

of homicide and held to trial as for a private felony.

Now, gentlemen, according to my apprehensions, a proceeding of that kind was directly adverse to well settled and well received principles of public law; and of all others likely to arouse the indignation, not only of the Government, but also of the people of the country aggrieved. So it would have been with us. If a citizen of the United States, under the orders of his Government, and as a military man, obeys an order which he either must obey or be hanged, should find himself in the territory of the power against which the supposed crime was committed, and should be seized and tried as an individual for that crime, there is not a man among us who would not cry out for redress and vengeance. Any elevated Government, in a case where one of its citizens, in the performance of his duty, should be seized and sought to be made answerable, every elevated Government, I maintain, would say, "I am responsible for this act; as in the story of Nisus and Euryalus, she would exclaim:—*"Adsum qui feci—in me convertite ferrum."*

Now, gentlemen, when the despatches of the British government first reached this country—though I do not think it useful nor important to say much of them—yet if you all knew their contents, you would see that the commercial interests of the country, the shipping interests of this city must have been crushed at once. That crisis I thought could be averted; in the first place by upholding the acknowledged principles of public law, in the next place, by demanding an apology for whatever against these principles of law had been done by the British government. Let us put ourselves right in the first place, and insist that they shall do right in the next place.

While in England in 1839, I happened to be called on to address a large assembly of English persons, and in alluding to the relation of things between the two countries, I stated there what I thought, and what I now think, of any points in controversy which might terminate in war between the United States and England, and to the results of such a contest declaring that the only advantage which either would enjoy would be in possessing the right of the cause. With the right on our side we are a match for England. With the right on her side she is a match for us—and for any body.—In all the differences between nations and in the final judgment upon them a great new element has come in the constitution of the tribunal; I mean the tribunal of the public opinion of the world; a nation will not go to war now, either with the consent of her subjects or people unless the grounds and reasons are sufficient to justify her in the general judgment of the world.—The influence of civilization, the influence of commerce, and above all the influence of that heavenly light which shines over Christendom, restrain princes and people from gratifying an inordinate love of ambition through the bloody scenes of war; and as has been wisely and truly said, every settlement of national differences between Christian States, by reasonable negotiation and on the principles of public justice, is a new tribute to, and a new proof of the benign influence of the Christian creed.

In regard to the terms of this treaty, in regard to the matters made subjects of discussion, it is somewhat awkward for me to speak, because the treaty and correspondence have never been authentically published. But I persuade myself that, when the whole shall be calmly considered, it will be found that at least there has been manifested a good disposition to maintain every just right of the country and every point of honor on the one side, and to set a proper value upon a lasting peace between us and the greatest commercial nation in the world on the other.

Gentlemen, while I thus acknowledge the compliment you have paid to me, I have an agreeable duty to perform towards others. In the first place, I have great pleasure in bearing testimony to the intelligent attention manifested by the President of the United States, and to his sincere and anxious desire, in the whole negotiation, to bring it to successful termination; and it gives me great pleasure to acknowledge now as I shall ever acknowledge while I live, my obligations to him for the unbroken and steady confidence which he reposed in me. The negotiator for the United States, if troubled, and jealous, and distrustful would indeed have been an unequal match for the cool and sagacious representative of one of the most powerful and proud nations of Europe—possessing, to the fullest extent, the confidence of his government, and the authority to bind it, in concerns of the most vital interest, to any course in which he might agree.

I never shall forget the frankness and generosity with which, after a long interview on both sides with the utmost freedom and liberality, I was told that upon my shoulders and in my discretion, rested the ultimate decision of every question at issue between the two nations.

I desire also to acknowledge, as I do with hearty cordiality, the aid I received from the other gentlemen concerned in the administration of the government.—I may here say what I have said in a more official manner, that the highest respect is due to the Commissioners of Maine and Massachusetts, for their cordial co-operation.—Their faithful adherence to the interests of their own States, mingled with a just consideration of what was due to the general government.

I hope I shall not trespass on the propriety of the occasion, if I speak of the happy selection made by the government of England, in the servant on this mission of peace;—who, though steadily pursuing the interests of his own government, yet possessed large and liberal views, with a

strength and weight of character which would cause everything to which he should agree to receive the approbation of the whole people; intimately acquainted with the relations of the two countries, and always acting with strict integrity towards the people and the government of the United States. I am sure he will find his work received with commendation at home, and if peace should be made, with congratulations for having been instrumental in making an arrangement satisfactory and desirable, not only to our party, but to all parties—for making an arrangement honorable to both nations, as all just arrangements are;—and which he may well consider the greatest labor of his life.

