

TERMS.
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IS PUBLISHED WEEKLY, AT
THREE DOLLARS PER ANNUM, IN ADVANCE.
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ADDRESS
The Democracy of the United States.

A number of the friends of Mr. VAN BUREN, in the District of Columbia, who are still more the friends of Democracy, in view of the dangers which threaten their party and their principles, have caused the following remarks to be prepared, which, having been submitted to them, and approved, are now, by their direction, recommended to the serious consideration of their political brethren.

DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION.
WHY SHOULD ONE BE HELD?
There are several prominent men whose friends present them to the people as suitable candidates for the Presidency to be supported by the Democratic party. It is very probable that, if they all run, none of them will be elected by the Electors, and if the Whig candidate do not beat them all; the election will be thrown into the House of Representatives. To prevent either of these results, so fatal to good government and sound principles, the Democracy of the several States are willing to assemble in general convention, to compare the strength of their particular favorites, to make a sacrifice of personal preferences, and unite in support of him who, professing their principles, may appear to have the best prospects of success. The whole movement is based on a preference for principles over men. It presupposes a disposition in those who participate in it, to sacrifice all personal predilections as well as repugnances, for the purpose of securing the predominance of Democratic councils in the administration of the government. On this single object the eyes of every true Democrat ought to be fixed. If there be any who look upon the convention as a tribunal to decide between men merely; upon the basis of local attachments or personal preferences, or as a field for intrigue and management, they are unworthy to participate in its proceedings. It is only those who look to higher objects and are actuated by nobler aims, that ought to unite in this grand council of the American Democracy. Differences of opinion as to the strength of candidates, are to be expected; but, after expressing them fully and frankly, every honest Democrat will yield to an overruling majority and put forth his best energies to give effect to their decision.

HOW SHALL THE DELEGATES BE CHOSEN?
HOW SHALL THEY VOTE IN CONVENTION?
These points are so intimately connected, in practical results, that they cannot be well separated in argument.

This convention, let it be remembered, has nothing to do with fixing the principles or prescribing the process by which the election of President and Vice President is to be conducted. All that is already fixed, unalterably, so far as the Convention is concerned, by the Constitution of the United States and the laws of the several States. The Convention may or may not approve the principles of the process; the one may be useful and anti-democratic, and the other inconvenient and unsafe; yet, their sole duty and power, to present candidates to be voted for upon those principles and by that process, leaving it to the legitimate authorities, by amending the Constitution or altering the laws, to change the one or the other.

TRUE POINT OF INQUIRY.
To ascertain which of the Democratic candidates is likely to concentrate the most votes in the election, is the obvious path by which the Convention must approach its object.

It will be of no use to inquire in whose favor are a majority of the people of the United States—men, women and children, black, white and mulatto—for five-sixths of them have no voice in the election of President or Vice President. Nor will it be of any use to inquire, which candidate is preferred by a majority of the voters who elect. The true point of inquiry is, which candidate can most probably secure a majority of the electoral votes?

HOW TO BE ARRIVED AT.
By what means are the Convention most likely to come at a correct solution of this question? Obviously, by a course analogous to that pursued in the election.

"Each State shall appoint," says the Constitution, "in such manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a number of Electors equal to the whole number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in Congress," &c. "The Electors shall meet in their respective States, and vote by ballot for President and Vice President," &c. And a majority of the votes so given, if in favor of one candidate, elects the President and Vice President.

The States, in the exercise of the power here conferred upon them, have, we believe without exception, provided for the election of Electors by General Ticket. The necessary consequence is, that the Electors in each State, being already elected by the same party, are all of the same political faith, and being pledged beforehand, all vote for the same candidate.

Hence, each and every Elector speaks the voice, not of a majority of a District, but of a majority of the whole State.

Now, what is the best way to ascertain for whom the electoral vote of any State is likely to

be given in the next Presidential election? Can not the majority which is to give it, best answer the question? Shall we ask the majority of the State, or the State as one District, and ask the majority of each District when they prefer? Would their answer be of any utility in ascertaining whom the majority of the State prefer—that majority which is to give the vote? Why not ask that majority at once, instead of the majorities of Districts? Not to do so, is as wise as to ask George what John intends to do, when John is standing by, ready to answer for himself.

