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From the Carolina Republican.

MR. STANLEY
TO HIS CONSTITUENTS.

At an extra session of Congress which commenced on the 22d of May, closed the 28th of the adjournment, to the fourth Monday of the next month.

The act of Congress directing this extra session was founded on the apprehension of a situation of affairs between the United States and Great Britain and France, might necessitate a change in the course of measures adopted by us, either for precaution or defence: and upon a presumption that the meeting of Congress, intelligence received from Europe to govern such

will be in your recollection, that Congress subjecting the United States for twelve months to the accumulated unprecedented distresses of an embargo, and obtaining any of those changes in the course of either Great Britain or France to which we were promised as a requital for our manifold sufferings and evils which had been imposed upon us to sustain; on the 1st of June, last, virtually abandoned that weak measure, by substituting for it the non-intercourse act. The non-intercourse act passed on that day, interdicted commerce into our waters and harbours, and prohibited the sailing of our public ships both of Great Britain and France, and a prohibition which till that time had been imposed on British ships only. The commercial restrictions declared by the act, also the same as to both nations. The act authorized the President, in case of non-compliance or a just modification of the act of France or Great Britain, to declare the same by proclamation; and provided that the trade of the United States might be resumed with the nation, whose policy towards us might become more just.

Previous to the meeting of congress, the British minister, Mr. Erskine, induced (he says by the false change in the relation of the two countries the effect of the non-intercourse act, and Great Britain on the same footing, in respect, with the other belligerents,) to a conciliatory disposition in the president, and on the 18th April, terminated in the admission of the Chesapeake; with an assurance from the British minister, that the orders in relation to the Chesapeake, which had been withdrawn on the 10th June; a proclamation from the President, announcing the renewal of trade with Great Britain, on the 10th of June.

In regard to other points of the relations between the United States and Great Britain, which have long been in discussion, and which their nature must depend on mutual assent, the British government agree to send to the United States an Envoy Extraordinary, with power to conclude a treaty for adjustment.

I permit me here, in congratulating you on the removal of that dreadful scourge, the embargo, and the revival of the cheering influence of commerce, to say, that no small amount of praise is justly due to the present Magistrate of the United States, for his liberal, and enlightened conduct in the negotiation with the British minister.

The late President embarrassed and defeated in the first negotiation, by insisting that an absolute relinquishment of the British claim on their seamen from neutral merchant ships, should make an indispensable part of the adjustment for the attack on the Chesapeake; without such extorted relinquishment, no honorable reparation should be given for that injury—to which demand a qualified refusal was given. Even after the subsequent negotiation with Mr. Erskine, the demand for this pre-relinquishment was wavered, yet other demands were coupled with the adjustment of the Chesapeake, by insisting that a pledge for an effectual interposition, respecting other subjects of complaint; to which the British envoy replied, he was required by the instructions of his government, from entering on any subject but the adjustment of the Chesapeake, and "not authorizing any pledge concerning them."

Mr. Madison took up the affair of the Chesapeake upon its own ground; left the British claim to impressment to be settled upon other matters in the proposed treaty, and happily removed that stumbling block which had presented an obstacle at the threshold of every late attempt at negotiation.

The emperor of France no communication had been received, at the meeting of the session of congress. Neither the minister here, nor through any other channel, have any indications been shown of the least change on the part of that go-

vernment, in its unfriendly dispositions and unjust treatment of the United States—the decrees of the emperor violating our neutral rights, continue in full force.

Congress having convened under this state of things—the differences with Great Britain adjusted; but appeals to the interest, as well as to the justice and magnanimity of Bonaparte, having proved ineffectual; it was only necessary to provide means for securing as far as was practicable, the persons and property of our citizens from French depredations, and to adopt such a course of measures, as while they yield advantages to their enemy and produced inconvenience to themselves, might make it the interest of the emperor of France to depart from his unjust treatment of us, and induce him to respect our rights. The act of the last session of congress commonly called the non-intercourse act, seeming to unite more opinions in its favour than any other plan, its principal provisions were adopted, and an act passed conforming in all commercial restraints to that law.

By this act all commercial intercourse with France and her dependencies, is prohibited, and the importation into the U. States of any goods or merchandize the growth or manufacture of France, is interdicted: if any such are imported they are forfeited.

In one particular this act differs from the act of the last congress. By the first act, the public ships both of France and Great Britain, were denied admittance into our harbours and waters. The present act does not continue in force the sections of the former act which contain this interdiction, and those having expired by their own limitation, the consequence is, that the public ships both of France and Great Britain are admitted—This admission of French ships, into our harbours I disapprove. It is perfectly well known that the public ships of France are the instruments by which the iniquitous decrees of Bonaparte are to be executed—that the object of those ships when they can escape the British ships and get upon the ocean, is not to seek in combat the ships of war of their enemy, but to capture, plunder and burn the neutral merchant vessels of the United States. While therefore the decrees of Bonaparte remain in full force, and his ships of war charged with the execution of them; to receive them in our harbours, afford them an asylum from the pursuit of their superior enemy; to yield them the means of refitting for a cruise against ourselves; seems to me to be cherishing a serpent in our bosom, and to sharpen the weapon intended for our own destruction.

