

for the sake of peace, would have been abandoned.

The allies wished to maintain the established system of Europe, to protect the stadtholder and the seven United Provinces, to prevent an iron barrier against the contagion of innovation; and they too, in the progress of pride and ambition, meditated the dismemberment of France, and individually their own aggrandizement.

But in these objects on either side, there has been in the course of the war, a considerable change. Neither has the internal administration of France been such as to invite her neighbors to follow her example, nor have the arms of the allies been so successful as to justify any hopes of conquest, or subduing the power and the unconquerable will of liberty—every liberty run mad—by force of arms.—The spirit of ambition, one would imagine, would now be pretty much abated on both sides.—But, whatever their objects may still be, how far does the farther prosecution of the war offer a reasonable hope of their attainment; The great hopes of the grand mover of the alliance, the British government, are founded avowedly on the depreciation of the French assignats, or paper currency; but the resources of a country are nothing else than its physical resources; viz. its population, means of subsistence, capital, and the industry, genius, and valor of its inhabitants. Money, in fact, is only a mark or sign of the value of labour.—Productions of art, and reproductions of nature, may be carried on without intermediate signs of wealth. It is possible for a great nation, with an immense and fertile country, to go on without them; and if it be impossible the French nation will make the attempt. It is vain, therefore, to suppose that the resources of France will not survive the existence of their assignats. On the other hand, the resources of the confederates are great, particularly of Great-Britain, whose commerce is extended far beyond its utmost extent in any former period, and is still increasing, stimulating and nourishing at the same time an increase of manufactures, and also, though in an inferior degree, an advancement in agriculture. It is to be presumed, that both France and England will take the advice of the apostle Paul, "I look not every man on his own things, but also on the things of others." If they do this with due reflection and candor, they will be disposed to meet each other half way, in the road of peace; united, indeed, they reconcile themselves to the idea of waging perpetual war against each other, as was formerly the case between the Christians and the Turks. But this is not to be supposed; and therefore it may be concluded, that France will give up her conquests for peace, and England also hers, with those from Holland, and those also to be made hereafter in the West-Indies, into the bargain.

But ought peace to be made with France on the supposition that she insists still on retaining her territorial conquests, altho' she should consent to grant an equivalent to the emperor on the right side of the Rhine and to Great-Britain in commercial and maritime aggrandizement? On this important question the opinions of men are divided, though, to use the phraseology of the house of commons the noes (and, in our judgment, with reason) seem to have it. There is one consideration (tending at least to a temporary pacification) that will naturally occur to a political and quick people, not very much restrained by treachery, namely, that, although they should consent to restitution of the Netherlands, the barrier being destroyed by the improvident restlessness of Joseph II. they might embrace an opportunity of taking possession of them afterwards. All these motives for peace, on the part of France, must be seconded by the present aspect or the great powers of Europe.—From

S P A I N,

indeed, they have nothing to fear; but as little, perhaps, to hope. There is an apparent imbecility and indecision in the Spanish court. The nation is in some danger, it is said, of internal dissension and contest.—In

I T A L Y,

according to the latest accounts, the kings of

Sardinia and Naples have determined to adhere to the confederacy.—the

E M P E R O R

makes the most vigorous preparations for war. Most of the principal

STATES AND PRINCES of Germany have agreed to furnish their quotas for carrying on the war; and as to the

K I N G O F P R U S S I A, although he be more disposed, by hook and crook, to catch money, rather than to give it away, having drawn all that he can from France as well as from England, he is now at liberty to follow his interest as well as inclination to restore the stadtholder. From

T H E T U R K S

the French have but little to expect at the present moment.—and

T H E E M P R E S S O F R U S S I A

becomes more and more in earnest in her stadtholder and the seven United Provinces, to prevent an iron barrier against the contagion of innovation; and they too, in the progress of pride and ambition, meditated the dismemberment of France, and individually their own aggrandizement.

F R A N K F O R T, March 28.

The numerous couriers that are dispatched from Basle to Vienna, and from Vienna to Berlin, the frequency of the conferences between Baron Thugnet and the Marquis Luchini, which are mentioned by the late advices from Vienna, confirm the general opinion of the pending negotiation for a peace between the Empire and France.

A report is in general circulation in this place, that General Pichegru, on quitting the army, remarked, that the people ought to wait with a little patience, and in a short time, the object of their wishes would be accomplished. It is certain that the report of a speedy peace is much accredited in the French army on the Rhine. Individuals who have come from Deux Ponts report that, there, as also at Landau, a truce for three months had been proclaimed, by beat of drum, and that the Preliminaries of peace would be signed before the expiration of that time.

