

# The Carolina Watchman.

PUBLISHED EVERY FRIDAY, BY HAMILTON C. JONES, EDITOR & PROPRIETOR.

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SALISBURY, APRIL 19, 1839.

WHOLE NO. 350.

## NEW TERMS

**Carolina Watchman.**  
The Watchman may hereafter be had for Dollars and Fifty Cents per year. A single copy will be sent for one cent. The whole sum at one payment, or the paper for one year at Two Dollars, and as long as the same class shall continue to pay in advance the sum of Dollars the same terms shall continue, and no other terms will be charged as other subscribers who do not pay during the year shall be charged three Dollars in all cases. No subscription will be received for less than three months.

Advertisements will be discontinued, but at the option of the Editor, unless all arrears are paid. All letters to the Editor must be post paid, otherwise they will certainly not be attended to.

**Terms of Advertising.**  
One Dollar per square for the first insertion, and Fifty Cents per square for each subsequent insertion.

Advertisements will be charged 25 per cent, less than the above rates. A deduction of 50 per cent from the regular price will be made for those that advertise by the year. A premium will be inserted for less than one dollar. Advertisements will be continued until orders are received to stop them, where no directions are given.

SALISBURY.	
Cents.	Cents.
9 a 10	Molasses, 55 a 60
Brandy, ap. 65 a 70	Nails, 8 a 9
Whisky, 85 a 90	Oats, 25 a 30
10 a 12	Pork, \$6
10 a 12	Sugar, br. 10 a 12
10 a 12	loaf, 18 a 20
10 a 12	Salt, \$1 62 1/2
10 a 12	Tallow, 10 a 12 1/2
10 a 12	Tobacco, 8 a 20
10 a 12	Tow-linen, 16 a 20
10 a 12	Wheat, (bushel) 81
10 a 12	Whiskey, 45 a 50
10 a 12	Wool, (clean) 40

FAYETTEVILLE.	
Cents.	Cents.
1 a 1 00	Molasses, 35 a 40
1 a 1 00	Nails, cut, 7 a 8
1 a 1 00	Sugar, brown, 8 a 12
1 a 1 00	Lump, 16
1 a 1 00	Loaf, 18 a 20
1 a 1 00	Salt, 75 a 90
1 a 1 00	Sark, \$2 1 a \$2 75
1 a 1 00	Tobacco leaf, 8 a 10
1 a 1 00	Cotton bag, 16 a 20
1 a 1 00	Dale rope, 8 a 12
1 a 1 00	Wheat 1 25 a 1 35
1 a 1 00	Whiskey, 40 a 60
1 a 1 00	Wool, 25 a 30

CERAW.	
Cents.	Cents.
1 a 1 00	Nails cut assor 7 1/2 a 9
1 a 1 00	wrought 16 a 18
1 a 1 00	Oats bushel, 20
1 a 1 00	Oil gal, 75 a \$1
1 a 1 00	18 a 23 lamp, \$1 25
1 a 1 00	110 a 125
1 a 1 00	16 Potk 100lbs, 6 a 8
1 a 1 00	15 Rice 100lbs \$5 1 a \$6 1/2
1 a 1 00	1 00 Sugar lb 10 a 12 1/2
1 a 1 00	1 00 Salt sack \$3 1 a \$3 1/2
1 a 1 00	1 00 bush, \$1 a \$1 1/2
1 a 1 00	53 a 61 Steel Awer, 10 a 12 1/2
1 a 1 00	English, 14
1 a 1 00	German 12 a 14
1 a 1 00	Tea 100lb, \$1 a \$1 37 1/2

## RUNAWAY.

**50 REWARD.**  
ABSCONDED about the last of October, from the subscriber, at that time residing in Stokes County, N. Carolina, a Negro man.

