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TV v T II PUBLISHED WEEKLY; BY COKSTITt-Tlbif AND THE UNIOX OP XHfl STATES-THeV "MUST BE PRKSHRVKD." - VOLUME IX. NUMBER 449.. TfiRMSO PER . EDITOR AND PROPRIETOR. ; ; : IV. C.nRSpAya:JVH.'l7 1843, i PA YABLEUVADVAJTCE. 4'.- ' ' 1 1 'r n v r. TERMS. THE NORTH CAROLINA STANDARD, 1 IS FCBLISHED WEEKLY, AT TnBEE DOLLARS PER ANNUM, IX ADVANCE. Mmtf Mall ( postage paid) Fire TTinse person" w v . w hilars will be entitled to a receipt for. Six Dollars, r mo years' sabscriptioo to th SUndard one copy two years, or two copies one year, For four copies, : : . ... : ' $10 00 20 00 1 85 00 The same rate for six months. , L Anv person procuring and fonvarding five subscribers, with the cash ($15), will be entitled to the Standard one year free of charge. - . advertisements, not exceedingourecn lines, will be inserted one time for One Dollar, and twenty-five cents for each subsequent insertion ; those of greater length, in proportion. Court Orders and Judicial Ad vertisements will be charged twenty-five per cent, bher than the above rates. A deduction of S3 1-3 er cent, will be made to those who advertise by the year 03" If tne number nsert'ons be not macd .,L,m thev will be continued until ordered out Le:ters to the Editor must come free of 'postage, or they may not be attended to. . ADDRESS Of the Convention of South Carolina, met at Columbia, on the 22nd of May, 1843, to the Democratic Republican Party of the United States. We have convened, Fellow-Citizens, to delibe rate on the subject of the approaching Presidential election, and have given it that serious attention, which its great importance demands at all times, but more especially in the present critical condi tion of the country. The result is, our unanimous termination to recommend to you John Cald well Calhoun, as the candidate of the Demo cratic Republican Party, for next President We nlso unanimous in recommending, that the General Convention of the parly should be held in Baltimore, in May 1844 ; that each State should appoint as many Delegates as she is entitled to members in the Electoral College ; thai two should y avvointed at large, and the remainder by Dis- iricts, one irotn eaci Congressional uistrict, irhere there are such in a State, and where not, by the mode which the Republican Party of such State may deem best luted to collect and, express the. opinions of the people ; and that the members should rote per capita. We shall Dass over all minor and subordinate considerations for recommending Mr. Calhoun, and proceed directly to state the leading and para mount reason for giving him our preference. We thpn rest our recommendation on his long, faithful, and important public services; on his ac knowledcred abilities, energy", firmness and sagaci ty; on his profound knowledge of the Constitution ana the genius and character of our admirable sys tern of Government: on his high administrative tal ents: on his devoted attachment to free and popu lar institutions, and the principles and doctrines of the Republican party ; and, finally, on the spotless D'jritv of his life. These are high qualification?, : but not higher than he possesses, nor, (as we believe) than a large maioritv of his fellow-citizens accord to him. Thev are those, which at all times should be re garded, as paramount in the selection of the Chief Magistrate, and as decisive, at such a period as the present, whpn the government is surrounded by perils and difficulties; when ks character and credit are greatly sunk, at home and abroad ; when great abuses and corruption have crept into its ad ministration ; when the principles of the Constitu tion have been departed from : nna when univer sal embarrassment prevails throughout the land. It is at such a period that the great and only ques tion should be, who is best qualified to carry the Government through its perils and qifiiculties ; to correct its errors; reform its abuses; elevate its character and credit; re-establish the Constitution, and restore confidence and the prosperity of the country? Whoever he may be, he ought to be the man. Every subordinate consideration should yield. Vjho, theriftis the man for the present period ? WithoutMntenling to underrate or disparage the high qualifications of the distinguished individu als of the party, whose names have been presented by theirfriends, as Candidates, we respond to the question. Mr. Calhoun is the man. We sincerely belief that he unifes in himself more fully, and in a hLierdegree, thacLany other individual, all the hijb qualities demShjed by theoccasion and that his efction would do more to redeem lye character of theWavernment and country, and restore confi dence" nsperity, than the election of any oth er marjf or the occurrence of any other event. It yfinot to be disguised that the deplorable con dition ofjife country may be almost exclusively , traced Cerrors and mismanagement of Govern-, mrnt. It cannotbe charged either to the Consti tution, or the dispensations of Providence. On the '"tontraryHis dispensations have not only been kindBut munificent, in abundant harvests and al most universS health, while to the violation or neglect of the provisions of the Constitution may be traced most of the evils that have befallen us. We then must mainly look for their remedy, to the correction of the errors of the