

MR. MADISON'S SPEECH

In the House of Representatives of the United States, February 2d, 1791.

THE BANK BILL UNDER CONSIDERATION.

MR. MADISON began with a general review of the advantages and disadvantages of Banks. The former he stated to consist in, first,—the aids they afford to merchants, who can thereby push their mercantile operations farther with the same capital; 2d, the aids to merchants in paying punctually the customs; 3d, aids to the Government in complying punctually with its engagements, when deficiencies or delays happen in the revenue; 4th, in diminishing usury; 5th, in saving the wear of the gold and silver kept in the vaults, and represented by notes; 6th, in facilitating occasional remittances from different places where notes happen to circulate. The effect of the proposed Bank in raising the value of stock, he thought had been greatly overrated. It would, no doubt, raise that of the stock subscribed in the Bank; but could have little effect on the stock in general, as the interest on it would remain the same, and the quantity taken out of the market would be replaced by Bank stock.

The principal disadvantages consisted in, first,—banishing the precious metals, by substituting another medium to perform their office. This effect was inevitable. It was admitted by the most enlightened patrons of Banks, particularly by Smith, on the Wealth of Nations. The common answer to the objection, was, that the money banished was only an exchange for something equally valuable that would be imported in return. He admitted the weight of this observation, in general, but doubted whether, in the present habits of this country, the return would not be in articles of no permanent use to it. 2d, Exposing the public and individuals to all the evils of a run on the Bank, which would be particularly calamitous in so great a country as this, and might happen from various causes—as false rumors, bad management of the institution, an unfavorable balance of trade, from short crops, &c.

It was proper to be considered, also, that the most important of the advantages would be better obtained by several Banks properly distributed, than by a single one. The aids to commerce could only be afforded at or very near the seat of the Bank. The same was true of aids to merchants in the payment of customs. Anticipations of the government would also be most convenient at the different places where the interest of the debt was to be paid. The case in America was different from that of England. The interest there was all due at one place, and the genius of the monarchy favored the concentration of wealth and influence at the metropolis.

He thought the plan liable to other objections. It did not make so good a bargain for the public, as was due to its interests. The charter to the Bank of England had been granted for eleven years only, and was paid for by a loan to the Government, on terms better than could be elsewhere got. Every renewal of the charter had, in like manner, been purchased; in some instances at a very high price. The same had been done by the Banks of Genoa, Naples, and other like Banks of circulation. The plan was unequal to the public creditors—it gave an undue preference to the holders of a particular denomination of the public debt, and to those at and within reach of the seat of Government. If the subscriptions should be rapid, the distant holders of paper would be excluded altogether.

In making these remarks on the merits of the bill, he had reserved to himself, he said, the right to deny the authority of Congress to pass it. He had entertained this opinion from the date of the Constitution. His impression might, perhaps, be the stronger, BECAUSE HE WELL RECOLLECTED, that a power to grant charters of incorporation had been proposed in general convention, and rejected.

Is the power of establishing an incorporated Bank among the powers vested by the Constitution in the Legislature of the United States? This is the question to be examined. After some general remarks on the limitations of all political power, he took notice of the peculiar manner in which the Federal Government is limited. It is not a general grant out of which particular powers are excepted. It is a grant of particular powers only, leaving the general mass in other hands. So it had been understood by its friends and its foes, and so it was to be interpreted.

As preliminaries to a right interpretation, he laid down the following rules:

An interpretation that destroys the very characteristic of the Government, cannot be just.

Where a meaning is clear, the consequences, whatever they may be, are to be admitted.—Where doubtful, it is fairly triable by its consequences.

In controverted cases, the meaning of the parties to the instrument, if to be collected by reasonable evidence, is a proper guide.

Contemporary and concurrent expositions are a reasonable evidence of the meaning of the parties.

In admitting or rejecting a constructive authority not only the degree of its incidentality to an express authority is to be regarded, but the degree of its importance also; since, on this will depend the probability or improbability of its being left to construction.