**COLLEMAN,**  
of 25 years of age, and of a very bright complexion. He is a Shoemaker by trade, has a high forehead, a thin visage, is of a dark complexion, and weighs from 135 to 140 pounds. He has a very large scar on one of his legs, which he believes to be on the right leg. He has a mark on his arm just below the elbow, which is a white mark. His hands have been freckled, and he has freckles upon them. He has a wife (a free woman) near Blakely, and it is probable that he may be accompanied by her. Although many persons believe that he has been stolen, he has been seen by the subscriber, who left the neighborhood about the 15th of October. I will give a reward of Fifty Dollars to any one who will deliver him to the near Brook Neal in Campbell County, Va. who will confine him in jail, and send him to my possession.

**RICHARD OVERSTEET,**  
of Campbell County, Va. 1838

**State of North Carolina,**  
**IREDELL COUNTY**  
County Pleas and Quarter Sessions,  
February Term, 1839.

Petition for Partition.  
The satisfaction of the Court, in this case, is not an inhabitant of this county, and the Court ordered that publication be made successively in the Carolina Watchman, and in the Statesville, and in the Statesville, on the 3d Monday of each month, until there answer, plead, or appear, and then there answer, plead, or appear, otherwise the same shall be taken as confessed to him.—Witness, J. P. ALEXANDER, c. c. c. 1839—price 50

## LETTER

OF HARRISON GRAY OTIS TO JOHN WHIPPLE OF PROVIDENCE, ON THE ATHONTON RESOLUTIONS AND THE AGITATION OF THE SLAVE QUESTION.

John Whipple, Esq: Dear Sir: I received with much satisfaction your letter, with a report to the Legislature of Rhode Island, on the Athonton Resolutions, and your speech explanatory of your dissent from that report. It is certainly flattering to me to know that I live in your recollection, and that the opinion of one so long withdrawn from the notice of the world, & all participation in public affairs, could create either confidence or distrust in your own; formed with the advantage of intellect in full vigor, and defended by argument to which nothing of substance can be added—your request under these circumstances would have imposed upon me an obligation of courtesy to form the best opinion I might upon a novel subject. But as your report (though upon a new question which you have disposed of by an eloquent and conclusive argument) grows out of an old subject—the condition of slavery among our Southern brethren, and the relationship between their rights and our duties—which has been familiar to my thoughts for half a century; I was quite prepared to examine its merits, and have no other trouble in replying to your favour, but that which is common to age—a loss where to begin and where to leave off.

Had I been a member of Congress, called to decide upon the Athonton Resolutions, I should not have voted for them. At the same time I have no doubt of the constitutional power of the House to adopt them. But I considered the original refusal of Congress to hear, commit and obtain a report upon the Resolutions regarding slavery in the District of Columbia as unfortunate and impolitic. It was sure to be confounded in popular belief with a denial of the right of petition itself and thus touch the community in its most irritable nerve. It was also an unusual and apparently an unkind and cavalier mode of cutting short a new inquiry—or an old one requested under new circumstances—entitled to attention on account of the number of petitioners. I had also predicted, three years ago, in a public speech, that the abolition movement would be mingled with political intrigue and party politics. These objections I thought would be in a great measure obviated by the Report of the Committee, which, being under the control of the majority, would have ended in the same result as having the petition on the table, without affording plausible occasions for offence or complaint.

But I am equally free to declare that had I been a member of the Rhode Island Legislature, I should have been found on your side in opposing the report of your committee, inasmuch as the question there assumed an entirely different aspect. It is one thing for Congress to refuse to act upon a petition, another thing for a State Legislature to deny the right of the former to regulate its own proceedings. There is nothing in the Athonton Resolutions which negates the right of petition, and nothing which in fact impairs its value. A petition in the constitutional view is a request addressed to a government supposed to have jurisdiction of the subject, for a redress of some grievance.—The right to frame, and of consequence to offer such petition belongs to every peaceful assembly of the people.—This right also involves the right to make the government acquainted with the subject matter of the petition—not to have it read in *extenso*, as matter of course to which there may be valid objections. Thousands of petitions may relate to the same single object or to subjects palpably out of the province and competency of the government to decide, or on which the minds of a majority may be known to be made up. They may be flagrantly indecorous, & numerous and voluminous enough to occupy in reading unreasonable time. But if not read, the Legislature addressed is bound at least to hearken to a statement of the subject matter—to be informed of the character of the grievances sought to be redressed. Otherwise the right of petition would be nugatory—at least nominal and unworthy of a place among the fundamentals of a constitution—the voice of men "crying in the wilderness."

