents above referred to, been committed, by a significant allusion to his upon the ground of their being inexpedient, or not as well adapted as they might be to the wants of the people, the veto was applied upon that of want of conformity to the Constitution, or because errors had been committed fro a a too hasty enactment.

There is another ground for the adoption of the eto principle, which had probably more influence in recommending it to the Convention than any other. I refer to the security which it gives to the just and equitable action of the Legislature upon all parts of the Union. It could not but have oc curred to the Convention that, in a country so ex tensive, embracing so great a variety of soil and climate, and, consequently, of products, and which from the same causes, must ever exhibit a great difference in the amount of the population of its various sections, called for a great diversity in the employments of the people, that the legislation of the majority might not always justly regard the rights and interests of the minority-and that acts of this character might be passed, under an express grant by the words of the Constitution, and, herefore, not within the competency of the judiciary to declare void; that, however enlightened and patriotic they might suppose, from past experience, he members of Congress might be, and however largely partaking in the gener I of the liberal feel ings of the people, it was impossible to expect that bodies so constituted should not sometimes be controlled by local interests and sectional feelings. It was proper, therefore, to provide some umpire, from whose situation and mode of appointment more independence and freedom from such influences might be expected. Such a one was afforded by the Executiv Department, constituted by the Constitution. A person elected to that high office, having his constituents in every section, State, and subdivision of the Union, must consider himself bound, by the most solemn sanctions, to guard, protect, and defend the rights of all, and of every portion, great or small, from the mustice and onpression of the rest. I consider the veto power, nitions, under varied circumstances, in acts of the be not only tolerated but encouraged, Legislative, Executive, and Judici il branches of Upon another occasion I have given my opin the Government, accompanied by indications in ion, at some length, upon the impropriety of Exe different modes of the concurrence of the general curve interference or the legislation of Congress. will of the nation, as affording to the President sufficient authority for his considering such disputed point as sett ed.

adoption of our present form of Government. It tion, and in particular, that he should never be would be an object more highly descrable than the loosest to for schemes of hounce. It would be vegrattication of the currosity of speculative states, ry strange indeed, that the Constitution should men, if its precise situation could be ascertained, a have strictly betaided one branch of the Legislafair exhibit made of the operations of each of its ture from interiering in the origination of such Departments, of the powers which they respectively bills, and that it should be considered proper that claim and exercise, of the collisions which have an altogether different department of the Governoccurred between them, or between the whole ment should be permitted to do so. Some of our Government and those of the States, or either of best political maximus and opinions have been drawn them. We could then compare our actual condition, from our parent Isle. There are others, however, after fifty years' trial of our system, with what it which cannot be introduced in our system without was in the commencement of its operations, and singular incongruits, and the production of much ascertain whether the predictions of the patriots mischief. And this I concern to be one. No who opposed its ad-ption, or the confident hopes matter in which of the House of Parliament a bill of its advocates, have been best realized. The may originate, but by which introduced, a counsgreat dread of the former seems to have been, that ter, or a member of the opposition, by the fiction the reserved powers of the States would be absorbed of law, or rather of constitutional principle, the by those of the Federal Government, and a consoli- sovereign is supposed to have prepared it agrees dated power established, leaving to the States the bly to his will, and then submitted in to Purnament shadow, only, of that independent action for which, for their advice and consent. Now the very rethey had so zealously contended, and on the preser | verse is the case here, not only with regard to the vation of which they relied as the last hope of lib principle, but the forms prescribed by the Constierry. Without denying that the result to which tution. The principle certainly assigns to the only they looked with so much apprehension is in the body constituted by the Constitution (the legislaway of being realized, it is obvious that they did not live body.) the power to make laws, and the forms server, our system presents no appearance of dis- jections. It is in his power, also, to propose cord between the different members which compose amendments to the existing revenue laws, suggestit. Even the addition of many new ones has projed by his observations upon their defective or duced no jarring. They move in their respective injurious operation. But the delicate duty of denerease of power in the Executive Department of tive, the more wholes me the arrange the General Government, but the character of that the more in accordance with Republican principle. Government, if not its design tion, be essentially and radically changed. This state of things has been in part effected by causes inherent in the Constitution and in part by the never failing tendency of political power to increase itself. By making the President the sole distributor of all the patronage of the Government, the framers of the Constitution do not appear to have anticipated at strument to control the iree operations of the State Governments. Of tofling importance at best, it had, early in Mr. Jefferson's administration, become so powerful as to create great alarm in the mand of that patriot, from the potent influence it unight exert in controlling the freedom of the elective franchise. If such could have then been the the danger at this time, quadrupled in amount, as it certainly is, and more completely under the control of the Executive will, than their construction of their powers allowed, or the forbearing characters of all the early Prosidents permitted them to make? But it is not by the extent of its patron