Government, and the reformation of its abuses, and for that, to the election of the President, without whose lead, and "enlightened and hearty co-operation, there can be no thorough and radical reform, or essential change in the course of Government, as experience has abundantly proved. What his lead and co-operation will be in the coming administration, depends on the individual to be elected, . and that as far as the nartv is concerned, on the candidate to be no minated ; and hence, at this time, the great impor-. tance of making the proper selection. . It may be supposed, that the fact of Mr. Cal houn being a native of South Carolina has.influ enced us in making up an estimate of his qualifica tions, and that large deductions ought to be made on'that account We are not unaware how much : opinion is. liable to be biased by State attachments, and h'"vnade allowance for it, but it is possible not enbugb. If, however; deduction is to be made on that account, fror the. weight ofoar opinion in his fa voir, there are other considerations, which miffht at least to thrown equal weisht-irvthe op posite scale. "JQhe fact, that we are of the State andvicinageofMr. CALHOuN,iscalculated to warp our judgment and lessen the weight of our opinion in his favor, the same fact is equally calculated, in another view, to add to its weight. For while it may bla3 our opinion in his favor, it gives us the opportunity to view his conduct, public and private, more closely and minutely,- and to make up our opinion from actual observation and full and cor- jges. the jury of the vicinage the whole S.w, renders an unanimous verdict in his favor, it ought to be entitled to" full credence. We say (Unanimous, for there is literally, but one party in the State, as far as he is concerned. .,. ';. . ; IVV On this elevated ground,, "we rest our preference for Mr. Calhoun. , To that, we might add many other reasons,' entitled to much , consideration. tbut of a subordinate character. . Among them, that he oeiongs to a portion oi tne union, , which Jias nev er yet had a President v. The' Central Stalesthe Northern, and Eastern,:jlhe Western andJSbrth Western,t all have'had their Presidents; but the Southern; or Southwestern, the great exporting States froni the exchange of whose products, with the rest of the' World more than" two-thirds of the reven:: i of the Union has been drawn, and which have ever furnished their full share of talents, pat riotism, eloquence and wisdom to the ' councils of thenationY have never yet had one. , J-i In this connexion, there is another view not less entitled to consideration. The Presidents t have heretofore been taken exclusively from the, Jarger States. There is not an instance of one, in the long course of half a century, selected from, the medium size, or smaller States. Is it to be infer red from these remarkable facts, that the smaller and weaker States, and the least populous portions of the Union are to be permanently excluded from its highest honors ? or rather has it been an ac cidental course, of events, without aim or design ? The latter we hope has been the case, but surely on the first fitting occasion, generosity, the sense of justice and sound policy, require of the larger States, and more populous portions of the Union, that they should give a practical and substantial proof, it has been in reality accidental, and not de signed. And what occasion can be more fitting than the present?1 If the high qualifications of Mr. Calhoun, strengthened by such long and important services, unanimously supported, as there is every reason to believe he will be, not only by his State, but the portion of the Union tovhich he belongs, cannot ensure his , election, is it to be expected that any I citizen herealter belonging to it, however eminent his talents or great his services, or from the small er States, will ever be elected? And would there not be strong grounds for believing, that their citi zens are forever to be disfranchised, as far as the office of President is concerned and that the office is to be a permanent monopoly of the larger States and more populous sections? To these, other reasons might be added of no less weight. We shall however allude to but one or two and among them, his disinterested and magnanimous course in his party relations, of which a single instance will suffice. . It is well known, that he did not hesitate, re gardless of consequences, in obedience to what he believed to be the true principles and policy of the Republican party, to separate from the great body of the parly in the plenitude of its power, and when the highest rewards and honors of the country were in his grasp. It is equally well known, that it subjected him, for the time, to the severest de nunciations of those he separated from, and appar ently forever blasted his political prospects, so far as omce, power, and influence were concerned. He willingly sacrificed all to maintain his princi ples. Nor is it unknown, when the tide of events turned against his former friends, from whom he had separated, and when the party was at its great est depression, and their old opponent ready to rush in and overwhelm them, as they believed forever, it was then that he, forgetting the past, and over looking all personal considerations, regarding on ly his duty and his principles, unhesitatingly brought to them, at their utmost need, his power ful aid. If events have since turned if the party is again in the ascendant, and more powerful than ever after its great fall, it may be surely said with truth, that the happy change is, in a great meas ure, to be attributed to him.