In this light the last Congress must have viewed the subject, and therefore, because at that time both France and England had in force orders and decrees violating our rights, they excluded the public ships of both. At this time our differences with England have been settled upon terms deemed honorable to this nation. As to England therefore, the hatchet is buried, and any marks of remaining national resentment at past differences, satisfactorily adjusted, would be inconsistent with national honor and magnanimity. Her ships therefore are again admitted to the rights of hospitality. As to France the case is widely different—Her conduct is no way changed. Since the act of last Congress she has not altered a letter of her decrees, or abated a tittle in the rigor of their execution. On what ground then does she deserve milder treatment at this time, than she did 6 months ago? If it was dangerous, imprudent, or otherwise wrong to admit her ships to the asylum of our harbors in February last, what has made it safe, politic or right since? If it is hoped to coerce France into an abandonment of her decrees, by withholding from her the benefits of other trade, is it not highly probable that in the present situation of her West India possessions, the refusal of an entry into our harbours, would materially aid in producing that result? Deprived of Martinico, and engaged in continuing attempts to supply Guadaloupe and Hispaniola, beset with the ships of England; the privilege of entering our ports may be highly valuable to her fleets in effecting those escapes to which they are so frequently driven. The desire to obtain this advantage, particularly if enjoyed by her enemy, might have had some influence towards producing the desired change in her conduct.

I voted against the admission of French public ships, and although that feature of the bill was retained, yet approving its other provisions, I voted for the act.

Soon after the adjustment with the British minister, and perhaps as a consequence of that event, the President directed notice to be given to the governors of the States, that the detachment of 100,000 militia recently called for by Congress, was no longer required to be held in readiness for actual service. The alacrity with which our citizens volunteered their services on that occasion, cannot be mentioned but to their honor; it was the call of the administration of the government of their country, and although the necessity or utility of the measure was not obvious, and we were perplexed with uncertainty as to its object; whether Quixotically to attack ships

of war, the only assailants which threatened to disturb our national quiet; or for the conquest of Canada, and the acquisition of a country costing more for its support and protection than its resources can pay; a plan not worth the candle; it was still our duty to obey. Fortunately as I deem it, events have excused us from the consequences which might have attended the employment of the militia in either of the conjectured or contemplated projects.

By an act of Congress of April 1806, the standing army of the United States was directed to be increased by an addition of about 6,000 men. The differences with Great Britain, the ostensible reason for this increase, having terminated, it was expected the army might be reduced; but some symptoms of unfriendly disposition having appeared among the Indians on the north western frontier, and vacancies frequently happening in the army from "different casualties" (the principal of which is like to be the death in the neighbourhood of New-Orleans) it was deemed prudent to retain the army in its present force. Of the additional military force about 3800 have been raised; all further enlistments are by law suspended. The former military peace establishment amounted to about 3,000—The present army therefore is about 6,800 men.

The naval force of the U. States consists at present of 10 frigates, 7 brigs, Corvettes and armed ships, and 170 gun boats.

Of the frigates, 5 are prepared for service and are at different ports, 5 require repairs, and are at the navy yard at Washington city; the inferior armed ships are all prepared for service.

Of the gun-boats, 24 are in service at New-Orleans, the residue laid up in ordinary, some on the stocks, others in the ship yards, or in what are commonly called "dry docks."

By an act of the late session, the President is authorized to cause to be laid up such of the vessels belonging to the navy as he may think proper.

The attention of Congress in the late session was particularly called to the gun boats. These machines although sanctioned in their creation by an act of Congress, seem to have owed their existence emphatically to the strong recommendation of the late President, Mr. Jefferson—and being now from experience better known and understood, must be pronounced one of those visionary projects of that exuberant mind "where weeds and flowers promiscuously shoot." The Secretary of the Navy was called upon for information on certain points respecting them; from the candid and perspicuous report of this intelligent officer, it appears,

That the gun-boats and two ketches have cost, for building and fitting alone 1,704,000 dollars. And the gun-boats on an average 9,000 each.

That the yearly expence of maintaining each gun-boat in service is 11,700 dollars, consequently the whole can only be kept in service at the annual expence of 1,955,000 dollars—[equal to 5739 dollars each day]

That if only the 24 at New-Orleans be kept in service and the residue be laid up in dry docks, the annual expence will be 357,000 dollars—

That from the quality of the materials of which they are built, repairs are so frequently necessary, that if they are suffered to lie in port one year without repair, it is probable at the expiration of the year, most of them will be found wholly unworthy of being repaired, and that the sails and rigging of those laid up, will at the expiration of one year, be so much injured as to be unfit for use.

