

THE RALEIGH STAR AND NORTH CAROLINA GAZETTE.

1831 J. LEWIS, EDITOR AND PROPRIETOR.

"NORTH CAROLINA—POWERFUL IN MORAL, INTELLECTUAL AND PHYSICAL RESOURCES—THE LAND OF OUR Sires AND THE HOME OF OUR AFFECTIONS."

[THREE DOLLARS A YEAR—IN ADVANCE]

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THE MEMOIRS

OF
MAJ. GEN. ZACHARY TAYLOR,
Written expressly for the National Whig.
CHAPTER I.

Heroic and successful defence of Fort Harrison on the Wabash River by Captain Zachary Taylor, on the night of the 4th of September, 1812, against an Indian force under the Prophet far outnumbering the besieged.

On the evening of Thursday the 2d of September, 1812, the report of four guns was heard in the direction where two young farms, resident in the country were making hay, about 400 yards distant from Fort Harrison. This fort was situated on the Wabash river in what was then called Indiana Territory, and about 65 miles north of the present town of Vincennes. Captain Zachary Taylor, the subject of these memoirs was in command of the Fort with a garrison of about 50 men. It was known to the commandant that the Prophet with a large body of Indians, was on his way to that section of country and he concluded at once from the report of the four guns just heard that the young farmers had fallen victims to the Indian rifle. The hour was late and it was not deemed prudent to send out that evening to see what had become of the farmers; but their not coming in tended to confirm the suspicion that they were killed. At 8 o'clock the next morning a corporal with a small party was sent in search of the farmers, with orders not to run the risk of being drawn into an ambush. The corporal in a few moments sent a man back to inform Captain Taylor that he had found both the farmers slain; whereupon he sent a cart and oxen out and had the dead bodies brought in and buried. They had been shot with two balls, scalped and cut in the most shocking manner.

Late in the evening of the 4th of September, 1812, old Joseph Lenar, with thirty or forty Indians arrived before the Fort from the Prophet's Town with a white flag. Among them were about ten women. The men were composed principally of the chiefs of the different tribes that made up the Prophet's party. A Shawanese, who spoke good English informed Captain Taylor that old Lenar intended to speak with him the next morning with a view to try to get something to eat. At retreat beating, the men's arms were all examined and found to be in good order and completed with cartridges of 10 pounds per man. For some time past Captain Taylor had not been able to mount a guard of more than 6 privates and two non-commissioned officers, owing to the sickness that prevailed in his little company, and he had not considered his force adequate to the defence of his post in consequence of this state of things should it be variously attacked. He had just recovered also from a severe attack of fever and was unable to be up much through the night. However, after sunset, he cautioned the guard to be vigilant and ordered one of the non-commissioned officers as the sentinels could not see every part of the garrison, to walk on the inside during the whole night, with a view of giving the alarm if the Indians should show any signs of attack.

About 11 o'clock that same evening, namely the 4th of September, 1812, Capt Taylor was awakened by the firing of the sentinels. He sprang up and ran out and ordered the men to their posts. At this moment the orderly sergeant, who had charge of the upper block house called out that the Indians had set fire to the lower block house, the lower part of which contained the property of the contractor to the garrison and the upper story of which had been assigned to a corporal and ten privates as an alarm post. The guns now began to be fired pretty smartly from both sides. Captain Taylor ordered the buckets to be got ready, and water to be brought from the well, so as to extinguish the fire without delay as it now began to make its appearance. From delirium or some other cause the men were slow in executing these orders—for the word "fire" appeared to show the whole of them into confusion—and by the time they had got the water and had broken open the door of the blockhouse the fire which the Indians had unceasing in the darkness of the night, introduced into the building through some holes which the cat had made by kicking away the mud filling between the logs in search of salt, had unfortunately communicated to a quantity of whiskey deposited on the lower floor, and in spite of every exertion that was made to prevent their spreading the flames in less than a moment mounted to the roof and all efforts to extinguish them were for a time, completely baffled. As this block-house joined the barracks which made part of the fortifications most of the men gave themselves up for lost and Captain Taylor had the greatest difficulty in getting his orders executed. What, with the raging of the flames—the yelling and howling of several hundred Indians—the cries of nine women and children, part soldier's and part citizen's wives who had taken shelter in the Fort—and the desponding of the men which was worse than all—the commandant's position was anything but pleasant. Indeed, there were not more than ten or fifteen men in the whole garrison able to do a great deal, the others being sick or convalescent, and he added to the misfortune of the commandant that two of the stoutest men in the Fort, and in whom Captain Taylor reposed every confidence, jumped over the picket

