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PUBLISH RO EYBRY, SATURDAY, , BIT
THOMAS WA'ia' ;
i-Tfarec Dollar per annum payable la
nce. No.
L reriod thaD one year i and no paper w.l
XueJ,anUHaata&e.arePaid!nleS,
et the option of tntf rubbsher.
House of Representatives, DtC' l. 1823. , ;;,
k.m clearly affirms the control of
hch he traces to the d,v,s.on oune r.
r 1. nr ooliticat syst m, and
bv compann , con
the sever. T r4.;,d bver lb
Snionr that ihObetPW W
meter. Mr. iviaaison issmm uc
in his report allmfed to he, saysr Al he
resolution having taken this vie wof the fe
dral compact, proceeds to infer, that tn
casr of a deliberate, papa ble, and danger
ous exercise of other twwert, not granred
bv the said compact, the states,; who are
parties thereto, have the right, and re in
duty bound, to interpose for arresting tht
progress of the vJ, and for maintaining
witbin their respective limits; the aothori
tie's, rkh's, and liberties appertaining to
them-' 'l appears to your committee to be
b plain principle, funded in common aense,
illustrated by common practice, and essen
lial to the nature of compacts, that jfhere
resort cn be had to no tribunal superior.to
the authority of the parties, - the parties
fhcmsrlve most bp the rigbtlul judges in
the last resort, whether the bargain made
basheen r arsufd-WT violated The consti
tution of the United States was formed by
the aanction of the states, given by each in
in sovereign capacity. It adds to the sta
bilicy snd dignity, as well rs to the authori
ty of the constitution, that it rests on this
legitimate and solid foundation, the states
thn being panics toMhe constitutional com-
pact, end in their sovereign Capacity, ' it fol
Joss of necessity, that there can be no tri
bunal above their authority to decide in the
last tegort, whether the compact made by
thni be violated, and, CopsqijentIy,that
i the parties to it, they must themselves
dffde in the last resort, such qaestipus as
day b? of sufficient magnitude to 'regain
their interposition." To these the ho less
exphcii i pinion of , Mr JffiVtson may be
edd(.d,ho in the Kentucky resolutions 6ri
tht; rame suhject states, IhnV the govern
B e .i cieated by this compact was not made
the exclusive, or final judge of the; extent of
the powers dIeated to iNelf, since that
would have mad its discretion and hot the
crnitHtjoii ihe measure of iis powers butr"1" f nature, ana as lenamg to leeoteness
that is in ail ibpr eases of Compact among
parties, hdvinp no common judge each par!
ty has one qual right to judge for itself; ;aspceay p' supreme power in cverjr com-
ell of inflection as of the mode and cm- I
l ime and xpefienre confirmed mVo
Bion on this f.l! inmoriant noint. The il.Mbai. it not comrojiea, sucn power masi ne-
h riuts cuizruv nearly a quarter of:a cen-
ua aneiwrfrds, in she yeai i 82 IVex pressed
fcmwelf in this mohtic manner. " It is a
iaai nrresyvvn says, to suppose that
eihr oor state governments aire" superior to
Hie tuleral r the ledeial to the state: nei
ti er is authorise, literally to deddr wh'
tl(.i.gs o its.'lf, ur its Copartner in gt)Verotf
n-tni: "in- oiff rences of opinion betweeri
ir.eii difiTfnt sets of public-servants tht
erpe-.l is to nenhfr, but to their employer.
pvareb!v bssembh d bv their renrent Jf
i;f.s o. convfrntioiv' If to these authori
I, hich so explicitly 'sffiim the righf ot
the 3 tea in their sovereign eapaehy, to de
de bt.tb on the infraction bf tbeir rights,
nd their remedy, there be added the" sw
lemn df-cisions of the . legislMtores of t wo
leading $talf,s roinia and KentuckyJ'and I
A I m .
ne impu-u sanction of r majorityV of the
lares in the inDonant Dolitical fevnhition
hich shortly followed, and" hrriughy?r.
fr," be scarcely pcslbfe; todd to-the
"r'Sn pi emhority. bv. which, this funda.
l Pr,r'ciple In our yium Is sustained
1 "v tommiitee lfvhie Jhus established
rpose in order to protechheir dci
nnot be necessarv to besiow mneh tim
n order to meet possible objecfioVsVTarii.
Tar,y a they roust be raisedrbot agains
"eseundnessof the argument by bich thf
Posttionis sustained which they deem un.
