

# THE RALEIGH STAR AND NORTH CAROLINA GAZETTE.

THOS. J. LEMAY, EDITOR AND PROPRIETOR.

"NORTH CAROLINA—POWERFUL IN MORAL, INTELLECTUAL AND PHYSICAL RESOURCES—THE LAND OF OUR HEROES AND THE HOME OF OUR AFFECTIONS."

(THREE DOLLARS A YEAR—IN ADVANCE.)

VOL. 28.

HALEIGH, N. C. WEDNESDAY FEB. 10, 1847.

No. 6

## LETTER FROM GEN. TAYLOR

We lay before our readers the following letter, which tells its own story too well to need any comment. It is but just, however, to its heroic writer, whose courage and judgment are equalled only by his honesty and modesty, to state that it was written to a near friend and relative, now resident in this city, endeared to him by very many years of personal intimacy, to whom he unboastfully all his purposes, opinions and feelings, without the least reserve. This friend would not have taken the liberty of making public a communication of this nature, did not the recent manifestation of the envious malignity of the Administration and its servants and friends towards the man who alone has saved them and the country from the consequences of their rashness, ignorance and incapacity, make it necessary and just that the object of their base detraction should, at this critical moment, be heard in his own defence, by the whole people, in his own simple and honest language.

We have more of this sort to communicate, and shall be able to show that, in his defence against his own secret personal enemies and selfish detractors, as well as against the armed enemies of this country, the old hero of the Rio Grande is ever "ROUGH AND READY."

## N. Y. Express.

MONTELEY, MEXICO, Nov. 9, 1846.

My dear Sir,  
Your very kind and acceptable letter of the 31st of August, reached me only a short time since, for which I beg leave to tender to you my sincere thanks. [A few confidential remarks on certain public transactions are here omitted.]

After considerable apparent delay on the part of the Qr. Master's Department, in getting Steamboats into the Rio Grande adapted to its navigation, I succeeded, towards the latter part of August, in throwing forward to Camargo (a town situated on the San Juan river, three miles from its junction with the Rio Grande, on the west side, nearly 500 miles from Brazos Island by water and 200 by land, and 140 from this place,) a considerable depot of provisions, ordnance, ammunition and forage, and then, having brought together an important portion of my command, I determined on moving on this place. Accordingly, after collecting 1700 pack mules, with their attendants and conductors, in the enemy's country, (the principal means of transportation for our provisions, baggage, &c.) I left, on the 5th of September, to join my advance, which had proceeded on a few days to Serralvo, a small village 75 miles on the route, which I did on the 9th, and, after waiting there a few days for some of the corps to get up, moved on and reached here on the 19th, with 6250 men, 2700 regulars, the balance volunteers. For what took place afterwards I must refer you to my several reports, particularly to my detailed one of the 9th ult. I do not believe the authorities at Washington are at all satisfied with my conduct in regard to terms of the capitulation entered into with the Mexican commander, which you no doubt have seen, as they have been made public through the official organ, & copied into various other newspapers. I have this moment received an answer (to my despatch announcing the surrender of Monterey, and the circumstances attending the same,) from the Secretary of War, stating that "it was regretted by the President that it was not deemed advisable to insist on the terms I had proposed in my first communication to the Mexican commander, in regard to giving up the city."—adding that "the circumstances which dictated, no doubt justified the change." Although the terms of capitulation may be considered too liberal on our part by the President and his advisers, as well as by many others at a distance, particularly by those who understand the position which we occupied, (otherwise they might come to a different conclusion in regard to the matter,) yet, on due reflection, I see nothing to induce me to regret the course I pursued.