and fled. But the presence of mind of Captain Taylor never for a moment forsook him.

He saw that, by throwing off part of the roof of the barracks which joined the block house now on fire, and by keeping the end perfectly wet, the whole row of buildings might be saved, and even then there would be left only an entrance of 18 or 20 feet for the Indians to enter, after the house should have been consumed; and he saw further that a temporary breast work could be erected so as to prevent their even entering at this breach. At once he convinced the men that this could be done and it appeared to inspire them with new life. Never did men act with more firmness or desperation. Those who were able—while the others kept up a constant fire from the other block-house and two bastions—mounted the roofs of the houses with Dr. Clark at their head, under a shower of bullets, and in less than a moment, threw off as much of the roof as was necessary. Dr. Clark acted with the greatest firmness and presence of mind during the whole time of the attack, which lasted 7 hours. The removal of the roof was done with the loss of one man killed and two wounded, but not dangerously. The man who was killed was a little deranged, and did not get off from the house as soon as directed or he would not have been hurt. Although the barracks were several times in a blaze and the heat of the fire was very intense, owing to its immense volume, the men used such exertion they kept it under and before the break of day, raised a temporary breast work as high as a man's head, and all this in the face of a heavy fire of ball and an innumerable quantity of arrows, which the Indians continued to pour in during the whole time of the attack in every part of the parade.

There was only one other man killed, and he lost his life by being too anxious. He got in one of the gulches in the bastions and fired over the pickets and called out to his comrades that he had killed an Indian, but neglecting to stoop down in an instant he was shot dead. No others were wounded inside the gate. One of the men who jumped over the pickets returned about an hour before the break of day and running up to the gate begging for god sake that it should be opened. Captain Taylor suspecting that it was a stratagem for the Indians to get in as he did not remember the voice, directed the men in the bastion, where the Captain happened to be, to shoot him, he who he might. One of them fired at him, but fortunately he ran up to the other bastion, where they knew his voice where upon Dr. Clark directed him to lie down closely to the pickets behind an empty barrel that changed to be there and at day light he was let in. His arm was broken in a most shocking manner which he said was done by the Indians and which was the cause of his returning. The other man, who jumped over the pickets was caught by the Indians about 130 yards from the garrison, and hewed into pieces. The Indians kept up a constant fire all night and until 6 o'clock in the morning, and as soon as the garrison began to return it with some effect, they moved out of the reach of the guns of the Fort.

On the morning of the 5th of September 1812 a party of the Indians drove the horses and hogs that belonged to the citizens in that quarter within sight of the Fort and shot the whole of them. All the cattle, numbering 65 head as well as the public oxen, they carried away with them.

Before the evening of that day, Captain Taylor had caused the vacancy occasioned by the burning of the block house to be filled up with strong row of pickets obtained by pulling down the guard house.

The garrison lost the whole of its provisions by the burning of the block house in which they were stored and was compelled to subsist upon green corn until a supply arrived.

It is believed that the whole of the Weas or Miami's were among the Prophet's party, as one chief whose voice resembled the famous Stone Eater's gave his orders in the Miami language. It is thought also that the chief Negro Legs was among the enemy. The Indians suffered severely, but they were so numerous that they carried off all their dead. They disappeared from before the Fort before the close of the 5th.

Captain Taylor remained cooped up within his pickets until the 10th of September, 1812 hoping that some assistance would have arrived from Vincennes, but none came and he determined to send two of his men to Vincennes by water, with a letter for Gov. Harrison, though it was weakening his force materially. He advised the sending of provisions under strong escort, lest the Indians would attempt to cut them off.

