Newbern Journal of Commerce.

PUBLISHED DAILY BY STEPHEN D. POOL, IN THE BRICK BLOCK, EAST SIDE OF CRAVEN STREET.

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Journal of Commerce.

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STEPHEN D. POOL,
Editor and Proprietor.

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Local Department.

Index to New Advertisements.

MITCHELL, ALLEN & Co., No. 22 Pollok St.—Implements.
MITCHELL, ALLEN & Co.—Agents—Ætna Life Insurance Company.
A. TYRTT.—Wholesale and Retail Grocery.
HELLEN & WILLIAMS.—Bacon and Sugar.
J. E. NASH.—New Publications.
STEAMER LOUISA MOORE.—Sails for New York on the 24th. See advertisement under head of Shipping, on 2d page.

Shipping.

Monday, July 22.—The Mayor pro tem. in the chair. Present all the members except Mr. Mayor Palmer.

Sarah Edney (col'd) was charged with throwing a rock at a boy in Hill street on Saturday night; but was dismissed.

Mary Jane Jones, was very drunk and disorderly on the public square on Saturday night—she was arrested by officer McGregor, and after leaving a bond of $5, she was allowed to go home; failing to appear, the Sergt. of police was directed by his Honor to keep the funds for the benefit of the city.

Henry Williams (col'd) was charged with having two dogs which he had not paid licence for. He was informed to hurry up or his "purps" would have to die. The law requires the State requires that all dogs shall be taxed whether allowed to run at large or not, and the Mayor informs all persons that he will carry out that law.

An Anxious Enquirer will appear to-morrow.

We have no change to report in the market.

Late News.—Nothing important has transpired. Since our Sunday's issue, or at least nothing reached us by last night's mail.

We had copied the opinion of Chief Justice Pearson in the case of Barnes vs. Good, but is unavoidably crowded out of this issue; but will appear in our next.

The Goodspeed steamer Ellen S. Terry arrived at her dock yesterday afternoon at 5 o'clock, and will leave for New York at 5 o'clock P. M. Wednesday, July 24th, 1867.

CONGRESS.—After a stormy session on Saturday, the Civil Rights bill was vetoed and passed over the veto by a vote of 29 to 10. Congress adjourned to meet Nov. 21st. Most of the Presidents nominations were rejected. Among those confirmed we notice the name of Denard Rumley, Esq. here, for Collector at Beaufort, N. C., to be Collector at Wilmington, N. C.

ADVERTISEMENTS.—Our advertising friends will hear with pleasure of their favors have been pushed out of their appropriate places by the President's Message. Others have been there because they should not for two or three days—while still others have not received proper local notice. These defects shall be remedied to-morrow.

We learn by a passenger on the train last evening that still another Robbery has been perpetrated in the region of Tuscarora, about 10 miles from the city. We did not learn the name of the party robbed but heard that they took everything he had. This was night before last. On yesterday in broad day, four negroes and one white man went to the residence of Mr. Solomon Wethington near Tuscarora, but Mr. Wethington not showing any fear they departed. It is thought to be the party that did the robbing the night before.

ANOTHER HIGHWAYMAN CAUGHT.—Joe Williams, one of the members of the supposed Sturgiss band was arrested and brought to the jail by deputy Sheriff Bryan, Williams yesterday. We understand that the prisoner Hicks whose capture we recorded at the time, has identified him as a member of the band to which he (Hicks) belonged. It is also reported that Hicks has stated Sturgiss was the leader of the band, and was but a short distance from the spot Mr. Cirero Green was robbed at, a short while ago, and that he was the person they meant when they said they must go see the Captain before allowing Mr. Green to proceed with his lady.

ANOTHER MURDER.—We are again called upon to record another atrocious murder committed on the person of Reubin Bratcher at Batchelors Creek in this county, and almost within sight of the steeples of this city. The murder was committed on Saturday last while Mr. Bratcher was in the woods chipping turpentine boxes. It is supposed to be the work of some of Sturgiss band, as the murdered man is said to have been one of the most important witnesses against Sturgiss, and as it is not probable he would have been shot for money or valuables at such a distance in the woods while at hard work.