- It is true that in all this he sought neither gratitude nor reward ; that, however, only enhances his title to both. To this we add, that he was the first to discover, long in advance, the present dangers and disasters ; to point out their causes, and warn against their approach; to use his utmost efforts, and peril his all to avert them; and, when actually arrived, to take the lead in the endeavor to pass through them in safety. In proof of all thi?, we refer to addresses, speeches, and reports for the last fifteen years. fsow that which was then luture is past, they look more like history than the anticipations of what was to come, and afford evidence of sagacity and foresight rarely equalled and never surpassed. Although he could not avert the dangers and dis asters he anticipated, it cannot be doubled he did much to lessen them, and to prepare the way hnal Iv to overcome them : and now, when the ques tion is, How shall they be overcome ? who so well qualified to give a satisfactory answer to under take the task, and restore health ana prosperity to the body-politic, as he who has given such con elusive . evidence of his thorough knowledge of the cause and nature of the disease to be reme died 1 . And, finally, may we not ask, without being thought to disparage the just merits of other can didates for the Presidency, which one of them do his past history and opinions more thoroughly identify with all the great articles of the Demo- cratic creed than ivir. UaIhoun t tie, as iar back as 1834, discountenanced the connexion of the Government with banks; and when, in 1837, that connexion was broken ; asunder, he was amongst the first to advocate the necessity of the separation to plant his foot, without fear of con sequences, boldly in the front; and, under denun ciations and obloquy unexampled for their, bitter ness jn political .warfare, to take up this great measure of reform, and by the force of his de cision and genius, principally contributed to sus tain and pass it through 1 Few men have. been so efficient in saving the liberties of the country from that most dangerous of all the instrurrients of Federalism, a United States Bank. . iNext to Mr. Jefferson, no one who has lived under' our Constitution, has done more, if a3-mucb, to pre serve its republican features, by exnosingkthe dan gers of consolidation, and reSstingts "Tfec'rcaefr ments. And when, in the lust for absolute power, it was ipadly proposed to mutilate tht nmstltu tion, by abolishing the great, 'balance wheel and lngeryae prJin q.he Veto,; h -was the jjTjospaistinguistied ot -all jn that gallant resistance jbjvhich the attempt was frustrated. The best energies ot his lite have beSn spent in efforts to reform a degenerating Government, and restore it, by economy ad retrenchment, toits original simplicity and purity. He is the true representa-' tive of the great essential principle of Democracy, freedom of human pursuits, in the exemption of industry from unnecessary burdens and exactions. rect knowledge. . When with sl Hp "no justice- in feriS faxiqg unequal i j fihe farmer; the planter, the inc. z. icf ;the shjpmafterf .and al 1 other . in.J gr.iui awaits, to give.. protection, to and make the labor and capital of the manufactu rer profitable." . He believes that "iach. injustice alienates affeciofi betvyecn these classes, f citi zens.and"' causes 'deep dissatisfaction5 whh' and weakens the Government which, sanctions it; that it causes fifoe.anid angry4tf uggfesjjby lhe efforts of the .one free themsefyesv froni .Wrongful bur dens, and; of the other to? maintain or increase them: that:.Dufrdf these conflicts,' .occurring peri- oaicaiiy, ana mixing themselves up. m aU'gQverh- mental questions, the best interests ol the manutac turers themselves' arc far more 'deeply injured, from the unsettled condition of their existence;' and the sudden and ruinous changes to which' ii sub jects their affairs, than they could possibly be by that fair protection which an equal, moderate, and just system "of Tevende duties- would affb'rdViand which, if just, equal, and fair;-Would bepcrma nent: : A power has been claimed as 'existingvin the Government, to give indirectly - to the Jajj'or and capital of one class, or one section, a prefer ence over those-of another, which; at the same time it is acknowledged it would be oppressive to give directly ; but he admits neither the constitu tional right, the morality, rior the logic, by which a mere d ifference of mode in perpetrating a wrong, can be used to change it into a right; and denies any rightful power in the federal legislature,' di rectly or indirectly, primarily or incidentally, to draw the exactions of the Government from the people by duties on imports, otherwise than by a fair, equal, and bona fide tariff of revenue. Be tween a tariff of protection and a tariff of revenue, discriminating for protection, he is able to see no difference in constitutional principle, and he holds the one as much as the other, repugnant to natu ral justice and the plainest, principles of political economy, and in their tendency subversive of the very