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BY THOMAS WATSON.
At three dollars per annum payable in advance.
1 COlTjOHNSON'S REPLY TO MR. INGHAM.
Trom the National Intelligencer of Aug. 12.
TO THE EDITORS.
' :" Blue Spring, fed August, 1831.
Messrs Gales 6f Seaton : After having iinish-
r A the within letter, I discovered in your paper
0f the 23d ult. that Mr. Ingham had published
letter to me as -well as his statement. You
Mill please, therefore, to publish this letter as
-iv reply, and oblige your obedient servant,
rpy, jRffl JOHNSON.
, ' Blue Sprino, July 31, 1831.
Dear 8irv -Yours of the lGtlf instant was
tiiis day. received, accompanied1; with a statc
inent, which, it seems you have prepared, for
ihe public, purporting to contain separate con
versations with the President and mvself rela
tive to an allegation made in the public journals,
that General Jackson had authorized a Mem
ber of Congress to require of Messrs. Berrien,
IJranchi arid yourself, and, your families, to as
sociate With "Mitj or Eaton, and his family, under
the penalty of being dismissed from office.
You refer to two articles in the Globe tojustify
vour appeal to the public, previously td recei-
. ring my answer in which it appeared that I had
denied the. above allegation, if it had any allu
sion -to -me. After the publication of this ac
cusation against General Jackson, I received
a lettcrfrom a friend, intimating that I was the
member of Congress to whom allusion was
made, and requested to know if I had ever
made such a communication. In my answer,
! I confined myself to the specific accusation
thus publicly made against the President and
fhich is attributable to -yourself, . and most
unequivocally denied that General Jackson
'ever made such a requisition through me,fand
' aV positively denied havihg ever made such a
vttttement to you. On the contrary, I asserted,
and now repeat, I did inform you, in each and
every interview, that the President disclaimed
any fight or intention to interfere in any man
ner whatever with the regulation of your pri
vate or social intercourse.!
Thus, in a matter in which I was engaged to
: .'rve you and other friends, in a matter of a
delicate and highly confidential nature, and in
which I succeeded, unexpectedly I found my-i-e
If presented in the public journals as a wit
ness impeaching one of those friends, and as-
riblng, to him declarations winch he never
made ; and placed in that attitude by you, self
respect and self-defence called upon me to cor
rect that erroneous statement. I cannot, there
tore, agree with you, that I did in any degree
hange my view' of the subject in considering it
improper "in any of the parties to come before
t-he public without the opportunity of !compar-
., . - " .11. -ft . T .. i
- ing our uinerent reconecuous. uu n yuu
feel under any obligations of a personal or po
litical character come before the public pre
viously, you will find me as ready as yourself
to meet any responsibility or 5 uimcuity w nicn
such a course may produce. Up to this date,
I have considered mv correspondence with you
arid Mr. Berrien of a character not to be divul
ged to any one, and have, therefore confined it
10 mv own bosom. The object of my first let
Ter to vou was to declare frankly and candidly,
in thVsnifit of nerfect respect and friendship,
that I was misunderstood, provided I was the
member of Congress to whom reference was
made, that you might have it in your power to
correct your misaprchension ofLmy communi
cations. '
I did not sec how it could impeach your char
acter or lessen your reputation to consider and
acknowledge if a mistake, without your as
sumption of the eround that you understood
me better than I understood myself, and that
vou could make the public believe so. My
standard of confidence and friendship, arising
from a .'personal and political intimacy of twen
fv vears, would have dictated that course to
me. Such a course could have been injurious
to none, and less troublesome to all. But, so
&r as I am concerned I feel perfectly willing
to take the course adopted by yourself, of pla
cing our - views before the public. I do not,
however, think that it will be much benefitted
by our labors ; and I am farther induced to be
lieve thaTi the public will place a less value up
on the controversy than you do. In denying
the confidential character of our conversations,
you urge, as one consideration, that the intima
tion to invite Maj.. Eaton arid his family to
vour large parties was, offensive, although you
are kind enough to believe that I did not so in
tend it. If the nature of the suggestion chan
ged in your mind the character of the conver
sation, and the relation of that perfect friend
ship which had so long existed, would it not
have been magnanimous and generous in you
-to have advised me of it? I now come to the
material point in controversy- whether Gener
al Jackson, through me, .required of you; to
invite Maj. Eaton and his family to your large
