Newspapers / Western Carolinian (Salisbury, N.C.) / March 25, 1842, edition 1 / Page 2
Part of Western Carolinian (Salisbury, N.C.) / About this page
This page has errors
The date, title, or page description is wrong
This page has harmful content
This page contains sensitive or offensive material
1 i . t St , 11 -v. i of amouuinjj, as iu that of forming and adopting . the Constitution I All thi must a;ip"ar anomalous, etrangH, and xinaccountaMe, o.i lh theory tif the Senator, but harmonious and easily explained on Ilia opposite ; that nun U an union, lot of individuals, omted by what ia called it sOcial. compact, fur that would uake if a nation; nor of Governments, .for that w"ould have formed a mora Confederacy. like the Oo superseded fey the present Constitution ; but an union of-Statee, foun-iod on a written, poeitiva compact, forming a Federal Republic, with the aam equality of nghta among the State com pnsiug the Union, as among the citixa.ns co npoin2 the S atea theraselvea. Instead ofja nation, wo are in reality an amtilage of nations, or peoples, (i( the pi ami noun may be used where the lanzuaire affords none ) anted in their sovereign character in) uediately and directly by their own act, without lusingjuoir separata and .independent .exist once. It' results frou all that has been stated, that eihor the theoryof the Senator is wrong, or th.ti our political system is throughout a profound and ralical error. elf the latter be lha case, thca that complex system of ours, consisting f so many parts, it it wended, at was supposed, into one bar monious and sjlli nu whole, raising its front On .. tilth and challenging the admiration of the world, .it but' a misshapen and disproportionate structure tn.it ought to be demolished to the ground, with the single exception of the apartment alluded to Mouse of, usprescutitives. Is llie Senator prepared to commence the work of demolition Docs be beliere that all other parts ul this complex structure ait irregular and deformed appendages ; and that if they were taken down, and the Govern, tueut erected exclusively on the will of I lie Humeri cul majority, it would effort as well, or better, the great obje-.t Tor which it was Instituted ; " to es tablish justice, ensure domestic tranquility; pro vide for the common defence ; prim te the general welfare; and sccuro the blessings ot liberty, to . ouraclres and our- posterity." AfiU the Senator will any one cau any one venture to assert lhat? And if pot, why not! There is lha qnosiion, on the proper solution of which hang nut only, the explanation of the veto, but that of the real nature and cliaracrt-r. of our complex, but beautiful and harmonious system of Government. To give a fiill and systematic solution, it would be necessary to descend to the elements of politic! science, and discuss principles little suited to a discussion in a deliberative attemoiy. I waive the attempt, and !iall content myself with giving a much more matter of fact solution. It i sufficient for that purpose,- to point to the - actual operation-of llie GoveriimeoViurough all the stages of its existence, a id the many and im portant measures which have agitated it- fro-n the beginning ; the success of which, one portion of tha people regarded as essential to their prosperity and happiness, while other portion hive viewed them as demruitiva of both. What does this im ply, but a deep oufltct of inte-ests, real or sup pined, between tho different portions of the com munity, 01 iiiSjis of the first m iguitude the currency, tha finances, ioclu hug taxation and dis burseinents ; the Bank, the protective UruT, dis tribution, and many others; on all of which tha most opposite and conflicting views have prevailed I And what wauld be llie e3.-ct of placing tha piwer of thi Govuraroeut uud.'r the exclusive control of the numerical majority--! 8,OJO,OO0 over 7,000. t)00 j of six Stales over all the rati but to give dominant intcro!, or combination of interests, au unlimited and dt-saotio control over , all oiW ' VVbst, but to vest tt with the p w?r to administer tho G tverii.nsnt fr its exclusive- benefit, regard 'aii'f wretchfldaeiis 7 ' A id whit, r a country of izh vast exteiit ani diversity of Condition, initi -lmiH in J jilryaai itJacJUun jvojild. .thatJe bit U subject the rfjt to the m wt grinding n aolu:u juii xjpir as ii mil BaL wiiai ii tbarumedy. 