In Captain Taylor's despatch of the 10th of September to Gov. Harrison at Vincennes, he advised that an expedition against the Prophet should be provided with every thing, as he believed that every inch of ground between Fort Harrison and the Prophet's Town would be disputed by them.

On the 13th of September, 1812, Captain Taylor, finding that the men whom he had sent on the 10th to Vincennes by water, were compelled to return, owing to the river being so well guarded despatched his orderly sergeant and one private through the woods with a letter to Governor Harrison. These last messengers got through safely though they were entirely

ignorant of the country. The first messengers found that the Indians had built a fire on the bank of the river just below the fort and had a canoe ready to push out and cut off any canoe that might attempt to pass the fire.

On the afternoon of the 13th of September 1812, Col. Russell fortunately reached the Fort at the head of several companies of Rangers and Indian militia, and relieved the garrison which was in a starving condition. Several wagons loaded with provisions had been previously sent on from Vincennes to Fort Harrison under an escort of 13 regular troops, commanded by Lieut. Fairbanks, but they were surprised, and all slain but three.

CHAPTER II. THE BLOODY BATTLE

OF LAKE OHEE-CHOBEE.

On the 19th of December 1837, Colonel Zachary Taylor then in command of the First Brigade of the Army of the South received a communication at Fort Gardiner in the Territory of Florida from Major General Jesup, informing him that all hopes of bringing the war with the Seminoles to a close by negotiation through the mediation of the Cherokees were at an end, as Sam Jones with the Mickasukies had determined to fight it out to the last, and directing Colonel Taylor to proceed with the least possible delay against any portion of the enemy, he might hear of within striking distance, and to destroy or capture the same.

Having left two officers and an adequate force for the protection of his depot, Colonel Taylor marched the next morning, the 20th of December, 1837, carrying 12 day's rations—his means of transportation not enabling him to carry more—with the balance of his command which consisted of Captain Munroe's company of the 4th Artillery total 35 men—the 1st Infantry, under the command of Lt. Colonel Foster, 274—the 8th Infantry under Lt. Col. Thompson, 221—the Missouri volunteers, 180—Morgan's spies, 47—Pioneers, 30—Puntoners, 13—and 70 Delaware Indians—making a force in all, exclusive of officers, of 1032 men. The greater part of the Shawnees had been detached from Col Taylor's command, and the remainder refused to accompany him under the pretext that they—many of them were sick, and many of them had no mock asins.

Col Taylor moved down the west side of the river Kissimmee, in a south easterly course towards Lake Istopoga. His reasons for taking this route were: 1. because he knew that a portion of the hostiles were to be found in that direction. 2. If Gen. Jesup should fall in with the Mickasukies and drive them before him and they should attempt to, elude him by crossing the Kissimmee from the east to the west side of the Peninsula between Fort Gardiner and the entrance of the Kissimmee into the Okke-chobee, in that event, he, Colonel Taylor, might be near at hand to intercept them. 3. To overawe such of the enemy as had been making propositions to give themselves up and who appeared to be very slow, if not to hesitate, in complying with their propositions on that head, and to induce them to surrender at once. 4. And because he deemed it advisable to erect block houses and a small picket work on the Kissimmee for a third depot, some thirty or forty miles below Fort Gardiner, in order to obtain a knowledge of the intervening country for he had no guide that could be relied upon—and by this means to open a communication with Colonel Smith who was operating on the Caloosahatchee or Saubel river, under his, Colonel Taylor's orders.