parties. 1 his suggestion was made upon : my
own ' responsibility, with an anxious desire
more effectually to reconcile the then existing
difficulties. But Gen. Jackson never did make
snich a requisition, in any manner whatever,
directly or indirectly ; nor did I ever intimate
to you that he had made such a demand. The
complaint made by Gen. Jackson against this
part of his cabinet was specific, that he had
been informed, and was induced to believe,
that they were using their influence to have
Major Eaton and his family excluded from all
respectable circles, for the. purpose of degra
ding him, and thus drive him from office ; and
that the attempt had been made even upon
the foreign ministers, and in otic case had pro
duced the desired effect. He proposed no
mode of accommodation or satisfaction, but de
clared expressly that if such was the fact he
would dismiss them from office. He then read
to me a paper containing the principles upon
vjucii ne lmenueu xo acr, wmcn uisciauucQ
the right to interfere with the social relations
of his cabinet. Acting in the capacity of a mu
tual friend, and obeying the impulse of my own
mind, can it 'be supposed that I would have
misrepresented any of the parties, and thus de
feat the object I had in view? I should have
considered it a gross violation of the ties of
thstf friendship which then existed between us,
to have carried to you such a message, as that
you should invite Maj. Eaton and his family, or
any other persons to your large or small par
tics, under a menace of dismissal from office.
When the President mentioned this charge of
conspiracy I. vindicated you against it. I gave
it as my opinion that he was misinformed.
To prevent a rupture, I requested the Presi
dent to postpone calling upon those members
of his cabinet till Saturday, that I might. have
the opportunity of two days to converse with
them.
When I made my report to the President,
I informed ' him that I was confirmed in my
opinion previously expressed, that he had been
misinformed as to the combination and conspi
racy. I informed him of your unequivocal and
positive denial of the fact, andf communicated
every thing which transpired between us cal
culated to satisfy, his mind on the subject.
It was this report of mine that gave him satis
faction, and changed his feelings and determi
nation not his ground as you have supposed ;
with me he had no ground to change. He had
assumed none except that which I have stated;
nor did I ever make use of such an expression
to you that he had- changed his ground. It is
true that I informed you that the President was
very much excited, but I do not now recollect
the precise language :used to convey my idea
of, that excitement. I presume you had the
advantage of your private memoranda, when
you say I compared h,im to a roaring Lion.
You attribute to jme another declaration
which I never made-j-that on our way to Mr.
Berrien's I stated that the President had infor
med me that he would invite Mr. Branch, Mr.
Berrien, and yourself, to meet him on the next
Friday, when he would inform you of his de
termination in the presence of Dr. Ely. I never
received or communicated such ah idea.
The paragraph is substantially correct when
that part in reference? to Dr. Ely is expunged.
it is true, in some 01 our various conversa
tions, the name of Dr. Ely was mentioned, but
in connection with another part of the subject.
The President informed me, that when the ru
mors against Maj. Eaton ind his family had
been opened to him by Dr. Ely, he had invited
the accusers to make1, good their charges, and
that they had failed this is the substance of
that part of our conversation in which Doctor
Ely's name was; mentioned. Again, you say I
called at your house at about 5 o'clock, when
we walked to Mr. Berrien's, j The fact is that
you called for me at my lodgings about that
time, by a previous appointment. This is a
mistake in a matter of fact of no great impor
ance, except to show how easily wre forget. 1
If we thus diflef in matters of fact, how much
more liable to differ as to words ; and still more
as to the time, manner, and circumstances in
which these words have been introduced, and
still more as to the precise meaning the speak
er wishes to convey to the hearer!
Having thought it important to memorandum
our conversation, would it not have given ad
ditional proof of your friendship and confi
dence, and would it not have been an act of
justice to mef to have furnished me with it,
(so far -as I was concerned,) that I . might
have corrected, if necessary, any erroneous
1 i .
impressions which my conversations may
have made upon you? The witness in court
is often misunderstood byllawyers and jury,
and as often called upon to correct the mistake
and to explain his meaning; and you have gain
ed little, in your desire to be accurate, so far
as J am concerned, by failing to present me
with your private memoranda; and if now fur
nished I dare think that I might put a different
construction upon your own notes.