The right thus explained, has I think, an intrinsic value. It belongs to the whole and every portion of the people—extends to all subjects—is indispensable to an exposition of their sentiments and wants, and in popular and paternal governments, will when exercised, command attention and obtain relief, unless the first shall, after information and reflection, be thought superfluous, and the last inexpedient or impracticable. The exercise of this right in a particular case, may as you have ingeniously shown, be of no value. Still the right remains, and has a value in itself—like a perennial fountain in repairing to which one man's piteous may be broken and his water spilt, while the source remains inexhaustible.

With this explanation of my views of the right and value of the privilege of petition secured by the constitution, I am prepared to go the whole length of your argument and counter report in the distinctions so elaborately drawn between the right of Congress to regulate their own proceedings

and consequently to dispose of petitions at their will and pleasure. This you have so amply illustrated, that the argument is exhausted, and little more is left for me than to say, "ditto to Mr. Burke." I will venture, however, to make one suggestion confirmatory of your views; and that not to render them more luminous, (which cannot be done) but merely because it had occurred to me as decisive of the question from my own unaided reflection.

While the abolitionists insist upon the duty of Congress to do something more than merely hear their petitions or a statement of their contents, they furnish no standard for measuring or defining its extent. They do not inform us at what stage of proceedings it may be allowable for Congress to exercise its discretion in rejecting or postponing a petition. It would seem reasonable that the claims of petitioners to the attention of Congress should not be regarded as of a higher character than those pertaining to their Representatives on the floor, that the privilege of the constituent should not exceed that of a member in his place. But it is notorious that ordinary proceedings of Congress are upon resolutions offered by a member or reported by a committee. Every member is entitled to offer a resolution upon any subject; & it is equally certain that the House possesses and exercises at pleasure, the right of refusing to consider resolutions, and of postponing or rejecting them without debate. The lips of the member are therefore sealed upon the subject thus disposed of. Suppose, however, that the same subject is afterwards presented in the form of a petition from persons out of doors—perhaps by the same member, and that the House is constitutionally bound to entertain and act upon it because it is a petition. The action must be upon resolutions, and these must of necessity conflict with the previous decision, and supersede the rules that have been applied to resolutions on the same subject. Here, then, the right of the house to regulate its own proceedings is annulled, by the right of petition.

Let this doctrine be established, and there is no vagary or extravagance when an assemblage of petitioners may not come into the form of a petition on which Congress must act or violate the constitution. In the North we may petition for the abolition of slavery in the U. States. The South may ask to open the slave trade. One set of persons may propose to amend the Constitution by abolishing the Executive, or the Senate, or the Judiciary; another by making the President eligible for life. There are, possibly, some persons in the United States who should prefer a limited monarchy to the existing government. Indeed an endless variety of projects over which a great majority of the House may be satisfied that Congress has no jurisdiction—or on which their opinions are fixed, or which they deem it impolitic, dangerous or premature to agitate; and which they would instantly suppress if propounded by one of their own members—would be forced upon their deliberations because, first, the right of petition is sacred. Thus the control of its proceedings would be taken from Congress and transferred to any and every assemblage of people convened to petition for redress of grievances. In fact the right of initiating laws and of compelling Congress to act upon them would thus be involved in the right of petition, and the business of legislation, as conducted by every organized body of delegates from one immortal world become impracticable.