is correct, there was wanting no other addition to the powers of our Chief Magistrate to stamp a control of the public finances. And to me it appears strange, indeed, that any one should doubt that the entire control which the President possesses over the officers who have the custody of the public money, by the power of removal with or without cause, does, for all mischievous purposes at least virtually subject the treasure also to his disposal. The first Roman Emperor, in his at. tempt to seize the sacred treasure, silenced the sword. By a selection of political instruments for the care of the public money, a reference to their commissions by a President, would be quite as effectual an argument as that of Cæsar to the Roman knight. I am not insensible of the great difficulty that exists in devising a proper plan for the safe keeping and disbursement of the public revenues, and I know the importance which has been attached by men of great abilities and patriotism to the divorce, as it is called, of the Treasury from the banking institutions. It is not the divorce which is complained of, but the unhallowed union of the Treasury with the Executive Department which has created such extensive alarm. To this danger to our Republican institutions, and that created by the influence given to the Executive through the instrumentality of the Federal officers, I propose to apply all the remedies which may be at my command. It was certainly a great error in the framers of the Constitution, not to have made the officer at the head of the Treasury Department entirely independent of the Executive. He should at least have been removable only upon the demand of the popular branch of the Legislature. I have determined never to remove a Secretary of the Treasury without communicating all the circumstances attending such removal to both Houses of Congress. The influence of the Executive in controlling the freedom of the elective franchise through the medium of the public officers can be effectually checked by renewing the prohibition published by Mr. Jefferson, forbidding their interference in elections further than giving their own votes; and their hwn independence secured by an assurance of perfect immunity, in exercising this sacred privilege of freemen under the dictates of their own unbiassed judgments. Never, with my consent, shall an officer of the people, compensated for his services out of their pockets, become the pliant instrument of Executive will.

There is no part of the means placed in the hands of the Executive which might be used with greater therefore, g ven by the Constitution to the Evecu effect, for unhallowed purposes, than the control of tive of the United States solely as a conservative the public press. The maxim which our ancestors power, to be used only. 1st, to protect the Consti- derived from the mother country, that "the freetution from violation; 2:lly, the people from the dom of the press is the great bulwark of civil and effects of hasty legislation, where their will has religious liberty," is one of the most precious lebeen probably disregarded or not well understood; games which they have left us. We have learned, and, 3dly, to prevent the effects of combinations too, from our own as well as the experience of violative of the right of minorities. In reference, other countries, that golden shackles, by whomto the second of these objects, I may observe, that moever or by whatever pretence imposed, are as I consider it the right and privilege of the people to total to it as the iron bonds of despotism. The decide disputed points of the Constitution, arising presses in the necessary employment of the Gofrom the general grant of power to Congress to vernment should never be used "to clear the carry into effect the powers expressly given. And guity, or to varnish crimes." A decent and manly I believe, with Mr. Madison, "that repeated recog-examination of the acts of the Government should

f the President to communicate information and authorizing him to recommend measures, was Unwards of half a century has elapsed since the not interficed to make him the source of Legislaclearly see the mode of its accomplishment. The even direct that the enactments should be ascribed General Government has soized upon none of the to them. The Senate, in relation to reven e bills, reserved rights of the States. As far as any open have a right to propose amendments and so has warfare may have gone, the State authorities have the Executive, by the power given him to return amply maintained their rights. To a casual ob them to the House of Representatives, with his oborbits in perfect harmony with the central head, vising a homes of revenue should be left where and with each other. But there is still an under the Constitution has placed it-with the immended current at work, by which, if not seas-mably ate representatives of the people. For similar checked, the worst apprehensions of our anti-Fede reasons, the mode of keeping, the making treasure ral patriots will be realized. And not only will the should be prescribed by the art and the farther State authorities be overshadowed by the great removed it may be from the coveral of the Execu-

Connected with this subject is the character of the currency: The idea of making it exclusively metallic, however well intended, appears to me to be fraught with more Lital to exponent than any other scheme, having to relating to the personal rights of the citizen, that havever been devised. It any single seneme could produce the effect of how short a period it would become a formudable inwhich thousands of our most malagest fellow cats zons, by their industry, and enter cise, are raped to the possession of wealth, "but is the one. If there is one measure better calculated their anoth er to produce that state of things an much deprecated by all true republicans us which the new are daily adding to their heards, and the poor effects of its influence, how much greater must be sinking deeper into penary, it is an exclusive use. tailin currency. Or it there was process by which the character of the country for generos ty and nobleness of feeling may be desirayed by the great increase and necessary toleration of usury, it is an exclusive metallic currings.

Amongst the other daties of a deligate character age alone that the Executive Department has he which the President is called significant in perform, is come dangerous, but by the use which it appears the supervision of the government of the Territomay be made of the appointing power, to bring un ties of the Patter States. Those of the m which der its control the whole revenue of the country, are destined to become members of our great pul-The Constitution has declared it to be the duty of tical lamily, are compensated by their reged or . the President to see that the laws are executed, and gress from intency to mathematic furthe partial and it makes him the Commander in Chief of the ar it in the Dourset, only, where American outs-

zens are to be found, who, under a settled system of policy, are deprived of many important political privileges, without any inspiring hopes as to the future. Their only consolation, under such cir cumstances of such deprivations, is that of the devoted exterior guards of a camp—that their suf-ferings secure tranquility and safety within. Are there any of their countrymen who would subject them to greater sacrifices, to any other humiliations than those essentially necessary to the security of the object for which they were thus separa-ted from their fellow-citizens? Are their rights alone not to be guarantied by the application of those great principles, upon which all our Consti-tutions are founded? We are told by the greates of British orators and statesmen, that, at the commencement of the war of the Revolution, the most stunid men in England spoke of "their American subjects." Are there, indeed, citizens of any of our States who have drea ed of their subjects in the District of Columbia ? Such dreams can never be realized by any agency of mine.

