

EUROPE.

"END OF THE HOLY WORK."

The Treaty Signed on Saturday

-Great Enthusiasm - Congratulations to the Czar - The Russians Jubilant.

LONDON, March 3.—The following announcement of the conclusion of peace between Russia and Turkey, was received to-night by Reuter Telegram Company:
CONSTANTINOPLE, Sunday Night, March 3, 1878.
The treaty of peace has been signed. The Grand Duke Nicholas announced the fact to the soldiers at review at San Stefano to-day. Russia has abandoned her claims on the Egyptian and Bulgarian provinces.

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LONDON, March 4.—A special to the Standard from Vienna asserts that two divisions of Austrians will enter Bosnia in about ten days.

The Standard's correspondent at Vienna states that the Austrian and British ambassadors are instructed to protest, if the Russian enter Constantinople.

The Times's St. Petersburg and Pera correspondents confirm the report that the treaty of peace had been signed.

At St. Petersburg the celebration of the news of peace is unprecedented. Immense crowds are before the Palace, shouting and singing, "God save the Czar."

The Pera correspondent says the treaty was signed on Saturday.

Thirty-one thousand troops were reviewed at San Stefano, and a Te Deum was sung amid great enthusiasm.

The Daily Telegraph's Pera correspondent professes to give the conditions of peace. He makes the indemnity 1,400 million roubles, with forty millions sterling in bonds added.

The Paris correspondent of the Times telegraphs as follows: "Lord Lyons, the British Ambassador here, will go to London on Tuesday, presumably to confer with the government about his course at the conference."

A despatch to Reuter from Constantinople, March 3rd, by way of Athens, says: "Previous to the signature of the treaty of peace, Gen. Ignatieff demanded that Turkey should unite with Russia in defending all its stipulations before the conference. Saifet Pasha refused to accede to this. Gen. Ignatieff then telegraphed to St. Petersburg for instructions. It is not known how the question was settled."

Russia agreed not to include Valachia and Bulgaria, including Bulgaria, Valachia and Kastellia. Money indemnity of 40,000,000 pounds originally claimed in addition to territorial concessions, was finally fixed at 12 millions.

REPRESENTATION, March 4.—The Grand Duke Nicholas has sent the following to the Emperor: "San Stefano, March 3.—I do myself the honor of congratulating your Majesty on the conclusion of peace. God has vouchsafed to us the happiness of accomplishing the holy work begun by your Majesty, and on the anniversary of the coronation of his Majesty, your Majesty has delivered Christians from the Mussulman yoke."

LONDON, March 4.—The Pera correspondent of the Times says: "By giving up their hostile European provinces, and at the same time receiving a tribute from the national debt, the Turkish fleet the indemnity was reduced to 12,000,000 sterling, and that the Egyptian tribute was not affected."

THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, in answer to a question, said the matter of defence of the island of Cyprus was being carefully considered, at the present moment.

A Cuban Proclamation.

HAVANA, March 4.—A proclamation, dated Puerto Principe, and signed by Captain General Jovellar and General Matias Campos, says:
"Whereas, the insurgents are surrendering their arms, and whereas, a majority of the slaves who took part in the insurrection did not figure in the same, and whereas, the law of 1870, which belonged to masters who stipulated directly or indirectly in the insurrection, thereby acquiring their liberty de facto, and whereas the sentiment is taken into account which inspires the present law of the gradual emancipation of the slaves in this island, therefore, authorized by the home government, we proclaim:
ARTICLE 1st.—All slaves of both sexes, who were in the files of the Insurgents on the 10th of February, will be free if they present themselves to the legitimate authorities, or the government troops before the last day of March.

ARTICLE 2nd.—The former owners of these slaves have no right to indemnity if they took part in the insurrection themselves directly or indirectly.

ARTICLE 3rd.—Those formerly owners of these slaves, who remain faithful to the Spanish government will receive an indemnity in the manner which the law of gradual abolition prescribes.

ARTICLE 4th.—All local authorities will furnish papers of free citizenship to these former slaves included in article first, giving direct and detailed accounts to the heads of their respective departments.

A decree signed by Capt. General Jovellar and Gen. M. Campos, says: "Whilst during the existence of the insurrection the attention of the government was absorbed by the war, now after its happy conclusion comes the time to introduce into the organic political administrative system of the island, such reforms as will give it a new life, and which have enjoyed long ago and would have been in an analogous position with Porto Rico excepting certain reforms of

OUR WASHINGTON LETTER.

Our Representatives at Work

-Thurman and Lamar - Growing Weakness of the Cabinet - The Signal Service Maps - Corcoran Art Gallery.

(From our own Correspondent.)

WASHINGTON, March 2d, 1878.
Neither House of Congress is in session to-day nor was the Senate in session on yesterday.

Nothing of special interest transpired in the House, on yesterday,—the day having been mainly devoted, as is the usage on Fridays, to the consideration of the private mail.

Mr. Wadwell, from the Committee on Post Offices and Post Roads, reported back, on Sunday, for sundry bills referred to that committee, and by the House on Monday.

On motion of Mr. Wadwell, Wednesday afternoon, the consideration of the bill to regulate the compensation of postmasters and for other purposes, was postponed to Friday.

Mr. Davis presented the petition of 50 citizens of Wilson county, N. C., praying for the establishment of a United States District Court at Tarboro; and

Mr. Hooper presented the petition of sundry citizens of Catawba county, against the abolition of the Western Judicial District.