But apart from the merits of this particular question, I freely confess that I regard with deep concern the intervention of our State Legislatures in any shape, regarding the abolition of slavery in the South. It is none of our affair. We can do nothing towards changing or abolishing that condition, but may do, as we have done, very much towards aggravating its evils. If slavery is a stain, it is one with which the Union was born, and which cannot be removed by our efforts, unless by cutting off the limbs which wear it. To judge correctly on this subject, we must not only resort to the Federal Constitution but go behind it. The members of the first Congress came from the South with a consciousness of the peculiar interest arising from their slaveholding tenure. From the north they went under the impression that all men are "born free," and would become so *de facto*, when the colonies should become independent. Within my remembrance, in the year '76, the volunteers minute men paraded our streets with metallic letters "no slavery" on their caps—which, though not intended peculiarly to bear upon the condition of the African race in the South—pointed towards it. It was not easy for the men of the North to reconcile these doctrines of universal liberty, with the same doctrines professed by the South, but qualified practically, by their holding slaves in bondage. There was then no resource but to leave the subject at rest and to secure the confidence of the South by leaving slavery to State jurisdiction.

It is in connection to the jealousies, fears, prejudices, and habits of the South, principally arising from this one cause, that Prevost Randolph was chosen President of the first Congress, and George Washington commander of the army. And it is notorious that this act was the source of the "embarrassments" and "delay" in forming the Confederation of 1788, and in combining into one general system, the various sentiments and interests of a continent divided "into so many sovereignties and independent communities," which are so forcibly set forth in the address to the people of the States by Congress of the preceding year.—Looking into the Confederation itself, we find that the parties to it are the "free inhabitants of each of these

States"—terms involving the recognition of slavery, and a virtual assent to exclude slaves from rights of freedom. Passing down to the era of the Federal Constitution, it is manifest that the institution of slavery is by that instrument as sacred, and as agreed to be protected. The agreement to surrender fugitives slaves, and to tolerate the importation for a term of years, would have been a profane mockery if the right were not reserved of rendering these clauses inoperative by promoting the liberation of slaves restored or imported—Equally decisive would be the power granted to the general government of "suppressing insurrections;" if in those most likely to happen, the troops ordered for service should be led by the maxims of their legislative commanders to favor the insurgents.

Thus it is beyond controversy that whatever question may arise respecting the conflict of jurisdiction between the Federal and the State Governments from various constructions of the constitutional instrument, the condition of slavery in the several States is manifestly not a case of the constitution—*non casus federatice*—but one which the people of the United States under full advice, and covenanted not to agitate by their representatives in Congress.—This is, indeed, so incontrovertible that I do not find it denied in any quarter. But the admission of this plea to federal jurisdiction over slave property irresistibly draws after it the same conclusion against the right of State jurisdiction—and consequently the right of one State to attempt, through the medium of its Legislature, by its resolutions or enactments, to operate upon the condition of slavery rather than upon any other domestic situation of another State. Such right, if it is evident, could have no foundation out in a federal compact. Not being found therein it becomes a nonentity. When, therefore, Rhode Island and Massachusetts adopt measures intended to have a bearing on the domestic institutions of the South Carolina and Virginia, they shoot from their spheres, and assume the attitude of independent States, which can have no legal force; thus exhibiting a spectacle which but for its sinister tendency would be merely ridiculous as a species of burlesque legislation. I am aware that the fanatical supporters in justification of these vagaries disavow the expectation and intent of promoting slave emancipation otherwise than by awakening the consciences and enlightening the understanding of the owners. With individuals or associations, who sincerely expect to attain the desired consummation by these means, my view of this question has no concern. I am not speaking of the freedom of the press nor of speech, nor of pen; but of legislative, propriety and dignity—the wisdom and decorum of legislation by one sovereign State in order to enlighten the bewildered minds of the people of another—to enact moral discourses, homilies on abstract rights and abusive commentaries on laws and customs other than their own—to fulminate anathemas against the religious institutions of Louisiana, which in this relation stand on the same parallel. Neither does this reasoning apply to those who, laying their hands on their hearts, can say, that their object in meeting the action of the State Legislature is confined to the District of Columbia. For no matter how insignificant, is exceedingly small, and while they desire it to be expedient and obligatory on their conscience to pursue this course, nobody is entitled to judge over them. As to the rest, would to God the folly of our legislative proceedings were the worst of their effects. But I am profoundly convinced that if the mania for competing with the slave tenure of the plantations of the North, or indeed be permitted to go much farther, the days of this Union will shortly be numbered. The people of these States already think they discern in it, the commencement & slow approach of a mine destined to blow her social fabric into air, and they will anticipate the explosion by cutting off the communication. These suggestions, I am aware, are, with many, themes of derision and contempt. In a strain of arrogant self complacency that undervalues all powers but their own, they insist that the South dare not secede; that the measure would place this favorite interest in greater jeopardy, and be destructive to other interests. As a northern man, I have no disposition to break a lance with those who hold to these opinions. I am willing to believe that in the event of a partition of the family estates they could not manage their share of the inheritance we do not us. But it is lamentably true that they think otherwise; and that great names and splendid intellects among them are enlisted in propagating the opinion that they could not do so well, but better—certainly much better unless we forbear our persecution—in a separate establishment; that there would be the sunshine and curb the shade, and the mist. They may be entirely mistaken, but in what government is it found that the passions of a people or of their rulers excited to certain pitch do not prevail over their interest? It was not for the interest of your ancestors or mine to have the dangers of a revolution, their wives might "supper" without paying a duty. And there are many persons among our southern brethren—probably a large majority—who regard the perpetual assaults made upon their right to their slaves, as menacing dangers to their property, liberty, lives, and social comforts, not less flagrant than those which united them with us in a common cause.