"As a rule," though not so ridiculous; and not so ridiculous, because it not only may not produce, but may actually defeat the very object for which a Convention is to be held. New York has thirty-six votes in the election of President and Vice President, and South Carolina, nine; to be given by a majority of each State. Ask a majority of the New York Electors, whom do you prefer? The answer is, Mr. Van Buren. Ask a majority of the South Carolina Electors, whom do you prefer? The answer is, Mr. Calhoun. The Convention thus ascertains that, in those two States, Mr. Van Buren would probably receive thirty-six votes, and Mr. Calhoun nine. But cut up the States into as many Districts as they have Electors, and ask a majority of each District whom they prefer? Twenty Districts in New York may answer, Mr. Van Buren, and sixteen in N. York and nine in South Carolina, may answer, Mr. Calhoun. Thus, in these two States, Mr. Van Buren would get twenty votes and Mr. Calhoun twenty-five, when those who are to give the votes, declare that, by no possibility, in a contest for the Presidency between the two, could Mr. Calhoun command more than nine votes out of the forty-five. Is it by a process like this, that the Convention can arrive at the relative effective strength of the candidates?

THE MAJORITY PRINCIPLE.
How is this incongruity justified? One argument in its favor is, that the representation by Districts is more likely to elicit the will of the majority of the party, than the representation by States.

This is by no means a necessary consequence. On the contrary, it is no so likely to elicit the will of the majority in any State, as a State vote. Divide New York into thirty-six Districts; suppose one District to have a majority of one thousand for Mr. Van Buren, and the other thirty-five an average majority of ten each for Mr. Calhoun, making three hundred and fifty in all; it is obvious, that while Mr. Van Buren would have in the State a majority of six hundred and fifty popular votes, Mr. Calhoun would get thirty-five votes to one in the nominating Convention! A moment's reflection will satisfy any man, that if the popular will be the object in view, the surest way to arrive at it, is to take the sense of the whole body, without any division or subdivision. Just in proportion as you divide and subdivide, you increase the danger of throwing power into the hands of a minority. It has sometimes happened in our country, that a majority of our State Legislatures, being elected by majorities of counties or towns, was of one political party; when the Governor, elected by majorities of States, composed of several of the same voters, were of another. A few large majorities overbalance many small ones, and make a District representation a very unsafe guide in arriving at the will of the majority.

The entire Democracy of the Union, voting as one body, would afford the only conclusive testimony of its own preferences. But this mode is obviously impracticable. The next surest guide is, a vote by States. By this mode, the true majority in each State is ascertained. By a division of States into Districts, you hazard that result, and make the evidence furnished inconclusive. And it is absurd to maintain, that a process which, in twenty-six States, consists, essentially, in doubt, affords more reliable testimony of the will of the people. You might as rationally say, that twenty-six doubts are better evidence of truth than twenty-six certainties.

Hence, the position that a representation by Districts affords a better evidence of the will of the majority than a representation by States, is palpably indefensible. But what if it were not? However sound the general principle, that a majority should govern, such is not the fact, either practically or theoretically, in the government of the United States. It was not the majority of one consolidated people which gave vitality to our Constitution, but majorities of States. Neither the Legislative nor Executive branches of the Government is based upon the consolidated majority principle.

The House of Representatives is organized upon an approximation to that principle; but the Senate has no regard to it—each State having therein an equal representation with all the rest; and these together constitute the Legislative power. The Electors of President and Vice President are not chosen by a majority of the people of the United States, nor by a majority of the voters, nor yet by a majority of the States. The Constitution gives to each State two Electors to represent its Senators, and to them adds as many more as it has Representatives in Congress. The election of President, therefore, approaches nearer the majority principle than the Senate, but not so near as the House of Representatives. The votes are not assigned to a majority of the people, but are apportioned out to the States. The Electors do not represent the people of the United States, but the people of the several States. The election is, in fact, an election by majorities of States, (just as the Constitution was adopted,) and is based neither on popular equality nor State equality, but on a compromise, and compound of the two principles. An attempt to make the election conform to one principle or the other, by adopting it in nominating candidates, is, therefore, utterly subversive of the principles and compromises of the Constitution, and of dangerous tendency.