As was to be expected, the leading business of the morning was the Wall Street gentry, and the "bleeding" of the silver bill in the severest terms, while the press of the South and West generally explained it. By the way, a Washington correspondent of the Detroit News mentions, as a matter of current gossip, that

Mr. Wadwell, one of the prominent Democratic candidates for the Presidency and Vice-Presidency in 1876, on the ground that the former will not concede a "financial" sentiment at New Orleans, and that the Eastern States may be expected to like a Southern man, who has expressed very liberal views on re-construction and who voted against the "black" bill, although he is known to have voted for it. Possibly some such expectation, on Mr. Lamar's part, may explain his vote.—In other words, account for the milk in that case.

I have just read the able report of Gen. Scales, Chairman of the Committee on Indian Affairs, recommending the purchase of the Indian Bureau from the Interior to the War Department.

The proposition is supported by a thorough and candid resume of the sad but instructive history of Indian Affairs under the existing system,—a history of fraud, corruption and "ring" rule, further enforced by a searching examination into and estimate of the cost of the two systems.

The case which surrounds President Hayes is growing daily, more and more, in popular disfavor. The recent eagerness of the majority of them to indict the Executive to interfere in Louisiana, and the charges and countercharges in the matter of the late vote, have given their disrepute a further downward tendency.

Mr. Everts, unquestionably a great lawyer, and one of the ablest of the country, has given thanks and honor due in the case at the door of Judge Furche, for whom I have occasion to have high personal regard.

While on the subject of Judges and Courts, I might have something to say in regard to a recent decision upon the Supreme Bench which would be of interest to your readers. It is in the case of the State vs. Linton, for the crime of rape of a respectable white girl of this county.

This case is a pair of unusual interest here. The last decision is the uppermost theme in many of the localities of the country, now in view of the result.

The girl was the orphaned daughter of a brave Confederate soldier who lost his life in one of the bloody battles in Virginia during the war. The family were quite little, and the girl was a victim of the crime perpetrated to have always borne an irreproachable character. The negro Jim Linton, who was a very intelligent, dark, and well-to-do citizen of the county, No negro in the county stood fairer in business circles than this same Linton. He had ample means, and was a member of the Board of Merchants around. So deep-seated were the attachments of many of his friends, that they have advised him to desist from the prosecution. He has been defended by what is considered the best legal ability in the State in criminal practice—Cols. Falk and Armfield.

The negro was convicted in Caldwell county, and on appeal for a new trial, which was granted by the Supreme Court a year ago, was convicted again in the county of Washington. The evidence revealed a most horrible crime. The rebutting facts were few and insignificant. Yet the case was managed with consummate skill, and the result was a conviction. The strong point that the defense tried to make was in undue familiarity existing between the parties before him. They had worked together in common field operations on the farm of a neighbor; and Jim Linton was in the habit, it was said, of visiting in a sort of friendly way in the family. One night when it was known that the girl was alone at home, he went and under false pretences entered her door, when he seized her and perpetrated his heinous and horrible purpose.

It is due to say that the very large majority of even those who had been the negro's friends now acquiesce in the final decision of the Supreme Court, and believe the judgment of the lower tribunals to be just and righteous. It is said that when this last decision of the court was given to the young lady, she simply turned her head heavenward, and with her hands spread, said "Thank God at last!"

Spring seems to be upon us at last after the long, long winter of rain and snow, and ploughing and going ahead trying to help "the silver bill" bring prosperity to the country. No NAME.

MCDOWELL.

Mad Dogs - Wedding of the Blind - Politician.

(From our own Correspondent.)

MARION, N. C., March 2d, 1878.
The mad-dog excitement has about subsided, without serious injury to anybody.

Mr. Walter McCurry, of this county, was married a few evenings ago to Miss DeLoche, of Northampton; both blind.

The new Pope's name, as pronounced Patchee.

FALSE PRETENCES.

ALBANY, N. Y., March 4.—A. A. Chapin, of the late lumber firm of A. L. & W. Chapin, New York, was brought here yesterday on a charge of obtaining \$7,000 worth of lumber on false pretences from B. A. Towner, of this city.

SUPREME COURT.

Digest of Opinions of the Supreme Court, January Term, 1878, 78 N. C. Reports.

(Reported for the News by Walter Clark Esq. Attorney at Law.)

The following opinions were filed last evening, (4th March) at 11 o'clock:
56. By SMITH, C. J. Barringer vs. Allison. Where a justice's judgment is "stayed" by a surety, such surety's liability rests upon contract only, and is not to be nearly identical in form as that of the plaintiff.

The following opinions were filed last evening, (4th March) at 11 o'clock:
57. By SMITH, C. J. Phillips vs. The N. C. R. R. Co. I. Common carriers may, by special contract, bind themselves to convey and deliver goods to a particular point, unless the contract comes up to the mark. It is more.

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THAT PEARSON MONUMENT AGAIN

-A Correction - A Noted Criminal Case Disposed Of.

(Special Correspondence of the News.)

LENORA, N. C., March 1, 1878.
I regret that you did not see proper to publish all I had to say on the matter of that proposed monument to the late Chief Justice. I regret, also, that the court must require that the same persons are charged in the same bill, whether they unite in a common defence, or, as in this case, their defendants are antagonistic. The court must require that the same persons are charged in the same bill, whether they unite in a common defence, or, as in this case, their defendants are antagonistic.

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