I hardly know whether it is proper on this occasion to advert to the correspondence; but when it shall appear with the discussion of the other important questions—for the occasion was sought there to treat upon subjects of great moment and concern—when these shall be before the public and shall be calmly and thoroughly read; I shall venture to trust their judgment concerning them.

There yet remain, gentlemen, in our foreign relations several subjects of considerable interest yet unsettled with England. In the first place there is the important subject of our colonial trade, or the trade of the United States with the Northern British provinces and the West Indies. It became my duty to look into this subject—to keep the run of it, as we say, from 1839 to the present time. I was constrained to believe, indeed I know, that the operation of that arrangement is unfavorable to the shipping and navigation of the United States, especially of New England. It is an important subject for the exertions of diplomacy or for the consideration of Congress—one or both. Congress called upon the department in which I am for information, and a respectable Committee of the House of Representatives presented a report upon the subject. It is one which I hold to be of vital importance to our navigation and to the interests of the nation.

Then there is the question, somewhat more remote, but which it will be enough to settle; I mean the Oregon Boundary towards the Pacific and the Rocky Mountains. There are reasons why this dispute should be settled before the country itself is peopled on the one side or the other. The relations of other States require attention; and many of our citizens have claims of indemnity which require prosecution. It becomes the Government of the United States, by a calm and dignified but decisive and vigorous tone to administer her foreign affairs so as to ensure a just arrangement in these respects.

Gentlemen, I am here to-day as a guest. I was invited by a number of highly valued friends to partake with them of a public dinner, for the purpose of giving them an opportunity to pass the usual greeting of friends now met after some absence, to pay their respect to my public services, and to tender their congratulations at the result of the negotiations just concluded. It was at my instance that this festival, from a dinner, took its present form; and instead of meeting you at the vestive board, I choose for obvious reasons, this public manner. Still, gentlemen, its general character is preserved, and I am here as a guest. I am here to receive your salutations and greetings on particular subjects. I am not here under an invitation, or an expectation, that I should address the gentlemen who have been pleased to meet me here on topics not suggested by yourselves. It would not befit the occasion, therefore, in my opinion, that I should use the occasion for any such purposes because although I have a desire at some time, not far distant I hope, to make my sentiments known upon the political occurrences of the country generally and the political state of the nation and the parties at the present moment, yet I know well that it would be improper for me to do so now, because I know well that the gentlemen who have written to invite me here on this occasion, entertain many of them, opinions different from myself; and they might say, "we came here to greet Mr. Webster, and to extend our congratulations, on those matters in which we agree; and we did not come with the expectation that he would use the opportunity to discuss questions on which we differ.

On that account, and for the reason, I shall forbear, thinking it my duty so to do; and abstaining from using this occasion for the purpose of expressing my own opinions and of stating how far I agree with friends with whom I have acted for years, and how far I am most reluctantly restrained to differ from them, I look forward to a future occasion, if such should be offered, for the opportunity of fulfilling this promise.

I would say one thing, gentlemen, because it has been alluded to. The Mayor has been kind enough to say that, in his judgment, having discharged the duties of the Department in which I have acted in a manner satisfactory to the country, I might safely be left to take care of my own honor and reputation. I suppose he meant to say that in the present distracted state of the Whig party, and in the contrariety of opinion which prevails, (if there be a contrariety of opinion) as to the course proper to be pursued by me—the decision of that question might be left to myself. I am exactly of his opinion. (Loud and repeated cheers.) I am quite of this opinion, gentlemen, that, in a question touching my own honor or the consistency of my own character, as I am to bear all the consequences of the decision, I might a deal better be trusted to make it. And though, gentlemen, no man values more highly than I do the advice of his friends, yet on a question so important and of such a nature as this, I like to choose the friends to advise me; and on this whole subject, with this reference, I shall leave you just as en-

lightened as I found you. I give no pledge; I make no intimations, one way or the other; and I will be as absolutely free, when this day closes, to act as duty calls, as I was when the dawn first broke upon me. (Repeated cheers.)