After all, the blindness of those who deny that the South can be forced to a succession from the Union, is less astonishing and dangerous than the infatuation of others who console themselves with calculations that the loss would not be severely felt by the rest of the confederacy. There would, say they, remain enough of population and material for all the objects of a grand, prosperous and powerful nation, and sufficient to check and if necessary give law to neighboring States. The east and west as of course would become ipso facto, a new and homogeneous confederacy, without the trouble of a new arrangement among themselves—a cluster plucked from so exuberant a vine may easily be spared and the Corps d'armee would be more efficient without a wing composed of troops who are always disposed to dissent and mutiny, and embarrass the operations of every campaign.

Whoever, in reply to these reckless enthusiasts, should assume the duty of showing the consequence that would be found to await the disruption of the Union, would find himself engaged in a school boy's calculation to be made in a day, with slate and pencil, at Columbia

College, in South Carolina; but in compiling a volume of no small size; and in the posture of the country prior to the constitution, and analyzing the wonderful changes which have occurred with time in its commercial, agricultural, political and geographical relations. The results of an investigation would, I fear, prove less flattering to the capability of the non slave erected states, [and especially of New England] in the rapid advance to prosperity hitherto experienced, than some of us fondly imagine admitting even that the scene of separation would be confined to one set, and that the rest of the States would continue to stay together. "But how can any with the example (and not the fear) of the fate of the Republic on the south, indulge in the dream that we should divide upon the map of the American continent. We perceive the garden of the world extending from Mexico and Cape Horn coiled into a Bear Garden. Independent states springing up one day like mushrooms, and withering the next—yet living long enough to inflict some new calamity on their own people—commit some new ravage, add some new disappointment to the tri-ops of liberty—one day federal, the next anti federal; changing governments, boundaries, and names, so that nothing is constant but the spirit of revolution and the causes of agitation, which, with different phases, but always enhancing intensity, broods over contiguous and rival democracies—tormenting their funds and annihilating their prosperity. With this prospect in full view, with the news of contests, dissensions, carnage and desolation, and of perpetual civil war made the order of the day in those new fangled states, we cherish the deceitful imagination that we, an enlightened and chosen people, are beyond the reach of such calamities. There is, we think, some charm in our character, that will prove in all events an antidote to the contagion of bad principles and the dangers of an anarchy; that our people form a variety in the great family of the human species, and have a natural aptitude for making Constitutions and Federal compacts. But the only claim of our people to good sense pre-eminence over that of other nations must be found, if at all, in their having framed and for so long a time administered a government sufficient for all the objects of general liberty and security, under which we are advancing to the highest summit of national prosperity. But the good sense which having acquired these advantages, is not able to retain them, and suffers the golden fruit to become an apple of discord and fall from her hands, must cease to be a subject of boast or reliance.