-"ciuie, Dut agamst apprehended con
j;quences, whkb, eVen if tfueywould
so muchan obiectionvto ih rn.,.lnr
the commhw: ar t.v
. It is objected, in thw first place, that the
v.. iw iuierposef.-rests tt
re inftrencewithoiit any express prvi
?on ,D the constituiionand thai it is not to
"'upoosedj jf ihe onsUtution contempla?
: Jhe ercise or e poWeri of uch: higi
, yfna ii nuuiu nave oeen lett to
Trence'aluhe f In antxm-t l!ii nmmMf."
J uld ask hose who. raise the objection,
fv-F.oi tne supreme coutt
aw flncftTnt!f..iM.i :' vv ?
the constiiotionalfioht of thi-fliVirtJri.cdem
fif. Kii n.u:.u iu . . " , . .:. . - tUa. iiilimi jrivikmmonf the strong in I
'ivii, iuey are penoaaed-, will be lm??Vc."?.
nd,on mvestigaiton, destitAite ofW
uider these ifsnressmni th- rommi :i asoire to ofilte br Distinction
Ne to discuss the objections w ith all
J'ghe and most important
P 'y' Muon, if, aiso rests ou were
interencebut
that no t, express - provision
der .fit tctpre y. certainSef he Simple "facts
tteC the4 judgta
Ml ?Iannai the "I constitution is para.
sacsVoait tt.thtV qwt imposes a necessity on the
cjritto tJecjarethe lattevpld wbeoevet
it:omeVtntoicppflict ith itbe fcrmerl so
frim fiiVjfact
dtded and ibajrie states bold their pof
tii in the. aame soverergn capacity with
thVgenral government by like; necessity,
th is the:right bf: judging of thetinfrac
ti$i of 'their sovereignty, as well as of the
reledy, f The ided uction5 In the one case i
; no(learer thab the other but if we refer
tn e nature of opr constuotion the light
of tf state stands on stronger grounds than
t iti thf o-istrlbulioft of ponbtyen tfTe
genefa! ad state gbvernmehts, the consti;
totion professes to enumerate those assign
ed- to the5 iormer; in whateyeri cfepartmerit
they day be vested j while; the powers Oi
the latter- are: Reserved jn general terms,
a'tthnut an attempt "atr enumeration. It
therefor raites a presutiptiod against the
powers of the Court to i declare a law uricon
stilutiunal, that the power is not enomerated
among thoe .belonging to the judiciary.
While th b' omission to enumerate among st
the powers of the States that to interfere and
protect their rights', being strictly, in accord
with the principles on which: the framers
formed the . constitution, 'raises notl th
sUghte9t prewmptiori agafnit its existence.
: It is next objected to the power that it
places the minority oveHhe majority, in qp .
position to the whole theory of oiijr govern
riient, ; and that its consequences -must br
feebleness, anatchy, and finally disunion.
J it is impossible to impose any Hmitation
oh Sovereign power, without encounteriti
mitt its supporters t his very objection ; and
we accordingly find that the history of every
country which has attempted to establish
free institutions, proves, that on this point
the opposing parties: the advocates bl power
and of freedorb, have ever separated, ft
cousmute8 we essence or tne controversy
between T the natricians and plebeians of ihf
Roman repttbffC of the tories arid whigs in
England J ;of- the Oltras and liberals in
France' and fin airy of the federalists and
recniblicani in not own countrv: xrs illnatrV.
ted by Mh iIadljOh's Report y and if it were
proposed to give 6 Rusvia or Austria' a re
presentation of the people, it would form
the point of controversy between the impe
rai and popular parriesr;It is rnfct ni
ft all surprising, that to a people unaccuain-
ed with the nature ot liberty, ana inexpe
fienced in its blessings, all limitation on the
supreme pover should appear incompatible
Pn anarcnv-. ? , '-''---':r;:'y .
Wature tas not permitted os to oouDt tne
po1 u an "H 0,c
Perceive,
Uad to abujte 5 and still higher ef-
Vx to understand that Hnay be cftecked
wnoui cesiroyiog us aopremacy. iui .us
nowever wno unow, irora jour own.experi
iice and "that of i tither - free nations, the
truth1 of botr) .'these positions J. and afsO that
power can Be irerrdered oseful and secure by
twing properly checked,- if is indeed strange
that any unteirigent citizen should consider
UmrtatWo in soverere.ntyy as mcompatible
wiih its nature- or should fear dartger from
ny bek properfy lodged-, hkb may b
necessary iw ar curr any uisnuci nu iiupi
tapt interests . That there are such interests
rWnresenteci bv th states, and that on prm-
ctple the states alone can proffer them, has
oeen nrovea ? ana 11 on iy: rem a ins,-m oruet
10 meet "ilie objeciiony to pro yey that for, th is
purpose the-slates may .be safely entrfsted
i,nepower.n iur cuiuuiiuce uu uui goaM,
mistakef it riever.' has in ipy country fTor
pnder any institutions, been; lodged, whert;
it was rless liable to abused The great.nunj!