Reviewing the Constitution with an eye to these positions, it was not possible to discover in it the power to incorporate a Bank. The only clauses under which such a power could be pretended, are either—

1st, The power to lay and collect taxes, to pay the debts and provide for the common defence and general welfare; or,

2d, The power to borrow money on the credit of the United States; or,

3d, the power to pass all laws necessary and proper to carry into execution those powers.

The bill did not come within the first power. It laid no tax to pay the debts or provide for the general welfare. It laid no tax whatever. It was altogether foreign to the subject.

No argument could be drawn from the terms common defence and general welfare. The power, as to these general purposes, was limited to acts laying taxes for them; and the general purposes themselves were limited and explained by the particular enumeration subjoined.

To understand these terms in any sense that would justify the power in question, would give to Congress an unlimited power—would render nugatory the enumeration of particular powers—would supersede all the powers reserved to the State governments. These terms had it ever been pretended that they were to be understood otherwise than as here explained? It had been said that "general welfare" meant cases in which a general power might be exercised by Congress, without interfering with the powers of the States; and that the establishment of a National Bank was of this sort. There were, he said, several answers to this novel doctrine.

1st, The proposed Bank would interfere so as indirectly to defeat a State Bank at the same place.

2d, It would directly interfere with the rights

of the States to prohibit, as well as to establish Banks, and the circulation of Bank notes. He mentioned a law of Virginia actually prohibiting the circulation of notes payable to bearer.

3d, Interference with the power of the States was no constitutional criterion of the power of Congress. If the power was not given, Congress could not exercise it; if given, they might exercise it, although it should interfere with the laws or even the constitution of the States.

4th, If Congress could incorporate a Bank, merely because the act would leave the States free to establish Banks also, any other incorporations might be made by Congress. They would incorporate companies of manufacturers, or companies for cutting canals, or even religious societies, leaving similar incorporations by the States, like State Banks, to themselves; Congress might even establish religious teachers in every parish, and pay them out of the Treasury of the United States, leaving other teachers unmolested in their functions. These inadmissible consequences condemned the controverted principle. The case of the Bank established by the former Congress, had been cited as a precedent. This was known, he said, to have been the child of necessity. It never could be justified by the regular powers of the articles of confederation. Congress betrayed a consciousness of this, in recommending to the States to incorporate the Bank also. They did not attempt to protect the Bank notes by penalties against counterfeiters. These were reserved wholly to the authority of the States.

The second clause to be examined, is that which empowers Congress to borrow money.

Is this a bill to borrow money? It does not borrow a shilling! Is there any fair construction by which the bill can be deemed an exercise of the power to borrow money? The obvious meaning of the power to borrow money, is that of accepting it from, and stipulating payment to those who are able and willing to lend. To say that the power to borrow, involves a power of creating the ability, where there may be the will to lend, is not only establishing a dangerous principle, as will be immediately shewn, but is as forced a construction as to say, that it involves the power of compelling the will, where there may be the ability to lend.

The third clause is that which gives the power to pass all laws necessary and proper to execute the specified powers.

Whatever meaning this clause may have, none can be admitted, that would give an unlimited discretion to Congress. Its meaning must, according to the natural and obvious force of the terms, and the context, be limited to means necessary to the end and incident to the return of the specified powers.

The clause is in fact, merely declaratory of what would have resulted by unavoidable implication as the appropriate, and, as it were, technical means of executing those powers.—In this sense it had been explained by the friends of the Constitution, and ratified by the State Conventions.

The essential characteristic of the Government, as composed of limited and enumerated powers, would be destroyed, if, instead of direct and incidental means, any means could be used, which in the language of the preamble of the bill, "might be conceived to be conducive to the successful conducting of the finances; or might be conceived to tend to give facility to the obtaining of loans."

He urged an attention to the diffuse and ductile terms which had been found requisite to cover the stretch of power contained in the bill. He compared them with the terms necessary and proper, used in the Constitution, and asked whether it was possible to view the two descriptions as synonymous, or the one as a fair and safe commentary on the other?