The first measure, under the most favorable aspect of separation, that must be inevitable, would be a convention of the people of the free States to remodel the Constitution and adjust it to the new order of things. A partition treaty for the apportionment of the public domain, and the disposal of its property remaining in the South, and for regulating commerce, would be indispensable, and no power can be found in the confederacy authorizing any treaty or contract founded on the contingency of a division of the Union. Besides, the disturbance of the balance of the power among the States, the location of the seat of Government and innumerable causes springing from the prodigious alteration that occurred and is in progress in the relationship of the various parts of the Union to each other, would probably occasion a convention to be demanded with acclamation.—Supposing this to take place here as Rhode Island and Massachusetts quite aware that the first or one of the first subjects of discussion would not be a proposal for a new basis of State representation in the Senate? This, it is notorious, was the great standing block to the framers of the Federal Constitution which for a long time threatened to be insurmountable. And now that "empire states" have grown up within and beyond the old limits, would they be likely to acquiesce in our *ad hoc* part of political power in one branch of the Legislature? If not should we be ready to resign it? and if not again, do we not here discover the germ of an outbreak which would prove "the beginning of the end?" Again without attempting to enumerate what no man can number—are we of New England satisfied that the alternative of uniting and forming a new confederacy with all the other States would be left at our option? May not the myriads of the "great valleys" imagine, perhaps truly that their interests will be more closely affiliated with a Southern man with a Northern confederacy, and that free access to the ocean by their rivers and a free trade with Southern ports will outweigh all other considerations? In which case they will set us off to live in Sinope? Furthermore, is our prospect of dwelling together in unity ever in England, of harmonizing in our views of public measures and policy, altogether cheering? And are our resources so prodigious that we are ready and willing to go alone.

In a word, it is manifest that a new convention would be a different assembly from that of its predecessors. No parallel can be formed between the circumstances of the country which generated the "constitutional assembly" and its present condition. The popular sentiment even where was fixed and united in one conviction—the necessity of a federal government adapted to all the States. Hence a sympathy in the great community resulting from experience of common sufferings, and a good humor, from the consciousness of honesty and sincerity in their aim at a common object. Grave and weighty differences of opinion undoubtedly existed and were brought into that convention and debated with the spirit of controversy; but they were the hearts of great statesmen, patriots and jurists, warmed by the zeal which prevails in a Congress of Ambassadors, but untainted by the infection of the spirit of personal parties, which was yet unknown.

In such hands we know it was a Herculean labor to create a government for the Union but they were skillful and experienced workmen and had only to apply old & established principles in framing a new model. To this end, men were elected in reference only to high character for talents and services in the cabinet and the field, with Washington at their head. How different then was the honest strife of opinion and debate among these men; turning principally upon the great fundamentals of public law & real peculiarities of local institutions and interests, aiming sincerely at far and honorable compromise which they providentially attained, from that to be expected from men set from a

community chafed and embittered by party passions and collisions, nominated by cabals in the procurement of intricate ignorant of the first principles of constitutional or national polity. I cannot doubt that members of this description would be found in a new convention, sufficient to embarrass and defeat any comprehensive scheme of policy adapted to the exigencies of a great confederacy of states.

The times, my dear sir, are sadly out of joint—the minds of men teem with fancies in respect to government, of which our fathers never dreamed. No maxim in the science of Government seems to be settled except that every thing is to be doubted. There is not a clause in the Federal Constitution which some party, when convenient arise, is not ready to meet with a special plea or demurrer. The State Constitutions are like the high seas, requiring to be handled a spade or a pick axe, is incompetent to repair—thus making straight the path for the "march of intellect." The reformers are abroad, especially in those places where the "school-master is at home." And despite of the good sense and illumination of our countrymen, I do not believe the soil of Mexico, or Columbia, or Bolivia, or Chili, or Peru, is more prolific in all the varieties of political turmoil, than that would spring up in the hot bed of a new convention of these dis-united states.