ber by whorn if must be exercised, a majo
rity of the people of one of the staWs, the
solemnity of the mode, the delay, , jhe deli
beiation art aircalculated tb allr the ex-
turrtjMances itou
parttOpresw
uhjess the violation
ble, deliberate
ude rnwhich the istiU
f?orce pfpubfic ; opinion whicl wuld pe
PKrooht to bear On ber the deep reverence
caseust ever thrbthe
Mhe.mtrioritf"iiiSh
(he general covernmit,?'and,wpo! atand
ieady to take aid vantage of an rtprin tb
? ??Stt-:y'?i-ltu-:&t A"nAArfnl nrm these
kin mint, maiiiruv. rz
iiirTil ?nnt Kin"? but the 5 1 ruth nd ;
Fi&;&e:oTopw the par t-Uhe
rciseNdf the bower; no il it snouiu w
"r : uc esuoiaiene enecr! ; wnicn a
recognitiprfo(the pdW
adoriirilstratioVljoth
governments. On th fwer
pessarily produce; in thwerise ordoubi
M power, the most marked moderation.
On thd atter; a feeling
y wohlo" ebctually prevent jealousyahi
mosity and hatred and j jius ive scope to
the;ridral attachmim
Cut withhold ihis protective power from tlje
. wtrj' a indtii reverse of all these happy
consequences '.fas:foftovf:rcrir however
thf Commttjee will -"jtof;;:7 tttiitfeir fc lo-o-ldes"
crtbe, as tht living exa mpf e 0 discard, ha
trdcl, and jealpdsyi threateO-nianacchy and
UissolutioQj must imprespri elery beholder
a more ayvtd picture, than wat they couht
piisibiy ?dra w.' The Vdminuance of thi$
mtharjpjfcat
affect ion, leaving the jgovernment tc b su
tftiucuL uy turee insieao or oatriotism. : in
taci to him who will duly reflect' it must br
apparent, that' where there are I irowutant
separate interests to preserve thereis n
alternative bot a veto or military fori. It
these, deductions be Correct- as cannpt be
Noumea; men unaer mat states of moflera
lion and security, followed by mutual kind
ness, which? mustj accorf3iany the acknow
ledgment ofthe right, Iheiecessity of exer
cising a veto would rarefy exist : and tH;
posdibtlity of abuse, ion the part of the staje.
wodld almost be wholly t temoveii. Its ac
".'cugcu rAiatvucr wpcuu'inus superaeoe1
its ; eterhse. But suppdsrin this the com
mities to be' hiitaken sti there exists a
suffici-rit feOiedy for the d$eaSe. As bigb
as is the pow er of h States in their indivi
dual sovereign capacity, it is not the highest
power known to out systefc There is a
still higher power; placed above ill, by th
express consent of all; 1 the rating and pre
serving power, deposited in the hands of
'hree fourths of the UnitetJ States, which,
uuder the character of the amending power,
can modify the whole system at pleasure,
and to the final decision o( whicii it wouhf
be political heresy to object, tiive .then
the veto to the Stat e and admit its liability
to abuse by them; and what is the enVct.
but to create the. presumption against the
constituiVnafify of the disputed powers e'n
ercised by; the general government, winch il
the presomptiort be well founded mut com
pel therrf to abandon it ; but if rrot pit gen
eral government may remove ft by invoking
this high pou er to deiidS the qopstion in
the fbf rrt of an arandment to the consiitu
tion. lf (he decision fee fa VorfM'feld . the
umrcil 4j r zm mm. nj qj ii tU Contf tw-
rtve power will be converted into a certain
aifd express eranf. On th
omer nand, tt it
be adverse, the refusing
tantamount to inhibiting
o ran l will be
s exercise: and
tnus in euner case me controversy win o
. i , . . ... -i . i.- . . -. . ...
