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TRIAL OF Col. Aaron Burr,

(CONTINUED.)

Tuesday, August 11.

John H. Uphaw was called up; when the Chief Justice wished to know whether Mr. U's impressions had related to treason, or to what circumstances?

A. To the transactions in the western country. Q. Did your opinions amount to the charge of treason? A. My opinions have changed, as the lights of evidence seemed successively to rise upon me. It was my first impression, that Col. B. had nothing more in view than the settlement of the Wachita lands. I next supposed, that it was his intention to conquer Mexico; and last of all, that his plans were of a more complicated nature; and that the taking of New-Orleans was to be a step towards the invasion of Mexico.

Mr. Wickham. Did you think, Sir, as the result of all these considerations, that Col. B. was a dangerous man?

Ans. I did.

Mr. McRae. Have you formed or delivered an opinion, that he was guilty of the act charged in the indictment?

Ans. No: I have neither formed nor delivered such an opinion.

Mr. Baker. Have you in your part of the country supported the ground that Col. B. was guilty; and have you thus argued in conversation?

Ans. Yes; I have so thought, on the presumptive evidence that was before me; and I have not only supported such opinions; but have gone on to vindicate the energy of the measures that were taken by the government.

Mr. Burr. Enough, I think, has appeared to prove that Mr. U. has taken up deep-rooted prejudices against me.

Mr. McRae. Have you any personal prejudices against the prisoner?

Ans. None: I have no prejudices against him, but from his supposed designs against his country.

Mr. Burr. Had you not taken up some prejudices against me anterior to these rumoured transactions in the western country?

Ans. I had formed impressions rather unfavorable to you, from your conduct during the pending presidential election of 1801; but I had no positive evidence on that subject. Here Mr. Uphaw was suspended; to make way for a general argument on the doctrine of challenges.

Mr. Martin rose to proceed with this argument: He stated, that it was one of the soundest principles of law, that every man had a right to be tried by an impartial jury; that this rule was as well applicable in civil as in criminal cases; but that in criminal cases, it had been particularly secured by the constitution.

Mr. McRae apologised for interrupting Mr. Martin; but begged leave to enquire, whether it would not be a saving of time, first to know the objections of all the jurors, and then to hold one general argument to settle the principles that would be applicable to all; instead of thus holding an argument on each particular case as it might successively occur.

Mr. Martin. And does the gentleman, sir, pretend to dive into our hearts that he thus understands whether we are to hold twelve separate arguments? He talks, sir, of economy of time. And is this the way to economize it? I had a specimen of this mode when I was here on a former occasion. Yes, sir, I well know how these gentlemen would save our time. They would, if they could, deprive Col. B's counsel of an opportunity of defending him; that they might as soon as possible hang up their victim to gratify the feelings of the government.

Mr. McRae. That is a most unprincipled and unbecoming assertion; I say it, sir, to his face.

Mr. Burr. We have entered into this argument, because we thought it more expedient to fix the principles on this subject at once; and then to apply these to the particular cases.

Mr. Hay. It is our wish, sir, to pursue this enquiry as soon as possible, and to have time; but, sir, it is impossible for us to hear such gross insults as have

been cast upon us; insults, which are offensive to humanity itself.

The Chief Justice had hoped that no such allusions would have been made: The government ought to be treated with respect.

Mr. Burr had hoped, when he was up before, that he had made sufficient apologies, were any necessary, for any expressions which had been used; and that no allusions would be made to the subject: In his own person he had carefully avoided such language, though the prosecution had certainly furnished him with good reasons for it; and when it had been used by his counsel, it had met his decided displeasure. He again repeated his hope that no allusions would be made to the past; he would answer for it that his own counsel should furnish no occasion for censure.

