

From the Boston Repository.

No. I.

The political sky has seldom remained long unclouded. But it may be doubted whether it was ever charged with a blacker tempest than that we have lately seen burst upon Europe. France has accomplished, in twelve years, as much as Rome did, in five hundred. The Samnites, who occupied a little province that is now a part of the kingdom of Naples, resisted the Roman arms for half a century, and it was not till after four and twenty Roman triumphs and twice that number of pitched battles that they were subdued.

King Pyrrhus landed in Italy too late, after the Samnites had lost their spirit no less than their force. He proved an enemy worthy of Roman discipline and courage, yet he was unsuccessful.

The Romans after five hundred years of incessant war with the petty nations around them, who were their equals in valour, inferior only in discipline, at length aspired to extend their dominion beyond the bounds of Italy. First Sicily and then Spain were disputed, in arms, with the Carthaginians. Fifty years were passed in battles and alarms before this great controversy was decided, in favour of Rome.

When Carthage had fallen, Greece, the mistress of Rome in arts, her rival in arms and renown, fell an almost unresisting prey to Roman Ambition. She fell with all her confederated republics, as ours will certainly fall, if France should continue to wield our factions and our factions to dispose of our government. For factions in a democracy are sincere only in their hatred and fear of each other. Whether the Jeffersons & Madisons stand, or the Randolphs and Munros should rise in their stead, our rulers can have no patriotism. Their emulation is too fierce, and their objects of ambition too fugitive and too personal to allow them to take the views, still less to cherish the sentiments of statesmen.

Old Rome had patriots, but who would expect to find them in the amphitheatre among the gladiators. Those who love power will seek it in the contests of party. The lovers of their country will be found nursing their griefs and their despair, among the discarded disciples of Washington. To return from this seeming digression, Rome availed herself of the divisions of the Grecian republics to subjugate them all. Affecting a zeal for their liberty, she offered her alliance, and the allies of Rome, like those of France, were her slaves, the Greeks joyfully aided Rome to conquer Macedonia and Philip, the Macedonian king, was employed against Antiochus, called the Great, the Syrian monarch. Egypt was too base to make any resistance, but submitted to tribute as quietly as we do.

Thus every independent republic and powerful prince fell a prey to Rome.—Beyond the Euphrates, the Parthians at length formed a mighty Empire, which the distance and the deserts rendered like the modern Russia, inaccessible to the Roman arms. It was remarkable that Rome seldom had more than one enemy to fight at a time. They fell in succession, and their servitude was concealed, though it was embittered, by the title of allies.

France has achieved her purpose—the struggles of liberty are over, & the continental nations of Europe are now sleeping in their chains.

If France possessed the British navy, those chains could be adamant, which no human force could break. French tyranny, like the great dragon, would have wings, and the remotest regions of the civilized world would be near enough to catch pestilence from his breath.

Yet we are infatuated enough to think America a hiding place for liberty, where her affluence will not seek her life, or an impregnable fortress that would protect it.

On what reasonable foundation do the presumptuous expectations rest? France is master of both land and sea, will distance preserve us? With a hundred ships in the department of the Bouches, distance would be nothing to Bonaparte. He could transport an army of fifty thousand men to occupy New-York, which could not make one

hour's resistance. He could transport them with more expedition and ease, than Mr. Jefferson could assemble our STANDING ARMY of two regiments from the frontiers, to oppose them.—Yet this standing army, so potent to command the types, the exclamations and the silly tears of the democrats, though it assisted as a bug bear to make Mr. Jefferson president, would no better protect his house, at Monticello, from a French squadron of horse, than the army of the Imperial Virginia formerly defended its assembly from Col. Tarleton.

But our myriads of militia might defy the world in arms. Excellent hopes these? When Austria in vain opposes two hundred thousand veterans to the progress of Bonaparte, when Russia is repelled in the pitched battle of Austerlitz, when Prussia with its armies, complete in numbers and discipline, stands still, not daring to stir, and waiting to acknowledge Bonaparte conqueror, or to come more plainly to the point, when we see half a million of English volunteers, as formidable and as stiff in backbone as it is in the power of tailors to make uniforms, parading the coasts of Sussex, Essex and Kent, and yet trusting only to the vigilance of the British navy to hinder the French from crossing the channel—surely when we see these things we must be unwilling to reflect, or utterly incapable of reflection, if we can suppose that the array of the militia in the secretary's office would transplant fear from Mr. Jefferson's bosom into Bonaparte's.