The proposition on the part of General Ampudia, which had much to do in determining my course in the matter, was based on the ground that our government had proposed to him to settle the existing difficulties by negotiation, (which I knew was the case, without knowing the result,) which was then under consideration by the proper authorities, and which he (Gen. Ampudia,) had no doubt would result favorably, as the whole of his people were in favor of peace. If so, I considered the further effusion of blood not only unnecessary, but improper. Their force was also considerably larger than ours; and from the size and position of the place, we could not completely invest it; so that the greater portion of their troops, if not the whole, had they been disposed to do so, could, any night, have abandoned the city, at once entered the mountain passes, and effected their retreat,—do what we would! Had we been put to the alternative of taking the place by storm, (which there is no doubt we should have succeeded in doing,) we should, in all probability, have lost fifty or one hundred men in killed, besides the wounded,—which I wished to avoid as there appeared to be a prospect of peace, even if a

distant one. I also wished to avoid the destruction of women and children, which must have been very great, had the storming process been resorted to. Besides, they had a very large and strong fortification, a short distance from the city, which, if carried with the bayonet, must have been taken at great sacrifice of life; & with our limited train of heavy or battering artillery, it would have required twenty or twenty-five days to take it by regular approaches.

That they should have surrendered a place nearly as strong as Quebec, well fortified under the direction of skillful engineers,—their works garrisoned with forty two pieces of artillery, abundantly supplied with ammunition, garrisoned by 7000 regular and 2000 irregular troops, in addition to some thousand citizens capable of, (and no doubt actually) bearing arms, and aiding in its defence,—to an opposing force of half their number, scantily supplied with provisions, and with a light train of artillery,—is among the unaccountable occurrences of the times.

I am decidedly opposed to carrying the war beyond Saltillo in this direction, which place has been entirely abandoned by the Mexican forces, all of whom have been concentrated at San Luis Potosi; & I shall lose no time in taking possession of the former, as soon as the cessation of hostilities referred to expires,—which I have notified the Mexican authorities will be the case on the 15th inst., by direction of the President of the United States.

If we are (in the language of Mr. Polk and General Scott) under the necessity of "conquering a peace," and that by taking the capital of the country,—we must go to Vera Cruz, take that place, and then march on the city of Mexico. To do so in any other direction, I consider out of the question. But admitting that we conquer a peace by doing so,—say, at the end of the next twelve months,—will the amount of blood and treasure which must be expended in doing so, be compensated by the same? I think not,—especially, if the country we subdue is to be given up; and I imagine there are but few individuals in our country who think of annexing Mexico to the United States.

I do not intend to carry on my operations (as previously stated) beyond Saltillo, deeming it next to impracticable to do so. It then becomes a question as to what is best to be done. It seems to me, the most judicious course to be pursued on our part would be to take possession at once of the line we would accept by negotiation, extending from the Gulf of Mexico, to the Pacific, and occupy the same, or keep what we already have possession of; and that with Tampico, (which I hope to take in the course of the next month, or as soon as I can get the means of transportation,) will give us all on this side of the Sierra Madre, and as soon as I occupy Saltillo, will include six or seven States or Provinces, thus hold Tampico, Victoria, Monterey, Saltillo, Monclova, Chihuahua, which I presume General Wool has possession of by this time) Santa Fe and the California and say to Mexico, "Drive us from the country!"—throwing on her the responsibility and expense of carrying on an offensive war,—at the same time closely blockading all her ports on the Pacific and the Gulf. A course of this kind, if preserved in for a short time would soon bring her to her proper senses, and compel her to sue for peace,—provided there is a government in the country sufficiently stable for us to treat with, which I fear will hardly be the case for many years to come. Without large reinforcements of volunteers from the United States—say ten or fifteen thousand, (those previously sent out having already been greatly reduced by sickness and other casualties) I do not believe it would be advisable to march beyond Saltillo, which is more than 200 miles beyond our depots on the Rio Grande—a very long line on which to keep up supplies (over a land route in a country like this) for a large force, and certain to be attended with an expense which it will be frightful to contemplate, when closely looked into.

From Saltillo to San Luis Potosi, the next place of importance on the road to the city of Mexico, is three hundred miles—one hundred and forty badly watered, where no supplies of any kind could be procured for men or horses. I have informed the War Department that 20,000 efficient men would be necessary to insure success if we move on that place—a city containing a population of 60,000 where the enemy could bring together and sustain besides the citizens, an army of 50,000 a force which I apprehend will hardly be collected by us with the train necessary to feed it as well as to transport various other supplies particularly ordnance and munitions of war.