ends of civil society. He is not in favor of abolishing duties on imports for a system of direct or internal taxes, but for a system of duties on im ports laid purely for revenue, and allowing dis criminations only where true revenue principles call for it. He is in favor of burdening1 commerce and the labor which supports it with no more du ties than are indispensable. to the economical and necessary wants of the Government. He is un alterably opposed to all extravagance, corruption, and abuses in the expenditure of public money, the reform of which cannot be effected so long as the revenue is levied on the principles of protec tion, which acts as a bounty on large and influen tial classes, enlisting them in the support of ex travagant expenditures as an excuse for high taxa tion. He believes that the Government has no power nor right to lay taxes, nor to collect reve nue, nor to sell the public lands, for the purpose of distributing the proceeds, or any portion thereof, amongst the States; nor that it has any Tight or power, directly or indirectly, to assume the debts of the States; nor to carry on a system of Internal Improvement Many of these are cardi nal considerations, in comparison with which, the Presidency sinks into insignificance, and no com promises of them can be bartered, even for that high dignity. Having now given our reasons for preferring Mr. CALnouN, we shall next proceed to state those that governed us in making the recommen dations we have in reference to the General Con vention. Reason and discussion have already done much to settle most of the points connected with the Convention, and about which there was at first a difference of opinion. We regard the question as definitely settled, that Baltimore is to the place where it is to be held, and shall then-fore pass it over without further comment. The expression or opinion, so lar as there has been one, is so strongly in favor of May, 1844, it is scarcely to be supposed, that those who prefer November will stand out against it But four States, Tt-nnessee, Missouri, Virginia, and New York, have ex pressed opinions in favor of the latter, wliile.JVIary land, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Penn sylvania, Michigan, Alabama, Mississippi, Rhode Island, and ;Nev Hampshire, ' have either ex pressed opinions in favor of, or given strong indi cations that they prefer, the former. Indeed the argument, to afford the people ample time to make up and express their opinion, and to. mark the course of events and the conduct of public men during the first session of the next Congress, especially in reference to the Tariff and the ex- ! r . . .1. penaiiures OI me utovernmcni, is so strung, that we do not see. now n can wen oe resisrea. rsui putting aside that and other reasons which might t 111.". 1 T be urged in favor of the latter period, it seems to us, as a mere matter of courtesy, if time be re quested by any considerable portion of the party, it should be granted, unless the period proposed be obviously unreasonably late, which cannot be alleged against that which we, with so large a portion of the party, have concurred - in . recom mending. On this ground, if no other, we can not believe that those highly respectable States, which have fixed on an earlier day, will - be so wanting in courtesy, as to refuse to yield to so reasonable a request, and persist in adhering to November. Under this impression, we shall not dwell longer on the reasons in favor of May. We also regard it as substantially.sptlled,Ahat the Delegates,' with, the exception xif the tvo pro posed to be-nppointed by the Republican Members of the Legislature, or a State Convention, are to be appointed by Districts. . We are not aware that any State or portion of the party has expressed a preference for any other mode, except Pennsylvar nia, while most of the States and public meetings, where the subject of the Convention has been agitated, including Virginia, have expressed opin ions in its favor. . . .' ', ,v, -;, It is. certainly gratifying to observe, that the tendency of a free and enligtyened.discussion is to unite and harmonize the part'-, instead of dividing and distracting it, as was . feared by3jany: would be the case; and -it may be fairly anticipated, that the continuance of the discussion, in the sarrjarlibe ral Ani4e lrmer, which;" jRas already contribu; ted so ' rnQch to 3kle theCimportanY points it has coqnectea with the lonvention, wji jiave tne wne salutffrffect in sottlijgaho only two, that connected with the Convention. Wjll have the we rep-ard as rrmaihincr in reality unsettled the number of Delegates to be appointed from! each District, and the mode of voting whether per capita, that' is, eacK member, voting individually and bis Tote counting one, or by the majority, that is, the vote of the whole delegation of the State to he disposed "of J by a majority of the delegtionlf The recent Convention held, at Richmond,' recom mended four Delegates from each "Congressional District, and that a majority of the delegates hould dispose of the vote of the State in Conven tion in which, .the Legislative caucus held at Albany hasconcurred while all the other States, as far as vvei are Informed, which, have expressed an opinion," are in favor of one delegate from each District, andthejer copimode of voting.; . We" : have .carefully and impartially . examined arid compared both, and with;every respect for the source from vhehce it emanates, we are compel led to af. that our objection is irresistibly strong against what,' for brevity, we, shall call the plan of the Richmond Convention, and m favor of what with the same object, We shall call the, Maryland plahj that State being the first which fully adopted and recomrnended it 7 . 