Gentlemen, there is a delicacy in this case—because there is always a delicacy in speaking of differences with friends; but there is no embarrassment—no embarrassment. If I see the path of duty clear before me, I trust I have that within me which will enable me to pursue it, and throw all embarrassment to the winds. A public man has no occasion to be embarrassed, if he is honest. He himself—his own feelings are nothing; his country and his public duty are everything, and he should sink whatever is personal to himself in far higher considerations; these are the characteristics that mark us as great or as little men.

There were many persons in December 1841, who found great objections to my remaining in the President's Cabinet. You all know, gentlemen, that twenty years of honest, I do not say of efficient service, or not altogether undistinguished service in the Whig cause, had scarcely prepared me for an outpouring such as seldom proceed from Whig friends, against Whigs, or against any body. I am a little hard to be coaxed, and a great deal harder to be driven. I chose to act from my own judgment; and thinking that I was in a post where I could render service to my country, I said there; and I leave you this day, and I leave my country to say, whether this country would have been better off if I had gone also.

I have no attachment to office. I have tasted its sweets, but I have also tasted its bitterness. I am content; and I acknowledge I am more anxious to preserve the good I have than to run risks for new acquisitions in public life. I suppose I ought to pause here. I suppose I ought not to allude, and I will not, to any thing further than merely concerns myself.

Gentlemen, a very respectable convention, a most respectable convention assembled here some ten days ago, and passed some important resolutions. There is no set of gentlemen, so far as I know, for whom I entertain more respect and regard. They are Whigs—but they are no better Whigs than I am. They have served their country in the Whig ranks—and so have I—quite as long, though, perhaps with less ability and success. They were sent hither, as I suppose, to agree upon one whom the Whigs of Massachusetts should support for Governor and Lieutenant Governor. If their power extended beyond that I have not seen their commission. If they had authority to speak in the name of Whigs of Massachusetts, for other purposes or interests, I was not acquainted with that power. And in acting further it seems to me they were a little inconsiderate.

Among other resolutions, they declared, in behalf of all the Whigs of the Commonwealth, a full and final separation from the President of the United States.—If these gentlemen said this for the expression of their own opinions, to that extent, it is good. Whigs speak their sentiments every where, and they have a perfect right to do it here. But it becomes quite another question, when they assume to represent other characters, and to speak on other points than those on which they were authorized to speak. I am a Whig. I always have been one—and I always shall be one.—(repeated cheers)—and if anybody undertakes to turn me out of the pale of that communion—let him see to it who gets out first! I am a Massachusetts Whig—a Faneuil Hall Whig—breathing her air now for twenty-five years, and meaning to breathe it on this spot, so long as God shall be pleased to give me life.

I accept the decision of a Whig Convention for proper purposes; for I know that only through such bodies, and such organization, great public good can be obtained. But it is quite another question when a Convention, acting from the impulse of the moment, decides upon questions which have never been submitted to their arbitration at all. A full and final separation they declare, between the Whigs of Massachusetts and the President of the United States. This text reads a commentary.—What does it mean?

The President has yet three years of his term unexpired. Does the resolution mean that during that three years all the measures of his administration shall be opposed by the Whigs of Massachusetts—right or wrong? Great public interests require his attention—those to which I have alluded. If the President of the United States should make an earnest and serious effort to affect favorably the navigation of the country, to regulate the question of British Colonial trade, shall all the Whigs of Massachusetts separate from him and refuse their aid? (Cries of "no!")—Well I say no! If the President directs the proper department to review the whole commercial regulations of the United States, to take deeply into consideration that reciprocity in our direct trade to which so much tonnage is now sacrificed—and the proper measures shall be suggested and adopted by him, shall all the Whigs of Massachusetts separate and oppose him? Look, gentlemen, at the question. Do you know that now a great proportion—more than one half of the carrying trade, the transportation for instance, of goods between Brazil and the United States, is carried on by the tonnage of Northern Europe, in consequence of the ill considered reciprocity treaty? As well we admit them to share our coasting trade. We give them the right, without the shadow of advantage in return, to take the bread from our children's mouths and give it unto strangers.—I ask you, sir, (turning to a gentleman at his right,) as a shipping merchant, if this is not true.

Well, is every measure of this kind to be postponed or rejected—until these three

years become expired, and as may more as shall elapse before the time when Providence shall bless the Whigs with more power to do good than they have now?