peaceably determined. Slch is the sum of
its effects. And ought not i sovereign state,
in protecting the minor a id local interests
of the country, to have a p wr to compel a
decision ? VVitbout it,can the sy stent itself
exist ? Let us examine tt e case." To cero-
uel the state to appeal agpnst the aets of
the general government, by proposing an
amendment to. the const jtut.iOn,s would be
perfectly idle ; Tbe veryfcoriipfaint is that
4 majority of the sfatss,' through the gene
ral government, by force Of construction,
urge : powers not delega ?d, and. by; their
exercise1 increase tneftr weihh r and power at
the eipenSB of a minori How absurd
then to compel one Of thffu Fared states to
! attempt a remedy j 6y proposing an amend
ment to be ratim?d . by thlee fourths of the
siatesv when thefe is by pupposttion a ma
jorjty ofj posed to if. ; fiar .would It be less
absurd to lpect the general government to
propose, an amendment J in order to settle
tbe point disputed, ani?ss compelled to
tiiat course bv the tatef HOnv their pari
I there can 6e no inducetneht. 'vThey have a
more summary mode of aksoming the po wer
J-by construction. 'The consequence is clear.
.Neither would appeal o me , amending
power the one because if would be useless;
and the Other because it could effect i 1 s ob-
iect without it Under the operation of this
supreme coniroiimg power, to wnose inter
position no one' Can object; &t controversy
between' the statesaod general government
would' be thtts ;adjusftd and the
tidh would gradually acquire by its constant
interpositron in tmpomnr cases; aU the per
fection of which the work of nlen is suscep
tible, -ltiarthu-that the creative will be
come: :thpre$ervin power ; and we may
resi assureu nai ins hu i mmc iu pviuiv
than-in divrnkythat the TOTtreriwhlcb cre-j
LaieS can:!aIonfipreierv preserva
lion is perpetual creation. ? oucrr win oetne
pperatiottp tthettoH ,
If indeed it iiad the etteci oi placing tne
state oVhegelnerargoyw
i ect jouould be (BiiFolrii ihmajority
anTiproe trusteor wiin.ine-upFeujcwwwf,
neither cart the minority; and to transfer it
?roixi the fbrmVr to the latter,; would be but
tbe repetUionof ;the! bid error of mktng
hetter; undeicla monarch
aiainsttbeJmpreJoppressive;tyran
itAiifv tiTfllh constructed republics. v Bui
it js not the cons'ecuencerof proper checks
to changeplaces between the majority and
the nunorityIt leaves thewer con trot ,
iiir 0Treme as is eujut.ucu
in our
iittticiary
i - ' 1 1 ' v ii? nMWn ilithl iM.ftl J T 'u
Sbliucalinstitutionsbyi tuerpperationoi
ackitowiedged .checksThe iower of the
to declare an," vwutf v
nature of our government, ever, supposed it
really 3 w(ed (When xfified td: its proper
object) a uprenie power jn the court 'over
congress' 6r the state legislatures ? ; Such
could be rteither th intention nor Its proper
Effect. The check wai given to the judi
ciary to protect the supremacy of the con
stitution over the acts of legislation, and m t
o set tip a supreme bo we in the court.
iHie! ;cohstituionS has provided Vanbthei
check, whicril! stilt farther iHtistrate th
nature of its operation.; A mong thevarious
interests' which exist ndef?dutX complex
system7 that of large and sniall states are
4imong the most ' pruminent and among the
most carefully guarded in the organisation
of our government; t To settled the? relative
weight Of the stated in the system $ and to
secure to each the nieans of mainlaining its
pt 9pervpoVca ; cotiseuence-in its pT
tion, wnre nniongst the mo&t difficult duties
n framfng the constitution; No on subject
vccuped greater soace irf th nroceedinns
of the convention. ; In its final adjustment;
tbejafge . states had assigned to them a pre
f ori.terating influence in the house of repre
sentatives, by ha ving there a weight propor
tioned to thejr number's ; but to compensate
which, atid to secure their- political rights
against this preponderance, the small states
had an equality assigned them in the senate,
while in the constitution of the executive
branch the - two were blended. To secure
ihe conseefuende alfotted to each, as well As
to insure duf deliberation in legislation, a
veto is allowed to eafch in ihe passage of
bills ; but it would be absurd, to sappose
tht this Veto placed either above the other;
or was incompatible with the portion of the
sovereign power allotted , tp the bouse j tht?