Late on the evening of the first day's march, Colonel Taylor met the Indian chief Jumper with his family and a part of his band, consisting of fifteen men, a part of them with their families, and a few negroes in all, 63 souls—on his way to give himself up in conformity with a previous arrangement, which the Colonel had made with him. The chief and his party was conducted by Captain Parks and a few Shawnees. Parks was an active intelligent half-breed, at the head of the friendly Shawnees and Delawares, and was employed by Colonel Taylor to arrange with and bring in Jumper and as many of his people as he could prevail on to come in. Colonel Taylor encamped that night—the night of the 20th December, 1837—near the place where he met Jumper, & the next morning the 21st of December, having ordered Captain Parks to join him and take command of the Delawares and having despatched Jumper, in charge of some Shawnees to Fort Gardiner and thence to Fort Frazier continued his march southwardly. Three friendly Seminoles were sent forward before the line of march was taken up to gain intelligence as to the position of the enemy. About noon of the same day Col. Taylor sent forward one battalion of Gentry's Regiment, under command of Lt. Colonel Price with orders to pick up any stragglers that might fall in his way to encamp two or three miles in advance of the main force, to act with great circumspection and to communicate promptly any occurrence, that might take place in his vicinity important for the commander in chief to know.

About 10 o'clock of the evening of the 21st of December, 1837 Colonel Taylor received a note from Lt. Colonel Price, stating that the three Seminoles sent forward

in the morning, had returned—that they had been at the place where Alligator had encamped, 12 or fifteen miles in his (Lt. Col. Price's) advance—that Alligator had left that place with a part of his family for days before under the pretext of separating his relations from the Mickasukies, and that there were several families yet remaining at Alligator's camp who wished to give themselves up and who would remain there till the Americans should take them, unless they were forcibly carried off that night by the Mickasukies, who were encamped at no great distance from them. In consequence of this intelligence after directing Lt. Colonel Davenport to follow him early on the next morning (the 22d) with the infantry a little after midnight of the 21st December, Colonel Taylor put himself at the head of the mounted men who were with him, and joined Lt. Colonel Price. Thus reinforced the advance proceeded, on crossed Istopoga outlet, and soon after day light Colonel Taylor took possession of the encampment of Alligator, where he found the inmates, who had not been disturbed. They consisted of an old man and two young men, and several women and children amounting in all to 22 individuals. The old man informed Colonel Taylor that Alligator was very anxious to separate his people from the Mickasukies, who were encamped on the opposite side of the Kissimmee, distant twenty miles where they would fight the Americans. This old man was forthwith sent to Alligator to say to him that if he were sincere in his professions, he must meet Colonel Taylor the next day at the Kissimmee, where the trail, which the Americans were marching on, crossed and where they should halt. As soon as the infantry came up, Colonel Taylor moved up to the point just designated which he reached late on the evening of the 22d of December, and where he encamped. About 11 o'clock, the same evening the old Indian returned, bringing a very equivocal message from Alligator, whom he said he met accidentally and communicating the Mickasukies were still encamped where they had been tarrying for some days, and that they were determined to fight the Americans.

Colonel Taylor at once determined on indulging them as soon as practicable.

Accordingly next morning, (the 23d of December) Colonel Taylor laid out a small stockade work for the protection of a future depot, and in order that he might be able to move with the greater celerity, he deposited the whole of his heavy baggage, including artillery, &c., at this point. After having provisioned the command for three days, and leaving behind Captain Munroe with his company, the pioneer pontooniers 85 sick and disable infantry and a portion of the friendly Indians, who alleged they were unable to march any further he crossed the Kissimmee, taking as a guide the old Indian who had been captured the day before, and who accompanied the advance with great apparent reluctance in pursuit of the enemy and early the next day, (the 24th of December,) reached Alligator's encampment, situated on the edge of Cabbage Tree Hammock, in the midst of a large prairie, and in which from the appearance of things—there being other encampments in the vicinity and many evidences of slaughtered cattle—there must have been several hundred individuals. At a small hammock, at no great distance from Alligator's encampment and surrounded by a swamp, impassable for mounted men, the spies surprised an encampment, containing one old man, four young men and some women and children. One of the party immediately raised a white flag, when the men were taken possession of and brought across the swamp to the main body. Colonel Taylor proceeded with an interpreter to meet them. They proved to be Seminoles and professed to be friendly. They stated that they were preparing to come in, that they had just slaughtered a number of cattle and were employed in drying and jerking the same. They also informed Colonel Taylor that the Mickasukies headed by A-vi-aka (Sam Jones) were some ten or twelve miles distant encamped in a swamp, and that they were prepared to fight the Americans.