Mr. Martin declared that it was not his wish to hurt any one's feelings; but that when he was so often interrupted & accused of a disposition to wait time, he could not repress them. As to the point before the court, what does the constitution most emphatically require? That the jury should be impartial; that they should have no impression on their mind to the prejudice of the prisoner; but that they should come here to take all their impressions from the facts exhibited on evidence and upon oath. To this effect he would take the liberty of quoting Reeves's History of the English Law vol. 1, p. 329 and vol. 2, p. 446, and Carey's English Liberties, p. 245, 248, 249, to prove the rigid degree of impartiality required by the laws of England. These authorities would show that a jurymen ought to be completely indifferent to either party; that he ought to have neither enmity nor friendship; and that even a particular familiarity and at the same table, was sufficient to disqualify him. But if a man was to be divested of all affection and all relationship in a civil case, how much more should he be in that situation, in a case of life and death? It was one of the most sacred maxims of the law too, that every man was presumed to be innocent, until there was sufficient evidence produced to remove this presumption. Mr. M. did not understand this halving and quartering of prejudices. It was not sufficient that this man should have one fourth of the prepossession of that; or that he should be 3-5ths or 4-7ths less prejudiced than another; but the law requires that he should be wholly and perfectly impartial. The constitution forbids courts of justice ever forcing upon a criminal any juror that is not perfectly unbiassed. Gentlemen may say, indeed, that we must either take such men, or have no trial at all. But it was not so: he should contend that under the constitution a man should not be tried and hung because a court cannot get impartial jurymen to try him. The spirit of that instrument declares, that no man should be tried, until he could be tried by an impartial jury. Mr. M. quoted 2 McNally, page 667 to show, that a trial may be put off on an affidavit, if the public mind is so prejudiced by publications, as to exclude the chance of a fair trial. To the same effect also he cited the case of the King vs. the Dean of St. Asaph; and the case of Brookes and others, where the trial had been put off to another term, because an imperfect statement of part of the evidence had been given to the public; that public, from which the jury was to be selected. What is the situation of jurymen in the present case? They are to determine upon the subject matter growing out of transactions in the western country. These gentlemen may say that they are justified of Col. B's treasonable purposes: It would be enough if they had conceived that these purposes were dangerous; because it is the court, which is to give a name to these crimes. Can then a man, whose mind is impressed with an opinion of certain practices dangerous to the union, be looked upon as an impartial jurymen? His mind is already half made up; and that half is perhaps the most material part. The acts themselves might be innocent if unconnected with the intentions: 20 boats assembled at Blamchasset's Island, and their crews armed with rifles, are as harmless

an apparatus, as if the men were going to shoot game; but it is the intention which stamps them with a different character. Men whose minds are made up as to the intentions, need only have proof of certain acts; and the business is done. The constitution and common sense both require that a jury should be as free from impressions as to designs as to overt acts. The principle is the same as in a case of Burglary.—It is to be lamented that the public mind is in the state, which gentlemen have described; but it is certainly not so to the extent which they have represented. The 48 men who are on this panel, are not an accurate specimen of the whole state.—And who is it that commenced with these inflammatory publications? Was it Colonel Burr's counsel? No; it was the public papers, under the patronage of the administration. And it was the gentleman on the other side who has contributed to keep up this spirit. It was his zeal; it was he, who was supposed best acquainted with the evidence against him, that pronounced upon his guilt and prepossessed the public mind against him. No man can be looked upon as impartial who has been prejudiced by such publications.

Mr. Burr rose to narrow the argument not to extend it, not to add any thing more, but to throw out of the discussion what had been accidentally introduced. That the public mind was prejudiced against him was an obvious fact; but how this prejudice had been produced, he knew not. He had not wished this point to be at all introduced.—Certain analogies had been introduced between treason and other crimes. It was his hope, that the Court would, for the present dismiss such analogies, as they might be hereafter continued into opinions.—It was evident enough that no jurymen could be impartial whose mind was made up as to the intention. In the case of slaying, for instance, the act might be differently construed. It may be a murder: it may be, a clergyable felony.—Could a jurymen be considered as impartial, that thinks the accused person guilty of a murderous intent?

Mr. McRae stated that it had never been his wish in this controversy before the court, to wander from the way, in order to defend a government; that needs no defence; or to give an unnecessary wound to the bosom of the prisoner. He had most studiously avoided to excite the resentment or disturb the feelings of the opposite counsel. Frequent as had been the occasions when he was prompted to imitate their example; he had carefully avoided profiting by the opportunity; unless on one occasion when he had been forced to retaliate the attack. He should not, however, always pursue this course, if some of the opposite counsel should still persist in disregarding the admonitions of the court. He should attempt to retort with the force which such attacks deserved in every case, and more especially in cases of this description. He declared before that court, before that people, and before the God of his being, that he had never felt the inhuman wish of demanding the blood of the prisoner; or any human being. That man was a stranger to him, who should attribute to him such a disposition. He wished the prisoner to have an impartial jury; and if there was a single one among those let over, who was not impartial, who was not capable of passing between the U. States and Aaron Burr, he requested the court to reject him. As to the principles stated by Mr. Martin, he did not intend to controvert them. He only differed with him in their application to the present case. Which of these jurymen has informed the court, that he has an ill-will against A. B? a personal prejudice? and that on the question of treason, he has a bias against him? It is true, they have formed some opinions about his intentions; but they have received no evidence on which they can form any opinions as to the question of actual treason. And as to these intentions, they may have related to other acts, than those charged in the indictment; to acts done without the district; which are not now before this court. The distinction which they have drawn be-