Again, the various departments of the Government employ persons who are supposed to be good Whigs, holding offices, Collectors, and other Custom House Officers, Postmasters, District Attorneys, Marshals, &c.; What is to become of them in this separation? Are they to be forced to resign, or will you give them invitation and provocation to resign? Our distinguished fellow-citizen who does so high credit himself and to his country in upholding the interests and honor of his nation at the Court of London is he excepted to come home and yield his place to his predecessor or some one else? And the individual who addresses you; where do his brother Whigs intend to place him? Generally when a divorce takes place the parents divide the children, I should be glad to know where I am to go?

But I would not treat the matter lightly or severely I know that such conventions resolutions are never considered with any degree of deliberation.—They are passed as they are presented. Who the gentlemen were who brought in these resolutions I do not know. I dare say they were respectable persons; but I doubt very much whether they had any very definite meaning in their resolutions, or whether they very clearly perceived what little they had. They were angry, resentful, desirous to make out a string of charges against the President, a sort of a bill of indictment, and they concluded by pronouncing the penalty, a full and final separation.

Now, gentlemen, I do not look upon this without perceiving that they had a bearing, whether intentional or unintentional, upon my proceedings; and therefore I thought proper to take notice of them. There are some topics on which it is my fortune to differ with my Whig brethren; but I dare say they are right; and I know that I am right in entertaining these opinions, and in expressing them if I do entertain them. They are disposed to postpone all attempt to do good to some future and uncertain occasion.

Now the Whigs have a majority in each House of Congress, a strong majority, and, in my opinion, the time to do good is now; that now should be accomplished whatever remains to be done. There are persons of more sanguine temperament than I. "Confidence," says Mr. Burke, "is a plant of slow growth; and it is true when applied to public measures as well as to public men. Some people can see distinctly when the Whigs will have more power, and a better chance for serving their country. Beyond the present, far on in the future, these men see milder skies and halcyon seas; the fogs and darkness which blind other men, dim not their vision in the least.

Now it was not an easy work to accomplish what we have already attained. The Whigs tried it long—they tried it in 1840 and succeeded, but not without labor. I do not believe they will find it easier now; and I know that nothing but Union—and by that I mean a cordial sympathizing, paternal Union, can prevent the Whig cause from prostration. It is not, and I say it in the presence of the world, it is not by premature and partial, and especially by proscriptive and denouncing proceedings, that this great Whig family can be united. Do they not know that they came into power as a party made up of different opinions? What did the Country expect from these complex opinions? Here were extreme State Rights notions, extreme Federal notions, excessive Tariff and Anti-Tariff notions—what did the Country expect? That they should come together in a spirit of harmony, of conciliation, of unity and sympathy—and that they should seek to agree and not widen the breach. In this lay the hope of saving the country from the ruinous measures which at that time threatened its prosperity. The whole history of the revolution of 1840 preaches conciliation, and forbearance, and kindness, and friendship, and sympathy, and union.

Gentlemen, if I understand the matter, there were four or five great objects for which that revolution was undertaken. In the first place, one great object was the attempt to establish a permanent peace between the United States and England; for though we had no war, we had perpetual agitation and disturbance.—What should we do? We need men capable of knowing the future, and of calculating with a degree of certainty the chances for a permanent settlement. The accomplishment of this must be regarded as one of the most important objects; and I am glad if it proves acceptable to the country.

The next question was concerning revenue; the country was deficient in revenue. It was a fact, a notorious fact, that the late Administration exceeded their receipts by their expenditures, thus running the country in debt, and the Government was found in debt. Under the operation of the Compromise Act, the revenue was diminishing. Now this revolution had for one object, therefore, the supply for the revenue, and I hope and believe that to a reasonable extent that object has been answered.

And then the great interest of Protection—as incidental of consequent on Revenue—was maintained by means of levying duty by revenue. As to that much has been done; and it will be found I think that enough has been done and all the Whigs for its support deserve my thanks and your hearty gratitude. But let us be just, let us be just. The French rhetoricians have a maxim that nothing can be beautiful that is not true; and I am afraid we shall see that much of our juvenile oratory will not stand the test of this criticism. It is not true that the Tariff passed solely by the Whig strength, or that it could have passed. It is not true that the majority of Whigs could be found in favor of it in either House of Congress.

We all know that more than thirty Whigs voted against the Tariff, out and out, and after all it passed the House by only one vote; and a good deal of eclat was supposed to attend it and no little parade

was made about some one Whig who came forward to the rescue (as it was called) and cast that single vote.—Now had not every other gentleman that single vote, and did not the single vote of your neighbor, the Representative from the Middlesex District, who voted for the Tariff out and out, just as steadily as did the distinguished gentleman who presents this District, decide the question? He held the tariff in his hands just as absolutely as if he had the Presidential Veto.

