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Political.

From the Boston Centinel.

THE ANALYSIS
Of our Publick Diplomatick Despatches.
No. VIII.
(Continued.)

The illustrious partiality of language used towards the
belligerents, and some reflections on the high sense
of honour so much boasted of by our Administration.

A Candid review of the style, temper,
and language adopted towards France and
Great-Britain, will readily convince every
Impartial and virtuous man, that we owe
all our evils to the prejudices of our cabinet
in favour of France, and the malignant
antipathy to England;—that if the negotia-
tion with the latter had been as sincere as
with the former; if as strong a desire had
been shewn to preserve peace with G. Bri-
tain as with France, we should have been
at this moment enjoying that uninterrupted
prosperity, of which Mr. Jefferson speaks
in his late address, and to which his efforts
have been at every period hostile.

A thorough analysis of the late despatches
will prove, that Mr. Jefferson and Mr.
Madison are as devoted to the policy of
France, as they were when they opposed
Washington's proclamation of neutrality;
when they had the confidential ear of Ge-
net and Fauchet; when they privately
countenanced an opposition to the mea-
sures of our rulers, in one of the most e-
ventful periods of our history.

We shall contrast, in the present dia-
log, some few, but striking instances of
the difference in the tone and temper of
our cabinet, towards Great-Britain and
France.

We shall begin with the remonstrances
on their several blockading orders. It must
be again remembered, that in this warfare
France set the example. Great-Britain
gave formal notice of her determination to
retaliate, unless we should shew some signs
of resistance. France was bound to us by
treaty. Great-Britain by none.—Towards
the former, then our complains ought to
have been most loud, and most severe.

How is the fact?
The French decrees were issued Nov.
31st, 1806; and the first notice ever taken
of them by our cabinet—the first line
which they took the pains to write on this
interesting topic, was on the 23d May,
1807, more than six months after this vio-
lent outrage on our rights.

The British orders were published about
the 20th Nov. 1807, and were not known
here till the 1st Feb. 1808; yet on the 19th
of the same month, Mr. Madison address-
ed Mr. Pinkney on the subject, and on the
25th of March addressed his famous
letter of remonstrance to Mr. Erskine.

In the first letter of Mr. Madison to Mr.
Armstrong, of May, 1807, he chooses to
presume that the French government did
not intend to execute their edicts against
us; declares himself pleased with the ex-
planation of the Minister of Marine, but
expresses a wish to hear of their being
confirmed by the Emperor himself. This
proves not only that a disposition to give
the most favourable interpretation to the
French decrees, but also that the govern-
ment thought the explanation of DECRET
imperfect and insipere.—For who before
heard of a foreign government questioning
the authority of a public minister, and re-
quiring the positive assurances of the mo-
narch himself? It is a proof that our go-
vernment never reposed any confidence in
the loose explanation of Monsieur DECRET,
though they made it the ground of their
total silence and submission for twelve
months. And it is to be remarked, that
the Emperor never has confirmed the tri-
fling and insidious reply of his minister.

It is curious, that this same letter of Mr.
Madison should contain the proofs of the
extensive execution of those French de-
crees; and of similar outrages under the
Spanish orders, in imitation of and by the
direction of the French Emperor, and it
is still more amusing to hear the soft ac-
cents of Mr. Madison on this topic, that
these depredations will "thicken the cloud
that hangs over the amity of the two na-
tions."

No further orders or instructions appear
to have been given to Gen. Armstrong—

no enquiries about the Emperor's execu-
tion, until Feb. 8, 1808, more than four-
teen months after the date of the Berlin
decrees.—Then our minister begins with
admitting that, regarded as a municipal re-
gulation, that decrees own no infraction, and
required only friendly expostulations as to
its rigour and suddenness. In the same
letter he notices the cases of Hamburgh,
Leghorn, Holland and Bremen.—Now
ask Mr. Madison, whether the execution
of a French decree, by French force, in
the neutral state of Tuscany, and the neu-
tral city of Hamburg, on neutral prop-
erty, a decree too operating ex post facto,
is a "municipal regulation, which cannot
in strictness be regarded as an infraction of
our neutral or conventional rights"? Is
not a neutral territory as sacred as a neu-
tral ship? And is not the right of the
neutral, whose goods are seized in ano-
ther neutral country to which he has sent
them under the faith of the law of nations,
as solemn and sacred as that of the poor,
and oppressed, and insulted country, whose
territory is violated?

