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The object of Mr. Burr was to plunder the place of its wealth, and to seize on its property, would he, I ask have laid an embargo to keep both within reach? If he had had some other scheme than mere depredation against this northern rebellion, would he have expended the treasure of the public in erecting fortifications in the centre of the city, useless against a foreign foe—content only to overawe your citizens, and retain their property in the suburbs? Would he have the naval force have been stationed along the river in small detachments? Or would they not have been collected so as to act with some advantage against the descending force?—It is notorious that at the moment when he announced the greatest danger, of the four gun boats on the river, only two were stationed as high up as Point Coupee, and the two others at long intervals on the river, so that they might successively have been taken, half the supposed force had descended with the hostile army; and is it possible to suppose, that if the object had been to interrupt the invasion of Mexico, that no part of the naval force should have been stationed above the Red river, and that Natchitoches would have been left almost without a garrison? It is plain therefore, from these acts, and these omissions, from these arrangements, that no serious danger was apprehended; but that for purposes best known to the general himself, and his coadjutors, it was deemed necessary to keep up the alarm; to divide and weaken the country; to curb the town; to keep all its wealth in his power; to scatter the naval, and render the military force useless; to magnify the force of the enemy, and to terrify the executive, the legislature and the judiciary into a dereliction of their rights. The first I leave to you to judge whether or not he has succeeded; the last remain yet at their basis, and this day is to determine whether we are to partake the disgrace of the one, or share in the credit due to the other.—For let us not deceive ourselves as to the effect which our approbation of these measures, or even our silence, will produce. A sacred trust has been committed to our keeping; personal honor, actual dignity, and the solemn sanction of an oath, concur in pointing out our duty. Should we betray this trust; should we disregard what we owe to ourselves, our country, and our God; should we be bold enough to bear the reproaches of that internal Monitor, which no sophistry can refute, no pretended necessity silence, no power overawe; should we have the hardihood to do this, I ask, can the boldest of us meet his constituents with composure, before they appear at their tribunal? The effects of this vain terror, if it ever possessed their minds, will be dissipated. When we render an account of this winter's transactions, will they, I say, be satisfied with our list of divorces? with our militia arrangements? Or even with our grand reforms in the judiciary, if they should be effected? No sir, they will enquire of us about events which more nearly concern them; they will enquire of their violated rights; they will ask about their constitution, committed to our care; and in a stern accent, in which the voice of the People must appear to us the voice of God, they will demand whether we did not, in his awful presence, swear that we would preserve that constitution inviolable forever? They will then point to the open-avowed, undistinguished infractions it has received in our presence; before our eyes; in our own persons; in the very sanctuary of our legislature; and ask us what measure we took to preserve the constitution? What steps to avenge the injuries it received? What answer shall we give to those enquiries? Shall we reply, "it is true we have sworn to preserve your constitution and rights; it is true we have seen them openly violated and despised; we saw the commerce of your country endangered; its citizens dragged

disgracefully through the streets, first to a military dungeon, then to banishment and ruin; it is equally true we saw the peaceful traveller stopped on the high way, searched like a felon, and forced by violence to ask protection in passports, unknown and unauthorized by our laws; that private papers have been seized, private letters examined; that women and children have suffered imprisonment, exposed to cold and hunger; that our own privileges have been infringed; that our own dignity has been destroyed; that our country has been slandered; that your known loyalty has been questioned; and that your representatives have been insulted by a solemn proposition to violate their oaths, and join in the unrighteous work of destruction!" All this we must proceed to say; behold with tame submission, all this; some of it countenanced and admitted; and when solemnly called by the indignant voice of our country, to express in our legislative capacity, the feelings which ought to glow in the breasts of freemen, we excuse these illegal acts; we palliate these enormities; we throw the mantle of legislation upon the nakedness, the folly, the vice of executive acts. Though we could not lessen the horror so considerably felt, we merely undertook to decide the odium:—We have humbled ourselves in the presence of a petty officer, and terrified by the bayonets of a single regiment, we kissed the rod, and justified the common saying by our mean submission and flattery, that "YOU ARE NOT FIT TO BE FREE!"