STILL ANOTHER MURDER—ONE OF THE DEPUTY SHERIFFS OF THE COUNTY KILLED.—Last night a short while after dark, deputies Williams, Shipp and Mr. D. S. Ryan, started out on the track of the A. & N. C. R. R., leading out of the Northern portion of the city in search of the parties committed the late murders and robberies in this vicinity. About one mile from the city on the R. R. they met two negroes who not being able to give a good account of themselves were arrested on suspicion. Messrs. Ryan and Shipp, left the prisoner in charge of Mr. Williams, and we have to say, left him without searching the arrested parties. They had proceeded but a short distance when they heard a pistol shot, and returning back found Mr. Williams weltering in his blood. Immediately on hearing of the murder we started out to the scene; but found the corpse lying at the depot of the Atlantic & North Carolina Railroad. Judging from the nature of the wound, and from the fact that the murdered man's pistol was found in his belt, we think (as does the gentlemen who first reached him) that the wound was given by some one at a distance from him. The name of the deceased was Bryan Williams known for his zeal in the discharge of his duties. The ball entered the lower part of the right cheek, and passing down came out of his neck about an inch below the left ear.

On learning these facts Maj. Van Horn sent in a squad of the troops stationed a short distance out of the city to keep watch at the jail, judging rightly we think, that an attempt may be made to rescue the members of the same gang who are incarcerated there.

MEETING OF THE BOARD OF COMMON COUNCIL.—His Honor Mayor Palmer in the chair. Present Councilmen Foster, Menninger, Jacobs, Hubbs, Radcliff. Minutes of last meeting read and approved.

Raport of committees called for. Committees on Fire Department reported plan and specifications of Engine House for Atlantic Fire Co.

Dr. Menninger moved that the sum of $25 be added to the brigsal sum voted for the building of the Atlantic Fire Co's Engine House, which was carried.

Mr. Hubbs moved that the taxes on Bar Rooms in this city be reduced to $5 per month.

Dr. Menninger moved that the Tax list for August shall be the same as in July. Carried.

Mr. Radcliff offered the following resolution which was adopted:

Whereas, the yellow fever and other infectious diseases are now prevalent in the West India ports, and the Southern and Northern ports of our own coast. Therefore be it

Resolved, That on and after July 29th, 1867, a quarantine be established on all vessels arriving in this port, excepting such vessels as ply exclusively in the waters of this State.

The Mayor read a communication from Capt. Dougherty of Elizabeth City, N. C., stating that a certain sum of money was owed him by the city, and asked that it might be paid. On motion it was laid on the table.

Capt. Foster offered the following resolution: That the tax ordinance for the month of August be published the usual number of times, and the ordinance establishing the Quarantine be published for one month. Carried.

Mr. Radcliff moved that permission be granted to a number of citizens on the corners of Pollok and Craven streets to sink a force pump on the corner in front of Post office; to sprinkle the streets during the dry weather.

Moved that a lot of Ex-Marshall Whitty's be removed. Carried.

A small number of bills were allowed and the Council adjourned to meet next Monday after noon at 4 o'clock P. M.

JOHN HUTCHINSON, Agent Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Company. Surplus over $6,000,000.—Office opposite the Baptist Church.

THE PRESIDENT'S VETO MESSAGE.

The following is the message of the President, sent to the House of Representatives this afternoon, returning without his approval the supplementary reconstruction act:

To the House of Representatives of the United States:

I return herewith the bill entitled "An act supplementary to an act entitled 'An act to provide for the more efficient government of the rebel States,' passed on the 2d day of March, 1867, and the act supplementary thereto passed on the 23d day of March, 1867," and will state as briefly as possible some of the reasons which prevent me from giving it my approval.

This is one of a series of measures passed by Congress during the last four months on the subject of reconstruction. The message returning the act of the 2d of March last states at length my objections to the passage of that measure. They apply equally well to the bill now before me, and I am content, merely, to refer to them and to reiterate my conviction that they are sound and unanswerable.

There are some points peculiar to this bill which I will proceed at once to consider.

The first section proposes to declare "the true intent and meaning" in some particulars of the two prior acts upon this subject.