; Again : you are incorrect in supposing that
I informed you that the President requested
mc to co.nverse with you and your colleagues.
It was my own proposition ; and in this' you
will find I am supported by Mr. Berrien.
Nor did I ever say that, your families had not
returned the call of Mrs. Eaton; and that if
they would leave the first carp", and open a
formal intercourse? in that way, the President
would be satisfied. Such an idea never enter
ed my mind; for I never did know the. pre
cise manner in which the social intercourse
existed between your families, whether cards
had ever passed from either or not; and sure
I am, that the President and myself never had
anv conversation on the subiect. From first
to last, my efforts were put forth to reconcile
the parties concerned; they were for the
time being successful. I have never claimed
any merit for what I did : I felt happy, how
ever, that I was j in any way instrumental in
prolonging the political relations which have
since been severed, in which I have had no
agency, and which I deeply regretted. Hav-
ing thus acted, to my greai monincauon 1 imu
myself dragged before the public to vindicate
myself against I sentiments and conversations
imputed to me bv a part of those friends, with
out the opportunity of explaining to them their
misapprehension of what 1 uia say.
Without adverting to any farther inaccura
caps, nf von letter and statement, I have the
honor to be, very respectfully, your obedien
serv't, K'li. JMt. Junno uj.
Hon. Samuel D. Ingham.
Extract from Mr. Berrien's Address
y "The annunciation of the names of the
intended Cabinet seemed to me, however, to
present an insuperable bar tomy acceptance
01 the othce which was ctendered me.
thought I saw clearly the evils which have too
obviously resulted ? from - this selection."; So
then, it seems, he intended, from thebeffinhing
f to be dissatisfied and seek a plausible pretence
iyt tumcinwur juoooj- jsciovirut.
Mr. Calhoun's Sentiments.
From the rendition Messenger.
Mr. Symmes 1 must request you to permit me to
use your columns, as the medium to make known my
sentiments, on the deeply important question of the
relation which the States and General Government
bear to each other, and which is at this time a subject
of so much agitation. I -
It is one of the peculiarities of the station I occupy,
that while it necessarily connects 'its incumbent with
the politics of the day, "it affords him no opportunity
officially to express his sentiments, except accidentally
on an equal division of the body over which he pre
sides. He is thus exposed, as I have often experien
ced, to have his opinions erroneously and variously
represented. Inordinary cases, I conceive, the cor
rect tourse to be to remain silent, leaving to time and
circumstances the correction of misrepresentations ;
but there are occasions so vitally important, that a
regard both to duty and character would seem, to for
bid such a course; and such I conceive to be the pre
sent. The frequent allusions to my sentiment, will
not permit me to doubt, that such also; is the public
conception, and that it claims the right to know; in
relation to the question referred to, the opinions of
those who hold important official stations ; while on
my part desiring neither to receive unmerited praise
nor blame, I feel, I trust, the solicitude which every
honest and independent man ought, that my senti
ments should be truly known, whether they be such as
may be calculated to recommend them to tiie public
favor, or not. Entertaining these impressions, I have
concluded that it is my duty to make known my sen
ments; and I have adopted the mode, which, on re
flection, seemed to be the most simple, and best calcu
lated to effect the object in view. ' ;
The question of the relation which the States and
General Governments bear to each other, is not one
of recent origin. From the commencement of our
system it has divided public sentimeriL Even in the
Convention, while the Constitution was struggling
into existence, there were two parties, as to what this
relation should be, whose different sentiments consti
tuted no email impediment in forming that instru
ment. Alter tire General Government! went into ope
ration, experience soon proved that the question had
not terminated with the labors ol the Convention.
The great struggle that preceded the political revolu
tion of 1801, which brought Mr. Jefferson into power,
turned essentially on it; and the doctrines and argu
ments on both sides were embodied and ably sus
tained; on the one, in the Virginia and Kentucky
resolutions, and the report of the Virginia Legisla
ture; and on the other, in the replies of the Legisla
ture of Massachusetts and some of the other States.