In Leghorn and Hamburg (it is known
to Mr. Madison) the seizures were not
the acts of the immediate governments of
those places, but the direct military execu-
tion of French decrees in places in which,
by the laws of nations, they were forbid-
den to execute them.—In place, therefore,
of the snivelling, and almost treacherous
language "of friendly expostulations as
to rigour and suddenness," we ought to
have made the Imperial Palace ring with
our remonstrances of violation of our own
rights through the most unparalleled at-
tacks on the territorial sovereignty of other
independent states. Not content with this
base desertion of our honourable claims,
Mr. Madison, in his letter of February,
1808, appeals to the policy of France, and
endeavours to shew her that it is against
her interest to attack our rights, because
her enemy, being stronger on the ocean,
will beat her at this warfare.

If we had not seen an example of this hu-
miliation in our minister to France, in 1795,
we should have questioned the evidence of
our senses.

The last remark on the language of our
Cabinet as to these detestable decrees, is
this, that after giving both to Mr. Ar-
mstrong and Mr. Pinkney an apology which
Mr. Madison frames before hand for
France, and which he puts into the mouths
of their ministers before they adopted it
themselves, that France could and would
justify her decrees on the grounds of re-
taliation, which he pronounces she can
justly do; this glorious and independent
Minister of State is so afraid that even his
mild remonstrances, justifying in the out-
set the French decrees as municipal regu-
lations, proceeding afterwards simply to
shew their impolicy, and finally conclud-
ing with declaring their absolute justice
as retaliatory measures, would be esteem-
ed by France too harsh and severe, that
he cautions Mr. Armstrong in these words,
" In every view it is evidently proper as
far as respect to the national honour will
allow, to avoid a style of procedure which
might co-operate with the policy of the
British government by stimulating the pas-
sions of the French." In other words,
" wounded, insulted and abused as we are
by the perfidious breach of treaty, as well
as the shameless violation of National Law,
be careful lest in the manner of your stat-
ing our wrongs you offend the haughty
pride of our insolent oppressor." Lan-
guage is inadequate to convey an idea of
this baseness.—We shall remark here, that
there is no correspondent caution to avoid
offending Great-Britain:—Her resentment
is to be sought rather than deprecated.

Let us now examine the language of our
pretended impartial cabinet towards Great-
Britain, on the subject of her orders—orders
issued after due and honourable notice
—orders which did not subject the inno-
cent and unoffending to penalties, until he
was duly informed of their existence—orders
which were supported by at least a
colour of justification, inasmuch as they
were issued by a nation capable of enfor-
cing a real blockade, even upon the terms
laid down by the armed neutrality.—No
time was lost in remonstrating against these
orders.—Our government, so blind and so
tardy towards France, assumed, suddenly,
the character of vigilance and spirit. Mr.
Madison, though sick and feeble, as he
declares, on the 23d March, 1808, found
health and spirit sufficient to say, not that
the British orders were "a municipal re-
gulation, throwing a cloud over the amity
of the two nations," but that "they vio-
lated our rights, and stabbed our interest,
and that under the name of indulgence,
they superadded a blow at our national in-
dependence, and a mockery of our under-
standings." More bitter expressions could

not have been adopted.—We shall exam-
ine presently, the justice of the charge,
that the relaxations in the British orders
framed by the severity of the French decrees,
was adding insult to injury.