Although the Colonel placed but little confidence in their professions of friendship or their intentions of coming in yet he had no time to look up their women and children who had fled and concealed themselves in the swamp, or to have encumbered himself with them in the situation he then was. Accordingly he released the old man, who promised that he would collect all the women and children and take them in Captain Munroe at the Kissimmee the next day. He also dismissed the old man who had acted as guide thus far supplying his place with the four able warriors who had been captured that morning.

These arrangements being made, Colonel Taylor moved forward under their guidance for the camp of the Mickasukies. Between 2 and 3 o'clock in the afternoon of the 23d of December, Colonel Taylor reached a very dense cypress swamp, through which he was compelled to pass, and in which the guides informed him he might be attacked. After making the necessary dispositions for battle, it was ascertained that there was no enemy to oppose his march. The whole army crossed over the

swamp and encamped for the night, the hour being late. During the passage of the rear, Captain Parks, who was in advance with a few friendly Indians, fell in with two of the enemy's spies about three miles distant from the camp, one on horse back and the other on foot and succeeded in capturing the latter. He was an active young warrior, armed with an excellent rifle with fifty balls in his pouch and an adequate proportion of powder. This Indian confirmed the information which had been previously received from the other Indians, and, in addition stated that a large body of Seminoles headed by John Cohu, Co-a-coochee, (and no doubt Alligator) with other chiefs were encamped five or six miles from Col Taylor, near the Mickasukies, with a cypress swamp and a dense hammock between them and the latter. The army moved forward at day light the next morning, the 24th of December, and after marching five or six miles reached the camp of the Seminoles on the border of another cypress swamp, which must have contained several hundred persons, who bore evident traces of having been abandoned in a great hurry, as the fire were still burning and quantities of beef lying on the ground unconsumed. Here the troops were again disposed of in order of battle but no enemy appeared to oppose them. The command crossed over this swamp about 11 o'clock in the morning, and entered a large prairie in its front on which two or three hundred head of cattle were grazing and a number of Indian ponies. Here another young Indian warrior was taken armed and equipped as the former was. He pointed out dense hammock on the right about a mile distant, in which he said the hostiles were posted and waiting to give the Americans battle.

(To be continued.)

THE ADMINISTRATION AND GEN. TAYLOR.

The presses of the party in power make frequent efforts to defend the administration from the suspicion, entertained by many, of an indisposition to sustain Gen. Taylor in the field as his position and the services required of him demand. The language of facts, however, needs nothing to give it meaning and force. The public can understand it.

The following extract of a letter from Monterey published in the Cincinnati Chronicle, gives an exposition of the present state of things in connection with Gen. Taylor's command:

"No little speculation is indulged in by the officers of Gen. Taylor's command as to what course he will adopt after the term of service of the present volunteer force now out here shall have expired—whether, with the small and insignificant force with which he is to be furnished, he will remain at Monterey, or whether he will fall back to the Rio Grande. Some are of opinion that he will bring up the four regiments (which it is understood are all that have been assigned for him) to Monterey, and such supplies as he may want and hold the place—throwing the responsibility of opening the line of communication with the Rio Grande upon the Government. Not a few believe that he will adopt the former course, namely, fall back to Camargo or Matamoros. One thing is evident, he cannot hold the country he has conquered unless he is supplied with more troops than have been sent to him.

With the four regiments he will be able to hold Monterey, but Saltillo will have to be abandoned, and the whole line from Monterey to the Brazos left unprotected. This would present a deplorable state of things; the victorious leader of our army shut up, as it were in the enemy's country, and cut off from all communication with his own! Why the foraging parties of the enemy that have of late infested the country between here and Camargo could then retake all the towns of the Rio Grande. What a humiliating sight. Can it be that our Government will leave the old hero in this strait? And yet, if Gen. Taylor is not furnished with more troops by the 1st of June, one of two alternatives is left him: either to abandon the country he has conquered, and fall back on Camargo, or else concentrate his forces in Monterey, leaving it to the Government to open a communication with him."

