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AN ENGLISH VIEW OF THE WAR.

The following article from the Liverpool Courier of August 5th, cannot fail to be read with interest:

UNITED STATES.

We have at length the American official declaration of war, and the message of the President which gave rise to it. The review of the latter document will add little to the previous stock of information; but it must prove to every impartial person, if anything were wanting to prove it, that the determination to declare war against Great Britain is taken up by the American Executive on grounds very different from those usually assigned in England; and that the message itself being filled with every complaint real or imaginary, which has for years been groaned forth in the American democratic papers, is only designed to give a color, a semblance of a real cause to the measure which has been adopted. Wretched, indeed, must that cause be, when it requires to be supported by the allegation of grievances which have been disavowed, or for which reparation has been offered, or for which reparation has been offered, or which admit of no proof. Yet statements to which all these characters may be separately applied are found in this disgraceful manifesto, which equally sets at defiance the common feelings of justice, and the dignity of supreme government. We have, for instance, the affair of the Chesapeake, without the mention of the disavowal and the ample reparation offered; Henry's mission too is dwelt upon, though no one we believe on either side the water can attach the slightest importance to it, except as that affair exhibits the ease with which the American executive may be duped through the influence of its hatred to England and its corrupt attachment to France upon its judgment or principles. The very worst part of the message, however, is the charge which it revives against Great Britain for exciting the Indians on the frontier to hostilities.—To this known falsehood Mr. Madison has lent his sanction for the purpose of rousing the feelings of the American people. Yet he even halts in doing it; he performs the disgraceful task with a goit so shuffling as leaves no doubt of his being conscious at the moment that he was violating truth, or at least assuming that as a fact of which he had no evidence before him but that which tended to disprove it. The hostile Indian tribes are in the habit of trading with the British traders and garrisons, and therefore 'it is difficult to account' for their movements, except from British influence. Thus, on this flimsy ground of a supposition, on a mere suspicion of a partial wind, it is that the head of an extensive nation, in an official paper, charges Great Britain before the world with an act the most atrocious. Such reasoning and such an inference would have debased the most ignorant and brittle of the democratic journals. But Mr. Madison had even then before him a dispatch from the government of Canada which communicated to him the first intelligence he had ever received of the hostile preparations of the Indians. This information that government had received from the "traders and garrisons" on the Indian frontier, and thus the very circumstance which Mr. Madison assumes, on which to ground the possibility of British influence being employed in exciting the Indians, is that to which the American government is indebted for such timely information as to enable it, to collect sufficient force to oppose and defeat the Indians. On this part of Mr. Madison's conduct no further comment is necessary. We pity the feeling of every honorable American who reflects upon the disgrace inflicted upon his country by the choice of Mr. Madison.

Looking at the message politically, and taking it for our guide to the true ground of the declaration of war, the conclusion is irresistibly forced upon us, that America has made an unjust concession of herself to the continental system of Bonaparte, and that she goes to war for all the purposes couched by Bonaparte under her his favorite phrase "a maritime peace." This

conclusion, however, we apprehend no one will attempt to dispute, that the orders in council are not the sole cause of the hostile attitude assumed by America. No greater prominence is in fact given to them as a grievance, than to many other of the acts and usages of the British government; and the argument, therefore, of those who have impugned the orders in council as being in themselves the chief cause of the hostile spirit of the Americans, and in terms equally strong have commended their repeal as a sovereign panacea for healing every difference between the two countries, falls to the ground; in fact we have all the proof that any subject is capable of, that the object of the war is less to obtain a repeal of the orders in council, than to force a sacrifice of our essential maritime rights, and consequently, that had the orders in council been repealed previously to the American declaration, war would nevertheless have been advocated by the American executive and its supporters the democrats. This is what we have all along asserted and supported by reason adduced from the whole tenor of the conduct of the American government; and the message of Mr. Madison has justified the whole of our remarks and strictures for the last twelve months. We should, however, have felt great pleasure had the message of the President on this occasion proved us to have been inaccurate observers and judges of the conduct of the United States.

But it may be necessary to support the inferences we have drawn from the message by referring to the prominent subjects of its complaints; and to prove, that there is an exact correspondence of design and purpose between the American and French governments in the principles of the war in which they are both engaged.

