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LEESBURG, September 1.
THE FREEHOLDERS OF LOUDON, TO THE
FREEHOLDERS OF VIRGINIA.
(Concluded from our last.)

In this early instance of submission, and submission too, to France, for there were, then, fellow citizens, no more "Pyrenees," than there are, now, will be found, we believe, the prolific source of all our subsequent embarrassments, disgraces and calamities. Away then, with the unfounded assertion that Great Britain was our first aggressor of the Belligerents engaged in the present war. There can be no question but that she was emboldened to trifle with our neutrality, when she saw us wholly unprepared for its defence, endeavouring to purchase justice, where we should have harped defiance.

Neither in all this period nor in that which followed, did the administration earnestly recommend an addition to our navy, or any adequate preparation for the widespread commercial war which threatened our country. The keels of six seventy-fourers which had been purchased in better days, remained rotting on the ground, or were cut up for other purposes. Our countrymen of the North, who owe their opulence to their fisheries, navigation, and commerce, which employs sixty thousand seamen, and fifty millions of their capital, which are to us, as well as to them, "the mine of wealth," and to the nation, "the rightly used, a formidable safeguard of independence" complain of infractions of their rights by all the belligerents, and ask that protection to which they are justly entitled. Instead of augmenting our navy, the natural shield of our foreign commerce, the administration resorts to "embargoes" and "embargoes." It attempts to "punish the plunderer of three, or twenty millions of our property by an annual sacrifice of sixty." Our ships, it protects by consigning them to destruction; our seamen, by condemning them to inactivity; and our trade, by a suspension of all foreign commerce. It tells the fisherman of the East, that his harpoon shall rust in his cabin, and his line no more plumb the deep. The merchant is ordered to forsake the strand, and the mariner, his path on the ocean. The crowded mart is made desolate, and the hopes of the husbandman perish in the spring-time of his labour.

If there was wisdom, fellow citizens, in resisting the unjust pretensions of the nations of Europe, there was, surely, none in the quality of that species of resistance which the administration selected. Original and unaccommodating, it confounded the reasonings, assaulted the prejudices, and boldly attempted to change all the habits of intire states. Spurning all precedent or example from other times, it embarked in a philosophical experiment for the benefit of trade, which commenced with its destruction. Its untried remedy, was pushed, indeed, to the full extent of the art, which kills the patient, to cure his disease.

Embargoes, as preparatory for immediate war, are not without example in the history of other nations, as well as our own; but the sole merit of their invention, as substitute for open hostilities, is properly divisible between the late and present administrations.—If attributable to any particular member of either, it belongs peculiarly to Mr. Madison, himself, who first suggested its application to a similar purpose in the year 1794. It was singular enough, on a late occasion, to hear its friends complain that those, for whose benefit it was designed were ungratefully loud in their clamour against it.—As if an expression of pain leaves to the sufferer no choice of his mode of relief, and he must thank the surgeon who cuts off his arm to stop the aching of his finger.

Avowed to be a measure of precaution against both belligerents, it was in fact and intention, a measure of hostility against one of them, and had all the effects of war. It aroused her pride and her resentment and laid her under the necessity, if she conceded what we asked, of according it to the relief of her own wants, rather than to satisfy our claims of justice. Her con-

cession would have decided, as regarded herself, a question of power, and not of right. The humiliation of a people, who surrender their rights, under the pressure of famine, is as complete, as if that surrender was made under the pressure of war, provided the power who receives the surrender may, at any time, renew the pressure. Had the embargo, therefore, occasioned all the suffering in Great Britain, which it was designed to produce, she must have resisted the demands of America, however just and reasonable in themselves, or have acknowledged the existence of a power inconsistent with her own independence. Had this measure of self denial been successfully executed in America, it ought not, therefore, to have been expected to have the desired operation on G. Britain, and must consequently be regarded as the offspring of an inexcusable ignorance, in the administration, of the character and circumstances of the people on both sides of the Atlantic. In this, however, as in all other cases, where its measures failed of their intended effect, the administration laboured to shift the disgrace and the blame on its opponents; and an opposition, consisting of one fourth part of the whole congress, was relied on, as an excuse for the failure of a measure which considering its character was more pertinaciously adhered to by its friends, and more zealously, faithfully and rigidly executed, than any similar law ever was, or perhaps ever will be again.