If such is the picture now presented of Gen. Taylor's situation, it is only in keeping with the circumstances of hardship under which he has been compelled to struggle from the beginning. Recent accounts from his headquarters state that the old hero is evidently chagrined, but says nothing. Not he. A man of his sort never complains.—He does his duty under the most perplexing vexations; he can do no more under the most favouring contingences. This is what one always has under his control; and happy is he who knows how to discriminate between what pertains to his own proper functions and what belongs to those of others—and to

be contented with such discrimination and with the duties it brings to view.

In connection with the foregoing sketch, illustrative of Taylor's present situation, we append, as a companion piece, the following retrospective outline by the Louisville Journal.

The Government organs boast of the skill with which the Mexican war has been conducted on the part of the Administration. So far as the plans of the Administration are concerned, never was a war conducted more wretchedly. Santa Anna, having intercepted a despatch from the Government to Gen. Taylor became advised of all that was to be done—that Gen. Taylor, stripped of his regular troops, was to be left at Saltillo with less than 5,000 raw volunteers, while an overwhelming attack was to be made upon Vera Cruz.

Santa Anna saw at a glance that the best possible opportunity for conquest and glory was before him.—If with his army of more than 20,000 regulars, he could overwhelm Gen. Taylor's handful of volunteers, he knew that by a series of rapid marches, he might within the space of a single month, recapture Monterey, Matamoros and all other places taken by the American troops, and overrun Texas without opposition, laying waste and burning every town and village in the country.

This was Santa Anna's plan when he marched from San Louis Potosi. Every thing argued his success. And his success would have been complete—he would in four weeks not only have recovered every thing lost by Mexico during the war, but have conquered and depopulated Texas, a State of the Union, but for the wonderful fact, a fact unparalleled in the history of warfare, a fact upon which the Administration at Washington had no right to calculate, a fact upon which the Administration did not calculate, that Gen. Taylor was able, with between four and five thousand in experienced militia, to encounter and beat back a host of nearly five times in number of Mexican veterans led on by the Mexican Napoleon!

Was it not folly, infatuation, stark madness on the part of the Administration, to hazard all our conquests during the war & even the fate of a State of the Union upon the ability of less than five thousand raw volunteers to withstand more than twenty thousand regulars!

DESIGN OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT TO SEIZE PORTIONS OF MEXICO.

The New York Sun publishes a letter from a correspondent in London, the writer of which says, instructions have been sent by the British government to Mr. Bankhead, minister, and Mr. McIntosh, consul at the city of Mexico:

"These instructions, as I have learned from the highest authority, direct the English minister to push his efforts at mediation, to urge a treaty of peace, not to be over-scrupulous as to boundary lines, if the Americans ask territory, provided they retire north as far as the Rio Grande—and the moment the American army withdraws beyond that line, to demand from Mexico the eighty millions due to England, principal and interest, and if such demand is not settled, as the English cabinet very well know it cannot be with ready money or acceptable bonds, to seize all territory that has been left by the United States. Corresponding with these instructions, orders have been dispatched to the mail and war steamers and other armed British craft in and contiguous to the Gulf, to proceed at once before the Mexican ports, so that the moment we retire, the English demand can be enforced by a military occupation. The policy of the English cabinet is to drive us, by fair means or foul, from the coast and southern part of Mexico, in order to enjoy those portions themselves."

The Sun, in giving this letter, says the writer enjoys a position that entitles him to credit, and affords him superior opportunity for knowing the secret movements of the English cabinet.—How any newspaper correspondent can get at the secrets of the English Cabinet, we cannot see. They do not usually let secrets out.—Phil. Ledg.

VALUE OF MEXICO.

Col Curtis of Ohio writes from Buena Vista that there is no valuable land to be acquired by the conquest of Mexico. All that is productive is already owned by individuals. Ninety nine hundredths of the land between Camargo and Buena Vista are utterly worthless, for want of water which has to be carried for miles to water a few acres of corn, wheat or barley, by irrigation.

It is stated that a valuable invention in Medical Science has been introduced in New York called a "Sphygmometer," for testing the condition of the lungs.