But why do not the advocates of the majority principle carry it out? The S. Carolina Convention chose two Delegates to the National Convention, and recommended the rest to be chosen by Congressional Districts. Those two, standing in the place of Senators, have nothing to do with the popular or majority principle. Why do they not discard them? Why choose "Nine Delegates to the Convention, when that principle would entitle her to but seven? Why not reduce Rhode Island

to two Delegates instead of four; and Delaware and Arkansas to one each, instead of three? The majority principle would require it.

This is not all. Is the majority referred to, a majority of the entire population, men, women and children, black and white? Are women, children, and slaves to be consulted as to whom they prefer as President? We presume not. The majority meant, must be a majority of the voters. Now, some States gain Representatives in Congress, and consequently Electors of President and Vice President, by counting five slaves as equal to three voters. By the majority principle, these should be struck off. Nor is this all. The right of suffrage is very different in different States. Taking the same number of white people in Pennsylvania and Virginia, the number of voters among them in the former, is believed to be more than twice as large as in the latter. By the majority principle, all voters should have equal power, whereas the Virginia voter has twice as much as the Pennsylvania voter. If South Carolina would adopt the pure majority principle, let her strike off the two Delegates she has elected in place of her Senatorial Electors, one or two more which she gets by her slave representation, and one or two more, to reduce her voters to a level in power with those of Pennsylvania, New York, Ohio, Kentucky and many other States, and then may she stand ready, in all fairness to go into Convention with her sister States upon that principle!

What is the effect of her plan as proposed? This, and nothing more or less: To retain, in the nomination and election, all the advantages which the Constitution gives HER, and require New York, Pennsylvania, and other States, similarly situated, to surrender all the advantages the Constitution gives THEM. The two Electors and the slave vote are held by virtue of the compromises of the Constitution, and so is the power of other States to concentrate their votes in the choice of President. She proposes to retain in the nomination her two extra Delegates and slave representation, and at the same time claims from them a surrender of the power of concentration. And this, a most palpable departure from the majority principle, she endeavors to maintain by an appeal to that very principle!

STATE EQUALITY.
Another leading argument in favor of the S. Carolina plan is, in substance, that by going into Convention and thus concentrating the votes of the party upon a single candidate, the small States lose the chance they have of giving an equal vote with the large States in the election of a President into the House of Representatives; and that for this sacrifice they ought to be compensated by advantages in the nominating Convention.

Surely, those who press this argument, have not well considered the inference which it necessarily authorizes.

1. It is totally inconsistent with the majority principle which is so zealously pressed by the same politicians. In one breath, they tell us the Delegates ought to be elected by Districts more truly to arrive at the will of the popular majority; in the next, they give as a reason for pressing the same plan, that it is a concession to the small States in derogation of the popular principle! So little, after all, do they regard the majority principle, that they are "content" to abandon it altogether, and give the States an equal vote in the Convention. "Content" was the word used by the South Carolina Convention, and "content" is the word adopted by those who advocate their plan. They prefer, however, an intermediate course but still in subversion of the majority principle, and securing advantages to the small States beyond those secured to them by the Constitution.

2. An argument like this, implies an oversight of the great object which the Democratic party have in view. It has reference solely to local power or individual preference, and not to any question of practical administration. Not to secure any principle or promote any measure, but to obtain a local or individual advantage in the election, is the sole basis on which it rests. The Convention, we trust, is not to waste its energies in struggles of this sort, endangering, for local and personal objects, the great measures which it is called to secure.

3. This argument is inconsistent with one of the principal objects in holding a National Convention. That object is to prevent the election from devolving upon the House of Representatives, where it has never entered without poisoning the fountains of both patronage and legislation. Ought Democrats to ask a compensation for giving up such a chance as this? Has it been of any use to the small States, practically? Is it of service to them, that their members of Congress shall have a "chance" to sell their votes for office or money? Is this "chance" now to be made a consideration to secure local advantages in the nominating Convention? Can the Democracy give any consideration for it, which is not subject to the same faint and liable to the same abuse?