His instructions of April 4, 1808,
Madison tells Mr. Pinkney, " that
regarding the British orders as acts
of policy, and in trusting to the motives
of the British cabinet, the plan of starving Great-
Britain, they have appealed the
United States had given a signal proof of
their love of peace." In plain English—
the impartial administration which, for four-
teen months, had not only submitted to,
but had apologised for, the French decrees,
without one word of complaint, without
uttering a syllable about hostility, gave a
signal proof of moderation in confining it-
self to a mere attempt to starve Great-
Britain, instead of declaring war against
her, is our secretary says we might lawfully
have done.—So that while a perfidious
breach of treaty—a declaration of block-
ade, without the smallest power to enforce
it—the violation of neutral territories,
in order to seize seventeen millions of neu-
tral property, was only " thickening the
clouds which hung over our amity," and
demanded only " friendly expostulations
for the rigour and suddenness of the pro-
visions"—the attempt of the other belliger-
ent, after due notice to retaliate only
partially, is just cause of war.

We need say no more.—It is not in the
compass of human talent to make the case
stronger!

It may be said, that this was only the
language of our cabinet to their own min-
ister, and that they would not have violated
the rules of decorum by addressing such
harsh expressions to the British govern-
ment itself. But it will be remarked, that
I have compared it with like private in-
structions to Gen. Armstrong, in which,
besides the most tame and submissive lan-
guage, a positive injunction is given not
to offend France, at any price—to sacri-
fice truth and justice rather than to incur
her displeasure.

But the delicacy of our government for-
sook them in their intercourse with Great-
Britain.—In the official letter of Mr. Ma-
dison to Mr. Erskine, of March 25, 1808,
speaking of the relaxations of the British
orders, those relaxations which afforded us
some advantages not permitted by the
French decrees, our minister, now raised
to a war pitch, observes; " I forbear, sir,
to express all the emotions with which such
a language is calculated to inspire a nation,
which cannot for a moment be unconscious
of its rights, nor mistake for an alleviation
of its wrongs, regulations, to admit the
validity of which would be to assume bad-
ges of humiliation, never worn by an in-
dependent power."—This is truly the lan-
guage of wounded pride; and of a cabi-
net possessing high ideas of national hon-
our. If the occasion required it, it was
just—if it is the same course which they
have adopted towards all nations, and on
occasions still more affrontive, it is impar-
tial.—We shall shew that it merits neither
one nor the other praise:—

First. The relaxation of the British
orders did not merit this philippic.—An
attempt has been made to consider their
relaxations as insulting. Let us examine it.
France orders the blockade of all Bri-
tish ports—and the confiscation of all neu-
tral property, if coming from such ports, or
the growth or manufacture of her enemy.

If Great-Britain was authorized to re-
taliate, which upon this part of the argu-
ment we must take for granted, she had a
right to retaliate co-extensively with the
decrees of her enemy.—She had a right
to prohibit all trade with France, and her
dependencies, and to confiscate all prop-
erty the produce of her colonies. Had
she done this in the same words which Bo-
naparte had used, the only question would
have been, whether lex talionis was appli-
cable to the case. But willing to lessen
the horrible evils of such a warfare upon
neutrals, she relaxed its rigour. She au-
thorised the whole colonial trade with her
enemy, so far as was necessary to the sup-
ply of neutrals;—and she even permitted
the trade with the continental possessions
of her enemy, upon the condition that the
goods were carried to her ports, and there
subjected to a duty.—A perfect option still
remained to the neutral, whether he would
or would not, avail himself of this indul-
gence;—but it is difficult to conceive how
this qualified prohibition was either more
affrontive or more injurious than a direct
prohibition, like that of France.

That this was a mere popular trick, in-
vented by our government to excite a clam-
our against Great-Britain, is obvious
from the following facts contained in the
despatches:—

Mr. Madison, in his letter of March 25,

1808, to Mr. Erskine, complained of this
duty as adding insult to injury, more es-
pecially as applied to one of our own sta-
ples, cotton.