If, proceeded he, Congress, by virtue of the power to borrow, can create the means of lending, and in pursuance of these means can incorporate a Bank, they may do any thing whatever, creative of like means.

The East India Company has been a lender to the British Government, as well as the Bank, and the South Sea Company is a greater creditor than either—Congress, then, may incorporate similar companies in the United States; and that, too, not under the idea of regulating trade, but under that of borrowing money.

Private capitals are the chief resources for loans to the British Government. Whatever, then, may be conceived to favor the accumulation of capitals, may be done by Congress.—They may give monopolies in every branch of domestic industry.

If again, Congress by virtue of the power to borrow money, can create the ability to lend, they may by virtue of the power to levy money, create the ability to pay it. The ability to pay taxes depends on the general wealth of the society; and this on the general prosperity of agriculture, manufactures, and commerce.—Congress then, may give bounties, and make regulations on all of these objects.

The States have, it is allowed on all hands, a concurrent right to lay and collect taxes. This power is secured to them, not by its being expressly reserved, but by its not being ceded by the Constitution. The reasons for the bill cannot be admitted, because they would invalidate that right. Why may it not be conceived by Congress, that an uniform and exclusive imposition of taxes would not, less than the proposed Bank, "be conducive to the successful conducting of the national finances, and tend to give facility to the obtaining of revenue for the use of the Government?"

The doctrine of implication is always a tender one. The danger of it has been felt in other Governments. The delicacy was felt in the adoption of our own; the danger may also be felt, if we do not keep close to our chartered authorities.

Mark the reasoning on which the validity of the bill depends. To borrow money is made the end, and the accumulation of capitals implied as the means. The accumulation of capitals is then the end, and a Bank implied as the means. The Bank is then the end, and the charter of incorporation, a monopoly, capital punishments, &c. implied as the means.

If implications, thus remote, and thus multiplied, can be linked together, a chain may be formed that will reach every object of legislation, every object within the whole compass of political economy.

The latitude of interpretation required by the bill, is condensed by the rule furnished by the Constitution itself.

Congress have power "to regulate the value of money;" yet it is expressly added, not left to be implied, that counterfeiters may be punished.

They have the power "to declare war;" to which armies are more incident, than incorporated Banks to borrowing; yet is expressly added, the power "to raise and support armies;" and to this, again, the express power "to make rules and regulations for the government of armies." A like remark is applicable to the powers as to a navy.

The regulation and calling out of the militia, are more appurtenant to war than the proposed Bank to borrowing; yet the former is not left to construction.

It is not pretended that every insertion or omission in the Constitution is the effect of systematic attention. This is not the character of any human work, particularly the work of a body of men. The examples cited, with others that might be added, sufficiently inculcate, nevertheless, a rule of interpretation very different from that on which the bill rests. They condemn the exercise of any power, particularly a great and important power, which is not evidently and necessarily involved in an express power.

It cannot be denied that the power proposed to be exercised is an important power. As a charter, or incorporation, the bill creates an artificial person, previously not existing in law. It confers important civil rights and attributes, which could not otherwise be claimed. It is, though not precisely similar, at least equivalent, to the naturalization of an alien, by which certain new civil characters are acquired by him. Would Congress have had the power to naturalize, if it had not been expressly given.

In the power to make by-laws, the bill delegated a sort of legislative power, which is, unquestionably, an act of high and important nature. He took notice of the only restraint on the by-laws, that they were not to be contrary to the law and constitution of the Bank; and asked what law was intended? If the law of the United States, the scantiness of their code would give a power never before given to a corporation—and obnoxious to the States, whose laws would then be superseded, not only by the laws of Congress, but by the by-laws of a corporation, within their own jurisdiction. If the law intended was the law of the State, then the States might make laws that would destroy an institution of the United States.

The bill gives a power to purchase and hold lands. Congress themselves could not purchase lands within a State, "without the consent of its Legislature." How could they delegate a power to others, which they did not possess themselves? It takes from our successors, who have equal rights with ourselves, and with the aid of experience, will be more capable of deciding on the subject, an opportunity of exercising that right for an immoderate term.