But, if the wisdom of this measure be questionable in this view, what shall we say of it, when considered as the alternative preferred by our administration, to the treaty concluded with G. B. by Mr. Monroe and Mr. Pinckney? Had that treaty been ratified, not to speak of the present war, which is manifestly a consequence of its rejection, how many indignities, fellow-citizens, how many insults and outrages from foreign nations, how much dissention and discord among ourselves, would we not have avoided? what private wealth, what public revenue would have been retained, preserved and augmented? The administration which offered to purchase a treaty of Spain, through the agency of France, her master, would not deign to accept one from England negotiated and approved by such ministers as we have named. Of Spain and France who dared not, at that time, put to sea a single ship. Of England whose triumphant navies literally covered the ocean. Spain who never cultivated or valued foreign commerce. France who had, in jealousy of her rival destroyed hers—England whose arts and manufactures, every way suited to our wants, had grown and multiplied with our ploughs and hoes, our sickles, our fields, our ships and our people. Alas! fellow citizens, that any American statesman should have dashed to the ground our overflowing cup of plenty, to grasp in fellowship, the blood stained hand of a perfidious and ferocious tyrant.

But if such was the policy of the memorable embargo, where shall language be found to depict that which we have recently witnessed? Spain, of whose injuries we first complain, is no longer the object of our resentment. Her mangled body, pierced by the fangs of the monster who devours her, now bleeds at every pore, and invites our deepest commiseration. England has rescinded her orders of council, at the very instant in which we have declared war against her. While the olive-branch of peace was preparing in London, our administration was industriously forging, at Washington, the thunderbolts of war. It waited only the decision of Napoleon to hurl them at his foe. Amidst this busy "note of preparation," what was the language at Washington? "Wait the return of the Hornet from France. If Mr. Barlow does not send us a satisfactory adjustment of our differences; if any uncertainty even, shall remain in our relations to that country, after the arrival of the Hornet; our war shall be against both nations. Alike in their wrongs, they shall alike feel the weight of our resentment." Well! fellow citizens, months elapse, and the Hornet returns, not only without a treaty, but without any reasonable hope of one. But the Wasp is promised. And lo, without waiting her arrival, as if our prepared thunderbolts might cool, they are discharged at England alone. Still it is said, and repeated, "Should the Wasp, which is expected in a fortnight, not assure us of immediate justice, France shall suffer for it." We are at war, you perceive, with

England, and we the administration waits the arrival of the Wasp, to determine on war with France. A fortnight, you may say, was not too great a delay to keep off double war. Before the arrival of the Wasp, however, CONGRESS ADJOURNS, to meet several months hence. The Wasp returns. But the Wasp, like the Hornet, brings no treaty; and our peace with France nevertheless continues. To this sickening review, what else have we to add! There arrives, fresh from the cabinet of Napoleon, through the hands of Mr. Barlow, an imperial edict, purporting to have been dated more than a twelve-month before its publication, telling us that the Berlin and Milan decrees were then rescinded. When? On the 5th of August 1810, at the date of the memorable letter of the duke of Cadore. No! On the 1st of November 1810, as Mr. Madison's proclamation had assured us! No, fellow citizens—but on the 28th of April 1811, after we had purchased and paid for their repeal by suspending, at the loss of 20 per cent. of the value of all our exports, our whole importations from England, and taken the first step towards the present war. "There shall be no neutrals," said the emperor of France long ago. His minister told ours. "War exists then, in fact, between England and the United States, and his majesty considers it as declared." We were through the same organ, reminded, that "unless we so regard it, we were a people without policy, and without energy, who might at least be induced to fight for interest, after having refused to fight for honour." There are, now, fellow citizens, no longer any neutrals. We are at war, and with England. But it remains to be proved that this is a war either "for interest," or "honour." The honor of Mr. Madison, and we think, the nonintercourse law, under which he professed to act, once forbade him to revise its provisions against England, until France, besides her Berlin and Milan decrees, should have restored to our merchants the property iniquitously seized under that of Ramboulet. For proof of this, fellow-citizens, consult the letters written at this instance by the Secretary of State to general Armstrong, our minister at Paris, in the summer and autumn of 1810. But notwithstanding this joint determination of duty and honor, he issued his proclamation, declaring what was untrue with regard to the other decrees, as France now explicitly tells us, and not only without an actual restitution of that property, but without a promise of restitution. In the very teeth of his own injunction on Gen. Armstrong, he not only issued an illegal proclamation, but, after waiting in vain for either the one or the other, he has recommenced war against Great Britain alone.