These resolutions and this report, with the decision of
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania about the same
time, (particularly in the case of Cobbett, delivered
by --Chief Justice M'Kean, and concurred in by the
whole bench,) contain, what I believe to he, the true
doctrine on this important subject. I refer to them,
in order to avoid the necessity ot presenting my
views, with the reasons in support of them, in detail.
As my object is simply to state my opinions, I might
pause with this reference to documents, that so fully
and ably state all of the points immediately connect
ed with this deeply important subject, but as there
are many who may not have the opportunity or lei
sure to refer to them, and as it is possible, however
clear they may be, that different persons may place
different interpretations on their'meaning, I will, in
order that my sentiments may be fully known, and
to avoid all ambiguity, proceed to state summarily
the doctrines which 1 conceive they embrace.
their great and leading principle if, that the Ge
neral-Government emanated from tlje people of the
several States, forming distinct political communities,
and acting in their separate and sovereign capacity,
and not from all ol the people lorming one aggregate
political community; that the Constitution of the
United btates ism lact a compact, to which each
State is a party, in the character already described ;
and that the several States or parties, have a right
to judge of its infractions, and in case ol a deliberate,
palpable, and dangerous exercise of a power, not de
legated, they have the right, in the last resort, to use
the language of the Virginia resolutions, "to inter
pose fur ariestino" the progress of the evil, and for
maintaining within then respective limits, the au
thorities, 7-ighls and liberties appertaining to
them ." This right of interposition, thus solemnly as
serted by the State of Virginia, be it called what it
may, state right, veto, nullification, or by any other
name, I conceive to be the fundamental principle t)f
our system, resting on facts historically as certain as
our Revolution itsell, and deductions as simple and
demonstrative, as that of any political or moral truth
whatever; and I firmly believe that on its recogni
tion depends the stability and safety of our political
institutions. i
I am not ignorant, that those opposed to the doc
trine alwTays now and formerly, regarded it in a very
different 'light,' as anarcliical and : revolutionary.
Could I believe such in fact to be its tendency, to me
it .would be no recommendation. I yield to none, I
trust, in a deep and sincere attachment to our politi-'
cal institutions, and the Union of these States. I
never breathed an opposite sentiment ; but on the
contrary, I have ever considered them the great in
struments of preserving our liberty, and promoting
the happiness of ourselves and our posterity; and
jiext to ' these, I have ever held them most dear.
iNearly hail my life has passed in; the service ot the
Union, and whatever public reputation I have ac
quired, is indissolubly identified with it. To be too
national has, indeed, been considered by many, even
of my friends, to be my greatest political fault. With
these strong feelings of attachment, 1 have examined
with the utmost care, the bearing of the doctrine in
question ; and so far from anarchical, or revolutionary,
I solemnly believe it to be the only solid foundation
of our system, and of the Union itself, and that the
opposite doctrine, wThich denies to the States the right
of protecting their reserved powers; and which would
vest in the General Government (it matters not
through what Department) the right of determining
exclusively and finally, the power delegated to it, is
incompatible with the sovereignty ot the states, and
of the Constitution itself, considered as the basis of a
Federal Union. As strong as this language is, it is
not stronger than that used by the illustrious Jeffer
son,5 who said, to give to the General Government
the final and exclusive right to judge of its powers, is
to make "its discretion and not the Constitution,
the measure of its powers;" and that " in all cases
of co.'.ipact' between parties hating no common
Judge, each party has an equal right to judge for
itself, as well of the operation, as of the' mode and
measure of redress" Language cannot be more
explicit, nor can higher authority be adduced.
That different opinions are entertained on this sub
ject, I consider but as an additional evidence of the
great diversity of the human intellect. Had not able,
experienced and patriotic individuals, for whom-1
have the highest respect, taken different views, I would
have thought the right too clear to admit of doubt ;
but I am taught by this, as well as by many similar
instances, to treat with deference opinions differing
from ray own. The error may possibly be with me ;
but, if so, I can only sayi that after the most mature
and conscientious examination,-1 have not been able
to detect it. - But with all proper; deference, I must
think, that theirs is the error, who deny what seems
to be an essential attribute of the conceded sove
.1
reignty of the States; and who attribute to the
General Government a right utterly incompatible
with what all acknowledge to be its limited and re
stricted character: an error originating principally, as
I must think, in not duly reflecting on the nature of
our institutions, and on what constitutes the only ra
tional object of all political Constitutions.