It takes from our constituents the opportunity of deliberating on the untried measure, although their hands are also to be tied by it for the same term.

It involves a monopoly, which affects the equal rights of every citizen.

It leads to a penal regulation, perhaps capital punishments, one of the most solemn acts of sovereign authority. From this view of the power of incorporation exercised in the bill, it could never be deemed an accessory or a subaltern power to be deduced by implication, as a means of executing another power; it was, in its nature, a distinct, independent and substantive prerogative, which, not being enumerated in the Constitution, could never have been meant to be included in it; and, not being included, could never be rightfully exercised.

He here adverted to a distinction, which he said had not been sufficiently kept in view, between a power necessary and proper for the government or Union, and a power necessary and proper for executing the enumerated powers. In the latter case, the powers included in each of the enumerated powers, were not expressed, but to be drawn from the nature of each. In the former, the powers composing the government were expressly enumerated.—This constituted the peculiar nature of the government. No power, therefore, not enumerated, could be inferred from the general nature of government. Had the power of making treaties, for example, been omitted, however necessary it might have been, the defect could only have been lamented, or supplied by an amendment of the Constitution.

But the proposed Bank could not even be called necessary to the government; at most it could be but convenient. Its uses to the government could be supplied by keeping the taxes a little in advance—by loans from individuals—by the other Banks, over which the government would have equal command, nay, greater, as it may grant or refuse to these the privilege, made a free and irrevocable gift to the proposed Bank, of using their notes in the Federal revenue.

He proceeded next to the contemporary expositions given to the Constitution.

The defence against the charge founded on the want of a Bill of Rights, presupposed, he said, that the powers not given were retained, and that those given were not to be extended by remote implications. On any other supposition, the power of Congress to abridge the freedom of the press or the rights of conscience, &c., could not have been disproved.

The explanations in the State Conventions, all turned on the same fundamental principles, and on the principle that the terms necessary and proper gave no additional powers to those enumerated.—[Here he read sundry passages from the debates of the Pennsylvania, Virginia, and North Carolina Conventions, shewing the grounds on which the Constitution had been vindicated by its principal advocates, against a dangerous latitude of its powers, charged on it by its opponents.] He did not undertake to vouch for the accuracy or authenticity of the publications which he quoted; he thought it probable that the sentiments delivered might, in many instances, have been mistaken, or imperfectly noted; but the complexion of the whole, with what he himself and many others most recollect, fully justified the use he had made of them.

The explanatory amendments proposed by Congress themselves, at least, would be good authority with them; all these renunciations of power proceeded on a rule of construction, excluding the latitude now contended for.—

These explanations were the more to be respected, as they had not only been proposed by Congress, but ratified by nearly three-fourths of the States. He read several of the articles proposed, remarking particularly on the 11th and 12th; the former as guarding against a latitude of interpretation; the latter as excluding every source of power not within the Constitution itself.

With all this evidence of the sense in which the Constitution was understood, and adopted, will it not be said, if the bill should pass, that its adoption was brought about by one set of arguments, and that it is now administered under the influence of another set: and this reproach will have the keener sting, because it is applicable to so many individuals concerned in both the adoption and the administration. In fine, if the power were in the Constitution, the immediate exercise of it could not be essential; if not there, the exercise of it involves the guilt of usurpation, and establishes a precedent of interpretation levelling all the barriers which limit the powers of the general government, and protect those of the State governments. If the point be doubtful only, respect for ourselves, who ought to shun the appearance of precipitancy and ambition; Respect for our successors, who ought not lightly to be deprived of the opportunity of exercising the rights of legislation; respect for our constituents, who have had no opportunity of making known their sentiments, and who are themselves to be bound down to the measure for so long a period; all these considerations require that the irrevocable decision should at least be suspended until another session.

It appeared, on the whole, he concluded, that the power exercised by the bill was condemned by the silence of the Constitution; was condemned by the rule of interpretation arising out of the Constitution; was condemned by its tendency to destroy the main character of the Constitution; was condemned by the expositions of the friends of the Constitution, while depending before the public; was condemned by the apparent intention of the parties which ratified the Constitution; was condemned by the explanatory amendments proposed by Congress themselves to the Constitution; and he hoped it would receive its final condemnation by the vote of this house.