Is this, then we ask, fellow citizens, may we implore your attention to our anxious enquiry is this a war for honour? Does honour bid us unite our arms with those of the despot of Europe, against the liberty, independence, and happiness of all mankind? What will the Spanish Isles of our Archipelago, what will the rest of America, what will the people of the New World who naturally look up to us for the model of their rising institutions, think of a war in which they behold us contending, at the side of the enemy of the human race, against the only nation who has power to shield their infant growth, and rear their strength to manhood? How must the remaining friends of liberty on the continent of Europe regard a nation who labours to ally herself to the deadliest foe that freedom ever knew? Few, indeed, they are in number; but the more to be respected, as they stand alone, amidst the tempest which has swept away the nations around them. Alas! how many republics have disappeared in the short compass of twenty years! The rocks and lonely valleys of Helvetia have long ceased to resound the cheerful notes of liberty. Venice, Genoa, Lucca, St. Marino, where freedom, though in her decline, yet loved to linger, have disappeared—blotted out from the map of Europe—stunk and lost, like so many once verdant islands, beneath the dead sea of Italian tyranny.

Fellow citizens, we do not wish to inspire you with a deadly hatred of France—Frenchmen have their virtues also. Escaped from a horrible revolution, which overthrowing all law and order, lighted the torch and nerved the arm of the midnight incendiary and assassin; which, at rising in battle against each other, fathers and brothers, choked their rivers

with mingled carcases, and deluged their cities and fields with blood; they have sought, as many other nations have done before them, a sad refuge from a thousand tyrants, in the arms of one. As Frenchmen, we neither hate, nor envy them their delusive glory. As men, they ought ever to be objects of our benevolence, and as such, at present they fill us equally with pity and with horror. Their laurels of conquest are stained with the blood of innocent men; their song of triumph is lost in the cries and groans of human misery; their path abroad is moistened with tears, and saddened with desolation. The embellishments of their proud capital are the spoils of other nations, and the surviving monuments of that liberty which they have destroyed. France annually offers up the lives of her children as a propitiary sacrifice on the altar of the bloody Moloch, who has adorned her brow with these garlands and wreaths; but she knows not when the justice of Heaven may strike off the shackles of the nations she has subdued, and the sword of vengeance pierce that bosom now swelling with triumph.

As little, fellow citizens, are we disposed to be the apologists of Great Britain or of her ministry. We have not said, that we have no cause of war against her; but if we must chuse a foe, we hesitate not to condemn that choice which our administration has made for us. We are not trying the question of force between America and Britain. Whenever that is required of us, we shall be found on the side of our country, aiding her with our prayers, our strength. The administration not satisfied with rivalling, has artfully sought to usurp the place of our country in understandings and our hearts, & to find, in our patriotism, an ample cloak for its weakness, indiscretion and folly. We will not allow things, so distinct in themselves, to be confounded to our shame, mortification, & disgrace. What is at all times, an undoubted right, becomes, in the present unhappy circumstances of our country, a most solemn duty—to scrutinize the public conduct of the servants of the nation, and to discard them, if unworthy of trust.

We do not advocate a disgraceful peace with England, even though it would terminate an impolitic and unnecessary war. But we earnestly contend, that he who has involved us in the war is not likely to bring it to a speedy or an honorable issue; and we do most solemnly believe, that the best expedient for the accomplishment of both, is the removal of Mr. Madison from the station which he holds.

We are told that "our terror of an alliance with France, in aid of this war, is vain and unfounded." He who makes this assurance, only proves, that he has not surveyed the whole of the path before him. Suppose this war should be calamitous, notwithstanding our best efforts to prevent it; that the discrimination which our administration has so unwisely made against England, in favour of France, should unite against us, as it was so well calculated to do, all her people. The war will endure many years at least; and its unavoidable consequences must be calamitous to us, as well as to them. When Mr. Madison's re-election shall have been secured by these delusive assurances: when those numerous taxes which the administration has recommended, which Congress has resolved upon, and which are merely deferred, shall call on us for contributions to the war, which the war will deprive us of the facility of paying: when those loans, which have been effected with difficulty, shall be attempted hereafter, with still greater difficulty, to be renewed, and funds shall be required to reimburse them when the exchequer bills, which now threaten to pour into circulation, at once, five millions of dollars, shall be doubled, tripled, and quadrupled, over and over again, as they must be, if money to carry on the war cannot otherwise be had, and when they shall be reduced, from their present minimum of one hundred dollars, to five, and perhaps a single dollar, in order to give them a more diffusive circulation, and to displace their rivals, the notes of our banks: when, without fleets, or adequate fortifications to protect them, our cities are bombarded; and, without foreign markets for its products, our agriculture, as it has ever done, declines with our commerce, when for want of military talents or experience in our commanders, who will be gathered here and there, as the support of the administration may render most expedient, the operation of our arms shall be delayed or defeated: in fine,