It has been well said, by one of the most sagacious
men of antiquity, that the object of a Constitution is
to restrain the government, as that of laws is to
restram individuals. The remark is correct, nor is
it less true, where the Government is vested in a ma
jority, than where it is in a single or a few individuals ;
m a republic, than a monarchy or aristocracy. No
one can have a higher respect for the maxim, that
the majority ought to govern, than I have, taken in
its proper sense, subject to the restrictions imposed by
the Constitution, and confined to subjects in which
every portion of the community have similar inte-
resxs ; out it is a great error to suppose, as many do
the ricrhtot a maionty to mvem. i; n mt,,i
and not a conventional right ; and therefore, absolute
and unlimited. By nature, &very individual has the
right to govern himself; and. Governments, whether
founded on majorities or minorities, must derive their
right from the assent, expressed or implied, of the go
verned, and be subiect to sucli limitations as thev
may impose. Where the interests are the same, that
is where the laws that may benefit one, will benefit
all. or the reverse; it is just and proper to place them
under the control of the majority ; but where they
are dissimilar, so that the law that may benefit one
portion, may be ruinous to another, it would be on the
contrary unjust and absurd to subject them to its will ;
and puch, I conceive to be the theory on which cur
Constitution rests.
Thnt such dissimilarity of interests may exist, it is
impossible to doubt. They are to be found in every
community, in a greater or less degree, however small
or homogenous; and they constitute every where,
the great difficulty of forming and preserving free in
stitutions., To guard against the unequal actions of
the laws when applied to dissimilar and opposng in
terests, is, in fact, what mainly renders a Constitution
indispensable; to overlook which, in reasoning on our
Constitution, would be to omit the principal element
by which to determine its character were there no
contrariety of interest-', nothing would be more simple
and easy than to form and preserve free institutions.
The right of suffrage alone would be a sufficient
guaranty. It is the conflict . of opposing interests
which renders it'ihe most difficult work of man.
.. Where the diversity of interests exist in separate
nnddistmct classes of the community, as is the case
in England, and was formerly the case .in Sparta,
itome, and most ot the lree states ot antiquity, the
rational constitutional provision is. that each should
be represented in the Government as a separate es-
trtie, wiin a distinct voice, and a negative on the acts
of its co-estates, in order to check their encroach
mrnts. In England, the Constitution has assumed
expressly this form; while in the governments of
Sparta and Rome the same thing was effected under
different but not much less efficacious forms. The
perfection of their organization: in this particular,
was that which gave to the Constitutions of these re
nowned states all their celebrity, which secured their
liberty for so many centuries, and raised them to so
great a height of power and prosperity. Indeed, a
Constitutional provision, giving to the great and sep
arate interests of t he community the right of sell-protection,
must appear to those who. will duly reflect on
the subject, not less essential- to the preservation of
liberty than the right ol suffrage itsell. They in
fact have a conamon object, to effect which, the one is
as necessary as the' other to secure responsibility,
that is, that those who make and execute the laws,
should be accountable to those on whom the laws in
reality operate; the only sold and durable founda
tion of liberty. If without the right of suffrage, our
rulers would oppress us, so without the right of self
protection, the major would equally oppress the " mi
nor interests of the community. The absence of the
former, would make the governed the slaves of the ru
lers, and of the latter the feebler interests the victim
of the stronger.
Happily for us, we have no artificial and separats
classes of society. We have wisely exploded all such
distinctions; but we are not, on that account, exempt
from all contrariety of interests, as the present distrac
ted and dangerous condition of our country, unfortu
nately, but too clearly proves. With us they are al
most exclusively geographical, resulting mainly from
dirterence of climate, soil, situation, maustry and pro
duction, but are not, therefore, less necessary to be
protected by an adequate Constitutional provision,
than where the distinct interests exist in several clas
ses. The necessity is, in truth, greater, as such
separate dissimilar geographical interests are more li
able to come into conflict, and more dangerous wheh
in that state, than those of any other description; so
much so, that ours is' the first instance on record,
where they have not formed in an extensive territo
ry, separate and independent communities, or siib-
jected the whole to despotic sway. That such may
not be our unhappy late also, must be the sincere
prayer of every lover of his country.