Mr. Canning, as soon as he was ac-
quainted with this objection, applied re-
peatedly, and finally addressed a formal
note, to Mr. Pinkney, assuring him that
in making such provision, Great-Britain,
so far from wishing to give offence to
the United States, thought that they would
prefer it as absolute prohibition which the
decrees of France would have authorized,
and offered to take off the duty, and have
the prohibition absolute as it stood in the
decrees of Bonaparte.

But our government, thinking it an ex-
cellent string upon which to play upon the
passions of the people, have neglected, and
indeed refused to give any reply; prefer-
ring to have the qualified prohibition re-
main, as it gives them the occasion to har-
angue about the insolence of a British
tribute.

Thus we see, that even an honest and
sincere attempt on the part of Great-Bri-
tain, to do us justice, and relieve us from
the pressure which the unjust decrees of
France had created, is converted into a
new pretext for complaint.

I had intended to notice, at large, many
other instances of the meanness and par-
tiality of our language towards these two
nations;—but I am deterred, from the ex-
tent, and necessary enlargement, which I
have been obliged to give to the remarks I
have already made. I shall however, brief-
ly notice one or two flagrant examples,
which will serve to give some idea, though
a faint one, of the devoted partiality of our
present cabinet to the views of France.

Mr. Madison's letter of the 2d of May,
1808, notices the insolent note of Mon-
sieur Champagny, in which he undertakes
to declare that we are at war with Great-
Britain, and that His Majesty of France
will retain our property, arrested, amount-
ing to several millions, until we decide
whether we will take an active share in the
war. It is to be observed on this letter of
Mr. Madison,

Firstly. That he sends to Mr. Ar-
mstrong the newspapers of this country, to
shew what was the spirit and indignation
excited by that letter.—On which it must
occur to every man, that if our govern-
ment had the same impressions of its au-
dacity and insolence, as it now discovers,
it is extraordinary that neither Mr. Jer-
son in his publick messages, nor the de-
mocratic members of Congress, nor the pa-
pers devoted to the Administration, ever
mentioned this letter with indignation;
and, of course, that the papers sent for-
ward to prove our resentment, must have
been those issued from federal and in-
dependent presses.

Secondly. That the only epithet of sev-
erity bestowed on this impudent letter
was, " that it had the air of an assumed
authority."

Thirdly. That fearful that even this
phrase might incense the cabinet of St.
Cloud, Mr. Madison charges Mr. Ar-
mstrong to be careful that in his manner he
does not offend His Majesty the Emperor.

The last case which I shall select, at
this time, to prove the mean subservency
of our Cabinet to that of France, is Mr.
Madison's letter in relation to the burning
of our ships by the French frigates return-
ing from the West-Indies.

This unparalleled outrage which, upon
impartial principles, ought to have occa-
sioned a proclamation interdicting the en-
try of French ships into our ports, was
never noticed until July 21, 1808, more
than three months after it had been known
in this country.

It was then called, by Mr. Madison,
" the most distressing of all the modes by
which belligerents exert force contrary to
right"—but, not content with this mild
epithet, which applies rather to the suffer-
ings of the injured than the injustice of the
oppressor, Mr. Madison frames for them
a new justification, or apology, unknown
to the law of nations, " that if the destruc-
tion was occasioned by a wish to prevent
intelligence being conveyed to a pursuing
or hovering force, the remedy ought to be
the more speedy."

What! do we hear this from the min-
ister of a neutral nation!! That if a weak
belligerent fears a pursuit, and is incapable
of resistance, he may destroy all the neu-
tral ships which he meets with, on the sole
condition of making reparation through
the tedious and uncertain process of diplo-
matick complaint!—There is an end then
of all tribunals!!—The ship or fleet of a
belligerent may always pretend a fear, and
dread of discovery, may destroy the ship,
seize the goods, and leave the wretched
neutral to his diplomatick redress. This
is not only a new doctrine in the law of