senate, of the president; ;
It is thes that our system has provideii
appropriate Checks, Vvitfi a veto to ensurV
the supremacy of the constitution oVer the
laws ; and to preserve .the due importance
of the states, considered in reference to
large and small, without creating discord or
weakedihg the beneficent energy of the ga
vernment; and so in the division of sove
reign stithoritv between the general, and
tate governments, and in granting an effi
cient power to the lattery to' protect by
veto the minor against the major interests
community, the framersJ of the consthutiou
acted 'in Strict conformity with the principle
which iiirivariably preVu1sv throughout .the
hofe syhtem, whenever separate interests
xist; They- w&feVin tiriith ; pbordinary
men. . f bVy were wise and practical men,
enlichteOed - by ; bistorvlajld ' their own n.
our coufrtry through a most important! revo
iutiohf rfnd urrderstood profoundly the na
ture of mail and .of gdverhment. They
saw and felt that there existed in our nature
the necessity of a govern rdent, which to ef
fect the Object of government must have
(adequate power. They saw the "selfish
predominate over the social feelings, and
that witrroot a government with socb pow
ers, t un iversal ; convict an d anarchy m u l
prevail among the compotienfpart of soci
ety j.bdt they ,aIso clearly saw, that our ; na
ture remaining unchanged by change of Con
dition, that unchecked power from thfsy try
predominance of the selfish over fhe social
feeling,' which rendered goverrmient riecesV
sary, woold of necessity lead to corruption
and oppress kn on jhepart of those invested
with l itsv exercise" Thrja u the necessity of
government and of chacks originate iff the
same great principle of our nature, through
which the very selfishness, which; would
impel thoVe who have power ta desire more
than tlieir own,. will also, with great energy.
Impel those on. tfhora ; power may operate
to oemano ineir own ? ana rn rne oaiancf
of these opposing . tendencies from 'different
conditions, but ortvinating ra the same prin
ciple of action, the one impelling to excess,
the other restraining wifhftr bounds of mod
er atiotv; and justice: liberty, and hsppinets'
must for ever depend This , great prina
ple guided the framers of the cohstitutton
tin constructing burporrtical system.: There
is not an opposing interest, tnrougriout tne
"wholethat is ottounteriioised5 Have
the rulCri a separatejnterest from the .peo
ple ? " To check itr abuseV the relation of
representanve anq consiuuen is creaieu
between tbetn;; tbrocgb periodical elections,
bywhicbTthe ridelity of rulers to their trusts
mi secdred. : ,. Have the states,- as members
of thef Uniondistihct political interests m
ireference'tbtheiif'laaagn
live weight istcaremllysettled,taddeac
class has its appropriaie means, whh yew
to protectta political cbrtserencevS .May l
there be a con&ict! oetween tne consmuuoo
and the la ws, w hereby trrightr
rriay be aflfected f m TdpreserVe the J ascenj
dencyor the" cbhsHhjtioliarpower; isyested
iWtheshpreaew
coMtitutionarmsuchcasesirthere in a
geographtcar point of vie w separate inter
ests ? To meet this a peculiar organisation
is provided in ; the division of the.sovereign
wcVetiveen he
vernments. -: Is there danger growing put of
thnt divisiohk that the state jmiyncroaco
Oii "irieerieratC pb wers through the eels of
ttheir;iegistjstore.
also assigned adequate-power to check sticsi
WCToaxhmenttMaiyJ tm
i-ment on the other - hand; encroach on , the
rights reserved to1 the states rd tb?tate
in their Mvereign.'catjaCityJ the
ftpwerlb'aest
unauy, inayinis, powers oe aocaea-oy e
ajent TherV Remains still higbeV powet
created supreme dyer all 9 invested with th
ultimate power over sill interests, to enlarge)
io modify or rescind at pfeSs&re,' whose ' in
ierppsition the majority may invoke t ana
to oppose whose decision would be rebel
lion : On thjs the whole systemreats; ;
; That there exists a case which would! .
Justify the interposition of this state; and
thereby compelfhe; general gbvernment to
abandon ah unconstitutional Dower, or to .