'And here it is proper to premise, that as the nbmiqVtion, if acquiesced in, .would in ; effect ; be the election, - so fir as the- voice of the parly is cape'erned, we hold it, in the first place, to be in dispensable, that the -General Convention should conform, as nearly; as may be, to the Electoral College,! in the.manrjer of ; constituting it, and the mode of ; voting land counting they votes!-.- In the next, that every practicable meanSshouM 1 1 adopt er!, that the i voice of the. Convention .dlKutter the voice of the. People; in contradistinction to po litical managers ; .anj-that the relative .weigTit of the ".States, , as fixed by the Constitution in the election of President and . Vice-President, should be preserved. These; we regard as fundamental principles, by whicb every proposition, in' relation to the General Convention ought' to - be tested. None but those that can stand that test should be admitted.. They are; too obviously just and rea-' sonable to require illustration. : He would ill de serve the name of Republican who objects to them. It is to their test we intend to bring the points of difference between the two plans, which may be regarded as still unsettled. 1 , We object then, to. the mode of voting and counting recommended by the Richmond Conven tion, because it adopts a principle unknown to.the Constitution, and which, combined with the num ber of delegates proposed to be appointed from each district, would in practice be destructive of the most important of all the compromises of the Constitution, or as we might with truth say, the fundamental compromise on which the whole rests. As strong as these assertions may appear, we shall, unless greatly deceived, establish their truth beyond controversy. It is well known to all in the least conversant with our political history, that the greatest difficul ty experienced in framing the Constitution, was to establish the relative weight of the Slates, in the government of the Union. The smaller States, placing themselves on the incontestible principle of the perfect equal ity of rights between a sover eign and independent, communities, without re gard to size or population, insisted on a like equality of weight in the government of the Uni on, while the larger and more populous, admitting the correctness of that principle, insisted that in a Federal Republic, composed of States of unequal size, and united for the common defence of the whole, the Stales which brought to the common stock of power and mean,s the greater share should in fairness and justice have a proportionate weight in the government. Such was the obstinacy, with which both sides maintained their ground, that at one time it was seriously apprehended the object of the Convention would fail, and its labors end in doing nothing.' 'The alarm.Which this caused, led to a compromise. The larger States agreed to ah equality of representation in the Senate, and the smaller to representation in the House propor tioned to population estimated in federal numbers. From these two elements, nil the materials for constructing our beautiful and solid political fabric were drawn. The Electoral College . for the' choosing of President and Vice President consists of the two blended, so as to give to each State the number of electors that she may have of members in the two Houses of Congress. The modes of voting, as prescribed by the Con stitution, aro in unison with these elements. As there are but two, so there are but two modes of voting known to the Constitution, the per capita, and that by a majority, corresponding with the two elements. When the States are intended to be regarded in their original equality, and inde pendent and sovereign character, the mode of vo ting prescribed is by delegation, each delegation voting by itself, and the majority disposing of the vote of the State; but the vote of the State in such cases,' without regard to the number of delegates counts but one. Such was the mode of voting and counting in the formation and adoption of the Constitution, and sue h the mode prescribed for propo sitions to amend it, and in the election of Presi dent, when the choice devolves on the House, by the failure of the Electoral College to elect But when the States are not intended to be so regarded, the vote and count is always per capita, and such is the mode, accordingly, prescribed for the two Houses of . Congress in all cases, except the in stance cited, and also for the ElectoralXJollege, in votinsr for a President and Vice President . It is well known, that it was very difficult to agree on the mode of electing those distinguished officers, resulting from the same conflict between the large and small States, that endangered,: as has been stated, the formation of the Constitution itself.. That, too, ended in a compromiser which gave the larger States a preponderance in the elec-' lion by ihe- Electoral -College, and the smaller a preponderance in case of a failure of choice, and ; the election devolving on the House. .. - It was thus, that this great and glorious conflict among the States was settled by compromise, and that which endangered the formation of the Con stitution was,1. by consummate wiedo n and skill, made to furnish the' elements out of which the go vernment was constructed ; and what we are irre concilably opposed to in the plan of the Richmond Convention, is, that it confounds these elenents by combining together; incongruous modes- of voting and counting, and thereby adopts a principle un known to the Constitution, and in deadly conflict with the compromises upon which it rests, and on the observance of wliith; iUf balance depends. 