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OUR FUTURE CONDUCT.

Since it is in vain at present to attempt checking the power of France on the continent of Europe, the country should turn its whole thoughts and exertions, to the creation of new connections, new points of commerce, and new sources of wealth, with which to supply the place of those we are daily losing, and to counterpoise the increasing preponderance of the enemy. If France has acquired dominion over the continent of Europe, England possesses the undisputed sovereignty of the seas in all parts of the world—and if this country can establish herself in security against invasion, this state of things, so far from circumscribing her empire, may be the means of extending it and exalting her in greatness under a wise and vigorous government, alone fit to guide us in those times. Not a government depending on speech makers, borough-mongers, and faction couplers; but one which, by the boldness and utility of its measures, shall strike the world with awe, and secure the confidence of the English people. Within these few days we have seen, by the official notes of the Swedish government, with what terror our proceedings at Copenhagen has struck the north of Europe, how Russia even trembles—we have seen the king of Spain desirous of following the advice we so happily gave to the royal family of Portugal—and the effects of the orders in council, asserting practically our maritime supremacy, will continue raising this nation to a height which but few have foreseen she is capable of attaining. The shores of the ocean have been at all times the birth place of civilization and the arts, of wealth and of power. With these under our dominion, it may truly be said, "the Trident of Neptune is the Sceptre of the world." Within a year, should this country continue to stand in its present position, we shall begin to discover and wonder at our strength, our capabilities, and our resources. Commanding the seas, nations must become our tributaries, or fall into sloth, poverty and barbarism. The law of nations must be made binding on France and her vassals, if England is to be bound by it; but while France tramples it under foot as convenience requires, we must do the same, or the law of nations will become our most dangerous enemy. If some changes take place in the channels of our commerce, and the demands for our manufactures, it will soon be found that the aggregate amount of both will not be diminished, though the changes may have fallen heavily on individuals. The nation will not suffer though individuals may, and it is the nation alone we must look at. Since the enemy asserts & exercises its dominion over so many states, on no other right but that of power, we must on the same authority, exercise it over all the seas of the world. In any treaty of peace we must exchange the privilege of navigating that coast and this sea, against the privilege of sending our goods into that state or this kingdom. If Bonaparte will become Emperor of Europe, the king of England should declare himself Emperor of the Ocean. We have as much right to the one as he has to the other, the right of conquest. It is only by a proud tone, and an assuming conduct, that we can make the world feel our strength, and demonstrate our own confidence in its efficacy. It is not a question of right and wrong, but a question of power; that is to be decided. If we hesitate or compromise, we are gone. The moment our hearts fail us, the moment we admit it to be a vain task to struggle with France for the terms of peace, which really shall be safe and honorable, that moment we are a vanquished nation. Certain destruction will be the consequence of believing that concession and conciliatory conduct will produce in her the slightest disposition of justice, forbearance, or amity.—With the point of the sword our treaties must be written, or the characters will not long remain legible—at the cannon's mouth must they be maintained. Let those who have pretended to doubt the obvious and invariable designs of France, look at the fate of Spain, the most striking instance of treachery, usurpation, and rapine of the many that have been afforded, and ask what we have to expect from a state of peace? The only chance of our having friends in any part of the world, is in our putting forth a strong arm, and shewing not only that we are neither daunted nor disabled, but that our strength and our energy increase with our difficulties. Let us shew that we are confident of triumphing, and we shall triumph. The great fault of which this country has hitherto been guilty is, that instead of availing itself of its own means of attack against the most eligible points, it awaits the attack of France, and then flies to render assistance against her.—France generally has been left to choose the object of contest, the scene of struggle. We look on at her, what quarter she will next assail, and then we prepare to frustrate her designs often when it is too late. With the exception of assisting Sweden, and