A PRINCIPLE INVOLVED.
There is an objection upon principle to any compromise of this sort. The election of President by the House of Representatives voting by States, is provided for by the Constitution, simply as means of securing to the country a Chief Magistrate, after the failure of a bona fide attempt to elect one by Electors. It is the duty of every citizen in every State, by all proper means, to promote an election by Electors. No man, and no State, has a right to defeat such an election for the purpose of throwing it into Congress. To do so, is an aggravated abuse. National Conventions are means to effect such an election. Are they proper means? If not, Democracy should have nothing to do with them. If they are, no portion of the Democracy can honestly defeat their object in consideration of any individual or State advantage which may result. On the contrary, it is the duty of all to unite in them and promote their success by all proper efforts.

To ask a consideration for uniting in the proposition to secure an election by the Electors, implies a claim of right, to prevent such an election. It implies, that those who claim it, either do not consider it their duty to promote such an election, or that they do it for some other reason. For to prevent it is to impair such a motive as those who advance this argument. They have not well considered it, and our object is to call their minds directly and distinctly to the principles and inferences which it involves. We repeat, that a National Convention is an *advisory* and *proper* means to secure an election of President and Vice President by the Electors, and give effect to Democratic principles in the administration of the Government; that it is the duty of every Democrat, who

views it in that light, to unite in its support, and by all reasonable exertions give effect to its decisions; that, for doing his duty in this respect, he has no right to claim for himself, his candidate or his State, advantages in the nomination, and consequently election; beyond those given in the Constitution, and in derogation of the constitutional rights and powers of other individuals, candidates or States.

The concession of such a claim, if set up, and persisted in, would be a practical amendment of the Constitution. The South Carolina Convention insists, that in argument, the nomination by a National Convention ought to be considered as the election. Be it so; and, on that ground, what would be the practical effect of the plan which they propose? They say, they are "content" that the States shall have an equal vote in the nominating Convention, but are "more than content" that they have in the election by Electors. Concede to them that with which they would be "content" (allowing the States an equal vote in the Convention) and that the nomination is to be considered as the election, what would be the practical result? Why, the process of electing the President and Vice President, as prescribed by the Constitution, would be *interfered*, and its main provision for that purpose *subverted and nullified*. Instead of an election by States, each giving an equal vote, after the failure of a bona fide attempt to elect by Electors, the election would always be by States—each giving an equal vote in the National Convention—and the Electors would be but instruments, afterwards chosen, to give legal form and constitutional effect to their decision. The constitutional mode of electing by Electors, would be virtually superseded; and the process provided for by that instrument as the last desperate resort to save the country from anarchy, might spring from being without a Chief Magistrate, would become the ordinary mode of election. It is not this, but avowedly an approximation to it, that the South Carolina Convention proposes. Through their mode of organizing the Convention, and voting therein, they propose to divest the larger States of a portion of the weight which the Constitution gives them in the election by Electors, thus approximating the States to an equality of votes without regard to their population.

We doubt whether the Democracy of the United States would be so ought to be "content" to have their President, elected in all cases by an equality of States, or "more than content" with any nearer approximation to that principle than is already provided for in the Constitution. We doubt also, whether they will or ought to assent to a practical amendment of the Constitution, by a process so illegitimate, so irresponsible and so dangerous.

The Democracy cherish "State Rights," as in this country the surest safeguard of popular rights. To concentrate its votes in the election of President, and Vice President, is as much a State Right as to give two votes on account of its Senators. Both should be cherished and maintained, as we would cherish and maintain the Constitution. Nominating Conventions are no places to discuss or re-adjust constitutional principles or compromises; much less ought sacrifices of constitutional rights and powers to be asked, or made, as a consideration for giving or receiving political cooperation or personal support. It is not by such means, that the Democracy is to be kept together, led on to victory and established in lasting dominion.