The people of the District of Columbia are not the subjects of the people of the States, but free American citizens. Being in the latter condition when the Constitution was formed, no words used in t at instrument could have been intended to dr. prive them of that character. If there is any thing in the great principles of unalienable rights, so emphatically insisted upon in our Declaration of Independence, they could neither make, nor the United States accept, a surrender of their liberties. and become the subjects, in other words, the slaves, of their former fellow citizens. If this be true, and it will scarcely be denied by any one who has a correct idea of his own rights as an American citizen, the grant to Congress of exclusive jurisdiction in the District of Columbia, can be interpreted, so far as respects the aggregate people of the United States, as meaning nothing more than to allow to Congress the controlling power necessary to afford a free and safe exercise of the functions assigned to the General Government by the Constitution. In all other respects, the legislation of Congress should be adapted to their peculiar position and wants, and be conformable with their deliberate opinions of their own interests.

I liave spoken of the necessity of keeping the

respective Departments of the Government, as well as all the other authorities of our country. within their appropriate orbits. This is a matter of difficulty to some cases, as the powers which they respectively claim are often not defined by very distinct lines. Mischievous, however, in their tendercies, as collisions of this kind may be, those which arise between the respective communities, which for certain purposes compose one nation, are much more so; for no such nation can long ex at without the caref I culture of those feelings of confidence and affection which are the effective bonds of union between free and confederated States. Strong as is the tie of interest, it has been often found meffectual. Men, blinded by their passions, have been known to adopt measures for their country in direct opposition to all the suggestions of policy. The alternative, then is to destroy or keen down a bad passion by creating and fintering a good one; and it seems to be the corner stone upon which our American political architects have reared the fabric of our Government. The cement, buch was to bind it, and perpetuate its existence, was the aff-ctionate attachment between all us members. To insure the continuance of this feeling, produced at first by a community of dangers of sufferings and of interest, the advantagestof each were made accessible to all. No partierpateur my any good, powered by any men ber of an extensive confederacy, except in domestic government, was withheld from the citizen of any other member. By a process attended with no difficulty, no delay, no expense but that of removal the citizen of one might become the citizen of any other, and successively of the whole. The lines, too. eeparating powers to be exercised by the citizens of one State from those of another, seem to be so distinctly down as to leave no room for misunderstanding. The cutzens of each State unite. in their persons all the privileges which that character confers, and all'(but they may claim as citizens of the United Soites; but in no case can the same person at the same time, act as the citizen of two separate States, and he is therefore positively precluded from any interference with the reserved p wers of any State, but that of which he is for the time being, a citizen. He may indeed offer to the current of other States his advice as to their management, and the form in which it was tendered is left to his own discretion and sense of

It may be observed, however, that organized sociations of citizens, requiring complumes with their wishes, too much resemble the recommends tions of Athens to her allies-supported by an armd and powerful fleet. It was indeed, to the ambition of the leading States to control the domestic concerns of the others, that the destruction of that celebrated confederacy, and subsequently of all its members, is mainly to be attributed. And it is owing to the absence of that spirit that the Helvetic confe eracy has for so many wears been preserved. Never has there been seen in the institutions of the separate members of any confederacy more elements of discord. In the principles and forms of government and religion, as well as in the excentistances of the several cantons, so marked a iscrepance was observable, as to promise any hing but harmony in their intercourse or permawies in their alliance. And yet, for ages, neither has been interrupted. Content with the positive which their union produced, with the independence and salety from foreign aggression which it secured, these angacious people respected the institutions of each other, however repugnant to their own principles and prejudices.

Our Confederacy, fellow-citizens, can only be preserved by the same forbearance. Our citizens and be content with the exercise of the powers with a high the Constitution clothes them. The internet of those of one State to control the domestic institutions of another, can only result in feelings of distrust and jenlousy, the certain barbungers of disunion, violence, civil war, and the altimate destruction of our free institutions. Our Confederary is perfectly illustrated by the terms and pre-ciples governe g a common co partnership-There a find of power is to be exercised under the direction of the joint councils of the allied memburs, but that which has been reserved by the individual member- is intangible by the common coverament or the individual members composing . To attempt it finds no support in the prince ples of our Constitution. It should be our constant and carnest codeavor mutually to cultivate a spirit of concord and incremony among the various paris four Confederacy. Experience has abundantly taught as that the agitation by citizens of one par if the Union of a subject not confided to the General Government, but exclusively under the guardenship of the local nutherities, is productive dissofter consequences than bitterness, alienations discord, and report to the very cause which is intended to be advanced. Of all the great interes? which appertung to our country, that of union cordial, confiding, fraternal union, is by far to