So numerous and diversified are the interests of our
country, that they could not be fairly represented in
a single government, organized so as to give to each
great and leading interest, a separate and distinct
voice, as in the governments to which I have referred.
A plan Was adopted better suited to our situation, but
perfectly novel in its character. The powers of the
government were pivided, not as heretofore, in. refe
rence to classes, but geographically. One General
Government was formed for the whole, to which Was
delegated all of the powers supbosed to be necessary to
regulate the interests common to all of the States, leav
ing others subject to the separate control of the States,
being from their local and, peculiar character, such,
that they could not be subiect to the will of the maior-
ity of the whole Union, without the certain hazard'of
injustice and oppression. It was thus that the inte
rests of the whole wWe subjected, as they ought to be,
to the will of the whole, while the peculiar and local
interests were left under the control of the States
separately, to wmose custody only, they could be safe
ly confided. This distribution of power, settled sol
emnly by a constitutional compact,to which 11 of the
0u1tesa1ej.1a.rues, constitutes uie peculiar cnaracter
and excellence of our political system. It is truly and
emphatically American, without example or parallel.
To realize its perfection, we must view the Gene
ral Government and the States as a whole, each in
its proper sphere sovereign and independent, each per
fectly adapted to their respective objects; the States
acting separately, representing and protecting the lo
cal and peculiar interests; acting jointly, through one
General Government, with the weight respectively
assigned to each by the Constitution, representing
and protecting the interests of the whole j and thus per
fecting by an admirable, but simple arrangement, trie
great principle of representation and reponsibih,
without which no government can be free, or J 0
preserve this sacred distribution, as onginaUy settle,
by coercing each to move in its prescribed orb, is the
great and difficult problem, on the solution of which,
tne duration of our Constitution, of our Union, and,
in all probability, our Liberty depends. How is this
to be effected ? ,
; The question 13 new, when applied to our rcimar
political organization, where the separate and con-
but connected Oovemments ; but if? m reality an old
question undera new form, long since perfectly solved.
Whenever separate and dissimilar interests have been
separately represented in any Government j when
ever the sovereign power has been divided in its ex
ecif t"e experience and wisdom of ages have de
vised Dut one mode, by which such political organiza
a k if reserved ; the mode adoptedjn England,
2i 5r.emments ancient and modern, blessed
with Constirrrtions deserving to be called free ; to give
SstS co-estate the "ght to judge of its nowere,
with a . negative, veto, on the acts of the others, in
order to protect against encroachments, the interests
it particularly represents; a principle which allot .
our Constitutions recognize in the distribution of now- -er
among their respective Departments, as essential
to maintain the independence of each, but which to
all, whp will duly reflect on the subject, must appear
far more essential, for the same object, in that great
and fundamental distribution of powers between the v
States and General Government. So essential is fhe
principle, that to withhold the right from either, where
the sovereign power is divided, is in fact to annul the
division itself, and to consolidate in the one, left in
the exclusive possession of trie right, all of the powers
of the government ; lor it is not possible to distinguish,
practically, between a government having all. power.
and one having the right to take what powers it
pleases. Nor does it in the least vary the principle,
whether the distribution of power be between co
estates, as in England, or between distinctly orga
nized, but connected governments, as .with us. The
reason is the same in both cases, whuVthe necessity
is greater in our case, as the danger of conflict ;s
greater, where the interests of a society are divided
geographically, than in any other, as has alreadv
been shewn. '
These truths doseem to me to be incontrovertible :
and I am at a loss to understand howany one, who
has maturely reflected on the nature of our institu
tions, or who has read history, or studied the princi
ples of free governments to any purpose, can call them
in question. The explanation must, it appears to me.
be sought in the fact, that in every free' state, there
are those who look more to the necessity of main
taining power, than guarding against its abuses. ; I
dp not intend to reproach, but simply to state a fact
apparently necessary to explain the Contrariety ot
opinion, among the intelligent, where the abstract
consideration of the subject, would seem scarcely to
admit of doubt. If such be the true cause, I must
think the fear of weakening the government too much
in this case to be in a great measure unfounded, or,
at least, that the danger is much less from that, than
the opposite side. I do not deny that a power, of so
high a nature, may be abused by a State; butwhclt
1 reflect that the States unanimously called the Ge
neral Government into existence with all it3ipowerss
which they freely surrendered on their part, under
the conviction that their common peace, safety and
prudperuy requireu it; mat they are oound together
by a common origin, and the recollection of common
suffering and a common triumph in the great and.