2 It would ba b';t to' lucre.isa the evil,' to Iran-tier UprwsenUtivi,.ud ..plicejlie control exclusively Tun the other reaches that point, iKe're is iio secufn" in the htfi-'i f t!ie S-nite in thil of the fjurtiyTrr tlie'weaUft sga millions. inivl of thj et''it. If one mint Iw ! so extendi a countrv as ours. Acting in the sacrificed to t!i : ut!ir, it is letter that the fewitpint of these remarks, ihe amh rs of tun Consti eVxild bo lo the many, than the mViy to the few. ! tutioii, although they deemed the concuireuce of What then is to bo d.rfie, if neither the mijority j '" "a'6 "J ' 11x1 " "fi:'eot, with the nor the minority, lha greater nor h-xs pert, can be ; approval oUie President, to the enactment of laws aifely trusted with the exclusive control 1 Wlmt 1 ordinary cases, yet, when he dissented, they but to vest the powers' of the G ivrn.nut in thejdom it asoiriuuut presumiHion agaiu-rt the mea wholo the entire (ieoe to m ike it io truth and l( require a still greater eniarifoinil of tho reality lha Government of the people, instead ofl'P"'1" for this en ictmenu Wun this view, the Government of a dominant over a subioct oart.Mhe a""' of two thirds of bnh Hwses were re- be it the greater or le of the whole people eel( government ; and if this should prove impossi tie in practice, then to-mike the nearest approach to it, hy requirin; thi e sicurrence in ihe action of the G ovcrumerit, of the grcatoat pinNtulQ nu nb-r c m-iisreiit wtth Ion grett ends for winch govern vn'erK was inMituted justice an J security, within and without. Bit how 1 thai lobe ettaied? X certainly by con u lormg the whole community as one, and taxing its .sm as a wholo by a siugle process, which, instead of giving llie voice of all, can bjt give tint of a pir Ture is Ihit one way by which it can - pom'ily be accomplished ; aod that is a jiliciois sir vi division mi I org in si lion f ths governmont and community, with ref erence ti its did-Tsnt a id c mllicting in(-re-ts, ind ty taking (ha seine of n ich part sepiratoty. so l Ihe coucurrence of all noiis voice of the wn f Each may hi imperfect of itself, bit if Ihe cm struction be good anil- sll the keys skilfully touched. there will be given out in one b'en i-l and hirmn nious whole, the true aul p -rfjcl votes of the pen p:e H it on wd-if priucipl isuch n division and or- irimZillol 1 without which it is impotuble to pr-f-n-rve free and re-elHciiuu, the desire ol having a lavurite elected, popular iinl.lutions ? To this no gaunr.-il answer or maintaining the ascendancy of his party, miv can he jiven. It is the work of the wisu and et j h ive to a c insiders'ilo extent, the sauu mllienco pirn-.ncel, Inwing full an I perfect knowledge of tip ' over htm. The effect, in either case, would be to c Miutry an? the people iu every piMicuiar lor : make Inoi look more to the. interest of the whole whom the (jjvernme i? u luteuied. It must b" to s ifien so;tional bjelins and asperity lo be niade In fit, and him it does, it will fa no other more ofa p-nriot, thin Ihe partis in of any pirlicm aud will be incapahlo of being intimated or bor 'lar inlertsi j and through the inllutwu of these rowuJ. VV illicit, then, Htteihpttng io do what causes io give a more general rhsracter to t.'ie cannot I don", I pn.pfe to p n-it out how that; parties of the country, an I thereby rnnJnr the whicli I hive st itod ha li-ti ac; 'p!nh"4 in nor ' collision lntwmri sectional interests luss tirc than sys'em of (Jovrofiiiii. id t'u agu.h-y iul veio is it would be if legislators d-pended siMy on tne iiteiidod to hive ia effec'iuj it. oiHin'oers ot Hit two H juses, wuo ciwe no r-ipiiisi I l.,,,, wMl, tho Hjusu of Urev!it itiv.:s. b hty bit lo llloso who.eler.led them. T ie ssmt Tlwre each h is a 'Usj.resHiii Hiv. .ouor lm,. 'miiamwe acts evtn on the aspirants for thi Prosi In its Aider il iiumLors. ..uJ wh"ii ni -t, a o .j .rii; 1 dencv, and is followed to verv cons.d ir.thle extent of t' vrh .le nimVr ol members controls its pr.i. ' 'V the same softenm aud gom-ralixtng fleets. In ccfdiii 's,- thus giving to lha numerical majority j '' tlw Preseiout, H may lead to the inter, lha exclusive control through-sit. Thit-flecl 11 to l"-""g of his veto almost oppressive and dangerous idace Us pruceodugs hi lie: p-iwer of eiht nnllioim ; soct.on d umasures, evm wh -n supported bv Ih-isu of peou'e over sll th-j re.i, aud six of the hrg.-si ,"" ,lt "w,, U" election. But. be the cause Slales il willed, ovt-r lh other tw-uly ; sod Ihe , ' iiitflreeiughis veto whit it may, its ed m.-I mall conseq lonce, if the II -ui was the .