'Our loofcction applies not to the delegates of the Gene ral. Convention Voting. by States,.or tbat the vote of the States should be given by. the majority,-but what we da object tot as blending incongruous methods is, flhat the vote of a State should be giv en by a majority,. but counted per capita: It is that, which we nrouoiince.'io be "unknown, to the I Constitution, and monstrous and destructive in its character. Virginia or any.other btate, may take choice, to vote by majority,. ox. per .capita . but whichever she may selectshe cannot complain if she. should be subject! to the. mode of 'counting, which th;e Constitution in conformity to -its com promises, invariably prescribes for: that' mode-, If she should insist on a majority of her delegates disposing of her vote, she must also submit to place herself on an, equality with the smallest State, and count but one, as she would in the case of the Presidential election going to the House. If she desires to have her. whole delegation count ed, as in the House of Representatives oh all other questions, she must vote per capita, a nd run, as there, :the hazard of a division among her dele gates.' - She cannot, : without subverting the prin ciples, of the Constitution, : njoy the benefit of both modes, and exempt herself from their disad vantages,: ,She cannot . concentrate her whole strength by disposing of her vote by a majority, without placing herself in the same scale' with Delaware; or count her full number without the hazaTd of a division in her delegation. Choose which she may, we for one shall not object, but we never can assent that she, or any other State, shall at the same time grasp the benefit of both, and exempt herself from their -disadvantages. The advantages and disadvantages of whichever may Ie selected, must be taken together. But we consider the plan of the Richmond Convection as dangerous in its practical beaiings, as it is clearly unconstitutional in principle. It would tend almost irresistibly to concentrate the power of electing the President in the hands of the larger States and more populous portions of the Union, and by necessary consequence, give them the almost exclusive control over the Execu tive Department of the Government, and, through itspower and influence, over the whole Union. We must look at things as they ore. The con trol, of the nomination, if acquiesced in, would be in fact, as has -been', premised, the control of the elect ;oh', as far as the party is concerned: and what could be better devised 4o concentrate their combined power in the General Convention, than the plan of the majority giving the vote of each State, and yet at the same time counting per capita, and therebycontrollingits proceedings, and through it the nomination and election ? And what could tend more powerfully than that, to destroy the bal ance of the Constitution, and convert our Feder al Republic into a great consolidated and absolute Government, to be succeeded by all the disasters which must inevitably follow? But it may be said, that the evil apprehended has already occurred in another form; that their strength is already concentrated on the Electoral College by changing the system of choosing elec tors by Districts, into that of the General Ticket, find that it is but right that they should have the s.lme relative weight in the Convention, as they ha vein the Electoral College. It is, indeed, true that the system of choosing electors by general ticket, in its operation, as !ar as the concentration of power is concerned, has the same effect, as voting by majori ty, and counting per capita, and it is to be fbared has already done much, and will do still more, to disturb the balance of the Government. But there is a great difference between them, so much so, that the general ticket can afford neither excuse nor precedent, for the plan of the Richmond Con vention. If the two have the like effect in secur ing to the States a united vote, is it brought about in a very different manner. The General Ticket may defeat, to a certain extent, the intent of the Constitution, but it does not invade its principles, as to the manner of voting and counting. The electors still vote individually, and their votes arc counted per capita. Bad as it is to gel round the principles of the Constitution in practice, it is still worse to act in open defiance and contempt of them. Nor is this the only difference. It is well known that at the commencement of the Government, and for many years afterwards, the District sys tem of choosing Electors generally prevailed, and that it wa3 changed to the general ticket not vol untarily through a conviction, that the latter was