ARGUMENTS OF SOUTH CAROLINA.
Although we have elucidated, we hope with clearness, the general principles involved in the subject, we deem it of sufficient importance to require a more particular notice of the leading arguments advanced in support of the South Carolina plan. They are summed up in the following extract from an authoritative source recently circulated with the signature of "South Carolina," viz:

"They [meaning those in favor of District representation] are in favor of District representation, and the per capita vote. We are, that there are but two forms of representation known under the constitution of the United States and the Government it establishes. 1. The representation of States—and this is carried out in the Senate of the United States, where each State, being equal in sovereignty, is equal in representation. 2. The representation of the people—and this is carried out in the House of Representatives, where the people are represented generally by districts, and district representatives. Now, choose you—Take one or the other form of representation, as the model for the National Convention. If the former is adopted, we are content. That, all the States being equal, will give equal votes, as was practised under the old Confederation. And in the Constitution, which framed the Constitution of the United States; and as the Constitution itself provides, shall take place, when the Presidential election is thrown into the House of Representatives. Or, if the latter form, the representation of the people is adopted, we are more than content. Then, every Congressional district will send one representative; and, in the Convention, he will be equal in power and influence to the representative of the whole State. There is a third form of representation, because we desire the will of the people, and not the will of the States, to predominate in the convention. We put it in plain and candid words, can any thing be fairer than these terms? They are, in the very nature of things, the only terms, familiar to the people in their daily practices, under the Constitution of the U. States; familiar to them in all their practices in the several States. No State Legislature and State Convention was ever organized, but on the principle of district representation. Why should it not hold good for the organization of a National Convention?"

There is a fatal defect in the foundation of this imposing superstructure. Is it true that there are "but two forms of representation known under the constitution," the Senate and the House of Representatives? There is a third, "fixing up directly from the face of the constitution," a compromise of both, yet the people of the United States, as equals in political power, by occupying an intermediate ground. We mean the Electors of President and Vice President. Each State has two by virtue of its sovereignty, and as many more as it has Representatives in Congress by virtue of its population. They are entirely a representation of the people; and, practically, a much more faithful one than the Senate or House of Representatives. Choose ye between these two, says South Carolina, *we are content* with the other, for the very obvious reason, that they have nothing to do with the matter in hand! Making laws and making Presidents, are very different operations; the bodies which make the laws and

the bodies which make the President are altogether different—constituted on different principles, and in practice chosen by different constituencies. When we want the makers, we will choose between the two forms of representation, you present; if we want a Senator, we will call a convention of the Democratic members of the Legislature which is to elect him, to decide who is the strongest candidate, and if we want a member of the House of Representatives, we will call a convention of the Democrats of the District, or if the election be by general ticket of the whole State, to say who shall be the candidate. We would not call a State Convention to nominate candidates to be elected by Districts, nor District Conventions to nominate for a State vote; but if we wanted, bona fide, to ascertain the strongest man with the view of giving up personal preferences for the sake of our principles, we would also a nomination at the hands of those, *all those and those only*, who have a voice in the election. Is not this sound in principle and safe in practice? Is not the dictate of common sense and the universal practice of the country? Why depart from it in the nomination of a candidate for the Presidency? Why "choose ye" between the State representation in the Senate and the popular representation in the House for the model of a convention, when you have a third form of representation in the electors, exactly suited to your purpose? Each State may choose Electors as it pleases. Formerly, some were chosen by Districts, some by general ticket and some by the Legislature. Each had and now has a constitutional right to adopt the mode most conducive to her own advantage. South Carolina, as late as 1823, not only chose them by her Legislature, thus concentrating her votes, but held back her choice until she knew the result in other States; that she might make the most of her power. "It is a State Right," all the rest had the same right; and nobody complained. All have since adopted the General Ticket System; availing themselves of their constitutional right, and South Carolina how assists them to restore to her the advantage she so long enjoyed through concentration and delay, by giving up their relative constitutional strength in the nomination which she admits would be giving it up in the election!