LETTER FROM GEN. BLAIR.

Red Oak Camp, June 15, 1831.

Samuel H. Dickson, J. H. Read, E. P. Star, Committee.

Gentlemen:—I thank you for the polite invitation to dine with you and your fellow citizens of the "Union and State Rights Party" in Charleston, on the approaching 4th of July, and regret that the delicate and precarious health of my family, the hazard of so long a ride through the low country at that time of year, and a variety of other circumstances, will prevent my attendance. However, if my presence were of any importance, my absence would be compensated, no doubt, by a brief disclosure of my political views.

You obligingly express a belief "that a community of sentiment in relation to the great political questions which now agitate our beloved State, and a common feeling of devoted attachment to our country, unite us closely together." Of this you can judge more correctly when I present you a synopsis of my opinions, in relation to the topics which now agitate the public mind.

I view a "Protecting Tariff" as not only unconstitutional, but highly injurious to our best interests. Indeed, I am willing to regard it in as bad a light as the most violent "Nullifier" can place it; yet it is not a whit worse than the "National System of Internal Improvement." If it is possible for me to dislike one branch of the American System more than the other, I bear a greater hatred to "Internal Improvement" than I do to the "Tariff"—but I regard the two as one. Indeed, a distinguished individual of our State, who claimed to be "the Father of Internal Improvement" not many years ago, coupled it with the Tariff, and advocated both with the utmost zeal, as the "true policy of the Country!" To prove the alliance between the "Tariff" and "Internal Improvement" would be superfluous. They are inseparably connected as "the Siamese Twins." I am, therefore, surprised that while some of our ablest orators are pouring out such volleys of invective upon "the Tariff" they have not one word to say about "Internal Improvement"—while they darken our vision by the flight of their arrows against the former, they throw not a single shaft at the latter. They would move heaven and earth, and hazard the integrity of the Union to suppress the "Tariff"—while they seem to regard "Internal Improvement, as a harmless thing!!" Every one must draw his own inference; but it seems to me if I was not deeply committed in favor of the one, I could not confine my raillery exclusively to the other branch of the "American System."

To this system, I take it for granted, we are all opposed, and that our most anxious enquiry is, how and when shall we resist it? Is "Nullification" the proper remedy? It seems to me a political axiom, that whilst South Carolina remains a member of the Federal family, she must refer every controversy between herself and the General Government to the adjudication of the Supreme Federal Court. When she objects to the intervention of that tribunal, provided by the Federal compact—decides the question for herself; declares this or that law of Congress inoperative within her limits, and endeavors to carry her views into operation, it is virtually a resumption of all her former sovereignty; and she is "ipso facto" out of the Union—at least, she may be so considered, and so treated by the Federal Government. But if South Carolina should undertake to arrest the operation of a law of Congress, without a formal act of secession, the General Government has the option of another process, and one that would most probably be resorted to. It would have the right to say to South Carolina—"You seem to have forgotten that our Government was founded in the spirit of compromise and concession. You must remember that every law cannot be made to suit your particular interest; and you must bear in mind, that while you remain under my protection, and avail yourself of the benefit of such laws as you deem advantageous and constitutional, you must submit to those that are inconvenient, and which you may even think unconstitutional, or refer the disputed law to the decision of the constituted tribunal. Should that tribunal decide against you, and you refuse to acquiesce, I must use all the power vested in me by the Constitution, to enforce obedience." And it does appear to me that, under such circumstances, the President of the United States would be bound by his oath, and by every consideration of official duty, to carry the law into full operation, be the consequences what they may.