In the Senate it passed by a single vote again. Could the friends of a Tariff have spared the two votes from Pennsylvania, the one from Mr. Williams, of Maine, and that of Mr. Wright, of New York? Let us admit the truth, and a lawyer will do that when it helps his cause. The truth is far more favorable than such misrepresentations. The truth is, a portion of the other party came in their help of the Tariff, and an important truth it is, for I ask you, as composing a part of the industrious, hardy men of New England, as caring for your children and their livelihood, if you would wish such a great object as the Protection of your industry made a mere party object, rising as party rises, and going down to its grave as the party goes down. It is a National question, the utility of a Tariff of Protection, and let all parties support it, because, though I hope the ascendancy of Whig principles may be perpetual, yet I desire to take for the Tariff a bond and security, more durable than are my hopes of the perpetuity of the Whig party.

Let us be true in another respect. This Tariff has accomplished much. I honor the members who passed it. But what has it done? It has restored the country in regard to protection to where it was before the operation of the Compromise Act commenced, and it has done no more. It has repaired the consequences of that measure. I may speak of the Compromise Act. My turn to speak of it has at least come. I can truly say that no measure was ever passed which cost me so much grief as that. We heard the motives of that act presented. Whiff by motives gentlemen mean the personal motives of those principally concerned, we deem them pure, as all public men are supposed to act from pure motives. But if we look at the proposed objects of the law, if we look at what is written on the whole transaction—if we see what the law expresses on its face; if these are its motives, they are, as motives, still worse than the operation of the act itself.

It is explained in its action, every line is full of it, every circumstance attending it is full of it; the object was neither more nor less than to impose for all time, a restriction upon the Legislature in regard to levying duties without any change of the Constitution. It was in fact to insert a prohibitory clause in the Constitution, that after 1842 no duty should be laid which was not according to an observed horizontalism, and exceeded 20 per cent. I say now, as I said then, that the principle is false and dangerous; it admits a new feature into the administration of the government and the laws, and the country, only with a spasm and a throe, can ever get rid of it. Hasn't it done this? Yet thank God it's got rid of. The present Tariff Law is sufficiently discriminating, holds to common sense, and rejects the principle of the Compromise Act I hope forever.

Another and original object under the revolution of 1840 was the restoration of the currency of the country. Our troubles did not begin with a want of money in the treasury; they did not begin with the operation of the Compromise Act, which commenced in 1833, and has been contracting ever since. There were other causes of the troubles, and while they remained, even if the treasury had been full, and the Tariff and Protective policy undisturbed, yet still provision was made for a better currency, our universal validity throughout the land, the great cause would not be removed.

At the Special Session of Congress the Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Ewing, submitted to Congress a plan for a National Bank, founded upon the idea of a large capital made up by private subscriptions and having the power to extend its branches all over the country. I need not advert to the circumstances of its presentation to Congress. It had received the approbation of the President and was concurred in by every member of the cabinet as the best that could be done; for as we said circumstances had placed in the first place the gentleman whom we all thought good enough for the second and his opinions were different from ours but fixed, and we deemed it the part of wisdom and prudence to see how we could get along as well as might be under the circumstances. Mr. Ewing's plan was sent to Congress as it has been described—except that the bank could not establish branches in the State without the consent of the States.

Now I had no idea myself that there was any necessity for any such provision—as it was at most mere theory—though I never would agree in any case with the doctrine that the omission to exercise a power is a surrender of the power. What was done? Doubts were expressed as to whether the institution could go into operation; many were doubtful as to obtaining subscriptions. What did we do? We sent to the commercial cities, the principal towns in the country and asked gentlemen of known skill and capital to come and consult with us about it. They expressed doubts, but hopes also and pledged themselves to do the best they could; and as the community was interested in it and the administration was fresh and popular—they were earnest to have the bill tried. What was the result? It was sent to the Senate and rejected. Another bill was brought in divested of this theoretic difficulty, it was discussed two months and then it was found that it would not pass a Whig Senate.

I will not pursue the unhappy narrative of the session of 1841. Men grew angry and

resentful. I saw the storm arising, and endeavored, as far as I could, to hush it. I expressed my opinion freely to the two Senators from Massachusetts, and advised them to give men time to cool to let a conciliation take place, and harmony be restored if possible. I am bound to suppose my advice was not good; it certainly was not followed, and the consequences I need not tell you.