MANNER OF VOTING.
But, say the advocates of her plan, the Electors by the constitution vote per capita, and so should the Delegates in Convention. This is plausible but delusive. Carry the analogy through, and we are "content." The Electors are chosen by General Ticket and vote per capita. Each Delegate to the Convention by General Ticket, or his equivalent vote, and we are content that they shall vote per capita. Then would the Delegates vote be concentrated precisely as the Electoral vote now is. But you insist, that we shall follow the analogy of one end and abandon it at the other. You insist, that we shall change the mode of election and adhere to the mode of voting. We insist that you change neither or change both. We care not for forms; we look only to results. Elect Delegates by General Ticket, as the Electors are elected, or by State Conventions, which will make them equally a representation of the State majority; and we are "content" that they shall vote per capita. Or, if you elect by Districts, departing from the practical constitutional mode of electing Electors, we insist that you shall make a like departure at the other end of the process by allowing a majority of the Delegates from each State to dispose of its entire vote. "Now choose ye." Although a District representation may throw the power of the State into the hands of a minority, a danger not involved in a State representation, yet, we are "content" for the sake of harmony, to incur that danger, if while changing the mode of representation, you will make a corresponding change in the mode of voting. But we are "more than content" to take the constitution for our guide; and so far as results are concerned, change nothing. Upon this basis, as just and as firm as the principles of the constitution, which is not in every respect all that the enthusiastic Democrat would desire; is the best that we can reasonably hope for our party may rest in harmony and safety. Hence, we are from all impregnable fortress, we may carry on the war with our political adversaries without fear of disaster, and successfully plant our standard in every Department of Government. But if we tamper with the principles and compromises of the constitution, refusing to unite in proper treaties to secure the assiduity of our party without questions of power to States or individuals which are unknown to that instrument, or if the practice under it, we batter down our own walls, and expose a divided partition to the fury of an united, persevering and relentless enemy. What have we to expect in such an event, but sudden and lasting darkness over our present bright and glorious prospect? A darkness that will be felt!

We have our preference among the Democratic candidates for the Presidency—a preference decided and strong. But if we understand our own motives, that preference has nothing to do with the views we entertain on this subject. The success of the Democratic party, and the triumph of its principles, we consider a thousand times more important than the election of our man. That man, any man, even ourselves, we are willing to sacrifice politically, to secure the lasting ascendancy of our principles. But it is the duty of the Democracy solemnly to consider, whether a practical disavowal and re-adjustment of the compromises of the Constitution through other means than a regular amendment, giving to some States, an increase of offices, a degree of poverty they do not now possess, is an appropriate and successful expedient in striving to attain that result. It is impossible, in the nature of man, that the people of any State can be content to see themselves practically stripped of any portion of the constitutional power which rightfully belongs to them, and if, by giving effective power to the States, who are in the nomination, who they have no voice in the election, one man is nominated, when another is the obvious choice of the State majority, which is to control the result, it is to be apprehended that the decision of the Convention will be disregarded. Indeed, we cannot but look upon a proposition which necessarily leads to such a result as, in effect, though certainly not in design, a blow at the practice of nominating candidates for President and Vice President by National Conventions, the adoption of which must, sooner or later, break it up altogether. To render their decisions authoritative and worthy of respect, they must, in their nominations, strictly conform to the principles of the election, conceding to each State the same relative power, without addition or diminution. What sacrifices the Democratic party in the

several States shall make for the sake of harmony, we will not undertake to say. Our sole object, by candid arguments, without denunciation, is to convince South Carolina that she is wrong in asking constitutional power, not doubting that on due consideration, she will recede from the demand. We have too much confidence in our justice, and devotion to the Constitution, and State Rights, to consider what will be the duty of the Democracy of other States, if she should persist in it, as the only condition upon which she will meet them in Convention. "Sufficient to the day is the evil thereof," and that day, we devoutly hope and confidently trust, will never arrive.

MR. VAN BUREN.
In avowing our preference for Mr. Van Buren as the Democratic candidate for the Presidency, we shall not present him in comparison or in contrast with any of his Democratic competitors. To disparage him or them, is the necessary effect of such a proceeding, and that cannot be done without producing retaliation, ill blood and alienation. If we compare Mr. Van Buren's virtues with theirs, to prove his superiority, or if we undertake to contrast his merits with their deficiencies, what can be expected, but that their friends should imitate our example? With whatever good feeling and honest intention such a proceeding may begin, it will, in the end, be productive of mischief; necessarily an error exists in the human breast. The first step is retailed by going a little further; one offence becomes an excuse for another more aggravated; blind prejudice assumes to lead in a path which none but clear and unbiased perception can safely tread; passions engender and through reason aside, discussion degenerates into reviling; dislike becomes hatred; deadly hostility and relentless opposition divide those whom every principle and the most sacred duty require to meet in concert. Let us avoid the first step in this progress, and we shall be in no danger from the last.

