

# THE MINERVA.

TWO & A HALF DOLL. PER ANN. Publish half Yearly.

PUBLISHED (WEEKLY) BY WILLIAM BOYLAN.

TWO DOLL. PER ANN. Publish in Advance.

Vol. 10.]

RALEIGH, (N. C.) MONDAY, DECEMBER 9, 1805.

[No. 504.]

## AUSTRIAN MANIFESTO.

(The two following notes have been transmitted to the Minister of foreign relations by Count Philip de Cobenzel, on the 22th September.)

The court of Vienna does not hesitate to comply with the demand made to it on the part of the emperor of the French, to explain itself categorically upon its intentions and the motives of its armaments.

It has no other intentions but to maintain peace and its friendly intercourses with France as well as the general repose of the continent; no other desire but to see the intentions of the emperor Napoleon correspond with his own.

But the maintenance of peace between two powers does not consist merely in not attacking each other. It consists not less essentially in the accomplishment of treaties upon which peace has been established. The power who transgresses them in these essential points, and refuses to do justice to representations, is as much the aggressor as if it should attack the other unjustly.

The peace between Austria and France rests upon the treaty of Lunéville, one of whose conditions stipulate and guarantee the independence of the republics of Italy, as well as the Helvetic and Batavian republics, and insures them the liberty of choosing for themselves their own government. Every enterprise to compel them to adopt a government, a constitution, or a matter, otherwise than their free choice, and otherwise than in preserving a real political independence, is an infraction of the peace of Lunéville, and Austria has the right to complain & to sue for redress.

The wish to maintain mutual friendship, to calm suspicions, and to reserve public repose from greater dangers, will, in the midst of critical and delicate circumstances, induce the claiming party to adopt mild measures, to use great moderation in the prosecution of its grievances, and to postpone the discussion thereof to subsequent negotiations; but regards of friendship can never make it a duty in him to renounce the stipulations of treaties; and the power who, after having broken them, declines explaining itself, refuses to negotiate, and substitutes menace to conciliation, wounds as much the laws of friendship as the sacred rights of peace.

As to the maintenance of public repose, it requires that each state confine itself within its limits, and respect the rights of the independence of other states whether weak or strong. That repose is disturbed when a power attributes to itself rights of occupation, protection or influence that are avowed neither by the law of nations nor treaties; when it speaks of the rights of victory after the peace that has extinguished it; when it employs force and fear to dictate laws to its neighbours, to oblige them to assimilate their constitutions to its own, or to force out from them alliances, concessions, acts of submission and of incorporation; when it pretends that its dignity is offended by just representations, whilst its own journals attack successively all monarchs: when, in short, it erects itself sole arbiter of the fate and common interests of nations, and that it will debar other powers from all participation in the maintenance of the tranquility and general equilibrium, some because they are too far on, others because an arm of the sea separates them from the continent, opposing to the claims of the powers the nearest to the danger, vague answers, sending troops on their frontier, and menaces of rupture if they put themselves in a state of defence.

It is that power, therefore, who provokes the other powers to arm themselves, to succour each other, in fine, to unite, if necessary, for the maintenance of the public safety and of their own.

It is thus that the armaments of the court of Vienna have been provoked gradually as much by the armaments of France as by the insufficiency of the conciliatory means to insure the maintenance of a true peace and future tranquility.

All Europe has acknowledged the sincerity of the pacific dispositions of his majesty the emperor, in his exactitude to fulfil the conditions of the treaty of Lunéville; in his great condescension

on the subject of the extensions prejudicial to his interests, given to the execution of that treaty in Germany; in his moderation, not less great at the time of the first deviations of the French republic from that treaty, concerning the other republics.