It is declared that the intent of those acts was—First, That the existing governments in the ten "Rebel States" were not legal State Governments," and,—Second, "That thereafter said governments were continued, subject in all respects to the military commanders of the respective districts, and to the paramount authority of Congress."

Congress may, by a declaratory act, fix upon a prior act a construction altogether at variance with its apparent meaning, and from the time, at least, when such a construction is fixed, the original act will be construed to mean exactly what it is stated to mean by the declaratory statute. There will be, then, from the time this bill may become a law, no doubt, no question as to the relation in which the existing Governments in those States, called in the original act "the provisional governments," stand towards the military authorities. As those relations stood before the declaratory act, these "governments," it is true, were made subject to absolute military authority in many important respects, but not in all, the language of the act being "subject to the military authority of the United States, *as hereinafter prescribed*." By the sixth section of the original act, these governments were made "in all respects subject to the paramount authority of the United States."

Now, by this declaratory act, it appears that Congress did not, by the original act, intend to limit the military authority to any particulars or subjects therein "prescribed," but meant to make it universal. Thus, over all these ten States this military government is now declared to have unlimited authority. It is no longer confined to the preservation of the public peace, the administration of criminal law, the registration of voters, and the superintendence of elections; but "in all respects" it is asserted to be paramount to the existing civil governments.

It is impossible to conceive any state of society more intolerable than this, and yet it is to this condition that twelve millions of American citizens are reduced by the Congress of the United States. Over every foot of the immense territory occupied by these American citizens, the Constitution of the United States is theoretically in full operation. It binds all the people there, and should protect them, yet they are denied every one of its sacred guarantees.

Of what avail will it be to any one of these Southern people when seized by a file of soldiers, to ask for the cause of arrest, or for the production of the warrant? Of what avail to ask for the privilege of bail when in military custody, which knows no such thing as bail? Of what avail to demand a trial by jury, process for witnesses, a copy of the indictment, the privilege of counsel, or that greater privilege, the writ of *habeas corpus*?

The veto of the original of the 2d of March was based on two distinct grounds the interference of Congress in matters strictly appertaining to the reserved powers of the States, and the establishment of military tribunals for the trial of citizens in time of peace. The impartial reader of that message will understand that all that it contains upon the subject of military tribunals, martial law and military despotism. The act now before me goes still further, as the intent was to confer such military authority, but also to confer unlimited military authority over all the other courts of the State, and over all the officers of the State, legislative, executive, and judicial. Not content with the general language used by Congress, in the second section of this bill, specifically gives to each military commander the power "to suspend or remove from office, or from the performance of official duties, and the exercise of official powers, any officer or person holding or exercising, or professing to hold and exercise any civil or military office or duty in such district, under any power, election, appointment, or authority derived from, or granted by, or claimed under any so-called State, or the government thereof, or any municipal or other division thereof."

A power that hitherto all the departments of the Federal Government, acting in concert, or separately, have not dared to exercise is here attempted to be conferred on a subordinate military officer. To him, as a military officer of the Federal Government, is given the power, supported by "a sufficient military force," to remove every civil officer of the State. What next? That District Commander, who has thus displaced a civil officer, is authorized to fill the vacancy by the detail of an officer or soldier of the army, or by the appointment of "some other person."

This military appointee, whether an officer, a soldier, or "some other" person, is to perform the duties of such officer or person so suspended or removed. In other words, an officer or soldier of the army is thus transformed into a civil officer. He may be a Governor, a legislator, or a judge. However unfit he may deem himself for such civil duties, he must obey the order. The officer of the army must if "detailed," go upon the supreme bench of the State with the same prompt obedience as if he were detailed to go upon the court-martial. The soldier, if detailed to act as a justice of the peace, must obey as quickly as if he were detailed for picket duty.

What is the character of such a military civil officer? This bill declares that he shall perform the duties of the office to which he is detailed. It is clear, however, that he does not lose his position in the military service. He is still subject to the rules and regulations which govern it, and must yield due deference, respect and obedience towards his superiors.