-x..lu iva organ ' '-" ' rH,r"r wy of constituency, of Ihe voire of the p-)opl-, would be the domination ' through Ihe legislative organ., lo put th G.ivern- of the stronger overdue walker iutiiess of the community, and the esianlishinent of an ititokra Ida and oppieasive . dp dis n. Tu find the re me Jy agamsl what wiwld be so great hii evil, we Kia L!v. Hire au eutirelw dd! reiil '"itfvces is sdoptd to take the seoie of ti Vom ri-jndv- P4ul.ifiu i ea'iHy disr-yirdl. I States, without reference to the number of people, are made the basis of representation the etket of hich is to place lha eonirol bora in a majority or the States, which had they lha exclusive power,. would exercise it as despotically and oppressively s would the House of Representatives. Regarded, then, separately, aeither truly repre sen's the sense of the comm unity, and each is nn perfect of itself; .but when united, and the concur. ruiir voice of each is made necessary to enact laws. tha one corrects tha defects of the other; and, in stead of tha less popular derogating from tho mora popular, s is supposed by the beuator, tna two together give a more lull and perloct utterance to lha voice of the people than euher "could separate ly, Takeu'wjparaiely, six States might control Ihe llnse, and a little upwards of four millions might control the Senate, by a combination ot the fourteen smaller States ; but by requiring the con current votes of tho two. the six largest States must add eight others to have the control in both bodies. Suppose, for illustration, they should unite with ihe eight smallest, which would give the leant number by which an act could pass b th Houses, it will be found, by adding the population in federal numbers of Ihe six largest to lha eijht s nallet States, th it the least number by which an act can pass both Houses, if tho members should be true tothoke tbey represent, would be 9,693,. 870 againtit a minority of 0.119.797, instead of 9,000,000 against 7,900,000, if the assent of the most popular branch alone was required. .This mora full and perfect expression of the voice of the people by the concurrence of the two, compared io either separately, is a great advance towards a full and perfect expression of their voice ; but great as it is, it falls far short, and the framers of. the Constitution were accordingly out satisfied with it To render it still more perfect, their next step was to require the assent of the President, belure an act of Congress could become a law, and if he disapproved, to require twolhirds f both Houses to overrule his veto. "We are thus brought to lha point immediately under dicuo.i, and which, ou that account, claims a full aud careful elimination. '- One of lha leading motives lor vesting the Pre- sid nt wirh this high power, was, undoubtedly, to give him the memsof protecting the portion of the powers allotted to him by the Constitution, against the encroachment of Congress. To make a divi sion of power eflectual, a veto in one form or an other is ludnpeosable. The right of each to judge for itself of the extent of the power allotted to-1 s share, and to protect itsell in us exercise, is what in reality is m aut by a division of power. With out it, the allotment to each department would be a mere partition, and no division at all. Acting un-... d-r this imprestion, the framers of the Constitution have caretully, provided that his approval should be necessary, not only to the acts of Congress, but to every resolution, vote, or order, requiring the con srfiitof the twa lijujes, so as to render it jmpwHi bio to elude it by any conceivable device. Tins of itself was an adequate motive lor the provision, and were there no 'other, ought io be a sufficient reason for tha rej'-cuotj of llfW resolutiou. VViib.wt it, the division of power between the Legislative and Executive departments, would have bueu merely nominal. , But it is not the only motive. There is another and deeper, to which the division itself of the Go vernment into departments is subordinate ; to en large the popular basis, by increasing tha number of voices necessary to its action. As numerous as tho mmm Mfouttd to obtain lhj aseut of lha people through the Senate and the, U ue to an act, II was noi mo J4111 vy nip iraiiKii u uihiu all cases. " Nine tliousand elghr 1ia,tlr'fuTaTr.Ifg-(r a is the noiiiiir, were regarded as still t w.fe..- aud six thouind one huivlred too many lo remove ail motives nrpprssTo1Trt1i9latterTrrrn5 ;Twt-tw:' fasr to ba uluudcrxid, aud ihe furmsr not inr large... Ho dividj thelsooils of plunder sinonu. Till the ; T"rd overrule bis veto, thai is eiglit.wi Si itos in tha Senate, an I a constituency of ten m.lhous six hundred thousand in the other Hiusn. B it a still stroDyir comidera'ion for ve-iting him with the power iniy bi fouud ra Ihj difference 01' the m inner ol bis election, compared with thit of lha members of either House. Tua senators are elected br lha vote of tho Ligislature of tne respMtiva States, and the mem jers of the Hiu-ie by the people, who, in almost all ilio &tai-s, elect J by districts, in neitner is mere me least lespun