THE SENTINEL.

WM. E. PELL, SEATON GALES, } Editors.

Saturday, March 31, 1866.

The Veto.

We offer no apology for the space which we have devoted to the patriotic and unanswerable message of the President, vetoing the odious Civil Rights Bill. We could publish nothing, we are sure, more acceptable to our readers or our people.

The message dissipates the last glimmering hope, if any such existed, of a possible compromise between Andrew Johnson and Thaddeus Stevens, and his Congressional followers. It is, in fact, an emphatic declaration of war against the Radicals and their reconstruction system, root and branch.

Higher and higher the President ascends in his grand historic position. From the day of his accession to the Presidency we have sustained him, and it is with pride and with exceeding gratification that we can say, that our most sanguine anticipations, as to his magnanimity, clemency and patriotism, have been much more than realized.

Testimony Before the Reconstruction Committee.

Sad, indeed, in future days, will be the reminiscences of those actors connected with the efforts of the Reconstruction Committee to prejudice the Southern people before the country, in order to justify or palliate the gross offences committed against humanity, truth, peace, and the early restoration of quiet and harmony to the country. If conscience is not wholly blunted, the day will come, when its bitter remonstrances will extort the cry from them: *"Remorse! Remorse!"* History will write the doom of those men, both North and South, who seek to protract the differences which now unhappily exist in our once peaceful Republic.

The testimony taken by the Committee is so voluminous that we cannot even afford our readers a bird's-eye view of it. The testimony of Gen. Lee, in regard to Virginia, is so simple, truthful and sincere, and so well corresponds with the state of the whole South, that we should be glad to give it to our readers; but it is so lengthy, we cannot. Were we called upon to testify, upon oath, as to the status and feelings of North Carolina, we should scarcely alter a word of Gen. Lee's testimony. There is but one point, which we can call to mind, about which we should differ with him. That is in reference to the *Confederate* debt, if he meant the debt contracted by the late Confederate government. That question has not been mooted in North Carolina. No one, we judge, has entertained the remotest hope or desire of paying that debt. If it were submitted to our people, we think it could not receive 5,000 votes. Our people are so poor, they would be glad to find some honorable method of getting rid of all their debts. But, in the absence of this, we are sure they would neither propose to pay the debts of the dead Confederacy, nor repudiate the National debt. The *State* debt, incurred during the war, they looked upon differently, and would not have repudiated it but for the sacrifice which the President demanded of them. So far as the people, who invested in State bonds, were concerned, they invested in them, not to help on the war. If that had been their design, they would have preferred *Confederate* bonds. The sole object was to find a *safer* investment than Confederate bonds afforded; and, having implicit confidence in the integrity of the State, they invested in her bonds.—Agents, guardians and trustees, invariably chose State bonds, without inquiring whether the State could lawfully or constitutionally create the debt. They therefore regarded that debt as a *bona fide* contract between contracting parties, and hence the reluctance of our people to repudiate that debt, when so many innocent parties, widows and orphan children, were to be reduced to poverty by it.

The following sensible and patriotic remarks of the New York *Herald*, in regard to General Lee's testimony, we heartily endorse:

"We give in full the testimony of General Lee, because, as the evidence of the great military leader of the rebellion, everybody will be interested in reading it, especially in regard to the present state of public opinion in Virginia on the practical, living issues of the day. We presume, too, that General Lee is as well qualified, from his personal observations and knowledge of public sentiment in Virginia, as any other man in the State, to represent that people fairly before the Reconstruction Committee.—In this view his statements as to what the Virginians are prepared, and what they are not prepared, to do in the way of reconstruction are upon the whole as much as could be expected. If they are not in raptures over their subjugation as rebels, they are at least disposed to submit to the new order of things and the President's policy in good faith; and in the midst of the ruins of the rebellion they are too much absorbed in the struggle for existence to be concerned in the plots of political demagogues. This is an important fact, and, as with their best efforts to recover from their broken fortunes, it will require from the Southern people years of steady labor to repair the damages of the war, there need be no fears of mischief from them with their restoration to Congress."

A QUIDDITY.—The *Standard* charges us with speaking falsely, because, in alluding to the affidavit of Lt. Col. Clapp before the reconstruction committee, we said it had closed the door against North Carolina, after admitting the affidavit of a single sojourner. At that time we had not seen the statement of Mr. Fessenden, and inferred from what we saw that Lt. Col. Clapp was the only witness. Nor are we yet advised that Gov. GRAHAM ever tendered, a witness or that said witness or witnesses have been examined. Mr. Fessenden and others said that all the witnesses tendered had been examined, and that the door was not closed, after our article was written; at least we did not see it until afterwards. What witness did Gov. Graham tender, who has been examined?