right and the former wrong, but reluctantly, and under a general conviction, that the change was' for the worse. It was caused in a great measure by compulsion, through the almost necessary op eration of party conflicts. The system once com menced by any one party in a State in order to se cure victory by concentrating its united strength, almost necessarily compelled the opposite side, in order to avoid defeat, to imitate the bad example. Once started, the same cause, by its action and re action, led to the almost universal adoption. It was a weapon forged for party warfare exclusive ly, and fit only for the purpose for which it was intended. But to introduce a weapon so intended, in a Convention of members of the same party, assembled, not in hostility, but for the peaceable and friendly purpose of producing and preserving harmony, union and concert, would be clearly, not only not authorized by the example of the gener al ticket, but without justification or excuse. Another view remains, deserving the most se rious consideration ; going to show, that the intro duction of the general ticket, so fir from affording reason or precedent in favor of the plan proposed by the Richmond Convention, furnishes strong grounds against it The very fact that it has been adopted in choosing electors, and that it has increased the relative weight of the larger States and more populous portions of the Union, in the Electoral College and the election of President, instead of a reason why their weight should be increased in the General Convention and the nomination of the candidate, is one of the strong est against it It obviously makes it more im portant to the others, that what has been lost in tho election, shall not be lost in the nomina tion also. Ifit.be lost there too,all will be hopeless ly lost. To understand the full force " of the re mark, it must be recollected, that the nomination is necessary to make tho vote of the Electoral Col lege certain.1- One indeed of the leading and avow ed objects is to avoiddivision, in order to' prevent the election from going into the House where the vote is by States, and where the largest and the smallest, New York and Delaware, stand on the some le vel. "The certain consequence of the nomination is to deprive the m smaller States of the chance of this contingent advantage, given them by an ex press provision of the Constitution, in order s to compensate for the advantage which the larger States have in the Electoral College; It forms one of the' compromises in adjusting, the relative weight of the States in the Executive Department, and not an unimportant one, as it came from the hands of Us framers. We wish to be understood. We are not the advocates of carrying, the 'elec tion to the House. We know that there are strong reasons against it, and we are sincerely desirous. of avoiding it; if it can be done on lair anu equal terms';" but we are not so blind as' "not tosee,.that as things now stand, if the smaller States and less populous' 'sections,'- should surrender this contin gent advantage without securing, in '. the nomina-1 tion a compensationHwhich would preserve the relative weight assigned them by the Constitu tion, they will virtually surrender all control over the Presidential election and the Executive De partment. The plan of the Richmond Conven- tion does not secure , On .the Contrary, it is appa-, rent from what has already been stated, that in, going into a Convention on that plan,, so farfromi securing compensation for surrendering their con tingent advantages, the smaller-States would have, even less weight in the Convention, and nomina tion, than in the Electoral College .and election.. But the case is still stronger. As weak as tho mode of voting and counting would. make them, in the Convention, under the ' plan of the Rich mond Convention, they would be made still more, so, under that portion . of it, which recommends four Delegates to be appointed from each District, as we shall next proceed to show. Its obvious ef-. feet will be to give a much larger number of Del-; egates to the central and contiguous States, than, to the exterior and remote; for the plain reason,, that they could attend with far less relative incon venience, expense and , time. The most remote of their Delegates could go and return home in a' few days, at the expense of a few dollars, and with but little sacrifice of tim8 and convenience, owing to the nearness and' great facilities, which, rail roads and steamboats afford for travelling in that portion of the Union. Such would not be; the case with the Delegates from the exterior and . more remote States. To them the expense, time and sacrifice would interpose formidable obstacle against attending. The result would be. that from the one there would be a full attendanca and from the other a thin one. One would send a host ot live hundred or six hundred Delegates,., and the other a handful, nrobablv of smrr.f lv hundred. He has a very imperfect knowledfl-e of our nature, who does not see in this a great rel., ative increase of influence and weight- to the States. which should send the most, and diminution to those which should srnd the handful. The voice of the many would be almost sure to drown that of the few. But this relative increase of weight in the Con-- vention of the central and contiguous States would- be in reality, but