securing Sicily ourselves—who not secure till Naples is restored to its lawful sovereign, as well as to secure Madeira till Portugal is restored to its lawful sovereign? With these exceptions, as we have no immediate object in Europe at this moment; with so much disposable force, such an unexampled invincible navy as we possess, our main efforts should be directed towards the dominions of Spain in America and India. To attempt the conquest of them is at once the most difficult, the most expensive, and the least secure course. Independence and alliance should be held out to them. Had this course been taken two years ago, the countries on River Plata, Lima, the Carracas, and the whole of South America would have been in a state of friendship and close intercourse with us, consuming more of our manufactures, returning more valuable produce, and employing more of our marine, than the present situation of the continent of Europe, has effected. By this course, indeed, there would not arise a long list of military employments, to bestow on the panders and tools of faction at home; but the country would be put to little or no expense, while it would enjoy all the benefit. Sir Philip Francis, might redden more than his rihband with rage at being disappointed of his new governorship of Buenos Ayres, and the long list of place-hunting favorites named to situations there, might become discontented—but the lives of hundreds of our brave countrymen, and millions of public money would have been saved, while our merchants would have been carrying on an active trade to the place. But no, the conquest of a colony was deemed of no value by the late ministry, but just as it enabled them to provide for hungry, clamor-partizans. Places and pensions were, and indeed always have been, their chief objects; not commerce and manufactures. Gen. Whitlock was instructed by Lord Howick on no account to declare the people independent. No.—In that case Sir Philip and his crew would not have had their jobs. On the same grounds we presume the military that preceded them declined giving Miranda effectual assistance in establishing the independence of Carracas. The late ministry indeed who endeavour to throw the blame of all their faults on the king, or the Duke of York, insidiously whisper, they would have declared Buenos Ayres independent, had not his majesty, recollecting the American revolution, and the fate of the king of France, refused to assist any colonies in rebelling against their lawful sovereign. But if this was as true as it is false, it would not be a sufficient excuse since the Foxites vehemently contend, the ministry for the time being are responsible for all the measures of the king's government, whether they approve of them or not. But it appears from Whitlock's trial, that Buenos Ayres would even have become a colony of this country, receiving Sir Philip and his place hunting train, if the English government would have solemnly engaged not to restore the settlement to Spain when peace was concluded. But no—the first thing the Foxites did when they heard of the conquest of Buenos Ayres, was to tell France they would give it back to Spain without any equivalent! [vide the negotiation papers.] They then sent large armaments to conquer a place they declared their readiness to relinquish on the first occasion, and the Buenos Ayres very naturally resolved to resist us rather than become an article of barter in another negotiation. It is indeed a mischievous fault in all the Statesmen, that they take places in war, with no other design than to surrender them as the price of peace. As a price of peace this may be well enough; but let us enquire into the ruin of character which it brings upon us.

We rarely take a place in which there are not some considerable persons, perhaps a considerable number, who do not favor our attack, or cordially receive and join with us when we have conquered. When the place is restored, these persons are persecuted and ruined. By the repeated capture and surrender of Minorca, we have ruined our character in the Mediterranean, and by similar means have we lost all confidence in the enemy's colonies in the East and West Indies. Bonaparte, on the contrary, never gives up any people he has once taken under his protection, and hence the facility he finds in new modeling different states. The people of Buenos Ayres, therefore, very naturally and very wisely, desired a permanent connection or none. In this respect we should meet Bonaparte in his own way. In his negotiations he talks of the kings of Holland, Spain, Wirtemberg, Wespalia, Bavaria, &c. as independent sovereigns, his allies, of whom he cannot dispose, and to whom he cannot dictate. Were we to erect Buenos Ayres, Mexico, Carracas, Cuba, &c. into independent states, our allies, we might talk to Bonaparte in his own language. Instead of a long altercation about surrendering those places, we would have no negotiation respecting them.—They would be our allies for whom to stipulate, not our colonies of whom to make a barter, and we should derive all the advantage of co-

lonies from the connection with them, (except that of providing for the dependents of factious and rotten borough mongers) without risk or expense.

Our intercourse with the U. States shews, that we may derive more benefit from trading with an ally than with a colony. The spirit of industry, the encouragement to enterprize is much stronger in one case than the other. Colonists are confined in their industry; the sterility of slavery is in a degree spread over their country. Independence gives them a new impulse of action, which operates with great force, as the United States of America have shewn. Were we to declare countries independent, and assist them in throwing off the yoke of our enemy, all the islands in the world would of necessity put themselves under our protection, and we should have in effect, though not in name, but one colony from Hudson's Bay to Cape Horn. No great military or naval force would be necessary to retain faithful to our engagements! and instead of feeling a loss of the trade with the continent of Europe, we should find trade, wealth, and maritime greatness beyond the dreams even of the most sanguine, far eclipsing France both in power and splendor. The time for the achievement of these great objects is fast passing away forever. France is possessing herself of Spain, and through Spain, will possess herself of the Spanish colonies, to which she can spare an abundance of troops.—Let us then no longer hear of dozens of expeditions sailing from our coast at once, each so nicely balanced in strength to its object, that it probably fails, though with a staff strong in Parliamentary interest; but let us see one great expedition going forth four times as strong as is supposed to be necessary, thereby ensuring success, and passing from place to place, emancipating countries from the yoke of our enemies, thus raising up a new world of friends to supply the place of the one we have lost.

We invite the attention of the reader to the perusal of the following extract—it develops the deep-laid plans and treasonable intentions of certain characters high in office; and was written to a democratic Senator in April last by a gentleman who well knows of the presumptuous claim of the Yazoo Speculators. This extract was handed to the Editor by a gentleman of respectability, and who is ready to vouch for its authenticity. *Norfolk Herald.*

Extract of a Letter.

"It has been the opinion of a number of gentlemen in the Michigan Territory, and likewise my own, that the appointment of Gov. Hull, to that Territory, & the establishment of a Bank at Detroit, has been the result of a plan adopted by the chief of the Yazoo Company, to facilitate their seizing upon that valuable tract of country in the Mississippi Territory. It will be naturally asked how the Detroit Bank can in any way or manner answer the views of the Yazoo Company.

"I answer, that it is the intention of the Company to size upon the lands they claim, by conveying the ensuing summer, a strong settlement between the Alabama and Tombigbee rivers, not far distant from the south line of the state of Tennessee.