The clear intent of this section is, that the officer or soldier detailed to fill a civil office must execute his duties according to the laws of the State. If he is appointed a Governor of a State, he is to execute the office as prescribed by the laws of that State, and for the time being his military character is to be suspended in his new civil capacity. If he is appointed a State treasurer he must at once assume the custody and disbursement of the funds of the State, and must perform those duties precisely according to the laws of the State; for he is entrusted with no other official duty or other official power. Holding the office of treasurer, and entrusted with funds, it happens that he is required by the State laws to enter into bond with security and to take an oath of office; yet from the bringing of the bill to the end there is no provision for any bond or oath of office, or for any single qualification required under the State law, such as residence, citizenship or anything else. The only oath is that provided for in the ninth section, by the terms of which every "officer detailed" is to take and to subscribe the oath of office prescribed by law for officers of the United States." Thus an officer of the army of the United States detailed to fill a civil office in one of those States, gives no official bond and takes no official oath for the performance of his new duties, as a civil officer of the State only takes the same oath which he had already taken as a military officer of the United States. He is, at least, a military officer performing civil duties, and the authority under which he acts is Federal authority only; and the inevitable result is, that the Federal Government by the agency of its own sworn officers, in effect, assumes the civil government of the State.

A singular contradiction is apparent here. Congress declares these local State governments to be illegal governments, and then provides that these illegal governments shall be carried on by Federal officers, who are to perform the very duties imposed on the own officers by the illegal State authority. It certainly would be a novel spectacle if Congress should attempt to carry on a *legal* State government by the agency of its own officers. It is yet more strange than Congress attempts to sustain and carry on an *illegal* State government by the same Federal agency.

In this connection, I must call attention to the 10th and 11th sections of the bill, which provide that none of the officers or appointees of these military commanders shall be bound to his action by any opinion of any civil officer of the United States, and that all the provisions of the act "shall be constructed liberally to the end that all the intents thereof may be fully and perfectly carried out."

It seems Congress supposing that this bill might require construction, and they fix, therefore, the rule to be applied. But there is the construction to come from? Certainly no one can be more in want of instruction than a soldier or an officer of the army detailed for a civil service, perhaps the most important in a State, with the duties of which he is altogether unfamiliar. This bill says he shall not be bound in his action by the opinion of any civil officer of the United States. The duties of the office are altogether civil, but when he asks for an opinion he can only ask the opinion of another military officer, who, perhaps, understands as little of his duties as he does himself; and as to his "action," he is answerable to the military authority, and to the military alone. Strictly no opinion of any civil officer, other than a judge, has a binding force.

But these military appointees would not be bound even by a judicial opinion. They might very well say, even when their action is in conflict with the Supreme Court of the United States, "That court is composed of civil officers of the United States, and we are not bound to conform our action to any opinion of any such authority."

This bill and the acts to which it is supplementary are all founded upon the assumption that the ten communities are not States, and that their existing governments are not legal, throughout the legislation upon this subject they are called "rebel States," and in this particular bill they are denominated "so-called States," and vice of illegality is declared to pervade all of them. The obligations of consistency bind the legislative body as well as the individuals who compose it. It is now too late to say that these ten political communities are not States of this Union. Declarations to the country made in these three acts are contradicted again and again by the repeated acts of legislation enacted by Congress from the year 1861 to the year 1867.

During that period while these States were in actual rebellion, and after that rebellion was brought to a close they have been again and again recognized as states of the Union. Representation has been apportioned to them as States, they have been divided into judicial districts, for the holding of district and circuit courts of the United States, as states of the Union they can be districted. The last act on this subject was passed July 23d, 1866, by which every one of these ten states was arranged into districts for circuits.

They have been called upon by Congress to act through their legislatures upon at least two amendments to the constitution of the United States. As States they have ratified one amendment, which required the votes of twenty-four States of thirty-six then composing the Union. When the proposed fourteenth amendment was given in favor of that amendment—seven of these votes were given by seven of these ten States—it was proclaimed to be a part of the constitution of the United States, and it was declared not longer to exist in the United States of any thing subject to their jurisdiction. If these seven States were not legal States of the Union it follows as the inevitable consequence that in some of the States slavery yet exists. It does not exist in these seven States, for they have abolished it, if so, in their own State constitution, but Kentucky, by having done so, would be wrong in that State. But, in truth, if this assumption that these States have no legal State government be true then the abolition of slavery by these illegal governments binds no one, for Congress, stripped of duties to these States, has no power to abolish slavery by denying to them the power to elect a legal State legislature, or to form a constitution for any purpose, even for such a purpose as the abolition of slavery.