isihility of the members of any one State, to tha i Legislsture or prople of any other Si iio. Tiiny j are, as far as thir respoo-ibi iiy may be c -n. : cerned, solely and exclusively under the loflj nceol J tlie Sates ami poople, who respectively elect them, ; Not so the President The votes of the whole are j c Minted in his ek-dion, which makes him more or j les responsible to every part to those who voted ' sgainst bun,' as w:;ll as those to whom he owe his lelition, which he must fuel sensibly. If he should he an aspirant lor a re election, he-will desire to ijiiii the favorahlo opinion of States tint oppose! hiin, as well as lo retain that uf those w nch voted """'' """"i n?... n-,.,,,. ai.lnr ry to let sifili H, an o io unug mi n m ira mil ana pnfect reKms"j froin lha' voice of lha people. Tin-re is still another impediment, if not tha en ietui"nt of a law, to its execution, lo be found in j Ju4ieary Department. I refer lo the riht of tht ro,jr, m nil cava comn before tha n in Nw or eauit y, where an act of Congress eoiw io que. I " . L . T 1 I lion, to dei-KH on lis comUiutionaiuy, wmcu, 11 1 decided agaiiMt ins la iu ife Supremo Court, is in efUt s r.naoeut veio. B it here a di fiereace must bo made' between a docuiou against the! constitutionality of a law of Congress aud that ol States. The former ..cts as restriction on the uowers of Hits Goverument, but the latter as an enlarL'sment. . .. . Such are the Various processus of taking tha sense of the people through the divisions and organ izition oT the ditJoront dpiriments or the Uovern ment, all ot winch, acting through Ibmr appropn- ate org. ns, arc mteuJol 11 iJ:in its basis ami render it more popular, instead of less, by increas- mg the number nectary to put it in action, and havin " for their ohjact to prevent one portion ul the com nuuity from aggrandising or enriching itrelf at lha expense or the other, and lo restrict perhaps, necessary tt suouiu do so hi an popular the wholo of the sphere intended by the framers constitutional Governments like ours, which ex of the Constitution. 11 is it ofl icled these objects 1 eludes classes. It u necessarily the exponent 'of lias it prevented oppression and usurpation on the strongest interest, or c,ombijiation of interests the part of the Government? Has it accompished in the community ; and it .would seem to be ne theobjecis for which the Government was ordained cessary to give it the preponderance, in order id as enumirated in lha preaiuola of tha Constitution T infuse into (he Government the' necessary energy Much, very much, ceniauly baa been done, but' not 1 to accomplish the ends for which it was instituted, all. Many instances might be enumerated, in tha .The great question is, How is due preponderance history of the Government, of the violation of Ihe lo be given to it, without subjecting ihe whole, ia Constitution of the assumption , of powers not time, to its unlimited sway I which brings up the delegated to it or the perversion of thost delegated question, Is there anywhere, io our complex system to uses never intended and of their being wielded of Government, a guard, check, or contrivance, by the dominant interest, for the lime, for its ag sufficiently strong to arrest an (earfull a tendency graudizemeut, at the expense of tha rest of the of the Government f Of, to express it iu more community instances that may be found in every full and perfect expression of lha voice o the period of its .existence, from the eailiest to' the people of the States calculated to couulcreiU this latest, beginning with the Bank aud bank cotmee- ton lenty to the concentration of all the powers of lion at its outset, and ending wit 1 tha Distribution the Government in tha will ol the numerical ma act, at its lata extraordinary session. II w it this jority resulting from the partial and imperfect to 1m accounted (or! What is the reuse? ' expression of their voice through Its organs? The explanation. aod cau e will be found in lha Yes, fortunately, doubly fortunately, there is; fact, that, as fully as the sen- of the' people is not only a more futl and perfect, but a full and tuken in the aciini of the Government, it is not perfect expression to be found in the Constitution, taken fully enough. 