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MR. RANDOLPH'S SPEECH.

On the New Army Bill.

REPORTED FOR THE UNITED STATES GA-  
ZETTE.

Concluded.

As the revocation of the orders in council, it was admitted by the president himself that it was such as would satisfy the law—Then why did not he issue a proclamation to that effect? Why were we now at war? He was at a loss, he said to determine whether his imagination, his memory, his judgment or his command of words most failed him in expressing his ideas upon this unhappy subject; but, must it not be conceded on all hands, he asked, that after the revocation of the orders in council the man who would have made that revocation the ground of negotiation, would have been hailed by the people as the restorer of peace? But wicked disturbers excited and fomented the passions and we run into the war as a young couple ran into matrimony, without any consideration of the consequences, or any care how they shall support themselves or the offspring of their imprudent connexion. The champion of liberty—the last republic the tyrant Bonaparte has left upon the earth, was to be sacrificed as an atonement to the grim monster of France, who instead of smiling like the idol of Jaganaut upon his victims, looks contemptuously upon us; spurns us away from him; and turning his back in scorn upon our humble suit, directs his eyes to his hecatombs at Moscow, the capital of the largest empire of the earth, made the altar on which (while our miserable government was left to wait his return) the Emperor Alexander was to be offered up and immolated, and for what? Why, for fighting for the existence of himself and his subjects, and for not surrendering himself a victim without resistance to his bloated ambition.—After years that we had been bleeding in his cause, and for his purpose, he turns & leaves our beggarly minister to trot on his jaded pegasus at his heels. What does the Speaker of the House himself say, after censuring what he was pleased to call “the justification of the French emperor”—what does he say? Why he says that very French emperor’s conduct was a tissue of fraud and treachery, and that there was no epithet in language sufficiently base to apply to his character.—And where was your satisfaction, or when did you demand it? (asked Mr. R.) never—none. When without one additional soldier or seaman you might have righted yourselves, you chose to prostrate yourself at the feet of yours and the world’s curse and conqueror—Is there any want of provocation? No—All of you, even Mr. Speaker, say there is ample: and yet you all sit covering, while the fell monster sits, like a coromant on the tree of life, devising death—not satisfied nor fatigued—the personification of death itself—Incarnate death. When Spain was the ally of France, not a barbarian under a Spanish cloak, but was safe from us—Why, the king of Spain, or rather that phantom of a king, “who the likeness of a kingly crown had on,” Charles, was in alliance with him, that is, was his victim, and must not be touched—What had Spain done to bring down our war upon her? What event has happened since?—Why, she was helpless—she was not able to return our blows, and above all, she was in a state of hostility against Napoleon, defending her liberties and independence against him, and could not encounter us—the more infamous and cowardly our conduct to her if we touched her territories. But I forewarn and beseech you most sincerely to beware how you transfer the war from the rocks of Canada and Nova-Scotia to the sands of Florida, or the tobacco fields of our southern states. If you do, I pronounce you to be on the verge of that madness which precedes the fall of those whom God has doomed to destruction. Having thus, to use Mr. R.’s own words, sketched with a just but trembling hand the picture of our situation, as it really

stood so far, he proceeded to the discussion of the business of impressment: First however, taking occasion to glance at the Indian wars—a topic, he said, always in the inverse ratio of the understanding of those upon whom it was imposed; tomahawks and scalping knives were all called in to give a height to the coloring of the wars, of which, after all, there were none but of our own making. For a proof of this, Mr. R. referred to the President’s message. How did it happen, he asked, that when voting medals to those officers, who had distinguished themselves on the ocean, not a whisper was heard of those brave men who had distinguished themselves on the expedition to Tippecanoe? Do we know, as a legislature, however, by whom that war was begun, or is it come to this with us, that every governor, or any governor general of India, can, provided it be not with christians, at will, attack and exterminate our red brethren? Is it considered that he may invade and plunge us into war with foreign nations, for such are the Indians, he said, were of our seeking. The christians of the country were in the habit of hunting the heathen as they are of hunting the deer, bear, or any game; and who are we who do it? Virginians—THE BIG KNIVES. There was not a shadow of reason to countenance the belief that the Indians were instigated by the British. No, they were invaded, hunted, assailed, and they must fight or die.

