

ed the debts of the combined princes to such a degree as to halter either bankruptcy, or extraordinary demands for money, which will probably lead to convulsions in their own dominions. The pecuniary necessities of Louis XVIth, paved the way for the revolution in France; and the same necessity may bring a Francis or a George to the block. If this event is not probable, the danger of it is increased to those principles by the expenditures of the war.

So far then as the conspiracy against France was intended to check the progress of free inquiry and republican principles, and to secure to the privileged orders the continuance of their rank, power, and exemptions, the war was calculated to have a contrary effect, and accelerate the downfall of the present order of things in feudal countries. The madness of the French alone can operate to prevent or retard this effect.

In respect to France, it is difficult to pronounce with certainty what effect the combination has had on the interior police of that nation. It probably has had one of two effects—either to combine the efforts of different factions, divert their private animosities from private objects, and point the passions to the public defence; thus lessening the effects of evil dissensions and personal ambition and revenge—or it has been the means of augmenting and prolonging the factions and calamities which afflict that country. At this distance from France, opinions are generally in favour of the latter effect.

But whatever has been the effect, the coalition was wicked, detestable and alarming in principle. It is a precedent of a dangerous kind, that powers should unite to oppose a neighbouring nation in any reformation or change, either political or religious, in its interior affairs. It was dictated by the fanaticism of tyrants, blind, headstrong and ferocious; inflamed by that arch-fanatic Burke, the pensioned traitor to the rights of man; pressed by the pride of princes and the bigotry of priests, and carrying desolation and death into fertile fields and peaceful villages, for the mad purpose of extirpating opinions with the sword.

P A R I S, October 12.

Peace is made with the King of Naples. The treaty was signed the day before yesterday. It resembles not that concluded with the King of Sardinia. The king of Naples is not to make any cession of territory. He agrees only to allow certain commercial advantages; he excludes the English from his ports until a peace, and promises reparation for the outrages committed in 1792, against our ambassador at Naples.

To this treaty was joined a message, by which the directory ask for new funds to carry on the war.—They announce some hopes of peace; that negotiations with England will be opened; that the Cabinet of St. James mean to send an agent, but that he is not yet arrived. They mention the necessity of a resolution to carry on the war with vigour, if the obstinacy of our enemies render it necessary, in order to insure the acceptance of just and reasonable conditions of peace.

At one o'clock this morning, the military commission sentenced to death, Hugnet, Javoguet, Cufflet, Babi, ex-conventionalists; Gagnant, painter, native of Paris; Bertran, ex-mayor, of Lyons; Bonbon, a shoemaker, native of Orleans; Pitby, joiner, native of Champlite; Lafond, shoemaker, native of Monthrifon.

Several others were sentenced to imprisonment for different periods, and some liberated.

Prince Henry of Prussia has published and dedicated to the French republic a posthumous work of Diderot. He has been received a member of our national institute.

#### OFFICIAL DETAILS. ARMY OF THE RHINE & MOSELLE.

Extract of a letter from brigadier general Reynier, commander in chief at head quarters of the Army of the Rhine and Moselle, dated Waldenstetten, 2 Vendémiaire, 5th year.

I send you an account of the operations of the army, since the 25th Fructidor: as our couriers may be intercepted, I shall not enter into very long details. The retreat which

our army is now making, in order to approach our posts, has no effect upon our troops. As soon as the Army of the Sambre and Meuse can act offensively, all will be well.

(Signed) REYNIER.

The 24th Fructidor, the commander in chief observing, that the enemy would not oppose him, and being determined to resign some of the country to him, in order that he might fall upon the rear of his army, and at the same time wishing to cause a favourable diversion for the army of the Sambre and Meuse, resolved to detach a body of 10,000 men, under the orders of general Defaix, to cross the Danube, to go to Nuremberg, in the route of communication of prince Charles, in order to intercept his convoy and expresses, and force him to send more of his troops to those which he had at that time opposed to the army of the Sambre and Meuse, and to obtain certain intelligence of that army. During this movement, the army of the Rhine and Moselle were to remain at Neuburg, on the Danube, so as to be able to assist that of general Defaix, or to be ready to attack with much advantage the flank of general Latour, if he should offer to proceed to Augsburg. He preferred this movement on Nuremberg to one on Würzburg, because being at a greater distance from prince Charles, it needed more time for the troops which the enemy might send, as they were supported from him by the country of Anspach.

To carry this into execution, general Defaix assembled on the 24th the troops destined for this expedition, at the bridge of the Ingolstadt.—They marched to Neuburg on the night between the 24th and 25th, passing the Danube in the afternoon, and taking the Aichfeldt road. The same night the army left its position at Geissenfeld to go to Neuburg; as the march was very heavy, they made a halt at Richerhezen, behind the Par; the advanced guard rested the whole day, between Maimburg and Neuhadt; the troops under general Ferino, at the same time, left their positions on the Iser, and posted themselves near Dachau. The 26th, this body retired behind the Par, before Friedberg, a situation it was necessary to keep until the enemy approached him, when he was to go to Lech and guard the bridges.