'Fyr, after all that has been .acknowledged by all to be the fundamental and accouiplined in thai respect, there are but two auprenielaWof tfie land. It'is full, and perfect, orgaus througH which Ihe voice ol the community because It Ts"1 the expression of the vsXce of each , acts directly on the G vroment, and winch, taken Stae, adopted by the separate assent of ecch by separately, or 111 couibiii jtuHi, constitute ihe cle itself, and for itself, and Isjbe voice of all by boing uiunts of which' it is pomKMcd, the one is the tharoT each, component part, united and blended in ij .rity of the States regarded iu their cor,viriie into one harmonious whole, But it is not only full character as ho llos politic, which in its simple and perfect, but as just as it is full and pcroct;for form commutes the tJenate; and the other is the combining the. sense of each, and therefore all, mijority of tne people f tno States, of which, in there ia nothing left on which injustice, o0ppres its simple form, the liaise of Representatives is siort, or, usurpation can operate. And jGualy il ia composed. I hese combnied, in the proportions as' supreme as it is just, because, comprehending already stated, constitute the -Executive Depart- the will of all, by uniting that of each or Ihe inent, and that.depart nent and the Senate appoint parts, there is nothing within or above lo control the Judgs who OMistitute ttn Judiciary. But A is only in iheir simple lorm in the Senate aoJ the ; other House, -that tiwy Iwve a steady and liauttusl control over the legislative acts of I lie Government. Tne veto of the Executive is rarely interposed ; not 01 .re man about twenty tunes during the period of more than (if y years that tit" Govern ment has existed To4i-fctlbcti Jiavebeenbn encially f It, but only casually, at long intervals, and wniioui steady ami habitual nilljeocs over lha action of the Govsroinent. Ilia same remarks are substantially applicable to what, for the sake of mvvily, may be called the veto of the Judiciary the right of negativing a law for the want ot constitutionality, when it comes in question, ia a case bHore the courts. The Legislature, then, of lha Union, being un der no other habitual and steady control but ihese two majorities, acting through this and the other House, is, in fact, placed substantially under Ihe control of the portion pf the c lounumiy, which the uutteJ majorities ot' the two Houses represent for ihe lin and wttteiv wwy ewxis of but fooryee diates, wuh- teOVntf popo ati'iirof. less mair ten millions, n-'iiiHt a , Uitle more than six, as has already b:eu explained. Bir as targe as is the WtRP.rV.4nl.tJsmall as is in falter, tho one is not large enougn, m proportion, to prevent it irum pTunJeTmg, uuTfernfTi S4uaJi.eo.MigU Jroai.JlUi.luuJ!tXLMi,aud JiaQCfl. atte swsaiy ms) sncss mL ituUkiaXvl tuUusUladion4 ol .UjUfpjiJoi of jjors p'.rvo. KH a id wielded lor selfish purposes, wmcu tn''Krsto'ry'7r Hiei 'GuVeftf-" idea adonf-k Tney turnisit prod conclusive that the principle of ol eider, so' ti--ep!v implanted ia all G (v. r nimni, has n t heuu er. du-ated in (Airs by all tne precan'ion taken by its trainers against if. Bit in estimating tha numtier of the constituen cy necessary to c Miirol thi;. majority in the two II u)s of Congress at something less than ten millions, 1 have estima ed il altogother loo hig i, regarding ihe prtcneal peratiHi of the Govern, men!, f j form a correct conception of its prac tiua operati ai in this respect, another e(eront, whicn his iu pricuct an important iuiiieiice, which must b l iken into tha esttiiale, and which 1 snail next proceed to explain. Uf the ti moritis, wh.ch, acting either scpuslely or in cotonination, co itrol the Govern ment, the numerical majority is by tar Ihe most essential. It has the exclusive e mrol in tha House of Repress itaiivus, and prepon Isr.tes more than tivs to one iu lha choice of the PresiJont, usuiming that the ratio of representation will be fixed at sixty oignt thnnsaud, under Ihe lata ceqsos. It also greatly preponderates id appoiutiaaiit of the judges, I nn right of nominating having much greater nilloeuce in making appoiutineuis Uijii (Hat of idvising ind consenting. From these lams, it must be apparent that the leaning ol the President will ba to that element of power la which lie mainly owes bis elevation and on which he must prineip lly rely, lo aocure'his ia election, or 'in nnuin tne ascendancv of the parly an I system ol its policy, the head of winch he usually is. Tina Jea iing of. nis, must nave a powerim etmci on tne Inclination wl twndiicy ol ihe whole Isoveromenl. . In his hands are placed, substantially, all the nonors sn emolumouts of the Gnvsrnment, and lh-se, when greatly, increanxl, as they are endorser must be when lh" Mersof the Government are greatly stretched and increased, must give the Pre-wlnnt a (-orresjxindiiig infiuunce over, not only the innmbers ..... . . . ot notn tj ouses, DH also pom copimoo, and ihroogh ih il. h still mors powerful indirect influence over.' the grsnted powers, are expressly delegated to them ; uud thus tney may Ihj brought to su,Um t J Conjiess, be they powers granted In the L-gisIa-opp., through bis mllienie, measures which , ttt Execu'isc or Judicial " department, and can otherwise they would have opposed or .ustaine f, ..ii . ,a wo.