tween intentions and acts is perfectly clear and rational. These jurymen prove that they have adverted to this distinction, because they quote the opinion of one of the judges now on the bench, who has formally adopted it.—And if this impartiality does not reside in the bosom of the judge, what reason is there to ascribe less of it to the minds of the jurors?

Mr. Hay admitted that the prisoner was entitled to an impartial jury; but the question was who was an impartial jurymen? He must be one, said Mr. Hay, that partakes of the common sentiments of the majority of the people among whom he resides. Will the court undertake to say, that the majority of this district is incapable of judging properly? If so, he would unite with Mr. Martin in saying, that it was a libel on the state; and the majority would very truly return the compliment, by saying, you alone who brand us with this censure prove by this very act the prejudices with which you yourself are actuated.—The opposite counsel have spoken of news-paper publications. He would venture to say that there is not a man of however remote a situation, or of supine a disposition, who has not received some impressions on this subject. These impressions were taken up without any sentiment of ill-will to the accused; or without even knowing him. Is it reasonable then to pronounce, that with these impressions the majority is incapable of deciding fairly? There may perchance be some one ignorant man who has received no impressions on this subject, some solitary hermit that is shut up in the hollow of a tree; some human being cut off from all human concerns; into whose solitary bosom the history of these transactions has never yet penetrated; but such is not the picture of the world at large. Our society is divided into two great parties; he knew that these two were not to a man united on this occasion; but he knew too that there was not a man among them, who had not taken his side, one way or the other. Some authorities had been cited from Reeves and McNally; they did not bear upon this case; but he should cite two others which did. The first was the case of Callender, where it was supposed sufficient to ask the jurymen, whether he had formed and delivered an opinion on the point at issue. The other was from 2 Hawkins, ch 48, p. 418 on the subject of challenges, where it is said to be no good cause of challenge, that a man is a jurymen on an indictment similar to that on which he has already found a verdict. Mr. Hay commented upon these authorities at considerable length.

LATEST PROCEEDINGS.

SATURDAY, August 15.

It is proper to observe that on Thursday three of the jury, who had been summoned on the second Venue, were discharged by the court, viz. general Pegram, because he was then engaged in military business; Mr. Lewis, because he owned no freehold in the state of Virginia; and Mr. William Moncreu of this city, on account of his indisposition. It was understood before the rising of the court that the marshal was to summon three substitutes, and that the prisoner would accept them. Of course the Venue which was this day brought into court, was complete, and consisted of 48.

Benjamin Tate was excused from serving, on account of his indisposition.

Henry Randolph wished to be discharged because he was engaged in collecting the public revenue. The court would not however admit the validity of the excuse.

The Venue was then called over, in the following order:

Jacob Michaux, Powhatan, William Randolph, Surry, John Edwards, Sussex, George Minge, Charles City, William L. Morton, Charlotte, Christopher Anthony, Goochland, John Darriocot, Hanover, Washington Truehart, Louisa, Martin Smith, Prince Edward, Benjamin Tate, City of Richmond, Christopher Tompkins, do. Benjamin Branch, Dinwiddie, Thos. Branch, Chesterfield, James Sheppard, City of Richmond, Gabriel Raiton, do. Nicholas Davis, Bedford, Reuben Blakey, Henrico, Miles Sel-den, Sussex, Walter Biant, do. Richard N. Thweatt, Peterburg, John Fitzgerald, Nottingham, Robert M'Kim, City of Richmond, Benjamin Graves, Chesterfield, Wm. M'Kim City of Richmond, Robert Hyde, do. Thomas Miller, Powhatan, Robert Crode, Chesterfield, Henry Randolph, do. Miles Bott, do. Henry