All this perhaps may strike you as the opinion of an old man's dream, and may deserve no better estimate. But having in vivid recollection the great events of the revolution from the landing of General Gage in Boston, to its close; being honored by an intimate acquaintance with many of the members of the old Congress (of which my father was one)—having witnessed the scenes which preceded the adoption of the Federal Constitution & been familiar with the impediments to that happy issue, which filled all minds with agonizing apprehensions for the fate of the country; it is perhaps natural that I should feel peculiar concern, as I certainly do in perceiving that the time is coming for the discussion of topics the mention of which in a serious way would once have been regarded as the superfluous ravings of a demented mind. My personal acquaintance too with the men of the South in public and private life, for more than forty years, has been strict and durable.

I can conceive no justification for my fellow citizens this side of the line of Mason and Dixon, to throw fire brands and arrows of death on the other side of that line. The evil of slavery is not a new discovery. Its turpitude was a subject quite as familiar to the people of the North, when they sought the alliance of those of the South as it is at this hour, or at least it was so when they framed the Constitution. If other nations have since that time abolished slavery in their own domain, the consequence is that the amount of misery incident to that condition is diminished, and we should be thus reconciled to wait for "coming events," however apparently remote, rather than to do wrong that might right may come of it. But the strong and final argument in my mind is that already hinted. Our States and Legislatures can do nothing but agitate, provoke and drive to desperation our Southern brethren defeating their own object by adding new rivers to the black man's chains, which I believe is the effort of every legislative moment. I am yet to learn how emancipation forced upon the planter—admitting the thing to be possible—can be reconciled with the professions of those who announce the whole science of government to consist in promoting the greatest good of the greatest number. But I must remember that while there is no end to your patience, and am, with great respect and esteem, your obedient servant.

H. G. OTIS.  
Boston, March 1, 1839.

## DR DYOTT, THE BANKER.

The Philadelphia papers state that the Grand Jury of that city have found a true bill containing the following counts:

1. Colluding and contriving with T. B. and C. W. Dyott to conceal goods, value \$100,000.
2. Fraudulently conveying to T. B. and C. W. Dyott, goods, value \$50,000.
3. Colluding and contriving with T. W. Dyott, jr. to conceal goods, value \$50,000.
4. Fraudulently conveying to T. W. Dyott, jr. goods, value \$2,000.
5. Colluding and contriving with W. B. Dyott, to conceal goods, value \$30,000.
6. Colluding and contriving with W. Wells to secrete \$840 in money.
7. Fraudulently conveying to Julia Dyott furniture, value \$1,000.
8. Concealing goods and merchandise, value \$50,000.
9. Concealing \$300,000.
10. Concealing \$100,000 in money.
11. Concealing \$10,000 in money.

All with the expectation to receive in future benefit to himself, and with intent to defraud his creditors.

## SUBMARINE ARMOR.

This is the name given to an apparatus invented by Capt Taylor, formerly of Newbern, in this State and now of New York, by means of which a person may descend to the bottom of the sea near the coast, to search for and recover lost treasures. It is a sort of dress made of iron wire and covered with india rubber cloth, furnished with tubes by means of which the submarine adventurer is supplied with fresh air from above, and enabled to prosecute his work for an indefinite time. Cargoes have been recovered with it from wrecks which had been submerged in the sea for years and all hope of ever recovering which had been given up. Two of the proprietors are now in Charleston exhibiting the invention.

Raleigh Register.

The venerable and respected Chancellor Desaussure died in Charleston on Friday last in the 75th year of his age, and on Tuesday his remains were deposited in the Family vault in the Presbyterian burial ground in this place.—*Columbia Telescope*

Slippery Places.—A fellow coming out of a tavern one day morning, rather blue, fell on the door step. Trying to regain his footing, he remarked—"if as the bible says, the wicked stand on slippery places, I must belong to a different class, for it is more than I can do."