

SPEECH

OF HON. JOHN M. CLAYTON. Of Delaware before the Great Whig Convention held at Wilmington, (Del.) on the 15th June.

FELLOW-CITIZENS:

The chief object I have in view, in this day addressing you, is to call back your attention, and that of the country at large from the many distracting topics which now agitate the public mind, to the greatest of all the issues involved in the Presidential Election. The great question to be decided by that election is a question of BREAD—a question whether we shall abandon the whole principle of protection extended to the laboring classes of this country by the Tariff Act of 1842, and adopt, in lieu of it, a tariff discriminating for revenue and against protection; a question whether we shall go back, by our own voluntary act, to that state of colonial vassalage which existed in this country while England held us in subjection, and her statesmen boasted that they would not permit us to manufacture a hob-nail for ourselves—a question whether we shall now surrender to England one of the most essential blessings resulting from that independence for which the Whigs of the Revolution successfully contended. To every reflecting mind it must be apparent, that but few subjects can be decided to the satisfaction of a majority of the people, at a single election; and it is the old trick of designing politicians, to escape defeat upon subjects in controversy, vitally affecting the country, by multiplying the issues to be decided, distracting the attention of the people, and dividing the majority on the dreaded questions, by others of inferior importance. These are the tricks of all the enemies of Whig principles of the present day. Those gentlemen are well aware that a vast majority of the freemen of this country are decidedly hostile to the modern Free-trade doctrine, and as decidedly friendly to the Whig Tariff of 1842, embracing the Whig principle of protection to home-labor. With their new Democratic doctrine of Free-trade, all the leaders among them are conscious that they cannot go to trial before the country without incurring inevitable defeat. Within the past year, the friends of the protective policy have, every where, routed their opponents when this question has been raised in the elections. Our friends have unfrocked the partisans and advocates of British interests in this nation. They have torn the masks from all the faces of those who prefer English to American labor. The sheepskins have been stripped from their backs and the wolves, now stand out in their naked deformity. To insure our triumph in this great question, our friends have at last adopted a determination, upon which our welfare eminently depends, to reject with scorn, alliance with, or assistance from, all cow-boys, and such as pretend to occupy a neutral position between the contending parties on this question. This is a subject upon which the American people can no longer be deceived by pretended friends or by enemies. And, at this moment, you see the foes of the American system, conscious of their approaching destiny, if the two issues shall be submitted to the people, are every where endeavoring to direct public attention from it to other subjects, presented for the purpose of exciting popular feeling. Let us guard against the wiles of our adversaries. Our situation, at this time, may be compared to that of a large family about to emigrate to the West. We have one wagon belonging to our concern, with an excellent team attached to it. We can carry in it all that is really necessary for our safety and our happiness. But we cannot carry every thing which the caprice or fancy of every member of the family may induce him to throw into it. If we suffer every one to pile in, among our necessities of life all the trumpery which he may have purchased to carry with him, we shall soon find that there is not room enough for a hundredth part of it, and that one team is utterly unable to haul it. In this state of things, the only course left us, as sensible men, is to restrict the freight in the wagon to such things necessary to our safety and comfort, as we can certainly transport. But we will leave every one, who thinks he has got the means of transportation, independently of us, to lug along what he pleases; and we will promise not to fall out by the way or quarrel with any friend who may choose to go the journey with us, because he thinks proper to load himself down with articles which we are unable or unwilling to carry. The wagon and the whole cavalcade are now before me, about to start for the West. Henry Clay, the driver, knows the road well, and by his side sits Theodore Frelinghuysen, who is a good guide and experienced traveller himself. Inside of the wagon I see the Proceeds of the sales of the Public Lands, with duties laid for Protection to home-labor, a sound Currency, an economical Administration of the Government, and divers other good articles, necessary for our safety and prosperity. But there goes a fellow behind, driving an unbroken colt in a cart of his own, filled up with Texas Bonds and Texas Land Scrip. As he wishes to go along with us, we shall not dispute with him about his freight; though I think he will not drive his cart over the mountains this year! There comes another man, tugging in the rear with a wheelbarrow, loaded down with two hundred millions of Government Scrip to pay off the State Debts. He is a good fellow in the main, and decidedly in favor of our taking along every article in the wagon; but will insist on his peculiar notion that these State Debts must go in company with us; and while he works on his own hook, at his own barrow, I shall never quarrel with

THE CAROLINA WATCHMAN.

BRUNER & JAMES, Editors & Proprietors.

KEEP A CHECK UPON ALL YOUR BUSINESS.

RULES: DO THIS, AND LIBERTY GOES WITH IT.

NEW SERIES, NUMBER 11, OF VOLUME 1.