As to the other constitutional amendment having reference to suffrage, it happens that these States have not accepted it. The consequence is, that it has never been proclaimed or understood, even by Congress, to be a part of the Constitution of the United States. The Senate of the United States has repeatedly given sanction to the appointment of judges, district attorneys, and marshals for every one of these States, and, yet, if they are not legal States, not one of these judges is authorized to hold a court. Senator, too, both Houses of Congress have passed appropriation bills to pay all these judges, attorneys, and officers of the United States for exercising their function in the States. Again in the machinery of these States are districted not as "Territories," but as "States."

So much for continuous legislative recognition. The instances cited, however, fall far short of all that might be enumerated. Executive recognition, as it well known, has been frequent and unwavering. The same may be said of judicial recognition, through the Supreme Court of the United States. That august tribunal, from first to last, in the administration of its duties *in banc* and upon the circuit, has never failed to recognize these ten communities as legal States of the Union. The cases depending in that Court, upon appeal and writ of error from these States when the rebellion began, have not been dismissed upon any idea of the cessation of jurisdiction. They were merely continued from term to term until the rebellion was entirely subdued and peace re-established and they were called for argument and consideration as if no insurrection had intervened. New cases occuring since the rebellion have come from these States before that court by writ of error and appeal, and even by original suit, where only a State can bring such a suit. These cases are entertained by that tribunal in the exercise of its acknowledge jurisdiction, which could not attach to them if they had come from any political body other than a State of the Union. Finally, in the allotment of their circuits, made by the Judges at the December term, 1865, every one of these States is put on the same footing of equality with all the other States of the Union. Virginia and North Carolina being a part of the fourth circuit, are allotted to the Chief Justice. South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, and Florida constituted the fifth circuit, and were allotted to the late Chief Justice Wayne. Louisiana, Arkansas and Texas are allotted to the sixth judicial circuit, as to which there is a vacancy on the bench.

The Chief Justice in the exercise of his circuit duties, has recently held a Circuit Court in the State of North Carolina. If North Carolina is not a State of this Union, the Chief Justice had no authority to hold a court there, and every order, judgment, and decree, rendered by him in that court, were *coram non judice* and void. Another ground on which those reconstruction acts are attempted to be sustained is this: That these ten States are conquered territory; that the constitutional relation in which they stood as States toward the Federal Government, prior to the rebellion, has given place to a new relation; that this territory is a conquered country, and their citizens a conquered people, and that in their new relation Congress can govern them by military power.

A title by conquest stands on a clear ground. It is a new title acquired by war. It applies only to territory, for goods or moveable things regularly captured in war are called "booty," or if taken by individual soldiers, "plunder."

There is not a foot of the land in any one of these ten States which the United States holds by conquest, save only such land as did not belong to either of these States or to any individual owner.

I mean such lands as did belong to the pretended Government, called the Confederate States. These lands we may claim to hold by conquest. As to all other land or territory, which they belonging to the States or to individuals, the Federal Government has now no more title or right to it than it had before the rebellion. Our own forts, arsenals, navy yards, custom-houses, and other Federal property, situate in those States we now hold not by the title of conquest but by our old title, acquired by purchase, or condemnation for public use with compensation to former owners. We have not conquered these places but have simply "*repossessed*" them.

If we require more sites for forts, custom-houses, or other public use, we must acquire the title to them by purchase or appropriation in the regular mode. At this moment the United States, in the acquisition of sites for national cemeteries in those States, acquires titles in the same way. The Federal courts sit in court-houses owned or leased by the United States, not in the court-houses of the States. The United States pays each of these States for the use of its jails. Finally, the United States levies its direct taxes and its internal revenue upon the property in these States, including the productions of the lands within their territorial limits; not by way of levy and contribution in the character of a conqueror, but the regular way of taxation under the same laws which apply to all the other States of the Union.