Profession vs. Practice.

Actions speak louder than words. This is trite, but it is most true. There are a small class of men, and one or two presses, (not more,) in the State, who profess to be friends of the President and supporters of his policy of restoration, but who are daily playing into the hands of the Radicals, and laboring to defeat that policy, by a wholesale detraction of our people. The State is proclaimed as disloyal, and "unfit to be the associate, in the Union, of the loyal States of Pennsylvania and Ohio." (*Standard*, Jan'y 11th,)—the people are falsely charged with persecuting the Quakers and driving them from the State, on account of their Union proclivities,—the Governor, the Legislature and the Press are branded with infidelity to the Government,—and every other effort made to retard the good work of reconciliation and harmony. These calumnies are rolled as sweet morsels under the tongue by the factionists in Congress, and are daily cited in debate as sufficient ground for resisting the wise and beneficent policy of the President.—The strongest weapons with which Stevens and Sumner have been provided, to pierce the hearts of our crushed people, have been furnished from North Carolina. The chains with which they would bind us, hand and foot, have been forged in our own midst by designing and disappointed politicians.

And yet these men pretend to be friends of the President! *Joab* approached *Amasa* with extended arms, but stabbed him beneath the cover of an embrace!

The Case of Senator Stockton.

The recent action of the Senate of the United States, ejecting Senator Stockton, of New Jersey, from his seat in that body, is the culmination of iniquity. The case in a nut shell is this: Senator Stockton's right to a seat was resisted upon the allegation that he was elected by a plurality, instead of a majority, vote of the Legislature. The Committee on Privileges and Elections, composed, of course, of a large Radical majority, to whom the matter was referred, were so impressed with the entire legality of his election, that they were constrained to report in his favor. This did not suit the unprincipled majority on the floor and the effort was accordingly made to defeat the recommendation of the Committee. To this end, Senator Morrill, who had paired off with Senator Wright, absent and sick, violated his solemn engagement and honor, and *voted* for the ejection. This vote would have secured it at once, had not Mr. Stockton, in view of the base and infamous perfidy of Morrill, and in view of the meditated outrage upon the sovereignty of his State, voted in favor of his own right to the seat. On the succeeding day, Sumner moved to amend the journal, by expunging the name of Mr. Stockton from the list of those voting, which would leave a majority against him. The motion was sustained, and Mr. Stockton was ousted.

The Destructives are thus, day by day, building up a monument of infamy, upon which posterity will look with a shudder and with loathing.

South Carolina.

An intelligent gentleman, who has recently travelled through the country, on the track of Gen. Sherman's army, from Fayetteville, *via* Cheraw, S. C., beyond Columbia, has just given us the result of his observations.

He says, in some cases the devastation was greater than he expected to find; in others, not so great. In South Carolina, he says, he found a more hopeful spirit prevailing among the people than in this State. There is also exhibited greater energy and enterprise among the farmers especially, and the blacks are working better than in this State. The number of blacks has been greatly reduced in the section through which he passed, but those who remain seem to be in earnest in labor and in the improvement of their condition. In this, he thinks the farmers and negroes are much aided and encouraged by the present officers of the Bureau. The officers, at first, were so lenient to and confiding in the blacks, that indolence and crime were promoted. Most of those officers have been removed, and others substituted, who seem to feel, that every thing depends upon the industry and good habits of the freedmen, and their efforts are now directed, under wiser counsels, to encourage industry and promptness among the blacks, and a proper regard to the interests of the whites, as the readiest means of promoting the true interests of the freedmen.

We are, moreover, inclined to think, that much of the hopefulness and enterprize, which prevail in South Carolina, is due to the noble, confiding and generous course pursued by Gov. Perry, and the Union men of that State, and the absence of presses that are constantly decrying and abusing those who differ with them! We venture the assertion that, if Gov. Perry had been Provisional Governor of North Carolina, or any one of like spirit and purpose, North Carolina would, to-day, have been in advance of every Southern State, in meeting the wishes of the President and of Congress.