[The impressment, Mr. R. said, was the result of our having, by the means of the war in Europe, more trade than we had hands to do it with. On this subject his facts and general train of reasoning were little different from those who preceded him; but his deductions and collateral remarks were marked by singular sagacity and ingenuity.] He insisted that England neither would, could nor ought to give up the right of search. And he showed from the correspondence of our ministers, that it was a point on which G. Britain would nail her flag to the mast and go down to the bottom with it. He showed that it was the French doctrine also and that it would remain forever. It was one, however, on which no wise or honest man would go to war. It was, in a certain degree an evil, to be sure, but it was one annexed to and inseparable from a great benefit, and the price of unexampled prosperity. He would ask, were they willing to go to war for protection of redegades of whom he thought with detestation, because they brought upon this land of peace, misery and danger, the extent of which cannot be calculated? There were neutral duties as well as neutral rights, and should those, he asked who profited by the one, refuse obedience to the other? Certainly not. Adverting to one cause of the evil complained of; of the inability to distinguish between English and American sailors, he said that the French government captured and kept imprisoned all men who spoke the English language as Englishmen, till they could prove themselves Americans. So that the American who had the misfortune to speak the language of Milton, Shakespear and Locke, was kept a prisoner till proof was had of his being an American, and the *onus probandi*, [proof] was thrown upon him.

Another objection to the bill, grew out of an indigenuous jealousy of the military power; and of a sense of the number it would, if executed, draw from the population of the country. It passed sentence of degradation on the country, & cashiered the militia—besides, he could not consent to the raising a mercenary standing army. The militia alone was the constitutional army of a free state, and where the militia was not honored there the people was, if not in the gulf, or at least on the brink of destruction.

The finances of the country presented another objection. They absolutely were in such a condition, that they presented a libel on the policy, or the policy a libel on the finances.

The committee of ways and means had last session presented a string of resolutions, founded on the opinion of the secretary of the treasury, that the necessities of the country demanded heavy taxes to be laid. After this had been laid upon the table, the secretary (Gallatin) comes forward this session with a beggarly account of empty boxes, and instead of taxes, a proposition for loans. The treasurer who told the house last session that taxes were necessary, and by whose influence those were voted, in committee, this session tells

you the reverse. In doing this he has trifled with the respect due to the country, and should be called upon to show cause, why they were then necessary and not now.

Mr. Randolph then put it to the house whether it was not right to consider one point. Here is an army of 35,000 to be voted. What is fitting that such an army, much greater than that with which the liberty of the people, more numerous and as fond of liberty as ourselves, was acquired should be fully under the command of that officer,\* who in public letters called upon an army which the father of his country commanded, not to lay down their arms till all their demands were complied with? He then appealed to the feelings and moral and religious principles of the house whether it was fitting that two nations having one and that the only pure faith and worship, should embroe their hands in each others blood, as a sacrifice at the altar of the Moloch of France?

\* General Armstrong.

ENGLISH DECLARATION.

By an expeditious conveyance from New York to this place, London papers have been received of the 9th Jan. and Liverpool papers of several days later date. We understand they contain no news of much moment, except the following State Paper which we copy from a Liverpool print.

Nat. Int.

FROM THE LONDON GAZETTE.  
DECLARATION.

The earnest endeavor of the Prince Regent to preserve the relations of peace and amity with the U. S. of America, having unfortunately failed, his royal highness, acting in the name and on the behalf of his majesty, deems it proper publicly to declare the causes and the origin of the war in which the government of the U. S. has compelled him to engage.

No desire of conquest or other ordinary motives of aggression has been or can be, with any color of reason, in this case, imputed to G. Britain: that her commercial interests were on the side of peace, if war could have been avoided without the sacrifice of her maritime rights or without any injurious submission to France, is a truth which the American government will not deny.

His royal highness does not, however, mean to rest on the favorable presumption, to which he is entitled. He is prepared by an exposition of the circumstances which have led to the present war, to shew that G. B. has throughout acted towards the U. S. of America, with a spirit of forbearance and conciliation; and to demonstrate the inadmissible nature of those pretensions, which have at length unhappily involved the two countries in war.

