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It is a subject of fearful curiosity to inquire into the causes, which have so rapidly confuted France to the conquest of the continental part of Europe. By carefully tracing their operation, we may be the better enabled to calculate the chances of her triumph over England, and of necessary consequence, over America.

It was a long time the fashion to ascribe French victories to the republican fanaticism of her citizens. When France ceased to be republican in name, and it was only in name that she ever was republican, the superior personal bravery of the French soldiers and the superior genius of Bonaparte were deemed to be the two adequate causes of her triumphs.

There is probably little ground for these opinions, or the influence of these causes is much over rated. The body of American democrats are, no doubt, the greatest political bigots in the universe. They are accustomed to believe that no tenets can be true or wise but their own. That all power is derived from the people and should be exercised for their benefit is a principle of which they fancy the world was ignorant, till it was discovered in the course of our revolution. Considering themselves the sole depositaries of political truth, having in their hands her casket where she keeps liberty, the most precious of her jewels, they think our country is entitled to be not a little vain of, the other. They feel as if all patriotic merit consists in propagating their principles thro' the world with a rage of profelytism.— They would rejoice if not only France, but the Grand Turk and the Dey of Algiers should gather their unlettered rabble in primary assemblies and make them swear, with all the zeal and sincerity of opium and brandy, to maintain the rights of man with their daggers and their pikes.

Accordingly, when France said and sung and swore the words of their republican creed, they were sure the grovelling world was very near being snatched from its centre; it would be launched into the sky and glitter among the brightest of the stars. The reign of perfectibility was beginning; man so long a reptile, trodden in the mire, was rising to overtop the tallest of the seraphs. Their teeming fancies had made a creation of their own and lighted it with a new sunshine. Above all things, it delighted their hearts and seemed to realize all their hopes to see the low vulgar, the squalid hosts of vice and ignorance issue from the opening cellars of the Faubourg of St. Antoine and from the emancipated jails, to exercise the sovereignty of the globe by a signal vengeance on the Magistrates, their enemies. They were sure the structure of society must have risen, when they saw its low foundations already higher than its roof. It was not long before his rabble army was arrayed as a body of Marseilles patriots, and as a part of the National Guards. The splendid virtues of France were attributed to the exalted heroism of these men, who it was said, fought well, not because they were soldiers but because they were citizens. More than a million of the grown people of America believed that the liberty loving passion of Frenchmen made them an over match for the disciplined mercenaries of Austria and Prussia, and that the citizens were the better for their ignorance of discipline. The French Generals were not the dupes of our silly opinions.— They drilled and punished their citizens, till they would stand fire and push bayonet, and if they would not, they shot them.

The notion that the political opinions of the common men will make them any better soldiers is strangely absurd. They are more likely to effect a mutiny than a triumph. Men may fancy they are soldiers, but they are not really such, until discipline and habit have new moulded their thoughts and inclinations. The reviews of peaceable tradesmen are no more than the solemn foppery of a pantomime, acted in the open air instead of the theatre. We would not be understood to say that the militia has not both its merit and its use. Both, we confess, are great. But we do say that their proper use is not to face a veteran enemy.— It is indeed very

possible that political enthusiasm, as well as religious fanaticism, may inspire a sudden fury into the bosoms of a raw undisciplined multitude. But a veteran corps would surely defeat such a multitude.

If the inhabitants of France ever felt the republican enthusiasm, which is indeed very questionable, there is not much reason to believe that it contributed to fill the ranks of their own army or to make those of their enemy give way.— Experience, which brings plausible theories to the test, and a correct knowledge of human nature, have abundantly confuted the notion that the common men are the better soldiers for the soundness of their logic or their politics. Men are very much alike, in all the European countries, in respect to their capacity of being trained for war. When so trained, the difference between two hostile armies of equal numbers will be found to lie in the talents of their subaltern officers and principal commanders.