From first to last during the rebellion and since the title of each of these States to the lands and public buildings owned by them has never been acquired by the United States even under a title by confiscation, and not a foot of it has been taxed under Federal law.

In conclusion, I most respectfully ask the attention of Congress to the consideration of one more question arising under this bill. It vests in the military commander, subject only to the approval of the General of the Army of the United States, an unlimited power to remove from any civil or military officer in each of these ten States, and the further power, subject to the same approval, to detail or appoint any military officer or soldier of the United States to perform the duties of the officer so removed, and to fill all vacancies occurring in those States, by death, resignation, or otherwise.

The military appointee was required to perform the duties of a civil office, according to the laws of the States, and as such required to take an oath is, for the time being, a civil officer. What is his character? Is he a civil officer of the State, or of the United States? If he is a civil officer of the State, where is the federal power under our Constitution, which authorizes his appointment by any federal officer. If, on the other hand, he is to be considered a civil officer of the United States, in his appointment and duties, we should seem to indicate where is the authority for his appointment vested by the Constitution?

The power of appointment of all officers of the United States, civil or military, were thus provided for in the Constitution, it vested in the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, with an exception that Congress may by law vest the appointment of such inferior officers as they think proper in the President alone, in the courts of law or in the heads of departments. But this bill, if these are to be considered inferior officers within the meaning of the Constitution, does not provide for their appointment by the President alone, or in the courts of law or by the head of departments; subject to the approval of another subordinate executive officer. So that if we put this question and fix the character of this military appointee either way this provision of the bill is equally opposed to the Constitution.

Take the case of a soldier or officer appointed to preform the office of Judge in one of these States, and as such to administer the proper laws of the States. Where is the authority to be found in the Constitution for resting in a military or an executive officer strict judicial functions to be exercised under State laws? It has been again and again decided by the Supreme Court of the United States that acts of Congress which have attempted to vest executive powers in the judicial courts or judges of the United States are not warranted by the Constitution. If Congress cannot clothe an officer or soldier of the army with judicial duties over citizens of the United States who are not in the military or navy service, so it has been repeatedly decided that Congress cannot require a State officer, executive or judicial, to preform any duty enjoined upon him by a law of the United States. How then can Congress confer power upon an executive officer of the United States to perform such duties in a State? If Congress could not vest in a judge of one of these States any judicial authority under the United States by direct enactment, can it now do it accomplish the same thing indirectly by removing the State judge and putting an officer of the United States in his place?

To me these considerations are conclusive of the unconstitutionality of this part of the bill now before me, and I earnestly commend their consideration to the deliberate judgment of Congress.

Within a period less than a year the legislation of Congress has attempted to strip the Executive Department of the Government of some of its essential powers. The Constitution and the oath provided in it devolve upon the President the power and the duty to see that the laws are faithfully executed. The Constitution, in order to enable him to execute this power, gives him the choice of the agents, and makes them subject to his control and supervision. But in the execution of these laws, the constitutional obligation upon the President remains, but the power to execute that constitutional duty is effectually taken away.

The military commander, is, as to the power of appointment made to take the place of the President, and the General of the army, the place of the State, and any attempt on the part of the President to assert his own constitutional power may, under pretence of law be met by official insubordination. It is not to be feared that these military officers looking to the authority given by these laws, rather than to the letter of the constitution, will recognize no authority but the commander of the District and the General of the army.

If there were no other objection than this to this proposed legislation it would be sufficient. Whilst I hold the Chief Executive authority of the United States, whilst the obligation rests upon me to see that all the laws are faithfully executed, I can never willingly surrender that trust or the powers given for its execution.

I can never give my assent to be made responsible for the faithful execution of laws and at the same time surrender that trust and the powers which accompany it, to any other executive officer, high or low, or to any number of executive officers. If this executive trust, vested by the Constitution in the President of the United States is to be taken from him and vested in a subordinate officer, the responsibility will rest with Congress in clothing the subordinate with unconstitutional power, and with the officer who assumes it exercise.