"The establishment of the Detroit Bank is intended to enable the Company to acquire a large property, fraudulently, by circulating their bills in the New England States, and never redeeming them, by paying cash for them; by which means they will acquire near two millions of dollars to assist them in taking possession of that country, as they have circulated more than two millions in the New England States.—And the moment the Detroit bills began to come into the Bank for redemption, the whole of the Banking Company will remove to the Mississippi Territory, with the Yazoo Company, and settle on their claim.—Undoubtedly they will have their agents among the New England people, to encourage them into the Mississippi Territory, by plausible stories and promising lands to those people who hold the Detroit Bank Notes, in payment for those notes, provided they will settle on the lands they claim. Thus, by acquiring two millions of dollars to enable them to prosecute their schemes, they will acquire a powerful party in the New England States, whose interest will be to support them. To corroborate the above statement, I take the liberty of communicating to you a conversation which took place between the honorable Gideon Granger, Post-Master General of the United States, and Agent of the Yazoo Company, and myself, at his office in the City of Washington, the 2d of April, 1808.

"I called at Mr. Granger's office between 11 and 12 o'clock in the morning. When I called at the door he informed me that he was at that time busy, and desired me to walk into the General Post Office, the room opposite, which I did. After a few minutes I observed to one of the Clerks in the office, that it would probably be some time before Mr. Granger would be at leisure; the Clerk

made answer that he thought not; that Gen. Wilkinson was in the office with him—about half an hour Mr. Granger came to me, and asked me to walk into his office, which I did. I began my conversation with him by observing, that I had taken the liberty to call on him, to know whether he had dismissed Mr. James Abbot from the Post Office in Detroit. He said he had not, but observed, that it was intimated to him by the President that it was necessary Mr. Abbot should be removed from the Post Office.—I asked him on what account; and whether Mr. Abbot had conducted himself improperly in the office. Mr. Granger observed that he considered Mr. Abbot to be a man of abilities, and that as far as he knew he had conducted the office with integrity. I observed to Mr. Granger, that I thought it to be bad policy to turn such a man out of office, and that it would be attended with bad consequences to the people in the Michigan Territory. Mr. Granger observed he could not prevent it, that if he did not comply with the President's wishes, the President would turn him out of his office, and appoint a man to fill it who would comply with his requests.—I observed, that such things in the President ought not to be countenanced by the people of the United States, that every man ought to be treated according to his merits.

"We then entered into a conversation respecting Mr. Hull's being appointed Governor of Michigan.—I then observed to Mr. Granger, that the dismissal of Mr. Griswold from office, and the re-appointment of the Governor, would increase the dissensions in that Territory which already was very great.

"After considerable loose conversation, Mr. Granger observed, that in a short time he expected to go to New Connecticut. A conversation on land speculation was the subject I wished to enter into with Mr. Granger.—He observed that he was going there to get the County Courts established at Jefferson; that the commissioners to determine where the Court House should be built, were to meet in a short time; that the people were divided about it: some were for having it built at Austinburgh, some on the Lake shore, but that it was his object to meet the Commissioners, to have them to determine on Jefferson, as it was near the centre of the county. I observed to him, that I had been a considerable time at Austinburgh, and that I had been at Jefferson; that I did not like the country; that it was too flat and wet; that it appeared to me that it was once overflowed with the Lake. He observed that it was his opinion that that country was once ocean, and he considered the soil as excellent, and admirably adapted to the culture of tobacco. He observed to me, that he had employed a number of Virginians, and that he was going into the business largely. I observed to him, that I thought the article of hemp would be more profitable for exportation for that country, if the inhabitants were once in the habit of raising it. He observed that the raising of tobacco for the northern trade would be profitable, as there was annually sent to Michilimachinac 1000 huds.—I then enquired of him what chance he would give a person who would bring one or two hundred actual settlers from New Hampshire and Vermont, who would be able to pay him from one to four hundred dollars for lands. I also observed to him, that it was my intention to leave the Michigan territory—that under the present administration of that government, it would never become an elective one; for instead of inhabitants coming into that territory, all that could, would in a short time leave it.

"That whenever I made choice of a place for a settlement, I could form a company of active young men that would be actual settlers, who would be able to purchase several townships, and pay down a considerable part of the purchase money. Mr. Granger observed, that any person who simply made a sale of lands, that he allowed one dollar out of twenty, and when a sale was made for ready payment, one dollar in fifteen, and that his price was Congress price, or two dollars per acre. I observed to him that he held his lands too high.

"After a considerable conversation respecting his lands in New Connecticut, I went to a large map which appeared to me to be a manuscript, and the original of Mr. Agram Bradley's map on a large scale. I there pointed out to him the Tombigbee River in the Mississippi Territory, as the country which I meant to settle in; that the country near the head waters of that river was high, open and healthy, and the most beautiful climate perhaps in America; and that as soon as Congress would sell those lands, I meant to go there immediately; and I observed further, that I thought in a short time the Mississippi Territory would become the most valuable and populous part of the United States. Mr. Granger observed, that he never would wish for a son of his to go to that country.—I asked him his reasons. He observed that the state of son's was wretched beyond