Common soldiers are soon trained, but it is the work of art and time to form officers. There is not the least reason in the world to suppose that the Austrians or Russians are inferior to the French soldiers in steady, persevering valour.— But there is ample evidence of the superiority of the French officers over those of their enemies. War has become, indeed it ever was, among civilized nations, a science. It excites and employs the utmost vigor and extent of human intellect. Though it is a science, it is such only for the officers, not for the common men. For two centuries past, France has devoted more attention and more money to the perfection of this science than all the rest of Europe. Louis XIVth established such military schools as the Great Cyrus would have desired for the education of the officers of that army that achieved for him the conquest of Asia. Bonaparte and Moreau, both undoubtedly great Generals, are indebted for their triumphs to these schools. It is often said the common men will dare to do whatever their officers will lead them on to do. It is no less proper to say the officers will seldom flinch from leading the men if they but know how to lead them.

Nothing is more certain than that the military institutions of France supplied the first revolutionary armies with an infinite number of accomplished young officers, who glowed with impatience to gain glory and promotion in that profession which had from their infancy engrossed their thoughts and kindled all their passions. The revolution furnished only sparks and not the fuel for their combustion.

Nor is there the least reason to pretend that the first French armies were composed of raw recruits.— An immense standing army was maintained, & when it is considered that on the side of the low countries and on the Rhine, France guarded what has been emphatically called her iron frontier, with a double row of fortified towns, and that every one of these was occupied with a veteran garrison that would figure as a respectable American army, we see plainly that France possessed every advantage for success in war, from the very first day of her military operations.

The democrats, to a man, believe that France was entirely defenceless when the "coalition of despots" secretly entered into the treaties of Pilnitz and Pavia for her dismemberment. Those treaties, it has been a thousand times proved are forgeries. Austria was taken by surprise. The Emperor Joseph had levelled the ramparts of his towns the Netherlands, Luxembourg excepted, and his troops in that country were no more than a feeble corps of observation. The Austrians had a larger proportion of raw recruits in their armies than the French.

Be it remembered too that the revolution supplied the French with an unexhausted superfluity of men and means that no regular government in the world could countervail. That man must be strongly disordered in mind, who can now look back on French affairs and say that the revolutionary leaders, possessing such means, left any option to the governments of England or Austria to remain at peace. As well might they say, when a whole street is burning, that a man, by nerving calm in his elbow chair,

might save his house from the flames.— The English government, in particular, was near the scene, and could not see the revolution, like *Jæna vomit fire*, without some natural tears and some prudent measures of precaution. Who is now ignorant that Brissot and Barras and Danton and Robespierre would choose to understand those fears and those precautions as signs of the inveterate hostility of kings to the French liberty. If the English could have shunned the war in February 1793, it would have been forced upon them before June.

It is childish prattle to charge the enemies of France with the commencement of the war. The nature of the revolution was war against mankind. Its vital principle was a burning passion for power within the state, and when they had gained this, to establish by arms the power of France over every other state.— Why is the vulture carnivorous? why does not the tiger of Bengal eat grass? We might with as much good sense inquire why does not the torrent stay upon the hills? Why are the collected waters of the revolutionary storm precipitated from the height of the Alps, to desolate the plains and to bury men and their labours under masses of barrenness and ruin?

The military means of Austria were flinted, those of France unlimited. In almost every battle the French had the advantage. The officers, even the subalterns, had been educated for as to qualify them to be generals. The generals were fit for nothing else—they understood their trade and aspired to no other sort of distinction. The French, always well commanded by their officers, well supplied by their enemies countries which they ravaged, have rapidly overrun all Europe.

Another cause of the French superiority and which has grown out of the real superiority of their military science is to be found in the excellence of their artillery. The number and the manageableness of the French field artillery, must have given them decisive advantage over the Russians in the late battle of Austerlitz. It is not to be supposed that the Russians have equally improved their artillery, nor if they had, would they have encumbered their march of eight hundred leagues, especially when they had to many reasons for haste, with an immense train of field pieces. They would be the less directed to do this as the Austrians must have been obliged upon to supply them in sufficient number.— The French, by the celerity of their movements, had however obtained possession of a great part of the Austrian artillery. The deficiency of the Russians in this point, was, probably, a material cause of their loss of the battle.