A QUIP.—The *Standard* claims "that the *Sentinel* impliedly asserts that the President violated principle, cast reproach on the fair fame of the State, and inflicted a wrong on widows and orphans," by requiring the repudiation of the State debt. Our language justifies no such implication. We have admitted time and again the right of the President to demand it, as the conqueror. He never voted for secession. But we do not admit the right of the State to do it of her own accord, after she voted for secession. Nor do we admit the political integrity and honesty of any citizen of the State in that transaction, who voted for the ordinance of secession, and voted men and means to prosecute the war, as the Editor of the *Standard* and others did, and then turn round and advocate the repudiation of the debt incurred by the State. With these views, we can most heartily endorse and sustain the President, while we repudiate the Editor of the *Standard*, and other repudiators.

MESSAGE OF PRESIDENT JOHNSON.

Veto of The Civil Rights Bill.

To the Senate of the United States:

I regret that the bill which has passed both Houses of Congress, entitled "An act to protect all persons in the United States in their civil rights, and furnish the means for their vindication," contains provisions which I cannot approve consistently with my sense of duty to the whole people and my obligations to the Constitution of the United States. I am therefore constrained to return it to the Senate, the House in which it originated, with my objections to its becoming a law.

By the first section of the bill, all persons born in the United States, and not subject to any foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed, are declared to be citizens of the United States. This provision comprehends the Chinese of the Pacific States, Indians subject to taxation, the people called gypsies, as well as the entire race designated as blacks, people of color, negroes, mulattoes and persons of African blood. Every individual of these races, born in the United States, is by the bill a citizen of the United States. It does not purport to declare or confer any other right of citizenship than Federal citizenship. It does not purport to give these classes of persons any *status* as citizens of States, except that which may result from their status as citizens of the United States. The power to confer the right of State citizenship is just as exclusively with the several States as the power to confer the right of Federal citizenship is with Congress.

The right of Federal citizenship thus to be conferred on the several excepted races before mentioned, is now, for the first time, proposed to be given by law. If, as is claimed by many, all persons who are native-born, already are, by virtue of the Constitution, citizens of the United States, the passage of the pending bill cannot be necessary to make them such. If, on the other hand, such persons are not citizens, as may be assumed from the proposed legislation to make them such, the grave question presents itself, whether, when eleven of the thirty-six States are unrepresented in Congress, at this time it is sound policy to make our entire colored population and all other excepted classes citizens of the United States? Four millions of them have just emerged from slavery into freedmen. Can it be reasonably supposed that they possess the requisite qualifications to entitle them to all the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States? Have the people of the several States expressed such a conviction? It may also be asked whether it is necessary that they should be declared citizens, in order that they may be secured in the enjoyment of civil rights? Those rights proposed to be conferred by the bill, are, by Federal as well as by State laws, secured to all domiciled aliens and foreigners even before the completion of the process of naturalization; and it may safely be assumed that the same enactments are sufficient to give like protection and benefits to those for whom this bill provides special legislation. Besides, the policy of the Government, from its origin to the present time, seems to have been that persons who are strangers to, and unfamiliar with, our institutions and our laws should pass through a certain probation, at the end of which, before attaining the coveted prize, they must give evidence of their fitness to receive and to exercise the rights of citizens, as contemplated by the Constitution of the United States. The bill, in effect, proposes a discrimination against large numbers of intelligent, worthy and patriotic foreigners, and in favor of the negro, to whom, after long years of bondage, the avenues to freedom and intelligence have now been suddenly opened. He must, of necessity, from his previous unfortunate condition of servitude, be less informed as to the nature and character of our institutions than he who coming from abroad, has, to some extent, at least, familiarized himself with the principles of a government to which he voluntarily entrusts "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness." Yet it is now proposed, by a single legislative enactment, to confer the rights of citizens upon all persons of African descent born within the extended limits of the United States, while persons of foreign birth, who make our land their home, must undergo a probation of five years, and can only then become citizens upon proof that they are of "good moral character, attached to the principles of the Constitution of the United States, and well disposed to the good order and happiness of the same."

The first section of the bill also contains an enumeration of the rights to be enjoyed by these classes, so made citizens, "in every State and Territory in the United States." These rights are: "To make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey personal property," and to have "full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by the white citizens."—So, too, they are made subject to the same punishment, pains, and penalties in common with white citizens, and to none others. Thus a perfect equality of the white and black races is attempted to be fixed by Federal law in every State in the Union, over the vast field of State jurisdiction covered by these enumerated rights. In no one of these can any State ever exercise any power of discrimination between the different races.