On the 27th, general Defaix passed Aichfeldt, and forced several parties to retreat; a body of peasants saved themselves by flight at his approach. The rest of the left wing, and part of the centre, took post between the Danube and the chutter, the centre behind Unterstatt. They left some troops to cover Neuburg, and an advanced guard at Pottins; this movement was not accomplished until the 27th.

As soon as Gen. Latour learnt these transactions, he caused a body of troops under Gen. Nauendorff, which was at Abensberg, to follow Gen. Defaix; and drew in, by forced marches, the troops of Generals Mercantin and Defaix, as well as the emigrants under Conde, who were behind the Iser, at Landshut, and before Munich. He was encamped at Pfaffenhausen and Richerthofen. Conde's troops marched by Acha; the troops under Gen. Frolich, who was at the foot of the Tyrol mountains, near the sources of the Iser, marched for Landsberg, in order to cross the Lech, and disturb our rear; this last body retreated, and crossed the Lech, as soon as General Aboticey marched for Landsberg.

On the 28th in the morning, there was a very thick fog, and we took a more close position for our troops which covered Neuburg, and consisted of 4 battalions, 3 squadrons of dragoons, 4 of hussars, and 5 pieces of light artillery; the enemy, whom we could not see, on account of the fog, attacked our troops, before they could take their position. They made a great resistance for some time, but were obliged to give up to a superiority in numbers.

The enemy's cavalry were wishing to form in the little plain of Zell, under the protection of the infantry, who had possession of the woods; they were twice repulsed by the 10th regiment of dragoons, and the hussars of the 7th, who were at length obliged to retire in some small disorder, and the generals Deimas

and Oudinot were wounded; one piece of light artillery and one cannon were taken for a moment, but the infantry of gen. Duhem's division who had crossed the Danube, advanced in the greatest order on the enemy's cavalry, and renewed the combat; at 3 o'clock the commander in chief resolved to attack with three fresh battalions, the enemy who had staid in the same place they were in, in the morning; they were soon forced from Zell and the woods, as far as Pruck, were obliged to retreat without loss; the 7th regiment of hussars and the 20th of rangers obliged them. During this time the enemy's cavalry retreated, filing along the woods of Weyhring, which is bordered by a morass, which hindered them exceedingly; they were pursued as far as Liechtenau, where there was a good road for them to retreat, but night coming on, the infantry could not follow the cavalry, and they could not profit of their advantage, to entirely destroy the 16 battalions of the enemy, who were in the woods of Pruck and Weyhring. They made prisoners in this affair, about 80 hussars and dragoons, and as many horses.

Conde's troops, reinforced by the regiment of Modena, newly arrived from Galicia, attacked at the same time, two very weak squadrons of the 9th regiment of hussars, and a half battalion of light infantry, who were all Pottines, to clear the roads of Acha and Augsburg, forced them to retreat to Pruck. The next day, these troops were obliged to retreat still further.

This day, general Defaix advanced as far as Heydeck; from the information he found, he was too late to intercept the convoy destined for prince Charles. Five days before, a very considerable convoy of artillery had passed for Nuremberg; but very positive orders had been given not to let any thing go by this route, prince Charles drawing all from Bohemia, by the way of Egra and Bamberg. The general seeing that he could do nothing important, and that he was exposing his troops to the danger of being surrounded by the enemy, if he went further, determined to rejoin the army, which he began on the 28th.

The 29th the centre of the army and part of the left wing passed the Danube, and took post, the right at Boenfeld, and the left at Neubourg. At 3 o'clock in the afternoon they attacked the enemy who had remained in the woods of Pruck and Zell, and forced them as far as Wehring; those who were at Pottines and afterwards at Pruck, were again, forced to retreat to Seinting. One hundred and fifty horses of the 9th hussars were surrounded by the enemy's cavalry, but were delivered by the 20th of rangers on horseback and the 2d regiment of cavalry.

The road from Neubourg to Rain was discovered by this retreat: the enemy sent some parties of troops who took the waggons of the commissary at war and the victuallers, as well as the expresses, who, after having delivered to the commander in chief the orders from the directory, was returning to Donawert with dispatches for citizen Hauffman.

The 30th Gen. Defaix recrossed the Danube at Neubourg, and all the army was on the right side of the river. The centre marched towards Echkirch, its advanced guard as far as Walden, in order to chase the enemy who had gone by Pottines, and to cover the road of Rain, they disputed the ground but were at length obliged to give way; night coming on hindered the going to Pottines. Gen. Ferino also made a movement before Friedsburg towards Acha. A battalion of the 56th regiment who had been ambuscaded on the road from Munich to Acha near Klinggen, repulsed, in the night a body of emigrants, who were retreating by this route, and killed great numbers of them.

The first complementary day the army marched towards Pottines, in order to harass the enemy, and took post, the right towards Gemeldorf, on the road from Rain to Munich, and the left at Pottines, having some troops to cover Neubourg.—This movement was projected before, and would have been executed, if gen. Latour had gone to Friedsburg; but as he had only sent this way a body of flankers, it was opposed, by a