While, therefore, South Carolina remains in the Union, I can imagine no mode of procedure by which she can defeat the Tariff Laws, without bringing her Militia in conflict with the troops of the General Government. But suppose we elude, by any civil process, enable our merchants to avoid the payment of the duties—what measure would then be resorted to by the General Government? It would either require the duties to be promptly paid in cash; and establish a sufficient military force in our seaports to insure their collection; or our harbors would be blockaded by a detachment from the Federal Navy, prohibiting entirely the import of foreign goods, or the export of our produce. What then would be our remedy? Either unconditional and disgraceful sub-

mission, or a foreign alliance. And I doubt whether Great Britain or any other European nation would think the commerce and friendship of South Carolina of sufficient importance, under such circumstances, to induce them to encounter the hazard and expense of such relations. Thus I have tested the doctrine of "Nullification," by what I think would be some of its natural and unavoidable operations; and I am bound, therefore, to reject it as an impracticable and dangerous, and most discard it as an absurdity. But those of us who object to "Nullification," are asked by the "Nullifiers," with an air of triumph—"What remedy you propose?"

Were I an absolute Federalist of the "National Republican School," ready to "sacrifice the substance to the shadow," and to permit the vital interests of my country to be destroyed under the forms of the Constitution, while the spirit of that instrument was disregarded, I might deem it a sufficient answer to refer to the provisions of the Federal compact; and in ordinary cases this would be the correct reply,—but in a case like the present, supposed to involve an ultimate extremity similar to that of life and death, I would be guilty of no such mockery. I should say, that when the Public Debt is paid, and all pretext for a high Tariff thereby destroyed should "the American System" still be adhered to with stubbornness—should the "Tariff" still be regarded as absolutely intolerable, and all hopes of relief from Congress be entirely annihilated, we should then redress our wrongs in our own way. How would that be? Let all the Anti-Tariff States, or at least the Atlantic portion of them, South of the Potomac, make common cause; as they have a common interest, they should be actuated by the same political impulse and feeling. Let, therefore, Virginia, North and South Carolina, Georgia, Mississippi, Alabama, and as many of the adjacent States as choose to join us, assemble, in convention, if you please, and, acting in concert, present to the Federal Government the alternative of receding from its unjust and oppressive legislation, or submission to our separation from the Confederacy. I am fully aware of the hazard of such a proceeding. Should Congress adhere to its iniquitous policy, and we are driven to the necessity of pursuing the last and worse branch of the alternative, it is easy to imagine many dangers, difficulties, and expenses we should have to encounter. In such event, I can readily conceive the necessity we should be under of keeping up a large Navy to protect our commerce, a formidable chain of military posts to protect our inland frontier, together with a powerful standing Army, to repel invasion, and suppress insurrection. It is also obvious, our Liberty would be endangered by such powerful armaments, nor can I hide from my mental vision the certainty, that even in this little Republic, a rivalry of interest, and a struggle for political predominance would soon arise, that would shake our newly formed Government to its centre. I say, therefore, the experiment will be dangerous, and is only to be resorted to in the last extremity. Yet I would resort to it rather than we should become the mere stewards and overseers of Northern Monopolists and manufacturers, and entail slavery upon our posterity. But for South Carolina divided within herself, to attempt such an enterprise, not only without the aid or co-operation of any of her adjoining Sister States, but under the rebukes of all, would be madness and folly in the extreme.—It would, indeed, be a species of political insanity, that could only be exceeded by the absurd idea of a single State arresting the laws and operations of the General Government with impunity, and still remaining a member of the federal family.

But after all, may we not ask, what is the instrument "American System" and who they are that have mounted "the rider on the pale horse" that bringeth in his train all the ills of prosperity? Is it unwilling to wound the feelings of individuals by a minute enquiry, as to who are most culpable, or were the most efficient advocates and zealous agents in fixing this ruinous policy upon us? Fortunately, no such enquiry is necessary. It is universally known, and 'tis as strange as true, that the leaders of the party, who are "Nullifiers,"—of that party who have stolen from us the appellation of "State Rights," and have modestly arrogated to themselves all the course and path of the "South,"—the very men, who now wish South Carolina, single handed, and alone, to run a premature, dangerous, desperate tilt with the Federal Government, on account of its oppressive legislation, are the self same men who have done more than any others to bring these evils upon us. They have introduced the Robbers into the House; and because we object to the instant burning of the building, we are charged with all the plunder of the robbery.—Should they regard first, and then seek to injure us, as we have done, by bringing these evils upon us, they would not what they call a mode of escape, but which we consider certain destruction; and when we refuse to pursue their mad and hopeless scheme, more than any others to bring these evils upon us, they do, how much longer are the People to be thus gulled and deluded? But perhaps you are desirous of knowing, whether I have any more to say on this subject, than I have already said, and if so, I have no hesitation in saying, even at the hazard of a sneer, I do entertain such a hope.