a relative increase of the vveioht of the larger members of .the Union, as those having the greatest population . are in fact, for. the most part' the central and contiguous State. while the less populous; grnerally, are the exteri-. or and remote. , I ne two causes then, though ap-t-parently operating among the. different classes of States would, in fact, unite and combine to increase the relative influence of the same States and por-. tioris of the Union, ' and would by their joint opf ratk;n give them an overwhelming weight in th Convention, and through it, over the nominctioru the election and Executive Department. - We have now we trustconclusiveiy shown, that the plan of the Richmond Conventin, in the mode of voting and counting it .recommends, instead of. conforming to, departs wholly from the analogy of. the Electoral College, and that it adopts a. princi ple unknown to the Constitution,. and which in its operation would destroy the relative weight of the. States, is fixed by its compromises in the election of President and Vice President; and of eoursry not standing the test of the principles to which we proposed to bring it, should be rejected. So clear and just is this conclusion to our minds, that we hazard nothing in asserting, that rib State wpu'd venture to propose, as an amendment Jo the Con-T stitution, the mode of voting and counting recorrt' mended by the Richmond Convention, rontainins", at the same time, a provision to divest the smaller States of their contingent advantage, ch the elec- jtion devolving on the House; or that', if proposed, it would not receive the vote ofasingie State in the Union; so strong would be the sense of justice against it. And yet, if that plan' should beepmai the precedent, ana general Conventions for nom inating Presidents and Vice Presidents tne estaS-' lished practice, it would, in effect, supersede the existing provisions in reference to those elections, and become, virtually, a part of the Constitution ; as much so as if formally adopted as an' amend ment But if the mode of voting and counting recom mended by that plan should be rejected, as" it seems to us it cleat ly ought to be, and the per capita adopted, as it must be to conform to the Constitu tion, then the other portion of the plan, which recommends four Delegates' to be appointed from each Electoral District must also be rejected. The reason is plain ; it would be incompatible with the per capita mode of voting, which, in order to preserve the relative weight of the States, as fixed' by the Constitution, makes it necessary, that each' should have the same number of delegates in tha General Convention, that it is entitled' to in the . Electoral College. Were it however, possible to meet this objection to the number of dele-gates from each District, recommended . by the, Richmond Convention it would fall under the test of the other principle premised, which requires, that every practicable means should be adoptexl, in order' that the General Convention should niter truly the voice of the people, in contradistinction tey that of mere politicians. To effect that, it is jri disprnsable the delegates should, in all ' possible cases, be directly appointed by the people. Tfie greater the number of intermediate bod ies, the far ther the appointment is removed from the people, the feebler will be their voice, and the more po tential that of political managers. It is that which constitutes the great and fatal objection to appoint ing delegates by State Conventions, which them selves are always one, and sometimes two or,thre" degrees removed from the peoplo. However prop er they may be, to make previous arrangements preparatory to their appointment, it is hazardous to leave that to them. If it be left to. them,- it would be vain to hope ft would not become, in time, the chaunel by which improper influences, and even corruption itself, might enter and con-' trol the proceedings of the Convention, and, through it, the nomination and election. . No plan could be better devised, to give those who hold or , expect to hold office the control of the election, and, through them, give the President f heno we r of nom inating his successor. In other words, to divest tho p' ople of the control over the. election, and to trans fer, with it the control over the Executive Depart ment, to those who hold or seek to hold office. There is a proclivity in, all popular Government to that result, which can be prevented only by the greatest caution and vigilante. . Such is the danger of appointing the delegates ; by State Convention ;. and our objection to the plan of. the Richmond Convention, which propos es four delegates to each District, is, that it has the same tendency, though less powerfully, to weaken he voice of the people and strengthen that of pol itical managers. To increase the number of dele egates to be appointed from each district, is but to increase the necessity of a caucus to make the nom ination of the candidates. The greater the num ber to be appointed, the stronger the tendency to. distraction and confusion, and the necessity of ! such caucus to make nomination ; and the greater If i V v S r 8 i ii
The Weekly Standard (Raleigh, N.C.)
Standardized title groups preceding, succeeding, and alternate titles together.
June 7, 1843, edition 1
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