To say nothing of the improbability of the militia obeying the call for actual service, or, if they should appear promptly and in sufficient numbers, of the impossibility of detaining them in service long enough to make their arms of the least imaginable use, direful experience has at length instructed nations, that when they are in danger, they are to be preserved from it by their real soldiers. These are made, not in a tailor's shop, by facing blue cloth with red or yellow, but by learning in the field, that subordination of mind that will make men do and endure their doing all that men possibly can do.

Old Rome did not outnumber her enemies. Two legions each, of less than six thousand men, and as many of the Latin or other Italian allies made a complete continental army. Such an army routed the numberless forces of Mithridates and Antiochus. It cost the Romans more exertions to subdue Persus, king of Macedon, than to conquer all the east. His phalanx, of sixteen thousand men, was harder to break than all the million militia of the other successors of Alexander. Rome, by the perfection of her discipline, became mistress of the world.

Would Bonaparte calculate on the vigor of our government, as an insuperable obstacle to his military attempt on the United States? Would the Congress majority like a Roman senate create means and employ them, with a spirit that would prefer death to servitude or tribute?—The French Hannibal surely with our 17 millions of tribute money already in his treasury, would have no discouraging fear of this sort. When he reads our treaty with Tripoli, by which it appears that we chose tribute when victory was within our reach, when he sees that the Bey of Tunis presumes to say by his minister at Washington, pay or fight, what can Bonaparte conclude but that honour is a name, and in America an empty one, and that our national spirit can never be routed to a higher pitch, than to make a calculation.—With us honor is a coin, whose very baseness confines it at home for a currency. Such a people, he will say, are degraded before they are subdued. They are too abject to be classed or employed among my martial slaves. Let them toil to feed their masters and to replenish my treasury with tribute.

Is there a spirit in our people that would supply the want of it in our rulers? Our total unpreparedness, both by land and sea, to make even the show of resistance against an attack, is certainly not from the want of military means in the United States, but from a dread of the loss of popularity if they should call them forth.

Why is it unpopular? Because the progress of Frenchdom nation is not seen at all, or is seen with a fatal complacency, because we love our money better than our country; because we enjoy our ease almost as much as we love our money, and because by shutting our eyes to our public dangers, we escape the insupportable terror of their approach, and the toils of an efficient preparation to resist them.

It is a thing incomprehensible, that even the childish babble of the Chronicle is not dumb. Admitting the stupidity, admitting the baseness of the democrats, yet without admitting that they are both stupid and base in a miraculous degree, it is unaccountable that they should not see, in the victories of Bonaparte, the stride and almost feel the gripe of a master. If a storm should sink, or a fire-ship burn the British navy we should feel that gripe in a month. Gen. Turreau would quietly exercise all the authorities at Washington. Considering how tamely we gave up our millions, no less than seventeen in two years, while that navy still renders America inaccessible to France, is any man alive so absurd, as to suppose that our subjugation to French despotism would cost the great nation a single flask of powder. Take away the British navy, or give it to France, and we, free Americans, so valiant of tongue, tie up in our stalls as tamely as our oxen. The pen of Talleyrand would be found a sharper weapon than Gen. Varnum's sword. It is preposterous to suppose that a military resistance to France would be attempted. Her faction in this country would revive, the clubs and the maxims of 1794, and Genet would again summon the enemies of British Influence, to rally under his banner. We should be called the allies of France and our loyal addresses would accompany our tribute to conciliate the friendship of the great nation, and to claim a share in its glories. The men who could be nothing without France would be invested with the titles and powers of magistracy, and property would be made to shift hands till it rested with those who would be really interested to support France, that France might support them in keeping it. Thus we should avoid the odium of a violent revolution and yet would reap all the advantage of it, to rivet our dependence on her power. The distance of the Roman provinces at length favored their emancipation from her yoke.—But with the sole possession of a navy, the trans-atlantic provinces of France would not be distant.