( u no n,n ua ... , Ui luin 111 uio I sunn direction wun lha Executive. From these causes the G iveruuiut, in all of its dupartineiiis, gravitates atsadilv towards the.iiume rical majority, and has boa I moving slowly towards it from the beginning, som Dimes, indeed, retarded, or ev;-n kMpjx'd nr throw i back, but taking any considerable period of Urn, always advancing lo w irds it. Thai il be ins lo make nar snoroach lo that fat il p i'it, ample pnNif may be found in ihe on repe neu aecinration m ine mover ot this n-su lution, and of many "of his suiiorters at Ihe extra- ordmarv sessi m, mat the l ite Presidential election decided nil the gwnt measures which he so ardently pressed througl the Sonat . Yes, even here, in this chain's', in ihe Senal ', sffiichis composed of th" upswing i-leiieni, ad oh which ihe" only II Ttu.il resistance to this I .mi tendency exists that is in. le found in the Gover imenf, we an t.M that tie popular will as expressed in the Prejdifi!iul ebjciioo ! Io dide M only Uw ejection, pui every ...V.:- ka airititltfil in llm movis 111 1 . . 1 .. . 'ncasuni wihh -b.-- - order to mU'ence the result, wt.en wna was thus boldly insisted 00 comes to be aa establish principle of action, toe ana wm ce near. As the Government approaches O'jur anj . nearer to the one aWoluie anu single (wor, m wm i i greater number, its action will income more aim more disturbed aud irregular fuction, corruption, and anarchy, win raorean i m ire awouuo, l.,uim. will daily decay, aud tflection and teverence lor the uovernmeot grow weascr tne uuai stioca occurs, wunn mo mjnvm to ruin ana in aworu iaae mo piato wi w umstiiuiion. &t me not be misunderstood. I object not to that structure of the Government which ma es the numerics majority he predominant elemeut: it is, it. It is iudeed, the so popvli tox Dt; thi creating voice that called the system into existence and of which the Government itself is .but. crea- lure clothed with delegated powers to exccuie its high behests. We are thus brought to a question of the deep est import, and on ahich the lata of the system depends j How can' this full, perfect, just, and supre me voice of lha people, embodied in the Constitution, be brought to bear .hamiiially and steadily ,n counteracting Ihe fatal ieodeocy of the Government to tha absolute and despotic control of the numerical majority t Or, if I may be permuted lo use so bold ad expression, bow is ibis, the duty of our political system, lo be successfully invoked, to interpose its all powerful creating voice to save from perdition the creature of its will aud the work of Its hand? Il it cannot be done, ours, like all free G ovenmeats preceding it, must go the way of all Ae-m but il ,il can be, its deration may be from generation to generation, to lha latest posterity. To this all important question, 1 will m, khwiij r-tnn nnwr-inrora . ... . l . . 1 . I . -.Ji L.1 dKUnon. I descend from the digression nearer lo the subject immediacy at issus. in -order to pf ply To an objection to the veto power, taken by A tne-faenatof lrow V or jwiayoa tau siuediia ciuuo. Iwr.fM rr.Vrcnefn ;i He reals his support of this resolution on the j grouodjliatiie owjectmiotendeilo le-oectei oy the veto has failed ; ihaVtnetiTiTnersror ilie l?ih-" wirtitioo segarsM the WgisJativsdopaUmeut of Abe Ooveroment as the one roost. to be dreaded, and thai iheir motive for vesting the Executive with the veto, was to check its encroachments on the other departments; but that the Executive, and not tha Legislsture, had proved io be tha most dangerous, aud that the veto had become either useless or mischievous by being converted into a sword tit attack, instead of a shield to defend as was originally intended. I make no jssue from .the Senator, s to the correctness of his statement. I assume Ihe facia to ba as ha supposes not because I agree wiih bim, but simply wjtb ibe view of making my reply more brief. Assuming, then, (hat the Executive Department has proved lo be tha more formidable, and that it requires to be checked, rather than to have the power of cone sing others, the first inquiry on that assumption, should ba mm the cause of its increase of power, 'in order lo sscertam tha seat and the nature of the danger ; and Iho next, whether the measure proposed that of divesting it ol Ihe veto, or modifying it as proposed would guard against the danger apprehended. I begin with tha. first, and in entering on it, assert with confii nce, (hat if the Executive has