In regard to the armistice, which would have expired by limitation in a few days, we lost nothing by it as we could not move even now had the enemy continued to occupy Saltillo for strategy to say, the first wagon which has reached me since the declaration of war was on the 2d inst the same day on which I received from Washington an acknowledgment of my despatch announcing the taking of Monterey; and then I received only 125, so that I have been, since May, last completely crippled, and am still so, for want of transportation. After taking and scraping the country for miles around Camargo,

collecting every pack mule and other means of transportation, I could bring here only 80,000 rations, (fifteen days' supply with a moderate supply of ordnance, ammunition, &c. to do which all the corps had to leave behind a portion of camp their baggage necessary for their comfort and in some instances, among the volunteers, their personal baggage. I moved in such a way and with such limited means that had I not succeeded, I should no doubt have been severely reprimanded, if nothing worse. I did so to sustain the Administration.

Of the two regiments of mounted men from Tennessee and Kentucky, who left their respective States to join me, in June, the latter has just reached Camargo; the former had not got to Matamoros at the latest dates from there. Admitting that they will be as long in returning as in getting here, (to say nothing of the time necessary to recruit their horses) and were to be discharged in time to reach their homes, they could serve in Mexico but a very short time. The foregoing remarks are not made with the view of finding fault with any one, but to point out the difficulties with which I have had to contend.

Monterey, the capital of New Leon, is situated on the San Juan River, where it comes out of the mountains,—the city (which contains a population of about twelve thousand) being in part surrounded by them at the head of a large and beautiful valley. The houses are of stone, in the Moorish style, with flat roofs, which, with their strongly inclosed yards and gardens, in high stone walls all looped musketry, make them each a fortress within itself. It is the most important place in Northern Mexico, (or on the east side of the Sierra Madre,) commanding the only pass or road for carriages from this side, between it and the Gulf of Mexico to the table lands of the Sierra by or through which, the city of Mexico can be reached.

I much fear I shall have exhausted your patience before you get half through this long and uninteresting letter. If so you can only commit it to the flames, and think no more about it as I write in great haste, besides being interrupted every five minutes; so that you must make great allowances for blots interlinations and blunders, as well as want of connection in many parts of the same.

Be so good as to present me most kindly to your excellent lady and accept my sincerest wishes for your continued health, prosperity and fame.

I remain truly and sincerely,  
Your friend,  
Z. TAYLOR.

## LATER FROM THE ARMY.

The editors of the New Orleans Picayune have received advices from Tampico to the 14th instant, by the arrival of the brig Georgianina, at New-Orleans. The verbal news she brought was alarming, it being to the effect that Santa Anna had placed himself between Gen. Taylor and Gen. Worth with 35,000 men, and that a general action was immediately expected. All this is an exaggeration. We believe the authentic facts to be as follows:

Col. Kinney arrived at Tampico on the 12th inst., direct from Victoria. He entered that town with Gen. Quitman on the evening of the 7th inst.—Gen. Quitman drove the enemy, before him for the last thirty or forty miles before getting to Victoria. The Mexicans were reluctant to give up the place. As Gen. Quitman entered the town the Mexicans were going out on the other side. Gen. Q. had no cavalry and could not pursue them.

Col. Kinney parted from Gen Taylor at Monte Morales, and pushed on with Gen. Quitman to Victoria, and thence made his way by Soto la Marina to Tampico, having accomplished 250 miles in three days, and met with narrow escapes.

Col. K.'s servant was killed, and he only escaped capture by a party of 60 Roncheros by telling the Alcalde that Gen. Taylor was near at hand, and had sent him forward to prepare supplies.

We have no reason to suppose that Gens. Butler and Worth have moved from Saltillo, as has been reported.—We believe them still there, with at least 6,000 troops, and that a strong division of the Mexican army is in the vicinity, watching our movements and ready to take advantage of any favorable opportunity which circumstances may afford.

This advanced corps of the Mexican army is obviously a corps of observation, thrown out to watch the movements of our own, and to prevent an advance on San Luis from Saltillo, by cutting off the supplies of water.