G E N O A, March 24.

The Genoese piquet that was posted at Milisana, near Gavi, has been driven away by an Austrian piquet of superior force. The Genoese did not defend the post, but abandoned their tents and beds; which the Austrians had the cruelty not to suffer them to carry away.

We see by this how difficult it will be for the Genoese to defend their neutrality both against the Austrians and the French. It is to be feared, that the former being nearer the fort of Genoa than the French, will make themselves masters of the important post of Bochatta, from whence they may come to the very gates of Genoa. The French are also making dispositions to approach, and the measure of fortifying themselves at Voltui enables them to take both the roads of Acqui and the Bochetta.

B R U S S E L S, March 28.

The administration are straining every nerve in providing our army with every article it can stand in need of, in order to the opening of the campaign. Recruits, horses, parks of artillery, provisions, and ammunition of every description, cover the road which lead to the Rhine. It is computed that, from the first of March, the army of the Sambre and Meuse has received an accession of 20,000 horses for the saddle, the waggon, and artillery.

The magazines are overstocked, and should war be determined upon, there will be an obstacle to the immediate march of the Republican troops.

L O N D O N, April 22.

The following is an exact list of the number of officers of the British Navy, as they stood on the 1st January, 1796—100 flag officers, that is to say Admirals, Vice Admirals, and Rear Admirals; 460 Captains;

244 Commanders; and 10961 Lieutenants making in the whole 20491 Commissioned Officers.

The Navy of this country, exclusive of the hired armed vessels for protecting the Coast Trade, consisted on the 31st of March last of 170 ships of the line, 29 frigates, 188 Frigates, 211 Sloops, making in the whole a navy of 598 ships of war.

We have taken and destroyed, since the commencement of the war, 153 ships of the French navy, of which 27 are line of battle ships, not under seventy-fours, and we have added, of these captures, 64 to our own navy. The enemy have taken and destroyed of our naval force, 34, five of which are line of battle ships. This account extends to the 31st March last.

Our maritime force was never at any former period in so excellent so formidable state as is at present, and we are complete masters of the sea wherever the ocean is capable of bearing on her bosom the burthen of a man of war. Our enemies, per contra, were never as to their maritime force in so deplorable a state. We have blocked them up in their ports; from whence, except by stealth, they cannot escape; and yet the people of this country have great cause for complaint. Privateers and other small ships of war continually intercept our trading vessels, and make many valuable captures. Our convoys are not properly attended to, and a sufficiency of frigates is not at sea to protect such vessels as by stress of weather, bad conduct, or other accidents, may have parted from their convoy. It is in this point, and a tender one it is, that the French have found us vulnerable. We, therefore, hope that some new regulation will take place, and that every cause for murmur on this subject will be removed. Our exports and imports pay most exorbitant duties;—we are, therefore, entitled to every protection this country can afford.

Col. St. Leger is going to India, through the interest of the Prince and the Duke of York.

In a work just published in Paris, on the subject of peace, and the means of accelerating its conclusion, is the following passage: "The decided and declared wish of the great majority of the French is for a durable peace;—it cannot be speedily attained, if we only continue the war, under the pretext of proving that the Republic is not sufficiently exhausted to submit to disgraceful terms. It will not be durable, if we are led to believe that our successes, even the most brilliant, can authorize us to dictate conditions too onerous.

When the Americans are meditating the introduction into their Code, of an Act of Navigation similar to that which has contributed so much to the opulence of England, it becomes them to consider how they are to be furnished with the various articles of luxury, which even the simple manners of a Republican require, till the beneficial effect of the act, an increase of shipping, shall be felt. To restrain the commerce of others demands a large capital on the part of those who undertake it, and a Maritime Power which, tho' it may, as in the instance of France, be destroyed in a moment, can only be established by long time and favourable circumstances.

Those who present to account to the young Prince of Orange's leaving England, by a supposition that the French would not open any negotiation while our Court afforded an asylum to his unfortunate family, it is likely are much mistaken.

It is more probable that the French would object to our protection of the Count d'Artois, whom they call the young pretender. It is well known that the English Ambassador had Charles Stuart forcibly taken away from Paris in 1749.

There can scarce be a doubt that the cause of this young Prince's return to the continent is some negotiation, that his father in law, the King of Prussia, has had with France, concerning his private estate. If he recovers these only, it will be a great advantage. His family influence in some of the provinces is very great; particularly in the neighbourhood of all his Nassau Estates.