make an appeal to the amending power
tolconfer it by eipreas grant, the commit
tee does .not in the : least doub(i and uhey n
are equaljy clear in the existence of Vne
cessity to justify its exercise, If the general
government should continue; to persist in itft ,
improper assumption of powers, belonging
y . " i ""'co orings tnem to tne.tass
point which they - propose: to "coTrMder
When ; would it be proper to elercise thid
pigh power ? If they were to judge only
by the magnitude of interest nd urgency of
ne.case, they would without hesitation re
Jcommend the exercise Of this tower with
ut.delay But they deeply feel the obit
ation of respect for the other members ol
uhe.confederacy, and of greui moderAtioa
juu luiucrtraucf m me exercise, even oi me
most unquestionable right, between parties
wbo stand connected between the closest
4 ud most sacred oolitic! onion; v .With
these sentiments, they deem it advisable
after presenting tne views of the legislature;
in this solemn manner, to allow time fof
further consideration and reflection, in thd
hope that a returning sense of jotice on thej
part of the majority j when they come to re
bVct on the wrongs, which this and T'other;
staple states have suffered, and are suffeo
ing, may repeat the obnoxious and uncoa
stitulionaf acts, and thereby. prevent the ne
cessity of interposing the sovereign powcf
of this state. .. : '
the committee is further induced at tbif
tinife to take this course dnder the . h-pef
that the great political revolution which will
displace from power on the 4th of Marcll
next, tHose who acquired authority by set
ting the will of the people at defiance; and
which will bring in an eminent citizen, dis
tinguished for hiS services to bis country and
his justice and patriotism, may be followed
up under his influence with a Complete res
toration of the pure principles of our gov
vernment. ' .; . - . ."
But in thus recommending delays thd
committee wish it to be distinctly on derw
stood, that rteither doubts of the power of
the sifttesi mor apprelienslnn of cons?auen-
tivest They would be unworthy 'of, -the;
tiame of freemen, of A rnericans, of Carols
Tiians, if danger, however great, could cause'.
them to shrink from the maintenance of
their constitutional rights ; but they deem it
preposterous to anticipate danger, ' under ' tte
system of laws, where a sovereign part for
ihe compact, which fdrmed the government
exercises a power which, alter the futleit
mvestigatibh, she conscientiously believes
belongs to her, under the guarantee 61 the
constitution itself, a nd which is essential to
the preservation of her sovereignty.
The committee deem it not only the; f ight
of the state, but the duty of her representa
tive, Dnder'the solemn sahctiop of ah oath,
to interpose, if no other remedy be applied.
Tbey interpret the oath to the constitution
hot simply to impose n oWigafloh to ab
stain from Violation: out if possible" io pre'
I vant it in others.' In their opinidrr e is a '
guilty of vfolating f that sacred irrstrumentr
who permits arr, infraction, "when in hir
power to fira vent Hj as hi ' wfio is actually
guifty of the infraction. : One may be bolder,
md the other more ticlid, but the sense of,
duty must be equally Weak on' betb. V ,
With these views th. committee are.tov
lemnly -of imp'ressiony if the system be ptw
severed fn after due r forbearance on the
part Of the 'state.?' that it' will to Vkvcttt
dAy to? interpose her veto ; a datyr to her"
setftO Ae Ubi
gentrations, and fo the cause of Jiberty oetf '
ihe wdrld fo arrest the progres&oi a po wer
whicWif oot arrested." must.: in its conse
queje,Ycbrrbpt the public nToralsji and p'esv
troy ine uoeriyw me country. - v:-..
VTo avert these calamitif si to1 restore the:
tnstitotlon'to'its.originat parity, and to aU
lay 'the differences which' have been ujibap--
pily produced between Varipus. states,;, and
ostween me state ana general government
we solemnly appeal to the justlct: and good
fading of. those stUes heretofore opposed t&
m f and earnestly jnvbke the council end,
co-operaOod i of tfibse stater similarly' sttua
(AO wun-our own. : not nouoting- ineir goou
wilt aMsujmortah .
aense bftbe righteotisness' of its caose the
eommittee;ttusfth
dehce;.tfie.'ewrU
crowned with-Saccess.
f l sobscriuer oners ior ' saie as ton, ov
. t utockroo haad.coosistojg of a Ur: and cf
erat assortmeof of Suple and Fancy Dry Ooyday
Hardware. ntiery tecs- tic. t" aio, urocwifi-
ataoui wtiieli r are ptrlfs, choice old AJftarira-
ShrTyrori,vr.v junoon, r neroc, i ic wuci
ra Cette: Malaga U Muscat Wines ; old Holl.it d
GlDCataCJraqfly; JtintraiCii uum, oia.
PeftCo . raouy m 100007ancja. tr
Si Lump Srtgart; Hyson U uapowoer iea;Nit
irieg, Ciaasfion, MaCe, . Cloves,; black Pep? r
Alfcpice IheSpirits and Wines' are all o l very
superior quality, and wiU be sold much lowef -
Xfortftsh by, tha demijohn) thaxi usual ; in : th&
mi
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urn
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i Urn
'X 1 tie I
tit a State regisiaiurf, -
ortWrfuLand ibritsappropriate4)urposeatr
statestinjnteTieiihito
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fficiepis
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