Shall we be obliged to make this humiliating confession? No sir, it is yet in our power to retrieve the credit we have lost; to assume the character that befits us—to address the legislature of our country in the language of manly freedom—to shew to the executive how much he has been deceived and betrayed, by the civil and military chiefs; and to give him an opportunity of dismissing the weakness that degrades, and the tyranny that ruins his service in this territory. And yet sir, it is principally for our own credit, that we ought to seize this occasion of shewing that we are not the unworthy representatives of a patient and patriotic people. For, whatever ideas we may have of our duty, the representatives of the United States will know theirs; though we may be silent, they will speak; they are fearless, though we may tremble; and should we flatter, they will never cringe;—and next to the consolation of having done my own duty, I find one in the certainty that there are at least one hundred and thirteen independent men in our councils, who have remembered their oaths, and will punish the betrayers of their country.

We are favored by a friend with the official account of the Battle of Pultusk.—We believe it has not been published in any American Paper.

BATTLE OF PULTUSK.

[From the St. Petersburg Gazette, January 18, O.S.]

Subsequent to the provisional short account, which has been published, of the victory, gained by the troops of his Imperial Majesty, on the 14-25th December, 1806, at Pultusk, over the French army, consisting of 60,000 men, commanded by Bonaparte in person, and the Field Marshals D'Avoust and Lannes, the following circumstantial accounts have been received here, relative to that battle, which has crowned the victorious Russian warriors with fresh wreaths of glory. They are dated Head-Quarters, Lomza, December 27, (Jan. 7,) and are transmitted from General Baron Benningsen, by the Prince Goltzyn, Adjutant to his Majesty the Emperor.

"As soon as the corps of his Imperial Majesty, under the command of General Baron Benningsen, consisting of about 45,000 men, excepting a part of the 3d and 4th division, had arrived in the environs of Pultusk, on the 14-24th December, after a

very fatiguing march, (the roads being exceedingly bad) and continually harassed by the enemy; the said corps was immediately so posted, that its right wing was supported by the village of Moseczina, and the left by the small town of Pultusk, with a view to cover the road to Ostrolenka, and the bridges near Pultusk and Zamsk, to keep open the communication with the General of Infantry, Count Buxhowden.

"The van, commanded by Major-General Barclai De Tolly, consisting of three regiments of Jagers (the 1st, 3d, and 30th,) and supported by the regiment of Tengisk musketeers, and the Polish regiment of cavalry, took a position on our right wing in the bushes; whilst the detachment of Major-General Baggowut, consisting of the regiments of Staroskolsk, Wilna, and one battalion of Revel musketeers, with two squadrons of Kiev dragoons, was posted before the left flank, to cover the Narew and the road leading from Sierock to Pultusk. These regiments had no sooner made a movement, to occupy their positions aforesaid, than they were attacked about noon by a French detachment, under the command of Gen. Souchet. The fire between the latter and our advanced posts of cavalry commenced and was kept up for near three hours; whereupon the enemy were repulsed with considerable loss. It afterwards appeared, that this attack on the part of the enemy was only made with a view to reconnoitre.

"On the following day, being the 14-25th of December, when our troops were refreshing themselves, but placed in order of battle, at 11 A. M. they were attacked by a French army of 60,000 men, commanded by Bonaparte in person, and consisting of the corps of the Field Marshals D'Avoust and Lannes, and the detachment of General Souchet.

"The first attack was made by the enemy in six columns, under Marshal D'Avoust, with great impetuosity, and directed against our left flank, which consisted of the detachment of Major-General Baggowut, with a view to take Pultusk, to get into our rear, and to cut off our communication with the division of the Lieutenant-General Aurep, which was posted beyond the river Narew, two leagues from Pultusk. Soon after this, the van of Major-General Barclai De Tolly, on the right flank, was also attacked by six of the enemy's columns.

"During these attacks of the enemy, made upon both our flanks, he had posted a chain of Horse Jagers, behind whom stood several columns, which were to fall upon our centre; but the enemy's views upon it were completely frustrated, owing to the powerful and well directed effect of our batteries, which were erected before our front.

