

The Old North State

SALISBURY, FRIDAY, MAY 20, 1860.

THE XIV AMENDMENT—THE LEGISLATURE.

Is the operation of the 14th section of the XIV Amendment a valid and just law? or does it give holding seats in the several State legislatures?

This question, which is one of great importance, not only to the class of persons supposed to be particularly affected by it, but to the whole people of the State, has recently excited some discussion. At the request of distinguished gentlemen of the class supposed to be excluded, we consented to investigate it and give the result to the public. We have made such investigation as time, and the limited means at hand, enabled us to make, and now proceed to give our opinion for what the arguments we may be able to present, and the authorities we may cite shall prove it to be worth. In doing this we shall take the liberty of reviewing briefly the opinions of others, which have been furnished for the purpose of aiding us in the inquiry.

The substance of the question proposed at the head of this article, was maintained in an *opinion*, known to be from the pen of one of the first lawyers of the State, published in the *Wilmington Star* of February 13, 1859. That opinion was called forth by some of the severest cases of the kind then pending before our State Legislature. With this opinion we were extremely anxious to agree, but we have been unable to bring our mind fully to the conclusions of the writer, after allowing to his arguments the utmost weight to which they seem to be entitled.

The writer referred above sets out by presenting a clear analysis of the section of the amendment under consideration, separating it into two distinct sub-divisions. "The one," he says, "enunciates, in clear and well defined language, a *new* and the other a clearly defined penalty to be inflicted upon the criminal." After giving this analysis the writer assumes that the question takes another form, and asks—

"Is it not intended to make the words 'Legislative, Executive or Judicial officers of any State,' no distinction to be made?" The reason is obvious. The term "Legislative Officers" is a far more comprehensive one than is often used; and the purpose evidently was not to make the *subject* of the exclusion too numerous; but to confine them to that class of persons who had had the chief direction of the politics and government of the "rebel States," excluding such minor legislative officers as aldermen of towns and cities, &c., whose legislation was of a purely local and municipal character. The reason why the second distinction was made between members of Congress and officers under the United States, will be easily discerned.

BROWNE, in his Law Dictionary, which is a standard work, thus defines the word Officer:

"Officer, he who is lawfully invested with an office."

"Officers may be classed into, 1, executive officers; as the President of the United States, & the several Governors of the different States. Their duties are pointed out in the national constitution, and the constitutions of the several States, but they are required mainly to execute the decisions of the Government—their object always, and especially at the present time, being to avoid a conflict between the Judiciary and said departments.

It is quite true that in the clause above quoted a distinction seems to be taken between members of Congress and officers of the United States; but there is certainly no distinction whatever made between members of the State Legislature and State officers. The language in the latter case is, "as a member of any State Legislature, or as an Executive or Judicial officer of any State," and not, simply, "as an officer of any State."

But, it may be asked, why did not the framers of the amendment use the words "Legislative, Executive or Judicial officers of any State,"

if no distinction was intended to be made? The reason is obvious. The term "Legislative Officers" is a far more comprehensive one than is often used; and the purpose evidently was not to make the *subject* of the exclusion too numerous; but to confine them to that class of persons who had had the chief direction of the politics and government of the "rebel States," excluding such minor legislative officers as aldermen of towns and cities, &c., whose legislation was of a purely local and municipal character. The reason why the second distinction was made between members of Congress and officers under the United States, will be easily discerned.

After establishing the argument from the above stand-point, the writer takes another view.

He says:

"But admitting that each House may exercise the extraordinary and unheard-of right of convicting its own members *or treason*—which it is clear it is not entitled to do, if it be allowed to have been committed against the *United States*—then the Courts will be compelled to try the crime of discrediting a member of the General Assembly, and this will be done by the trial of the *United States*—that is, by the trial of the entire body of members of the General Assembly, for any crime, and after such conviction subject him to the penalty of death."

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