There was a considerable body of Mexican cavalry at Tula, under Gen. Valencia.

From a correspondent at Tampico we learn that on the 1st of January Gen. Taylor sent forward Col. May, of the Dragoons, to examine the mountain pass between Morales and Labadores.

On his return from Labadores he took another pass leading to Linages and was attacked by a large body of the enemy and his rear guard cut off

This was effected by rolling stones into the pass, which was scarcely wide enough for a single horseman. May managed to get through with the main body and reached a spot where he was enabled to dismount and return to the support of the rear guard, but it was too late, as the enemy had retreated with their prize. At one time during the passage of the gorge the dragoons would have been almost at the mercy of the enemy had the latter discharged their pieces with any accuracy; for the position they occupied was directly over the heads of our troops. We cannot ascertain Col. May's loss, or whether he had any men killed or not.

At the present time, there can be no doubt, Gens. Taylor, Twiggs, Patterson and Pillow are at Victoria, and with a large force. Had Gen. Taylor but a party of five hundred Texan rangers with him, their services, with the enemy's cavalry hanging about him in almost every direction, would be invaluable.

Tampico, January 12, 1847.

Gens. Taylor and Patterson are at Victoria with 6000 men awaiting orders from Gen. Scott. It is not supposed that any movement will be made against San Luis Potosi. It is pronounced the strongest fortified post in all Mexico, and Santa Anna has said that the man that takes it is welcome to the capital.

Gen. Ampudia, in a letter published in the Mexican papers, endeavors to justify himself for losing Monterey, and boasts (falsely, of course,) that he inflicted upon us, with total loss of but 465 in killed, wounded, &c., a destruction of 1,124 killed, of 1,080 wounded, and of more than 1,000 missing.

The late Mexican papers contain many acknowledgments of gifts received for the soldiers, chiefly from females.

The Picayune says that the Mexican Congress had not acted upon our proposition for peace; but the N. O. Times learns, from its letters, that the proposal has been rejected, only nineteen members voting to entertain it.

## New Plan of the Campaign.

It appears from the following letter, which we find in the Charleston Courier, that a new plan has been sketched for the Mexican Campaign. Although we feel convinced that the developments are exceedingly imperfect, and that some of the names of the places are incorrectly given, still if the route in question is a practicable one, the plan seems to be well digested. The movement from Tuspan has this general advantage over that from Tampico, that it may be made either upon the Capital or upon Vera Cruz, or both, as the exigencies of the campaign may prompt—thus carrying out the views expressed by our intelligent correspondent at Saltillo, in regard to attacking the city from the land side. Tampico is about half way between Tampico and Vera Cruz, and is only some twenty or twenty-five miles south of the Island of Lobos or Labos, which is said to have been selected as the general rendezvous of all the troops now moving towards the seat of War. The harbour of Tuspan, however, is not a safe one. Vera Cruz has the double advantage of being within a striking distance of the capital and of possessing a reasonably good harbour. Hence the necessity of the complex movement, to which we have referred, and which, we think, may be clearly inferred from the nature of the preparations in progress. Not only the species of forces which have been organized, but the kind of munitions which have been forwarded, show that it is intended to take heavily fortified castles as well as to storm mountain passes and cities. But it is useless to indulge in idle speculations, especially as some early and decided demonstrations may be anticipated. We give the letter in question for what it is worth:

"New-Orleans, Jan. 15, 1847.—Gentlemen: Colonel Totten, Chief Engineer of the United States, arrived here to day from Washington. The Rocket and double Howitzer Brigade is expected daily. The regiments of Louisiana, Pennsylvania and Mississippi are about being embarked, and will take ninety days rations with them. These troops are supposed to be destined for Tuspan, where they will be joined by the Massachusetts, North and South Carolina, Virginia, Illinois, and 2d Pennsylvania Regiments. Their future destination is unknown, as every avenue to information is carefully guarded; but it is now guessed at that a march will be made direct on Mexico from Tuspan by Guanchinago, Papamda Apan, and Tezaco, along the route over which the Indian runners passed in twenty four hours from the Gulf to Mexico in the time of Montezuma. The distance is only two hundred and fifty miles, and the road is said to present no serious obstacles to the march of troops. Gen. Scott will

advance at once on San Luis Potosi, simultaneously with the Tuspan movement. It is supposed that Santa Anna will not fight at Potosi when he finds 9,000 men advancing from Tuspan, but will fall back on Queretaro, and from thence to Tulacingo, in order to oppose our advance from Tuspan.