In the exercise of State policy over matters exclusively affecting the people of each State, it has frequently been thought expedient to discriminate between the two races. By the statutes of some of the States, Northern as well as Southern, it is enacted, for instance, that no white person shall intermarry with a negro or mulatto. Chancellor Kent says, speaking of the blacks, that "marriages between them and the whites are forbidden in some of the States where slavery does not exist, and they are prohibited in all the slaveholding States, and, when not absolutely contrary to law, they are revolting and regarded as an offence against public decorum."

I do not say this bill repeals the State laws on the subject of marriage between the two races, for as the whites are forbidden to intermarry with the blacks, the blacks can only make such contracts as the whites themselves are allowed to make, and, therefore, cannot, under this bill, enter into the marriage contract with the whites. I cite this discrimination, however, as an instance of the State policy as to discrimination, and to inquire whether, if Congress can abrogate all State laws of discrimination between the two races, in the matter of real estate, of suits and of contracts generally, Congress may not also repeal the State laws as to the contract of marriage between the two races? Hitherto every subject embraced in the enumeration of rights contained in this bill has been considered as exclusively belonging to the States. They all relate to the internal police and economy of the respective States. They are matters which in each State concern the domestic condition of its people, varying in each according to its own peculiar circumstances and the safety and well-being of its own citizens. I do not mean to say that upon all these subjects there are not Federal restraints; as for instance, in the State power of legislation over contracts, there is a Federal limitation that no State shall pass a law impairing the obligations of contracts and as to crimes, that no State shall pass an *ex post facto* law, and as to money, that no State shall make anything but gold and silver a legal tender. But where can we find a Federal prohibition against the power of any State to discriminate, as do most of them, between "aliens and citizens, between artificial persons called corporations, and natural persons, in the right to hold real estate?

If it be granted that Congress can repeal all State laws discriminating between whites and blacks in the subjects covered by this bill, why, it may be asked, may not Congress repeal in the same way all State laws discriminating between the two races on the subjects of suffrage and of office? If Congress can declare by law, who shall hold lands, who shall testify, who shall have capacity to make a contract in a State, then Congress can by law also declare who, without regard to color or race, shall have the right to sit as a juror or as a judge, to hold offices and, finally, to vote "in every State and Territory of the United States." As respects the Territories, they come within the power of Congress, for as to them the law-making power is the Federal power; but as to the States no similar provisions exist, vesting in Congress the power "to make rules and regulations" for them.

The object of the second section of the bill is to afford discriminating protection to the colored persons in the full enjoyment of all the rights secured to them by the preceding section. It declares "that any person who, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, shall subject, or cause to be subjected, any inhabitant of any State or Territory to the deprivation of any right secured or protected by this act, or to different punishment, pains, or penalties on account of such persons having at any time been held in a condition of slavery or involuntary servitude, except as a punishment of crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, or by reason of his color or race, than is prescribed for the punishment of white persons, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on conviction, shall be punished by fine not exceeding one thousand dollars, or imprisonment not exceeding one year, or both, in the discretion of the court." This section seems to be designed to apply to some existing or future law of a State or Territory which may conflict with the provisions of the bill now under consideration. It provides for counteracting such forbidden legislation by imposing fine and imprisonment upon the legislators who may pass such conflicting laws, or upon officers or agents who shall put or attempt to put them into execution. It means an official offence, not a common crime committed against laws upon the persons or property of the black race. Such an act may deprive the black man of his property, but not of the right to hold property. It means a deprivation of the right itself, either by the State Judiciary or the State Legislature. It is therefore assumed that under this section members of the Legislature who should vote for laws conflicting with the provisions of the bill; that Judges of the State courts who should render judgments in antagonism with its terms; and that marshals and sheriffs, who should, as ministerial officers, execute processes, sanctioned by State laws and issued by State judges, in execution of their judgments, could be brought before other tribunals and there subjected to fine and imprisonment for the performance of the duties which such State laws might impose.

The legislation thus proposed invades the judicial power of the State. It says to every State court or judge, if you decide that this act is unconstitutional, if you refuse, under the prohibition of the State law, to allow a negro to testify, if you hold that over such a subject-matter the State law is paramount, and "under color" of a State law refuse the exercise of the right to the negro, your error of judgment, however conscientious, shall subject you to a fine and imprisonment. I do not apprehend that the conflicting legislation, which the bill seems to contemplate, is so likely to occur as to render it necessary at this time to adopt a measure of such doubtful constitutionality.