become formidable lo tho liberty or safety of the country or other departments of the Government, the cause is not in the Constitution, but In Iho acts aud omissions of Congress itself. Acenrding lo my conception, the pnwor vested in the President by 'lha Constitution, are few and effectually guarded, awl are riot of themselves at ell forundaM. Ia ardor to have a just conception of Iho exient of his powers, it must be borne in mind that there are but two classes of power known to tl Con-dilution ; and they are poia that are expressly granted, and those hat are nitfeasarv to carry the irratited enwers into axe. eulion. Now, by a positive provision of ihe Con. f ; 4ttulion, all piwers necessary io the esscution hi i,f only bo exercised by tha authority of Conaress. , am i , manner urase.riued hv law. Th is pro visior. may be found in what is called ihe residuary .clauo, which declares Hint Owigress shall have power " to m ike all laws which shall ha necessary and proper lo carry into execution iho foregoing power," (those granted to Congress,) "and sll other powers vested by this CouMitution in the Government of llie I 'oiled Slutes, or in any do part ment or officer iheref. A more enmprohon ! sive provision cannot be imsgnmd. Il entries j with it all powers necessary and proper lo Urn. execution of tha gr mud iowers, lw they I.Mlged where they may, and voets Ihe whole, iu terms not j less explicit, 'in Congrossf and herolet me add, in t passing, that ike provision is aa wise" as "il is com. I preheusivo. It dep.sitcs tha righl of deciding j whal powers are necessary for tho ex'cution of ihe granted powers, where, aud where only it can ho lodged, wiih safnlyn the hands .of ihe law making power, aod forbids any department pf officer of lij UQvern'niec( Irom exercising any power x&l tit pressly authorized by tho (.onstitutimi or the laws, thus making ours emphatically a Government of law and Constitution. Having now shown that the President U restricu ed by the Constitution to powers express y granted ' to him, aud that il any ol bis granted powers be such, that they require other powers to execute A them, ne cannot exercise mem wunoui ma author- ity of Congress, I aliaU now shuw that thore is not one power vested in him that is any way dangerous, unless made so by the acta or permission of Con. grass. I shall take them in the order they atind io the Constitution. Ha is, in the first place, made. Comm inder-ia. chief of ithe army and navy of the United States, and tha militia, when called into actual service. Large and expensive military and naval establish meuls and numerous corps of militia, called into service, would, nodouht, increase very dangerously the power afld patronage ot the President; but neither can take place but by tne action of Coo. Kt . 11- sis grass. Wot a soldier can oe enusiea, a ship or war built, nor a militiaman called into service, without its authority J aud very fortunately our situation ia such that there is no necessity, and probably, will ' be none, -why his power and patronage should be dangerously increased by either of those means. Ua ia next vested with lha power to make trea. lies and lo appoint officers, with the ndvice and consent ot the Senate and here again his power can only be made dangerous ly the action of on or both Houses of Congress. In the formation of treaties two thirds of Ihe Senate must concur t and it ia difficult to conceive ol a treaty that could ma terially enlarge bis powers, that would not require an act of Congress to carry it into effect. The appointing power may, indeed, dangerously increase his patronage, if officers be uselessly multiplied aud loo highly paid t but if such should ba lha case, tho fault would be in Loo areas, by whose authority exclusively they, can be created or their compeu V sat ion regulated. , ,; But much M said in una connection, of the pow er of removal, ; Justly accompanied by -severe m.00; ' uemnatioo of Ihe many and abusive instances of -the use of Ihe power, and 'the duiigerous influence it give the President, in all of which I fully con cur. It is, indeed, a corrupting and dangerous" power, when officers are greatly multiplied, and highly paid, and when it is perverted from his le glttmite object, to the advancement of personal nr parly purposes. Bui I find no such power in the list o( powers granted to the Executive, which is proof Conclusive that it belongs to the class nt-ces-sary aod proper to execute Mime other power, if it exists at all, which none "can doubt, and, for rea sons already assigned, cannot be exercised without authority of law,,- lfT then, it. has boon sUna-d, it must be because Congress bsa rx4 done its duty io