When gun powder and great guns were first brought into use, they were more capable of striking an enemy with a panic than of breaking his line. The cannon were unwieldy machines, and the management of them was unskillful. Still the army which had them must have possessed a great advantage over that which had none. In the time of the famous Duke of Marlborough, the event of a battle depended on the expertness and resolution of infantry in discharging their musquets. In still more modern wars, the bayonet has been considered the arbiter of victory. But the French have introduced another revolution in the science of war, the lightness and prodigious number of their horse artillery enabling them to disorder and break an enemy's ranks, without coming to close fight, by raining upon them an intolerable tempest of grape shot.

By means of her innumerable field pieces, and of their unusual proportion of cavalry, it has become impossible for their enemy to defend a country by lines or field entrenchment. It has been stated that Bonaparte's grand army was attended by fifty thousand horse. Such a body, always on the alert, could strike an enemy at almost any distance, and in every mortal part at once. If he contracted his posts, his flanks would be turned—if he spread out his troops to prevent it, his lines would be forced.— By resisting, he met his fate, and if he retreated, it was swift and overtook him.

Thus we have seen the French maintain the same invariable superiority over

the Austrians, and lately over the Russians in the field; that the Spaniards possessed over the Mexicans. The Russian and Austrians are as brave as the French, but the French are really superior in the science of their officers, in the number and management of their cannon and cavalry. They will continue therefore to beat their enemies as the Romans did. Even the Grecian phalanx, supposed to be the perfection of military science and absolutely invincible, was found unequal to the contest with the Roman legion.

The French victories have happened in such a series that we cannot rationally suppose them to happen by chance. They would happen again, if their defeated, beaten adversaries could rise again to resistance.

From these positions this melancholy inference is to be drawn; the continental enemies of France are totally incapable of resisting her in the field. She has taken a permanent ascendancy over them. Austria humbled and beaten, is in a condition to learn the conquering art of her masters. Prussia, without risking the combat, has fallen prostrate with her useless arms in her hands. Russia, like the ancient Persia, is invincible but insignificant to the system of enslaved Europe.

If the French armies could pass the channel, there seems to be no sort of reason to hope that Great Britain could resist them. The regular army is spread over all the Empire, and if it were all collected it would be a handful against the French hosts, and surely no military man would place the smallest dependence on the volunteers of England.

It is one of the inevitable, perhaps incurable evils of Mr. Pitt's administration and the greatest I think in the fame of that truly illustrious statesman, that instead of forming an efficient army of two hundred thousand men, who could be sent wherever they might be wanted, he was either the schemer or the dupe of the wretches, expensive, and, if the French should land in England, fatal projectors of volunteers. By equipping volunteers he not only has no army, but it was out of the power of England to have one.— The men were all engaged in acting the comedy of an army, and the finances were exhausted in getting up the decorations of the peace.

The sole protection of Great Britain then is in her navy. The writer has been brought very late, and loth to believe, that the military resistance of the continental nations of Europe would be itself equal. Events have at last convinced him that the French actually possess a greater and more decisive military superiority over those nations than the old Romans did over the forces of Antiochus, Mithridates and Jugurtha; and especially over the Carthaginians, Greeks and Macedonians. Nothing is wanting to the solid establishment of a new universal empire by France, that should spread as far, last as long, and press as heavily on the necks of the abject nations, as that of Rome, but the possession of the British navy. France, whenever she can get access to her enemy, is already irresistible. If Mr. Grey would give her that navy, he would impart a kind of ubiquity to her power.— The soft winds that wake the spring in the remotest regions of the globe, would wait there the ministers of French rapacity to blast it. France would enjoy every thing that Rome wanted to make the plundered world her province.

Are these ideas chimerical, or are the inferences drawn beyond the admitted truth of the premises? Is India more capable of resisting France than an English merchant company its present sovereign? Spain and Italy are provinces already.—Greece, Egypt, the Turkish empire, and all the shores of the Mediterranean were once the patrimony of the Cæsars; and for many hundred years slept soundly in their chains, till they were rudely waked by the Goths, the Heruli, the Huns and the Arabs. Africa is a quarter of the globe that could be governed by factories, and America is another that would yield not merely with tameness, but alacrity to imperial Rescripts. It by miracle, force should be needed, France could employ Spain or Desalines, or slaves still more abject

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