Regarding the gun-boats as relating to the interest of the nation, the secretary of the navy is of opinion, that they can never be of service in offensive warfare. If in the event of war, the United States resolve to act merely on the defensive, gun-boats if properly stationed will aid materially; "but (he adds) our marine should be directed against a foreign trade, and to the conveying and protection of our own, a system of well armed, fast sailing frigates and smaller cruisers, would on every principle be preferable, in point of effect and much less costly." He observes too very justly, that it is only on board vessels suited for sea service that good seamen are to be formed.

Of the comparative expence of building and the cost of maintaining a gun on board a frigate and a gun-boat, the secretary of the navy states,

That the frigate President mounts 56 guns, 42 pound carronades and 24 pound long cannon, and cost 221,000 dollars—requires 420 men to man her, and is maintained in actual service at the annual expence less than 120,000 dollars.

A gun-boat whether mounting one or two guns, requires 45 men to man her, and costs annually 11,700 dollars in actual service.

It hence results that 19 gun boats each carrying guns, and in the whole only 33 guns, costs more than such a frigate. That 10 gun-boats, carrying only 10 or 20 guns require more men to man them than a frigate carrying 56 guns.

That a frigate fights 56 guns with 420 men. Whereas to fight 56 guns on board 28 gun-boats requires 1260 men, and if on board 56 gun-boats requires 2520 men, and that 2520 men employed on board frigates of 56 guns each, fight 336 guns.—As to the expence per gun, it appears that 56 guns mounted on board a frigate cost annually less than \$120,000 that the annual expence per gun on board a gun-boat carrying 2 guns is \$5,850, and on board a gun-boat carrying one gun \$11,700 per annum. That 56 guns cost annually \$207,600 more than the same number of guns on board a frigate; and the same number of guns on board 56 gun-boats, cost \$535,200 more than the same number on board a frigate—

These facts before us the proper course seemed to be, to sell the gunboats, while they would yet command any price. The proposition to sell them failed. Consequently gun-boats are yet to be numbered among the toys of administration and the moths of the treasury.

750,000 dollars was appropriated for completing the fortifications commenced for the protection of our ports and harbours, and to erect such fortifications as may be necessary for the protection of the northern and western frontiers of the United States: believing peace the proper season to prepare for war, I approved this appropriation and voted for it.

As a consequence of the deficiencies in the revenue of the United States, occasioned by the embargo, it was to be expected that a resort to loans for the support of the government would be necessary.

To borrow money for the support of gun-boats and an army, would not find many advocates out of the sphere of the immediate influence of their fond parent the late President of the United States. And to borrow for the ordinary expences of government, while it would revive among the people some embargo recollections, could not be popular, and therefore not very agreeable to the gentlemen whose measures had produced the necessity. —But as more money was wanted, and the necessity of a loan suggested by the Secretary of the treasury; and as "to stop the wheels of government," by withholding supplies, was not advised at this time; a legislative stragem was adopted, by which the fact of borrowing money, if not entirely concealed from the people, is yet to be wrapped in a garb so plausible, as probably to pass without detection or without censure.

This was to authorize a loan, not for gun-boats, army, or for the payment of the instalments of the public debt as they fall due.—For this purpose a bill was introduced as supplementary to an act passed 3d March 1795, making further provision for the support of public credit; which gives to the Commissioners of the Sinking Fund, the same powers to effect loans for the payment of the existing debt of the U. States, as they possess under the act of 1795, in regard to the debt then due.

It happens however, that in consequence of existing provisions for the payment of the debt, the funds for that purpose are ample, and the design and effect of this bill could only be by diverting the funds appropriated for the debt, to the ordinary exigencies of government, to keep those moving, without the odium of creating a debt for their support—and to borrow, for the righteous and popular purpose of paying the debt, and supporting public credit.

The facts which support the development of this project, will be stated as briefly as possible:

Prior to the administration of Mr. Jefferson, Congress by act of the 3d March, 1795, appropriated certain funds, bestowed on distinct sources of revenue, for the payment of the public debt; and for the monies accruing therefrom, denominated the "Sinking fund" were (in the words of the act) "vested in the commissioners of the sinking fund, in trust for the reimbursement and redemption of the debt;" to be applied in the first instance and without discretion, to the payment of the annuity of 8 per cent. on the 6 per cent. and deferred stocks, until the final redemption of said stocks: and "the fifth of the United States was pledged, that the said funds should inviolably remain and be appropriated and vested as aforesaid, to be applied to the said reimbursement and redemption until the same should be fully and completely effected." The product of these funds depended on contingencies, and might fall short of the instalments of the debt annually payable. Power was therefore given to the commissioners of the sinking fund, to borrow the deficiencies in any year which might be necessary to make the payment and preserve the public faith.

If language have any meaning, can there be a doubt that the proceeds of these funds thus solemnly "vested in the commissioners of the sinking fund," and "inviolably appropriated," for the discharge of the debt, were in the first instance, subject to the call of the commissioners, and gave their claim a priority over every other appropriation?

By the subsequent acts in 1797—98 and 1800, certain additional duties thereby laid, were appropriated to the debt; "but the mo-