With these irrefragable proofs of the fatal certainty with which the power of France would reach us, and of the unresisting tameness with which we should endure it, if France should ruin the British naval power, what comments shall we make on the sense or spirit of the non-importation project of Congress, which though ineffectual for its purpose, is intended to impair the force and resources of that navy?—How deep and considerate will be our scorn and execration of the Armstrongs and Livingstons & Munros, who, to make their flattery welcome to a tyrant's ear, have blended it with American invectives against that navy. We seem to be emulous of the spirit of slavery before we descend to its condition, as if we were resolved to merit their contempt, by an earlier claim and even by a juster title than their yoke. For as long as the British navy may triumph that yoke is not inevitable.

The most successful way to prevent our servitude, is faithfully to expose our dangers. So far as our fate may depend on our wisdom or our choice, it is proper to call the attention of our citizens to the fact that Bonaparte, though he has done much, has done it in vain, unless he can do one thing more. Give him the British navy, and he will govern the United States as absolutely, and certainly with as little mercy, as if our territory were a French department, and actually lay between the Seine and the Loire. Let our scribblers then extol the long foreseing wisdom of the Jeffersonian administration.—Let them boast of their devotedness to the cause of the people.—The man whose chief merit is grounded on his having penned the declaration of independence has done more than any other man living to undo it. He has

made conventions to pour the fullness of our treasury into the coffers of Bonaparte. He has dictated laws in aid and to carry into effect French authority, over the blacks of St. Domingo—a degree of servile condescension beneath the independent spirit of those blacks; and now his minions in Congress have begun a warfare against the British trade, as if without our own active co-operation to cripple the maritime resources of England. Bonaparte might meet with too great obstructions and delay in subverting the independence and liberty of our country.

If we love our country as we ought, we cannot but wish that the conquered nations of Europe break their chains.—We cannot but wish that Great Britain may courageously & triumphantly maintain her independence against France. But on this point what are we to expect? A military opposition on the continent of Europe has proved unavailing. Will France, now mistress of the land, become mistress of the sea also, and establish her iron domination over the civilized world? This is a question of life or death to American independence and the awful decision is near.

[The extreme length of Mr. Quincy's Speech on the subject of fortifying the ports and harbours of the United States, has rendered its publication in our paper, impracticable. In this days paper we make the following extracts, which will be alike admired, for the solidity of argument—force of expression—and brilliancy of wit.] *Esq. Can.*

ELEGANT EXTRACTS.

“Can we expect to be rich and not tempt the spirit of avarice? To be defenceless, amid armed pirates, and in no danger of robbery or insult? I ask again, Mr. Chairman, how is the utility of fortifications proved? Suppose, for the sake of argument, it should be admitted, which however I deny, they cannot be erected in sufficient force to defeat every great armament; yet is it nothing to prevent the partial attempts of single ships? Is it nothing to deter an invader? Nothing even to delay an attack? Is it worth nothing to have the chance of crippling an assailant? The only argument I have heard urged against the utility of fortifications is, that *the whole cannot be fortified, so that, protect as strongly as you will particular points, the invader will land somewhere else.* Sir, this is the very object of fortifications. No man ever thought of building a Chinese wall all along the indentations of our shore, from the St. Mary's to the St. Croix. The true object of fortification is to oblige your enemies to land; it is to keep them at arm's length. If they cannot reach your cities with their batteries, and would attack, they must come on shore. They are then only a land force and our militia will find no difficulty in giving a good account of them.”

“It is not denied that our gun-boats are weapons of considerable effect, or that in certain situations they are useful or that, in aid of other and heavier batteries, they may not sometimes be important. It is only when they become the favourites, to the total exclusion of more powerful modes of defence, and draw away to the less power, appropriation which are wanting for the greater, that the system which upholds them, become an object of contempt, or of dread.—Nowadays, sir, put what you will into the crucible, whether it be seventy four or frigates, or land batteries, the result is the same; after due sweltering in the legislative furnace, there comes out nothing but gun-boats.”

“On all sides we are met with the objection,—where are the means for these defensive measures?—How is the public debt to be discharged, if we incur such an expense?—Mr. Chairman, none of these difficulties are insurmountable, when southern land is to be purchased, or when our new territories on the Missouri and Red River are to be explored, or when Indian titles in the western country are to be extinguished. We have paid within these two years fifteen millions of dollars for Louisiana and have sent off two millions more to purchase the Floridas. I ask on what principle can either of these purchases be palatable to the people of the United States? Do they want more land or wide