"The impetuous attack made by Marshal D'Avoust with 15,000 men, in six columns, upon both flanks of the detachment of Major-General Baggowut, obliged the latter to fall back a little, as he had only between 4,000 and 500 men with him; but in his retreat he checked the enemy's progress with the 4th regiment of Jagers, which spread itself before the infantry. In the mean while, the Lieutenant-general Count Osterman arrived with the regiment of Tota, and one battalion of the regiment of Pawlowsky Grenadiers to support him, and the enemy's further progress was checked.—Major-general Baggowut, with the grenadier battalion of the regiment of Staroskolsk musketeers, and a battalion of the 4th regiment of Jagers, then threw himself with fixed bayonets, upon the centre of the enemy, by which he had been pressed, whilst Major-general Koshin, with the regiment of his Imperial Majesty's Body Cuirassiers, and two squadrons of the regiment of Kargopol Dragoons, penetrated to the front and flank of that column, and the result was, that the whole column was immediately cut to pieces.

"In the mean while, the other battalions of the 4th regiment of Jagers, and the regiment of Tartarian Horse, with two squadrons of Kiev Dragoons attacked the ene-

my's columns, which had advanced from the left, and compelled them to retreat; however, the enemy receiving an immediate reinforcement, advanced a second time with impetuosity, but were completely overthrown, as we had formed a firm front of the Jagers, and these had thrown themselves upon the enemy with fixed bayonets, and our cavalry had also broke through the columns with their sabres.

"At the same time, Major-general Dorochow, with the regiment of Isium Hussars, made a premeditated retreat before the other columns of the enemy which were on our right, and then suddenly turned about on the left with his regiment, by which well-timed manœuvre he brought those columns right upon our batteries, which made great havoc among the enemy.

"All the rest of our cavalry, which was posted in our front, and made partial attacks upon the enemy, received orders to march through our front of infantry, to leave an open field for action, and to post itself in the rear.

"At this moment all our batteries opened their fire on the enemy's columns, which were advancing against our centre, but which, in consequence of the happy effect of these batteries, were not only checked in their progress, but also driven back.

"The enemy's corps, notwithstanding their being thrice defeated, attempted, on receiving a fresh reinforcement, to repeat their attack, on all the points of our left flank, with renewed ardour, and pressed forward upon it with several co-operating columns. The detachment under Major-general Baggowut was also compelled by the superior force of the enemy to fall back, once more, as far as the trench in the rear. But being, in the mean time, joined by the Muron's regiment, and two battalions of the regiment of Revel, and Lieutenant-general Osterman having occupied the height in the rear of the trench, and opened a brisk fire from the battery planted thereon, Major-general Baggowut attacked the enemy's columns with fresh ardour, and succeeded in throwing them into disorder. At the same instant, Major-general Mowow rushed upon the enemy with the Tulas regiment of Musketeers with fixed bayonets, and thus completed their total discomfiture; the enemy was routed, driven from the field of battle, and pursued until the approach of night. Thus, the result of the enemy's attack on our left flank, in consequence of this intrepidity and judicious disposition of Lieutenant-general Osterman, terminated, in this quarter, in his own destruction, and the whole corps under Marshal D'Avoust was totally defeated and dispersed.

"During this furious attack upon our left flank, a numerous body of the enemy's infantry, under the command of Marshal Lannes, divided into six columns, and, according to the statement of the prisoners accompanied by Bonaparte in person, attempted, by penetrating through the wood, to surround our advanced guard under the command of Major-general Barclai De Tolly, which had taken a position to cover our right flank. The object of the enemy on this side was to break, or at least to repulse our right flank, and by this means to cut off our communication with a part of the army under Count Buxhowden, posted in the village of Miskow and Ostrolenka. The attack of the French on this side was extremely violent and impetuous. Our advanced guard notwithstanding a display of the utmost valor and intrepidity on the part both of the commander and troops, was compelled to fall back, by which moment our battery, which kept in check the enemy's columns on the road from Nowe-lesko, soon fell into the hands of the enemy; but the Tengisk regiment of musketeers, in conjunction with the Jagers, charged the enemy with the bayonets, routed him, and retook the position of which he had got possession. In the mean time, by order of the commander-in-chief, General Baron Benningsen, a masked battery had been planted in the wood, and the can-