Independent of other considerations, is it wise to indicate to the enemy, in a war among ourselves, our ascertainable points, and furnish his magazines with weapons? If Democrats exhaust their industry and talent in hunting up and recording all that can be adduced to prove their candidates weaker or underserving, do they not perceive that as soon as the Convention has selected our man, the Whigs will take up the weapons thus furnished and sharpened to their hands, and use them with deadly effect in the great and final battle? And what can we say in reply to our own arguments and assertions? Let us not fabricate and sharpen swords to our own throats, or furnish nails to spike our own artillery.

The conduct of others what it may, however ungenerous, unjust or outrageous towards the man whom we prefer, we shall entirely refrain from a course so dangerous and so suicidal. Others may murder with malice prepose, or kill in mad dening excitement; but our hands shall never be red with the blood of civil war. Unstained will we live them, if it must be so, over the grave of Democracy, slain by its own children, as we raise them now to adjust our friends of every class and clan, to disist from the course of discussion already begun, and reserve their strength and their ammunition for the common enemy. Be assured, we are not to have an uncontested field. A compact host, well appointed, well disciplined, well armed and well paid; is already wheeling its formidable squadrons into the field upon which those man kingdoms are to be fought for, and shall we meet them with an array as compact and as formidable as their own, or in separate clans, scowling at each other, with halting chiefs and broken weapons?

We are in no danger from the selection of our candidate, if it be dispassionately made. Whosoever our Convention shall deliberately nominate we can triumphantly elect. But if the nomination be made in a storm, desolation will follow. What is the all-worshipping rain, if it come with the hail and whirlwind, which destroy the growing crop? We call on every true Democrat, who regards measure more than men, to oppose for the purpose of averting the hot bloods who are already aiming at each other their fratricidal spears: Leave it to the Whigs to prove that our leaders are inconsistent or unpopular, not to be relied on, or not available. If when the Convention has spoken, the principles of the nomination shall be worse than Whigism; let those who think so, go openly and manfully, for Mr. Clay. Let them not stab Democracy through the bosoms of its chiefs, and then hypocritically say, "its death was not my fault."

In the spirit we recommend to others, we proposed to give the reasons why, in our opinion, Mr. Van Buren ought to be nominated as the Democratic candidate for the Presidency.

HIS PRIVATE CHARACTER.
In fidelity to moral obligations, Mr. Van Buren has no superior. In the uniform integrity of a life some that extended, he affords security more reliable than bonds or oaths, for a faithful administration of the government. He has not one set of morals for private life, another for public life. He regards his official acts as transactions between man and man, to be subjected to the same moral tests, and governed by the same principles.

Too little are good morals regarded in our selections for public stations. A gambler in private life, will be a gambler in public life. The man who does not hesitate to cheat his neighbor, whenever an opportunity presents itself, will seek opportunities to cheat the public. He who distorts social relations and breaks up families to gratify his appetites and lusts, is not a safe guardian of the laws and institutions which form their basis. And he who, in eating or drinking, makes himself a beast, is not fit to be trusted with the affairs of men.

Not only Mr. Van Buren, but in the other Democratic candidates, have the Democracy just cause for congratulation on this score. Not in comparing them with each other, but in contrast with them with the men whom Whigism deliriously honors, may we find not only sources of just pride, but elements of power.

HIS PUBLIC CHARACTER.
From his youth up in peace and in war, in private life and in public life, has Mr. Van Buren been distinguished for devotion to the true interests of his country. Always a Democrat, he has looked on party merely as a means to advance the happiness of man and his country's property, freedom and glory. To say that he has never been mistaken, or has never changed his opinions, is to say what probably cannot be said with truth, in relation to any house man who has attained the age of fifty years. If Mr. Van Buren has