permitting it to be exercised by the President with out the sanction of law authorizing its exercise, and guarding against the abuses lo wbich it ia so liable. ' . '. The residuciiflhe: fat arerfather-duliflethsa rights; that of recommending to Congress auch measures a he may deem expedient ; of conven. ing-botb Hooos on sxtraorJiuary osrasi.ms ; of adjourning them when they cauiHit agree on the time; ot receiving ambassadors and other -tinni-lers ; of uking care that Ibe jaws be faiihlu ly ex-, ecuted, and commissioning the officers of the Cm. led States. l)f all these there is but one which claims particular notice, iu connection wiiirtho point immediately under cooasdumlhsj j and thai is his power as the administrator ul lit laws. IJui whatever power be may have in th a rapacity de pends oiheacijou,,of t.k....ia .. 1 I.. liliM.hLl.lWLt!k.!lfcVaLsMV!l!-'!djL h,,. ,V . j . me ua laws ms lo b-sve is little as possible to discretion, and luks care to wn that they are duly and faitiifuify vxjouied.Nw admioiattanve powers of the Pa-sidenV wowid L ' pfdpmodT-imtcfh-end ?dtvsjWri e.l dmigwr... But if, oo lha omtrsry, it should ex .end (is li-xiiuy livnm every tireHmti aitaw-smoie- hs.xsiIwmi oiieetasMftfCMHlK& .. . ....... nuuiply its acts, crcieprumcrus ullm-rs, and in crease tha revenue andetpendtturvwnpftnftilyT and al the ssme time, frame its lawt -iguely aud loosely, and withdraw, in a great measure, its su pervising eare over iheir execution, "his power would indeed become truly formidable and alarm ing. Now I appeal to the Senator and bis frieod.jke author of this resolution, whether the growth- of Executive power baa not been the result of such a course oo the pari of Congress. I ask theai wheth er his power bas not in tact increased, or decreased, just ia proportion to the increase end decrease ot' Hie system of Icgr-lstiou, surh,as has born tie. scribed ? -' What was the period of its maximum in. crease, but the very period Which 1hey have so frequently and loudly denounced as ihe one m.wl diviinguiihed lor Ihe prevalence of xecuttff H). er and usurpation? . Muchjf thajower certainly depended oo the remarksble man, then at the bead of the Department, but much far more, oo the system of legislation, which the author of this res olution had built up with so much -sl and labor, snd whicn carried the powers of the Government lo a point beyond that lo which it had aver before attained, drawing many and imKiriant powers miu its vortex, of which ihe framers of the Constitution never dreamed. And here lot me say lo both of the Senators, niid the party of which they are prom iumit mcmhers, that they labor iu Vaih to bring down Gxueutjve power, while ihcy sopj.irt lhes)s lem lliey so t 'aiousl&advocatq. The power they complain of is,but its necessary frint. Ba assurvd thai as certain as Congress transcends il assigned limits,- aud usurps . powers never cou'errcd, r simtches fh'ise csifvrred beyond the protier limits, dfeiy am xn rrum nrtw ujuruitumv pass mtw llie hands of the Executive. In seeking to become master, it but makes a master in Ihe person of the President. It is only by ctmfiuinu itself lo its al rf lotted snhere. and a disciaet uua ul na ackiuibvio.ii Al powots, that it can retain thai aceuda m-V in the tfovernment winch lha Lonslituimu intended t" confer on it. Having now pointed out the cau-e oflliegmt increase of the Executive power oh winch the Sen ator rested his olijuction io Ihe veto power, ami having satisfactorily shown, as I trust I have, Hint if it has proved dangerous in fact, the fault is net in lha Constitution, but in C-ongres, I would net ask him, in what poesih'e way could Iho divesting the President of his veto, or modilymi: it as lm proposes, limit his power ? - Is it not dear, thai sn fir from (lie veto being the rause of the increase of his power, it would have acted as a limitation oa it if it had been more ftoeW and frequently used! If the President had vetoed Iho original Bank lha connect ion with Dm banking system the ta riffs of 24 and '29, and the numerous acis appro priating money lor roads, csu.ils, harbors, and a I Mig list of other measures not le unconsiiluiiimsl, would, hik power Iihvo been half as great as il i now ? Ha has irrown ureal and iwiwerfulT not be- I can' he u$ej Ins veto, but became he uhttaiwd . from using it. In Kid, it is difficult lo imagine a ' case-in which ilsapplicaimn "an lend lo oiilarK" I Ins power, ejeopt it I in the case of an act Intend;
Western Carolinian (Salisbury, N.C.)
Standardized title groups preceding, succeeding, and alternate titles together.
March 25, 1842, edition 1
2
Click "Submit" to request a review of this page. NCDHC staff will check .
0 / 75