In the next place, this provision of the bill seems to be unnecessary, as adequate judicial remedies could be adopted to secure the desired end, without invading the immunities of legislators, always important to be preserved in the interest of public liberty, without assailing the independence of the judiciary, always essential to the preservation of individual rights, and without impairing the efficiency of ministerial officers, always necessary for the maintenance of public peace and order. The remedy proposed by this section seems to be, in this respect, not only anomalous but unconstitutional; for the Constitution guarantees nothing with certainty, if it does not insure to the several States the right of making and executing laws in regard to all matters within their jurisdiction, subject only to the restriction that in cases of conflict with the Constitution and constitutional laws of the United States, the latter should be held to be the Supreme law of the land.

The third section gives the District Courts of the United States exclusive "cognizance of all crimes and offences committed against the provisions of this act," and concurrent jurisdiction with the Circuit Courts of the United States of all civil and criminal cases "affecting persons who are denied or cannot enforce in the courts or judicial tribunals of the State or locality where they may be, any of the rights secured to them by the first section." The construction which I have given to the second section is strengthened by this third section, for it makes clear what kind of denial or deprivation of the rights secured by the first section was in contemplation. It is a denial or deprivation of such rights "in the Courts of the United States." It stands, therefore, clear of doubt, that the offence and penalties provided in the second section are intended for the State Judge, who, in the clear exercise of his functions as a Judge, not acting ministerially, but judicially, shall decide contrary to this Federal law. In other words, when a State Judge, acting upon a question involving a conflict between a State law and a Federal law, and bound, according to his own judgment and responsibility, to give an impartial decision between the two, comes to the conclusion that the State law is valid and the Federal law invalid, he must not follow the dictates of his own judgment, at the peril of fine and imprisonment. The Legislative Department of the United States thus takes from the judicial departments of the States the sacred and exclusive duty of judicial decision, and converts the States Judge into a mere ministerial officer, bound to decide according to the will of Congress.

It is clear that in States, which deny to persons whose rights are secured by the first section of the bill any one of those rights, all criminal and civil cases affecting them, will, by the provisions of the third section, come under the exclusive cognizance of the Federal tribunals. It follows that if, in any State which denies to a colored person any one of all those rights, that person should commit a crime against the laws of the State, murder, arson, rape, or any other crime, all protection and punishment through the laws of the State are taken away, and he can only be tried and punished in the Federal courts. How is the criminal to be tried? If the offence is provided for and punished by Federal law, that law and not the State law is to govern.

It is only when the offence does not happen to be within the purview of the Federal law that the Federal courts are to try and punish him under another law. Then resort is to be had to "the common law as modified and changed" by State legislation, "so far as the same is not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States." So that over this vast domain of criminal jurisprudence provided by each State for the protection of its own citizens, and for the punishment of all persons who violate its criminal laws, Federal law, wherever it can be made to apply, displaces State law.

The question here naturally arises, from what source Congress derives the power to transfer to Federal tribunals certain classes of cases embraced in this section? The Constitution expressly declares that the judicial power of the United States "shall extend to all cases in law and equity arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United States and treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority; to all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls; to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; to controversies to which the United States shall be a party; to controversies between two or more States, between a State and a citizen of another State, between citizens of different States, between citizens of the same State claiming land under grants of different States, and between a State, or the citizens thereof, and foreign States, citizens or subjects."

Here the judicial power of the United States is expressly set forth and defined, and the act of September 24, 1789, establishing the judicial courts of the United States, in conferring upon the Federal courts jurisdiction over cases originating in State tribunals, is careful to confine them to the classes enumerated in the above recited clause of the Constitution. This section of the bill undoubtedly comprehends cases and authorizes the exercise of powers that are not by the Constitution within the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States. To transfer them to those courts would be an exercise of authority well calculated to excite distrust and alarm on the part of all the States, for the bill applies alike to all of them—as well to those that have, as to those that have not, been engaged in rebellion.

It may be assumed that this authority is incident to the power granted to Congress by the Constitution, as recently amended to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the article declaring that "neither slavery or involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime, whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction." It cannot, however, be justly claimed that, with a view to the enforcement of this article of the Constitution, there is, at present, any necessity for the exercise of all the powers which this bill confers.