This attempt to interfere with the Constitutional authority of the executive Department is an evil that will inevitably sap the foundations of our Federal system, but it is not the worst evil of this legislation. It is a great public wrong to take from the President powers conferred on him alone by the Constitution; but the wrong is more flagrant and more dangerous when the powers so taken from the President are conferred upon subordinate Executive officers, and especially upon military officers. Over nearly one-third of the States of the Union military power, regulated by no fixed law, rules supreme.

Each one of these five district commanders, though not chosen by the people or responsible to them, exercises at this hour more executive power, military and civil, than the people have ever been willing to confer upon the head of the executive department, though chosen by and responsible to themselves. The remedy must come from the people themselves. They know what it is, and how it is to be applied. At the present time they cannot, according to the form of the Constitution, repeal these laws, they cannot remove or control this military despotism. This remedy is, nevertheless, their hands it is to be found in the ballot, and is a sure one if not controlled by fraud, overawed by arbitrary power, or from apathy on their part, too long delayed. With abiding confidence in their patriotism, wisdom and integrity, I am still hopeful of the future, and that in the end the rod as despotism will be broken, the armed heel of power infied from the necks of the people, and the principles of a violated Constitution preserved.

ANDREW JOHNSON.

WASHINGTON D. C., July 19, 1867.

At Saratoga the gambling hells have as signs, a picture of a key with the word "no" under it—keno. As a general thing the dupes of professional blacklegs need no guide board to point the way to their ruin.

New Advertisements.

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The best and cheapest

Wholesale & Retail Grocer in Newbern,

And examine his well selected Stock of

FLOUR, MEAL, BUTTER, CHEESE, COFFEE, SUGARS, TEAS, SYRUPS, MOLASSES, BACON, PORK, DOMESTICS, SHOES, &c., &c., &c.,

Call and examine or you will lose bargains.

July 22-1m

INSURE YOUR LIFE

In the Ætna Life Insurance Company,

$4,000,000 ASSETS.

A sound person, 25 years old, pays $11 Cash per annum, for $1,000 insurance.

No investment will pay better, or be safer.

April 20-1t MITCHELL, ALLEN & CO.

Journal of Commerce.

Rates of Advertising Revised, 1867.

	1 w.	2 w.	1 m.	2 m.	3 m.	6 m.	12 m.
1 sq.	5 00	8 00	10 00	15 00	20 00	28 00	48 00
2 sq.	8 00	12 00	15 00	20 00	25 00	48 00	90 00
3 sq.	12 00	20 00	25 00	30 00	35 00	80 00	125 00
1 col.	20 00	30 00	35 00	50 00	60 00	90 00	180 00
2 col.	30 00	40 00	50 00	60 00	80 00	125 00	225 00
3 col.	40 00	60 00	80 00	100 00	120 00	160 00	300 00
4 col.	50 00	80 00	100 00	125 00	150 00	200 00	450 00

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New Advertisements.

New Publications.

[illegible] AND BAR. A Complete Digest of the Wit, Humor, Pathos and Incidents of the Law. By L. G. Bigelow, Counsellor at Law.

CHRONICLES OF THE SCHONBERG-COTTA FAMILY.

COSINE, The Rose of the Algonquins. By Mrs. Anna [illegible]

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There will be a BOAT RACE (no Choice entered,)

AT MOREHEAD CITY,

Saturday, the 27th of July.

TWO PRIZES IN MONEY,

Offered to the two boats which shall be declared by the Judges successful.

The amount of the prizes will be announced the day of the race.

The decision of the Judges will be final.

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A BALL AT NIGHT, at the MACON HOUSE, Will close the festivities of the day.

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WILL sail for Norfolk, Va., touching at Roanoke Island and Nag's Head, N. C., on Thursday, July 25th, at 4 o'clock, P. M.

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The patronage of his friends he respectfully solicits a continuance.

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Dissolution of Co-Partnership.

THE CO-PARTNERSHIP HERETOFORE EXISTING under the name and style of

Bryan & Richardson,

is this day dissolved by mutual consent. Mr. Bryan will continue the business, and is alone empowered to sign the name of the firm in settlement of its affairs.

All parties indebted, are requested to make immediate payment to him.

JAMES A. BRYAN,
JOHN A. RICHARDSON.

Newbern, July 5th, 1867.-1w