It seemed to be conceded on all sides, that the duty on Sugar, as well as several other items of the Tariff, would have been reduced or repealed if there had been time, at the last Session, to obtain the final action of Congress on these propositions. But the Session being limited to the 4th of March, and much of its scanty time necessarily taken up by the trial of judges, and the prosecution of that kind could be definitively acted upon. Besides we had still in progress the same old material that constituted it 12 months before, and, therefore, not much to be expected from that source. It had been done at the preceding Session. In the next Congress, I trust, the case will be somewhat different: several changes have already taken place in the representation of some of the States. As you are no doubt aware, I mention to this, the opinion of older and more experienced members than myself, that the monster, is staggering with its own deformity, and tottering under the weight of its own iniquities. The system with absolute certainty, and say that its final overthrow cannot be postponed much, if any, beyond the payment of the National Debt. The friends of the system, themselves, look to the extinction of the National Debt, as the grand and decisive policy—they look to it "with fear and trembling"—and with a view to keep off their evil day as long as possible, they vote for every measure that will delay the day of their doom, and the day of the object, or from whence the application.

I have thus briefly presented you some of the reasons on which my expectation of a change for the better is founded. I have done it frankly—and have addressed you throughout in a spirit of candor—not only because I regard equivocation, on these subjects, unarrantable in a friend—but because I consider you my political friends, and would not thus descend upon these topics were you an assembly of "Nullifiers." I have not, I trust, held out hopes and favourable expectations, and my objections, (as they would call them) should not be promptly and literally fulfilled by Congress, the nullifying gentry would be disposed to "nullify" me for the disappointment. They would be ready to visit upon me all the penalties due to the original sins of their own favourite politicians. Therefore, although I neither make nor regard threats, I do not wish to be understood as promising or predicting what the operations of Congress may be upon the "Tariff." The State which I in part represent, is composed of reading and intelligent freemen, as capable of judging for themselves as I am—and I will not, as a politician, and especially the "Nullifiers," to make their own calculations of "the prospect before us."

About President Jackson, and the prospect of his reelection, I have but little to say—I consider that event to be as certain as it is indispensable to the welfare of our common country. Some blame him for doing too little to do too much in that way; perhaps the best evidence of his honesty and patriotism is, that he is a little beloved by all parties. All know, whatever they may say to the contrary, that Gen. Jackson will do what he believes to be right—and no man is blessed with a more infallible judgment, or a more fearless spirit. The great body of the American People know this, and they know besides, that no other man, under existing circumstances, could hold this confederacy together five years longer. They are aware that the crisis demands the re-election of Andrew Jackson, as President of the United States—and they will pose me desirous of flattering Gen. Jackson—character and disposition apart, I have no motive for such a proffer. To say nothing of my want of qualification, I do not wish, nor am I in a situation to accept, any office in the gift of the President, neither would I beg office at his hands for my best friend. I wish, indeed, the Constitution prohibited every member of Congress from taking any appointment under the Federal Government. It is a slander on the American People to say, that competent men cannot always be found, except among their Representatives. A Representative of the People should have no motive to court the smiles or dread the frowns of any but his Constituents.

Pardon me for troubling you with such a long letter, and allow me to conclude by proposing to your meeting the following sentiment:

GEN. JACKSON AND THE PEOPLE OF CAROLINA.—They cannot be divided while he continues honest and they remain FREE.

Very respectfully, your ob'dt humble servant, JAMES BLAIR.