Slavery has been abolished, and at present nowhere exists within the jurisdiction of the United States; nor has there been, nor is it likely there will be, any attempt to revive it, by the people or the States. If, however, any such attempt shall be made, it will then become the duty of the General Government to exercise any and all incidental powers necessary and proper to maintain inviolate this great constitutional law of freedom.

The fourth section of the bill provides that officers and agents of the Freedmen's Bureau shall be empowered to make arrests, and also that other officers may be specially commissioned for that purpose by the President of the United States. It also authorizes Circuit Courts of the United States and the Superior Courts of the Territories to appoint, without limitation, commissioners, who are to be charged with the performance of *quasi* judicial duties. The fifth section empowers the commissioners, so to be selected by the courts, to appoint in writing under their hands, one or more suitable persons from time to time to execute warrants and other processes described by the bill. These numerous official agents are made to constitute a sort of police, in addition to the military, and are authorized to summon a *posse comitatus*, and even to call to their aid such portion of the land and naval forces of the United States, or of the militia, "as may be necessary to the performance of the duty with which they are charged." This extraordinary power is to be conferred upon agents irresponsible to the government and to the people, to whose number the discretion of the commissioners is the only limit, and in whose hands such authority might be made a terrible engine of wrong, oppression, and fraud. The general statutes regulating the land and naval forces of the United States, the militia, and the execution of the laws, are believed to be adequate for every emergency which can occur in time of peace. If it should prove otherwise, Congress can at any time amend those laws in such manner as, while subserving the public welfare, not to jeopard the rights, interests, and liberties of the people.

The seventh section provides that a fee of ten dollars shall be paid to each Commissioner in every case brought before him, and a fee of five dollars to his deputy, or deputies, "for each person he or they may arrest and take before any such Commissioner," "with such other fees as may be deemed reasonable by such Commissioner," "in general for performing such other duties as may be required in the premises." All these fees are to be "paid out of the Treasury of the United States," whether there is a conviction or not; but in case of conviction, they are to be recoverable from the defendant. It seems to me that under the influence of such temptations bad men might convert any law, however beneficent, into an instrument of persecution and fraud.

By the eighth section of the bill the United States Courts, which sit only in one place for white citizens, must migrate, with the Marshall and District Attorney, (and necessarily with the Clerk, although he is not mentioned,) to any part of the District, upon the order of the President, and there hold a court "for the purpose of the more speedy arrest and trial of persons charged with a violation of this act," and there the Judge and the officers of the court must remain, upon the order of the President, "for the time therein designated."

The ninth section authorizes the President, or such persons as he may empower for that purpose, "to employ such part of the land and naval forces of the United States, or of the militia, as shall be necessary to prevent the violation and enforce the due execution of this act." This language seems to imply a permanent military force, that is to be always at hand, and whose only business is to be the enforcement of this measure over the vast region where it is intended to operate.

I do not propose to consider the policy of this bill. To me the details of the bill seem fraught with evil. The white race and the black race of the South have hitherto lived together under the relation of master and slave—capital owning labor. Now, suddenly, that relation is changed, and as to ownership, capital and labor are divorced. They stand now each master of itself. In this new relation, one being necessary to the other, there will be a new adjustment, which both are deeply interested in making harmonious. Each has equal power in settling the terms, and if left to the laws that regulate capital and labor, it is confidently believed that they will satisfactorily work out the problem.—Capital, it is true, has more intelligence; but labor is never so ignorant as not to understand its own interests, not to know its own value, and not to see that capital must pay that value. This bill frustrates this adjustment. It intervenes between capital and labor, and attempts to settle questions of political economy through the agency of numerous officials, whose interest it will be to foment discord between the two races; for as the breach widens their employment will continue, and when it is closed their occupation will terminate.

In all our history, in all our experience as a people living under Federal and State law, no such system as that contemplated by the details of this bill has ever been proposed or adopted. They establish, for the security of the colored race, safeguards which go infinitely beyond any that the General government has ever provided for the white race. In fact, the distinction of race and color is, by the bill, made to operate in favor of the colored and against the white race. They interfere with the municipal legislation of the States, with the relations existing exclusively between a State and its citizens, or between inhabitants of the same State—an absorption and assumption of power by the General Government which, if acquiesced in, must sap and destroy our federative system of limited powers, and break down the barriers which preserve the rights of the States. It is another step, or rather a stride, towards centralization, and the concentration of all legislative powers in the National Government. The tendency of the bill must be to resuscitate the spirit of rebellion, and to arrest the progress of those influences which are more closely drawing around the States the bonds of union and peace.