Here the declaration enters into a historical account of the Berlin and Milan decrees, and other hostile measures of France towards neutrals; the retaliatory orders in council of G. B.; the consequent embargo, non-intercourse and non-importation acts of the American Congress, and the different diplomatic representations and explanations which have taken place on those subjects between G. B. and America, the particulars of all which have been long before the public.—The declaration then continues—

The American government, before they received information of the course adopted by the Br. government, had in fact proceeded to the extreme measure of declaring war, and issuing letters of marque, notwithstanding they were previously in possession of the report of the French minister for foreign affairs, of the 12th of March, 1812, promulgating anew the Berlin and Milan decrees, as fundamental laws of the French empire, under the false and extravagant pretext, that the monstrous principles therein contained were to be found in the Treaty of Utrecht, and were therefore binding upon all states.—From the penalties of this code no nation was to be exempt which did not accept it not only as the rule of its own conduct, but as a law the observance of which it was also required to enforce upon G. B.

In a manifesto accompanying their declaration of hostilities, in addition to the former complaints against the orders in council, a long list of grievances was brought forward; some trivial in themselves others which had been mutually adjusted but none of them such as were ever before alleged by the American government to be grounds for war.—As if to throw additional obstacles in the way of peace, the American Congress at the same time passed a law

prohibiting all intercourse with G. B. of such a tenor as deprived the Executive government according to the President’s own construction of that act, of all power of restoring the two states, so far at least as concerned their commercial intercourse until Congress should re-assemble.—The President of the U. S. has, it is true, since proposed to G. B. an armistice; not however, on the admission that the cause of war, now brought forward as such for the first time; namely that she should abandon the exercise of her undoubted right of search to take from American merchant vessels British seamen, the natural born subjects of his Majesty; and this concession was required upon the mere assurance that laws would be enacted by the Legislature of the U. S. to prevent such seamen from entering into their service; but independent of the objection to an exclusive reliance on a foreign state, for the conservation of so vital an interest no explanation was or could be afforded by the agent who was charged with this overture either as to the main principles upon which such laws were to be founded or as to the provisions which it was proposed they should contain. This proposition having been objected to a second proposal was made, again offering an armistice, provided the British government would secretly stipulate to renounce the exercise of this right in a treaty of peace. An immediate and formal abandonment of its exercise as preliminary to a cessation of hostilities, was not demanded; but his royal highness the Prince Regent was required in the name and on the behalf of his majesty, secretly to abandon what the former overture had proposed to him publicly to concede.

This most offensive proposition was also rejected being accompanied as the former had been by other demands of the most exceptionable nature, and especially of indemnity for all American vessels detained and condemned under the orders in council, or under what were termed illegal blockades—a compliance with which demands, exclusive of all other objections, would have amounted to an absolute surrender of the rights on which those orders and blockades were founded. Had the American government been sincere in representing the orders in council as the only subject of difference between G. Britain & the U. S. calculated to lead to hostilities it might have been expected, so soon as the revocation of those orders had been officially made known to them that they would have spontaneously recalled their “letters of marque” and manifested a disposition immediately to restore the relations of peace and amity between the two powers.—But the conduct of the government of the U. S. by no means corresponded with such reasonable expectations. The orders in council of the 23d of June, being officially communicated in America, the government of the U. S. saw nothing in the repeal of the orders in council which should of itself restore peace unless G. B. were prepared in the first instance substantially to relinquish the right of impressing her own seamen, when found on board American merchant ships. The proposal of an armistice, and of a simultaneous repeal of the restrictive measures on both sides subsequently made by the commanding officer of his majesty’s naval forces on the American coast were received in the same hostile spirit by the government of the U. S. The suspension of the practice of impressment was insisted upon, in the correspondence which passed on that occasion as a necessary preliminary to a cessation of hostilities. Negotiation it was stated, might take place without; and also without any armistice being concluded but G. B. was required previously to agree without any knowledge of the adequacy of the system which could be substituted to negotiate upon the basis of accepting the legislative regulations of a foreign state, as the sole equivalent for the exercise of a right, which she has felt to be essential to the support of her maritime power.

If America, by demanding this preliminary concession, intends to deny the validity of that right, in that denial G. B. cannot acquiesce; nor will she give countenance to such a pretension, by acceding to its suspension, much less to its abandonment as a basis on which to treat. If the American government has devised, or conceives it can devise, regulations which may safely be accepted by G. Britain, as a substitute for the exercise of the right in question, it is for them to bring forward such a plan for consideration. The British government has never attempted to exclude this question from amongst those of