The first point presented is the right of search, and if the message means any thing, it asserts that it is necessary to go to war to compel Great Britain to renounce it. It is not necessary to our argument to justify that right, or to shew that Great Britain has a much stronger ground of complaint against the United States for the seduction of her seamen, and the issuing of false certificates of citizenship, than America has against this country for the detention of her real citizens. This is sufficiently obvious, though Mr. Madison is careful to abstain from even a distant allusion to it. The principle, and not the practice, is the point more immediately at issue; and this principle France would wring from us, that the practical benefits to us may cease with it. In this point, then, America and France are agreed. France demands of neutrals that they resist by force of arms the search of their vessels, and America in compliance, does resist by force of arms.

The next right of ours attacked is that of blockade. Now, as it has been explained between Mr. Monroe and Mr. Foster, that Great Britain assumes no right to blockade any port but what has a force before it capable of enforcing that blockade, the next object of going to war stated in the message can only be to compel us to relinquish that right even when so explained. For the right so restricted is already conceded, and as something more is required, that something must be the allowance of the principle of blockades as stated by Bonaparte; namely, that no place shall be considered in a state of blockade, except it is invested both by land and water. Here America and France also agree to force from us the allowance of a principle which in ninety-nine cases out of an hundred would prevent us from blockading an enemy's port at all.

The same agreement is marked as to the orders in council. America would enforce their repeal, not because the French decrees are repealed generally; but pretendedly so as to her. She leaves other neutral nations under their operation, she sanctions by her indifference the seizure of neutral states by Bonaparte, for no other crime than exercising the neutral right to trade, for, says Mr. Monroe, those states themselves must take care of their own interests; she goes farther than this, and allows those decrees fully to operate upon herself in their full spirit, by consenting not to trade in any articles of British origin, and allowing the quirkling plea of a municipal regulation, and yet she demands the repeal of the orders in council. Thus she joins with France in aid of the designs of Bonaparte. What he wants is, to oppress our commerce by unjust measures against neutrals, at the same time depriv-

ing us of the power of retaliation and defence, and for this America goes to war—that she may accomplish his wishes.

A consent so obvious and so fairly established leaves it beyond a doubt that in this measure America has accepted and acted upon the ultimatum of Bonaparte; he will now receive her as worthy of the honor of an ally, and the difficulty in the way of Mr. Barlow's negotiation will be removed.

It is a very natural question, "how far will the repeal of the orders in council, when it becomes known in America, alter the newly adopted policy of the American government?" We are aware that many persons are extremely sanguine as to the effect of this measure in pacifying America; and none are so much so as those who have clamored most loudly for it. Were this the effect, it would remain to be seen how far in a commercial view Great Britain would benefit by it. It is our opinion not at all, for the revival of the trade to the United States would be counterbalanced by the depression of our commerce to other quarters, leaving us the shame of conceding an important right without compensation. But judging from the message, we have no reason to expect that the American government will retrace its steps, unless we are also prepared to surrender other rights besides that of retaliating on the enemy. The rescinding of the orders in council is but one of the objects for which it has entered into war, and no greater importance is attached to that than to the questions of search and blockade. How, therefore, the satisfying of one demand out of many can adjust the quarrel, does it not very clearly appear. We can easily conceive that the American executive may say to Mr. Foster, "we owe you nothing for rescinding the orders in council: you have done it not from a sense of justice, but for your own convenience, and we must now have a guarantee that you will not again resume them in the express renunciation of other principles which have rendered your naval power injurious to us." This they may say, and probably will say to Mr. Foster, and among themselves they may whisper, and often have they been further from the truth, "that the British ministry having yielded the orders in council to clamor, and party violence, they may be induced to yield the rights of search and blockade also. We are at least encouraged to make the experiment.—The very men who cried out for the rescinding of the orders in council did so only for the sake of their own interests. The country was out of the question; and when the maritime rights of England as evidently stand in the way of their trade, they will be equally as willing to surrender them. They will find as many reasons against them; and we are so much obliged to certain members of the English opposition, that there is no prejudice however gross, no clamor however violent, which they will not undertake to advocate in the houses of parliament, provided they obtain an adequate return of applause from the populace, and gratify their inveteracy against the existing government.