My lamented predecessor, in his proclamation of the 1st of January, 1863, ordered and declared that all persons, held as slaves within certain States and parts of the States therein designated, were, and thenceforward should be free, and, further, that the Executive Government of the United States, including the military and naval authorities thereof, would recognize and maintain the freedom of such persons. This guarantee has been rendered especially obligatory and sacred by the amendment of the Constitution abolishing slavery throughout the United States. I therefore fully recognize the obligation to protect and defend that class of our people, whenever and wherever it shall become necessary, and to the full extent compatible with the Constitution of the United States. Entertaining these sentiments, it only remains for me to say that I will cheerfully co-operate with Congress in any measure that may be necessary for the civil rights of the freedmen, as well as those of all other classes of persons throughout the United States, by judicial process under equal and impartial laws, in conformity with the provisions of the Federal Constitution.

I now return the bill to the Senate, and regret that in considering the bills and joint resolutions—forty-two in number—which have been thus far submitted for my approval, I am compelled to withhold my assent from a second measure that has received the sanction of both Houses of Congress.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

Washington, D. C., March 27, 1866.

CHOWAN COUNTY, NORTH CAROLINA.—We have hitherto, more than once, alluded to the grape-growing region of the Old North State, which one of these days will become celebrated as a grape and wine region. In Chowan county, a gentleman cultivates a hundred acres in vineyards which embrace a large variety of the grape. His success has been splendid. In one year he sold wine from his cultivated grape acres, to the extent of $5,000—and we are informed the annual expense was $800. He has been offered for his grape crop, on the vine, six cents per pound. Here is a region for French, German and Swiss immigrants, whose occupation hitherto has been in the vineyards of their own native lands. They would in time make old Chowan almost as famous as the fair Rhineland or the smiling slopes of the Alps.—*Norfolk Virginian.*

Chowan County is not better as a grape-growing county, than most of the Counties of the State, adjacent to the sea-coast. The Scuppernong grape, perhaps, grows to greater perfection in Tyrrell County, where, we believe, it was first discovered, than in most of them, yet, in all the Counties, as far as eighty miles from the coast, no better vine-growing country can be found, perhaps, in the world.—EDS. SENTINEL.

"Many of them now deny that they ever were secessionists, but charge that the real secessionists are the old *Union* Democrats, like President Johnson and the Senior Editor of this journal."—*Standard.*

We challenge the *Standard*, to point out a single instance, in this State, in which President Johnson has been charged with being a real secessionist, by any responsible person.—He *has* been called a traitor by the Senior Editor of the *Standard*, but we have never heard him charged with being a secessionist by any one in this State.

The *Standard* says there was no dispatch from the Provisional Governor, which called forth the rebuke of the President in regard to the elections in this State in November last. We admit its statement, but deny that we charged the President with suppressing anything.

The telegram of the President bore such evident marks that he was laboring under an erroneous impression in regard to our elections, that we supposed it must have been occasioned by incorrect information received from some source. As the Provisional Governor denies having sent him any *telegram*, we admit that *he* did not send the telegram. How did the President receive his impressions?

IT IS REPORTED that the President of the Senate of New Jersey has declared himself in favor of the President's policy, and, holding the balance of power, has prevented the election of a successor to Senator Stockton. Good.

GOLD closed, in New York, on the 28th, at 128. Cotton had an advancing tendency, with sales of 8,000 bales at 41 @ 43 cents.

HIGH PRICE FOR TOBACCO.—A hogshead of tobacco, weighing nine hundred pounds, was sold at West Hill Warehouse yesterday, by Messrs. Todd, Pugh & Co., at $90 per hundred weight. The tobacco was the property of Mr. J. B. Hobgood, of Granville county, North Carolina, and was purchased by Mr. C. W. Spicer, of this city.—*Petersburg Express*, 29th.

STRONG LANGUAGE.—A Northern journal says that some of the reports to the Freedmen's Bureau are marred by "impulsive utterances," which detract from their merits. Very likely, and possibly their truthfulness. As a specimen of those not "calmly judicial," the following opening sentence of the report of General Fisk, from Kentucky, is given: "There are some of *the meanest, unsubjugated, and unreconstructed, rascally, rebellious revolutionists* in Kentucky that curse the soil of the country."