Attributing these deviations to the necessity of guaranteeing from all external danger the development of the plan formed for the re-establishment of the monarchical government in France, his majesty made no difficulty in acknowledging the state of things established in Italy towards the latter end of the year 1802. His confidence in the views of the first consul, the engagement taken by the latter towards the new Italian republic upon the temporary duration of his presidency, the public and solemn assurances which have accompanied and followed his elevation to the imperial dignity, or his repugnance from all views of aggrandizement and from every thing injurious to the independence of the Italian states; and finally, the subsisting engagements on his part with the sovereignty of Russia, namely upon the indemnification of the king of Sardinia, and upon a common arrangement of the affairs of Italy. All these motives have concurred to give birth and to nourish in the heart of his majesty the hope that the consolidation of the new empire of the French would in a short time bring the policy and the measures of its government to relations compatible with the balance and safety of Europe. And when, some time afterwards, the first reports of the new alterations in the states of Lombardy induced the ambassador of the court of Vienna in Paris, to require explanations on that point, his majesty was still confirmed in his hopes by the official assurance given in the name of the emperor Napoleon that the republics of Italy would not be united to France, and that no innovation would be made contrary to their political independence.

Europe will judge whether these assurances have been fulfilled.

The emperor has not ceased to claim them as the correspondence it has occasioned between the two sovereigns will prove, as well as the official and ostensible representations which ambassador, Count Philip de Cobenzel, was charged to make; and notwithstanding the letters by which the emperor Napoleon participated with his majesty some dispositions for the establishment of a kingdom of Italy, were accompanied with menaces and armaments, notwithstanding that every thing revealed then what the event has since proved, that the emperor of the French was determined to support these innovations by force. His majesty has, nevertheless, never acknowledged dispositions that were announced to him as merely provisory arrangements. He contented himself with repulsing the inculpations which served as a pretext to the menaces, and to manifest the hope that the principle of separation and of independence consecrated by the treaty would be maintained by the definitive arrangements, which the emperor Napoleon made to depend upon ulterior negotiations with the courts of Petersburg and London, at the period of the re-establishment of peace.

These negotiations were in effect the only hope remaining to his majesty, to succeed by the means of conciliation in consolidating peace, and restoring tranquility to afflicted Europe from North to South, by enterprises whose number and extent are every moment increasing.

His majesty the emperor of the French has made a first pacific step towards the king of England, but continuing still to hold out his design of excluding him from the rights of participating in the grand concerns of Europe. The restriction together with the relations existing between him and the court of Petersburg, induced his Britannic Majesty to have recourse to the mediation of his majesty the emperor of Russia, who, notwithstanding the interruption of official intercourse with France, did not hesitate to interpose his good offices, to lend to that effect, a negotiator, and to solicit his admission to the sovereign of France.

But the hope grounded upon all their pacific proceeding soon vanished. New blows were aimed at the political exist-

ence of other independent states of Italy, at the moment when the passport demanded of the Russian ambassador for his journey to France was forwarding to him; the emperor Alexander conceived himself henceforth authorized to look on his mediation as compromised; on the other side, French armies were suddenly assembled in Italy, notwithstanding the promise given not to arm.

A camp of thirty thousand men assembled in the plains of Marengo was followed by another camp of forty thousand men, in the frontiers of the Tyrol and the Venetian provinces of Austria. H. M. was thus constrained to provide in an efficacious manner for his own security. He then acquired the conviction that the pacific, friendly and moderate principles he professed, met with no such sentiments in return from H. M. the emperor of the French, as could authorize him any longer to neglect preparing necessary measures for the defence and maintenance of the dignity of his empire.

Such is the cause of his present armaments. But the same sentiments which have so induced H. M. to wish to avoid having recourse to such measures, have also determined their end. The emperor arms, not with hostile views, not to make a diversion to the decent on England, the execution of which after two years threats, should not appear reserved for the moment, when France has provoked both Austria and Russia. He arms for the preservation of the peace which subsists between him and France; from the maintenance of the conditions of peace, without which this peace would be merely an illusion, in order to succeed in an equitable accommodation, founded on the moderation of all the interested powers, and calculated to insure the equilibrium and permanent tranquility of Europe. The step by which H. M. invited at the same time the principal courts interested to renew the interrupted negotiations, which his interposition has just experienced from H. M. the emperor of the French, does not make him averse to renewing it.

He has been more successful with the emperor Alexander.

This monarch, who fills a distinguished place in the cabinets of the European powers, whose equilibrium and general welfare, are the objects of his constant cares, displays in the annexed reply which he has just caused to be delivered to H. M. an equal desire for the conclusion of an equitable and moderate arrangement. He is equally convinced of the necessity of an eventual armament and believes himself obliged in consequence of the encroachments already spoken of, in order to contest the right and consequence of his intervention, to send forward a part of his troops, in order to secure to this intervention all the weight and efficaciously of so great a power.