To us the repeal of the orders in council appears to be only calculated to encourage the war as far as respects the executive; but we doubt not that it will have a counteracting effect on the minds of the people, and will render the war still more unpopular, if, after the act is known, it should be persevered in. For if, under present circumstances, the declaration has been received in some of the seaports with such marked disapprobation, as is stated in letters from America, the repeal of the orders in council must produce a very strong effort on the part of the mercantile interest to oblige the government to enter into an amicable arrangement. Should this succeed, that arrangement will, however, fall very short of a full and permanent adjustment of differences. That can only be effected by the humiliation of France, and then only the Americans, however mortified, will be less boisterous.

THE BUDGET.

Some time since, I remember to have heard of certain bills, Treasury bills I think, to a very great amount, having been sold and bought in London as true bills, when the fact turned out to be that a Clerk in Mr. Noarse's office had forged his signature. I say was the money paid for the said bills refunded, and what was the Clerk's name?—did he belong to the party of Barna Bidwell and the other gentleman from Massachusetts?—I forget his

name? My reason for asking if the money got his money back, is, that I see by Lord Erskine's speech for Cuthell, as detailed in the 38th vol. of the Edinburgh Review, that the said Clerk ought to have been hanged, but that Joseph Noarse ought to have repaid the money. I do not know that he did not. There is a fund you know, out of which monies can be paid without any difficulty, or loss to any body—Henry's 100,000 dollars was paid out of it.

Nota Bene.—The British Adj. General who came 200 miles through his enemies country, and into the old General's camp without a bandage over his eyes, did not gain much by his journey.—The old General says the armistice which was granted was more necessary for us, than for them, and I believe so too. Let us yankees alone for taking the flats in.

GRANNY DERE.

ANOTHER.

I thank God said he, that I am a republican, that I live under a government which looks to the interest of the people—where the people's money is expended with economy. Sir, answered his friend, you thank God for nothing. You are abused, most scandalously abused. Economy! Do you see that string of waggons, each with its four horses? What do you think they contain? where do you think they are going? Those 15 waggons have been dragged from Carlisle in Pennsylvania loaded with fixed ammunition and are bound to Niagara! From Philadelphia to New-York is 90 to Albany 145 to Niagara 300—555 miles to carry cannon balls, grape and canister shot by land! Is this economy? They are not going to Niagara, said he, but to Lake Champlain—Be it so, be it so, if you please, but have they no other than land carriage from the Bowery to the Lake: Is it not a vile waste of money to send these grape shot by land, when they could be sent from here by water? But in the name of common sense, why send iron balls from Carlisle to Lake Champlain by land or water when they could be procured on spot?—Perkins & Co. have founderies and forges in Vermont almost on the borders of the Lake, where more round, grape, double-headed or chain shot could be furnished in a week than even such fighting fellows as Dearborn & Hull would, with all their troops, captured, raised, fire at an enemy in 6 months. Don't say a word, my friend, about economy. Those who have undertaken to support the war, and to forward on supplies, must be either knaves or fools.—Why, Sir, they sent on, not a week since, a thousand sets of tent poles, and Heaven only knows how many boxes of tent pins from Philadelphia to Niagara.—Transport wood 5 or 600 miles to a country full of wood! where every tree would make a million of tent pins, every saplin a sett of tent poles! 'Tis too bad! It beats Dearborne's Coat—that is private folly, this is public.—Coat? what of his coat? why I will tell you what of his coat.—This weak old man, this who was, at the close of the revolutionary war a waggon master, and is now Commander in Chief of the American army, has had the folly to get a new coat made in Boston, with such a quantity of lace and embroidery on it, that the coat alone, without vest or breeches, cost 500 dollars—and that is not the worst of it.—The French Taylor who formed, fabricated, and bedizened this coat of dotage, has had a picture of the coat painted and placed and spread out in his show window with this inscription over it—"General Dearborn's Coat! cost 500 Dollars!"—Sir, this is no federal lie as your friends term all the truths which are disagreeable to them—it is true, and pity 'tis, 'tis true. I blush for the leaders of your party.—Had they no better men than Dearborn and Bloomfield and Hull to place at the head of their troops? Hull the government will sacrifice, and yet I would rather, had I been forced to chuse between them, have given the command of the army to him than to Dearborn with all his coat.—Good bye to you, I will see you to-morrow and tell you more tartar-emetic truths.

N. Y. Her.

Shameless audacity.—The reader is requested to peruse the following extract from the National Intelligencer of this morning's mail.

"The late rumours from the westward of the savage barbarities committed by the Indians in British pay, have excited the sympathy of all feeling hearts and dis-