splendid achievement of their independence ;'and thatr
the strongest feelings of our nature and among them,
the love of national power and distinction, are on the
side ot the Union ; it does seem to me, thajt-the fear
which would strip tlie States of their sovereignty,
and degrade them, in fact, to mere dependent corpen
rations, lest they should abuse a right indispensable;
to the peaceable protection of those interests, which
they reserved under their own peculiar guardianship,
when they created the General Government, is un
natural and unreasonable. Jf those who voluntarily
created the system, cannot be trusted to preserve ir,
what power can?
So far from extreme danger, I hold, that there ne
ver was a free state, in which this great conservative
principle, indispensable in all, was ever so safely
lodged. In others, when the co-estates, representing
the dissimilar and conflicting interests of the corarauj
nity came into contact, the only alternative was
compromise, submission or force. Not -o in 'ours.
Should the General Government and a State corns
into conflict, we have a higher remedy; the power
which called the GeiferaLGovernment into existence,
which gave it all its authority aad cpn enlarge con
tract, or abolish its powers&t its pleasure, may. in
voked. The States themselves may be appealed; to
three-fourths of which, ill fact, form a power, whose,
decrees are the Constitution itself," and whose voice
can silence all discontent. The utmost extent then
of the power is,' that a State acting in its sovereign
capacity, as one of the parties to the Constitutional
compact, may compel the Government, created by
that compact, to submit o. question- touching its 'in
fraction, to the parties who created it ; to avoid the
supposed dangers of which, it is proposed to resort
to the novel, the hazardous, and, I must add,' fatal
project of giving to the General Government the sole
and final right of interpreting the Constitution,
thereby reversing the whole system, making that in
strument the creature of ite will, -instead of a rule of
action impressed on it at its creation, and annihila
ting in fact the authority which imposed it, and from
which the Government itself derives its existence.
That such would be the result, were the right in
question vested in the Legislative, or Executive
branch of the Government, is conceded by all.' .No
one has been so hardy as to assert, that Congress, !
or the President ought to havo the right, or to deny,
that invested finally and exclusively jn either, the
consequences which I have stated would not necessa
rily follow ; bat its advocates have been reconciled to i
the doctrine, on the supposition, that there is jono
Department of .the General: Government, which,:
from its peculiar organization, affords an independent
tribunal through which the Government may exer-
cise the high authority, which is the subject ot con
sideration, with perfect safety to all. ' ' " : T
I yield, I trust, to few in my attachment to the Ju
dkiary Department. I am iully senile of .its im
portance, and would maintain it to the fW .ex-r
tent of its Constitutional powers and ndepeencj
but it is impossible for me to 'l!
intended by the Constitution, that it .hould exercise
the power In question, or W"?,-,
and if it were, that it would be a safe depository
ItrnTwers are judicial and not political, and are cx
Vr?rined by the Constitution to all coj. in
law and equity arising under this Constitution, the .
laws of the United States, and the treaties made, ot
which shall be made, under its authority ; and Which,
I have -high authority in asserting, excludes political
questions, and comprehends those4 only, Jwhere there
are parties amenable to the process of the Court.
Nor is its incompetency ' less clear, than riswtiht of
Constitutional authority. There may be man and
the most dangerous infractions on the part of Con
gress, of which, it is conceded by all, the court jas a
judicial tribunal, cannot from its nature takej cognizance.-
The Tariff itself is a stong case in point; and
the reason applies equally to all otherst whereCon
gress. perverts a powers from an object intended
to one not intended the most insiduous and danger
ous of all the infractions ; and which may be exten
ded to all of its power Si more especially to the fax
ing aM appropriating. But
to take cognizance 01 an miracuuus - ...
tion, - die insuperable objection still ffi $
a u tn-hfmnl to exercise the powerjn.
. . . - j:.
1 refer to tUf uthorUy -of CTgi ' gg tbe speech$ fc,t
speak from nwurorr-
Jonathan kauoirs. . o :
All