At this point he can make a strong stand. But here this double Howitzer Brigade will act with great efficiency.—In order to understand how, it is necessary to describe the pass of Tulacingo. It is formed by a chasm in the mountain; the rocks rise almost perpendicular to a height of 150 feet. The road between will admit of no more than 4 mules abreast. The Pass is only one quarter of a mile in length. Over this chasm there is a natural bridge of rock, which is accessible by a steep and devious ascent, by which mules can ascend. The double mountain Howitzer will be placed on mules and carried to the natural bridge, when the road to the west of the pass will be completely commanded to the distance of 1,200 yards, so that the enemy's forces must retire on the approach of our columns to that distance. Our troops will thus be enabled to move through the pass and debouch into an open tableau of land, of some miles in extent, without hindrance of the Mexican artillery. Our army will then make a flank movement on Apan, which will compel the Mexicans to move on to Tezaco, 50 miles from Mexico. In the meantime General Scott will move rapidly on Maconi, Chico, and the Real del Monte, and hence to Pachuca and Otumba. The road from Otumba to Texaco is exceedingly difficult, and perhaps it may not be necessary to follow it in order to form a junction with our columns at Tezaco; if so, Gen. Scott will by a right flank movement reach Ixtamalca, 15 miles from Mexico.

I have thus briefly stated what is whispered amongst military men here. Though Vera Cruz is believed to be the point of attack, I think myself it is designed only as a feint. The arrival of Col. Totten, who is considered as one of the most skillful Engineers in the world, has created no small sensation in military circles. His mouth is closed.

I will write you again soon.

Yours,  
ANON.

## MR. BADGER'S SPEECH.

In the Senate of the United States, On the Bill to authorize the appointment of a Lieutenant General, to command the Military forces during the War with Mexico.

Mr. BADGER said, that the best return, he believed, he could make to the Senate for its kindness in adjourning yesterday, in order to give him an opportunity to say what he had to say to-day, would be to proceed at once to the statement of those reasons which seemed to him to present an insuperable objection to the granting of that which the President of the United States asked of them, and which the bill upon the table proposed to grant.

The proposal (said Mr. B.) is to appoint a commanding General, who, commissioned as Lieutenant General, shall command all the armies of the United States. If this bill, Mr. President, shall pass into a law, the proposed high office to be created by it must be filled either by the present General commanding the army, or by some junior officer of the army, or by some citizen to be taken from the walks of private life. In the first case, sir, I think it must be manifest, on a very little reflection, that the measure must prove entirely useless. The major general now commanding the army commands all the forces about him; his command extends over the whole district or department which the President of the United States has assigned or may assign him; and a lieutenant general, though the title may be loftier, can do no more. The President of the United States may assign to the present commanding major general of the army the whole, entire, and absolute control under him of all the military operations of the war, and he may assign, though he is not bound to assign, to a lieutenant general, to this officer with the title of lieutenant general, the same large and extensive authority. The President of the United States may confine the present senior major general of the army to a particular district, to a narrow command, or to a small body of troops, so can he confine the same officer elevated to the grade of lieutenant general; for, by the express provision of the Constitution, by the inevitable necessity of the case, by the inevitable necessity of the case, by whatever title he may be called, major general or lieutenant general, he is at last under the absolute control or direction of the President himself, who is the sole constitutional commander-in-chief. By changing, therefore, the designation of major general to lieutenant general, you do not enlarge his authority; for the chief command of the whole army, is incident to no general, whatever his grade may be, unless when that army is collected together and acting as one body; and, when so collected and acting together, the chief command is incident to the senior officer, whether called