In order completely to prove the rectitude of the intentions of the two imperial courts of Austria and Russia, it is here solemnly declared in the name of both: that they are ready to negotiate with the court of France for the maintenance of the continental peace, on the most moderate terms compatible with their general repose and security.

That, whatever be the issue of the negotiation, and should war inevitably break out, they mutually engage to abstain from all enterprises, which might tend to interfere in the internal affairs of France.

To alter the state of possessions and the relations now legally established in the Germanic empire; or the least to injure the rights and interests of the Ottoman Porte, whose possessions and integrity they are on the contrary ready to defend, as far as it depends on them.

Finally, that Great Britain has caused them to be informed that her sentiments are perfectly analogous to theirs, and dispositions equally moderate for the re-establishment of peace with France.

His majesty hopes that the frank and sincere explanations, into which he has just entered, will be found calculated to remove the doubts which may exist in the mind of H. M. the emperor Napoleon, concerning the intentions and motives which animate him; and all his wishes will be fulfilled, if these explanations can contribute to prevent misfor-

tunes which it does not depend on him to spare to humanity.

Annexed to the foregoing, and transmitted at the same time.

Copy of the Declaration transmitted by Count de Rosjounofsky, Ambassador of his Imperial Majesty of all the Russias.

It would be superfluous to retrace here the motives which induced his majesty the Emperor of all the Russias to recall the plenipotentiary whom he had sent, in concert with his Britannic Majesty, to treat for peace with the chief of the French government.

These motives are too just and too evident not to be appreciated by all Europe. They have been expressed in the note transmitted to the ministry of his Prussian Majesty by M. de Novoziltzoff, the 28th June (10th July) and the resolution they had provoked is but a consequence of the same sentiments and principles which have constantly induced his Imperial majesty to employ his assiduous care for the re-establishment of general tranquility.

Since the rupture between France and England, his majesty has seen with surprise and sorrow the greater part of the states of the continent successively compelled to bear the weight of a war entirely marian in its principles, and foreign to their immediate interests, but he could not persevere in the hope that the means of a frank and friendly negotiation would be sufficient to put an end to that afflictive state of things, when he was apprized that, without any regard for the solemn steps tending to establish peace, and at the very moment when Russia offered to treat for its conclusion, new states were still losing their independence.

If, therefore, his imperial majesty has taken the resolution of recalling his plenipotentiary, it is only because he had acquired the complete certainty that that mission would not have a satisfactory issue, not that his ardent wishes for restoring peace to Europe were in the least diminished.

The most signal proof which the Emperor can give of it, is to adhere at the present time to the request which has just been made by his Austrian Imperial Majesty and King, simultaneously to England, France, Prussia and Russia, for the purpose of having the interrupted negotiations resumed.

His Imperial Majesty, however, cannot in the mean time, dissemble the probability that a conduct on the part of the French government similar to that which has already compelled the emperor to retract his first steps towards a negotiation for peace, will render ineffectual that which Austria proposes to renew.

The painful apprehension but which experience justifies, of seeing new encroachments take place at the moment the negotiation will have been accepted or during its course; that greater dangers will arise for Europe from a step that has no other aim but to save it; that they will be unavoidable as soon as the just demands of the continental powers, as well as those which the French government will set forward in support of its successive encroachments, shall not have been satisfied on either point, the obligation especially, in which the Emperor finds himself in such calamities and difficult circumstances, to come to the assistance of his allies, whose security and even existence is eminently menaced, and to offer them, in short, not an illusory assistance, but real, immediate, and efficacious; all these considerations united, point out the only conduct which is appertains to his imperial majesty to follow. Russia cannot at present resume the thread of interrupted negotiations but by putting herself in a situation to succour her allies at the very moment they should be attacked, and to preserve Europe from an ulterior overthrow.— She must combine her measures in such a manner as to procure herself a well grounded hope that the negotiation for peace will promise happier results than those obtained from all the pacific steps made until now, and which have been marked only by the want of regard which the French government has shown for the instances and representations of Russia and other continental powers, and by an increase, continually repeated, of the dangers of Europe.