The subject came up again at the last session, and the President sent into Congress the plan of an Exchequer. The measure received but little favor, and it is necessary for me, lest the whole burden of displeasure should fall on others, to say that it met my hearty sincere and entire approbation.

Gentlemen I hope I have not, during my public life, had an overweening confidence in my own judgment, or been unwilling to defer to the better judgment of my friends. But there are some subjects in which I confess, I have some respect for my own feelings. The subject of the currency has been the study of my life. Thirty years ago, a little before I entered the councils of Congress, the question of the nature of a mixed currency and the relation of specie in a currency became with me a matter of consideration. And I discovered a debate upon a motion introduced into Parliament by Mr. Vansittart, during the suspension of the bank of England, and while her notes were 15 per cent. below par it was that the bank note was worth just as much as its face purported to promise; that the bank had not depreciated, but that the bullion had risen. Lord Liverpool, Lord Castle reach, Mr. Roebuck, and other members of Parliament espoused that side of the question; and on the other side were arrayed the strong reasoning powers and the logic of Horner, and the practical good sense of Mr. Alex. Baring, now Lord Ashburton. I confess that the study of these papers made me a bullionist. I concluded that paper notes would circulate safely only while they continued to be redeemed in gold and silver at the counter, wherever they were issued.

The next year Congress, at its session, found the finances of the country in a deplorable condition. I believe I had read every valuable work on the subject on either side of the Atlantic, and had closely observed the laws of paper currency as exhibited during the different epochs in this country, from 1811 to the present time. I had expressed my opinions at various times in Congress, some of which had not been falsified by subsequent events; and I must be permitted to entertain quite as much confidence on that subject, in my own opinion, as in the flippancy paragraph in a newspaper, or the hasty ebullition of a debater. And I take the responsibility of saying, that the measure then submitted to Congress was the best and the only measure for the adoption of Congress and trial by the People. I am ready to stake my reputation and it is all I have to stake upon it; and that if the Whig Congress will take the measure, and give it a fair trial, within three years, it will be admitted by the whole American People to have proved the most beneficial institution ever established, the constitutional loan only excepted.

Understand me—take it as it is—as it came from the consideration of the Cabinet, not as it was after Congress had begun to work upon it. For when they struck out the power of governing exchanges, it was not worth a rush, not worth the parchment on which the law would have been engrossed. The great desire, the urgent necessity of this country is a currency facility of exchange. You work for the people of Alabama, they plant for you, and you want a common medium to equalize debt and credit with the same velocity as steam transports men and machinery. You have not got it, you can't get it by the authority and permission of Government, never, never. You want a large and liberal provision for exchange, and without this you cannot reach the good at which you aim. How will you do it? I need not say by a Bank of the U. States, based upon private subscription; for it is out of the question. The man who pursues that follow an obsolete idea. Suppose a law should establish a Bank, with a capital of fifty millions; who will subscribe to it? what will you give per share? It is entirely out of the question. Take it, then for purposes of local discount, say in State streets; do you want this untaxed capital to make your discounts?

Well, what shall we ever have? For I repeat it, many gentlemen propose to do nothing but to postpone everything till the coming of the Jews. Is nothing to be attempted? When the Exchequer was presented to Congress it was assailed from all quarters. I believe one gentleman did get courage to say in its favor that he did not know but after all, by some possibility, some good might come of it. But it had many different classes of opponents. Some said that it would be a lifeless machine—it would not move at all; others said it would have by far too much life; it would answer the purpose of its creation—and that was to increase Executive power.—One found it King Log and the other King Serpent. One indicated it as a terrific giant of enormous magnitude, striding over and crushing the liberties of the country; it would, therefore, break the Constitution, and, therefore, they would oppose it.

These opposing agents contradicted, if they did not refuse, each other, and convinced me that the plan could not be adopted nor even temporarily considered. One was afraid to do one thing lest he should break the Constitution, and another was afraid to do another lest he should break it, so they did nothing. One man would not vote for a Bank which had the power to establish branches, lest he should break the Constitution; and another would not vote for one which had not, lest that he should break it. They acted like a boatman, who in the midst of rocks and shoals and whirlpools, should refuse to pull one stroke for his safety lest he should break his oar. But they stood looking forward to the time when restored confidence should enable the Bank to go into operation. When will this be? When prosperity returns to the country, then, when the emergency is over. Meantime