lieutenant or major general. Nor is the capacity of the officer to discharge with effect, to carry into successful results the duties assigned to him, in the smallest degree increased by a change of title or elevation to a higher grade. The authority must come from the President of the United States. The capacity to carry into execution the duties assigned to him must depend upon the forces belonging to his command, upon the force opposed to him, and upon his personal qualifications—his genius to conceive, his skill to combine, and his energy to execute whatever enterprise the crisis of affairs may require. It seems to me, then, that nothing can be founded upon slighter grounds than the opinion, if I prevail at all, that the officer who is now the senior major general will be in any respect better enabled to discharge, with honor to himself and advantage to the country, the duties assigned him by the simple operation of striking out of the list of major general from his commission, and inserting lieutenant general. But, sir, if the officer who is to fill this high place is not to be the present commanding general of the army, but some junior officer elevated over his head, I admit that this measure then ceases to be useless; it becomes mischievous, it loses its character of harmlessness; it is true, but it assumes one of gross injustice. It is, then, made the occasion for offering an open insult to a gallant officer whose life has been devoted to the service of his country; whose blood has been shed on her battle-fields; whose deeds of arms, during what has not inaptly been called the second war of independence, elicited eulogy from President Madison, thanks from Congress, and enthusiastic admiration from the whole people—a man whose generous humanity, high military qualities, and brilliant courage have earned for him, not only in this country, but throughout Europe, an honorable reputation, and who has contributed to elevate the American name. And if, instead of a junior officer from among that band of noble spirits who lead our arms, some one is to be taken from civil life; then, sir, involved in the same insult with their chief, we find all those gallant officers who fought at Palo Alto, at Resaca, at Fort Brown, and at Monterey—officers whose integrity is the theme of every tongue, the pride of every heart—officers who have shown themselves deserving of the highest honors, and who have been, some of them at least, elevated by your breasts—officers of whom it is not too much to say that they possess all the high qualities which have enabled either officers or soldiers in any service in the world. Sir, such ardent returns for noble services must inflict a pang of shame on noble and gallant and patriotic hearts—a return which no necessity can justify, and which, in my judgment, would stand as a foul blot upon the creation of this great Republic. Sir, would this insult stop here? No, sir. It would inflict a pain upon the nerve that vibrates in every noble heart; and, my word for it, if such a law as this be passed—if a civilian be advanced over the heads of all those gallant spirits in our army to the chief command, not only would the brave officers and soldiers of our army, but even the very sutlers and followers of the camp, feel their cheeks tinged with indignation and shame at the affront offered to that body and its head, of which they were the humble retainers.—Sir, there is not an instance in the history of this country which can serve as a precedent there is not an instance which can justify such a thing. It is true, sir, that, in 1798, when the country, possessing far inferior powers and inferior capacities for military defenses, was threatened with an inevitable war with the proudest and bravest and most powerful nation of that day—it is true that on that occasion the officer of lieutenant general was established, and Washington was called under that designation to take command of all the armies of the country. But, sir, it was Washington who was called to take that command; it was for Washington that that rank was established. Washington was then in retirement, which he loved—enjoying the ease and solace of domestic life, which he had earned for himself by long and glorious toil. Washington was called to that command by the people; by the army itself—called to take the charge and direction of those great military officers. And, if he returned upon the stage of active life, he left the spot in which he hoped to pass without interruption the few remaining days of his life, surely it was due him; it was due to that singular position of eminence and glory which he had occupied in this country. Yes, sir, it was due to him, who, as he had been great in war, was also first in peace; it was due to his character, to his preeminence throughout the whole breadth of this land; it was due to the proud position which he occupied in the civilized world; yes! it was due to him; when, at the call of his country, he surrendered ease and comfort, to appear more upon the field of arms, that he should do it with a title corresponding in some degree with his past and superior merits.

Sir, the state of things is now changed. We have no Washington. We cannot, if we look throughout the whole country, find in retirement a man on whose head a nation's blessing have, with entire unanimity, been showered as on him. We cannot look abroad and find some one upon whose name is gratefully cherished as having been once the saviour of his country.