SALISBURY, N. C., JULY 13, 1844.

him or attempt to drive him back; though if I must express my opinion, I think his freight will be swamped among the fens of Salt river. There comes another fellow, with horses attached to a cumbersome machine moving on skids, outside of which you may see the protruding muzzles of a whole battery of cannon, and the inside of which is filled with ammunition, guns, drums and trumpets, and all the paraphernalia of War. That fellow is full of fight and wants to go to war with either Mexico or England, or somebody else, he is not very particular with whom. He wishes to put all that freight inside of our wagon; but when we satisfied him we had not room for the fiftieth part of it, he agreed to bring it himself, with his own force, and I am not willing to drive him back or quarrel with him about his whims for although he, like the others, has his peculiar notions, yet he, as well as they, is in favor of our carrying every article we have in our wagon and desires to accompany us as far as he can to defend and protect it. Yonder comes another fellow, tottering under the weight of a knap-sack, filled with treatises on Political Economy and a thousand Sectarian Controversies. He ardently implored us to give room in the wagon for all that baggage; but he was assured that if one half his tracts should be read on the road, instead of proceeding in harmony together, there would be a general fight among the whole company; after which, when Catholic and Protestant had pommelled each other soundly, the company would be separated into religious factions, and would never reach their place of destination. He was informed, then, if he would take along his knap-sack, he must bear its weight, and keep its contents to himself; as the only tracts allowed to be carried in the wagon, or disseminated on the march, are those which inculcate religious toleration, in its widest and most liberal sense, and breathe no other spirit than peace on earth and good will among all men of all sects, classes and denominations. I can see also, (let me add) a rival train, with another wagon, behind all these, toiling hard to overtake ours, and bound for the same country; where they mean to settle as squatters for four years to come if they can reach it before us. This wagon is a heavy lumbering vehicle, being but a clumsy attempt to imitate a celebrated carriage which came into fashion about the year 1800. The horses are old political hacks, many of them being spavined and wind-broken and most of them sorely distressed with the thumps, a disease contracted by them on the long journey up Salt River, four years ago. Inside of this wagon you may see ponderous safes and chests of iron, upon which the brazen capitals are plainly legible, the Sub-Treasury separates the Government from the Banks, and the People from their own money. On many of these massive chests, we read, "Hard money for the office-holders and bank rags for other people." On the top of all them, they seem to have piled Ossa on Pelias, as if they designed to put all Texas upon wheels, including parts of the Mexican States of Santa Fe, Chihuahua, Coahuila, and Tamaulipas; the whole crowned with the Texan debt of untold millions, by the side of which, on the other package, you may read, "No assumption of our own State debts by our own Government." But the heaviest weight of all presses on the driver's box; where you may see James K. Polk, of Tennessee, holding his nags, four in hand; while George M. Dallas, sitting by his side, vainly plies a hickory gad to the excoerated flanks of the jaded animals. The driver sits on a cushion of enormous weight, labelled Free Trade. Every part of this vehicle is of foreign manufacture. The very wood of which it is made, is of foreign growth—even the horse shoes were made by English blacksmiths; the harness is all manufactured out of English leather, by English harness-makers; all the wheel-tire, the axle-trees, and even the brittle-bits, were imported from Liverpool. No American laborer, whether native or naturalized, was allowed to drive a nail into this wagon. Strapped up in the boot behind you may see a Broken Treaty with Mexico, covered over with that "black flag" which Mr Butler, in the late Baltimore Convention, predicted would prove the funeral pall of a certain concern, whenever it should abandon the principle that a majority should govern. A band of discarded office-holders and office hunters surround the wagon, shouting at the top of their lungs, for "Free Trade and Texas," "Hard money and James K. Polk." There is a little fellow, the editor of a paltry newspaper, blowing a penny whistle, labelled "Down with all Corporations;" while another of the same profession grinds a hardy-gurdy to the old tune of "Bargain and Corruption," and the "Murdered Coalition." Near these is another of the same trade, riding on a donkey, while he drums on the dead hide of the Bank of the United States. Behind these comes off a concerto, in which you may hear the praises of harmonious Democracy chanted, amidst every variety of sound, from the twanging of a jews-harp to the thrumming of a banjo. Whether this assemblage shall ever proceed further on their journey than that Serboman bog, which lies near the sources of Salt river, I leave others to conjecture. Pharaoh pursued the Israelites till he was

swallowed in the Red Sea. I feel too good natured just now to foretell the destiny of James K. Polk and his followers. But, jesting apart, let me return, in all sober seriousness, to the true question, as I have already stated it—protection or no protection for the country—bread or no bread for the laborer. It is no part of my purpose to discuss that question at length. To enable others to understand it, I have only to refer them to the last article in the March number of Blackwood's Magazine. We may there learn how Englishmen reason among themselves when discoursing on follies of the visionary doctrine of free trade; and we may also learn from it how much credit we should attach to articles of a contrary import, written by Englishmen for the American market. English periodicals, written for the purpose of being read by American citizens, have done more injury to the cause of the American laborer than any equal number of publications on the same subject which have appeared in our country. In connection with this subject, my fellow-citizens, let me say, that there are not wanting, in the ranks of our opponents, men who have been bold enough to charge Henry Clay and Theodore Frelinghuysen, the chosen champions of Whig principles, with having abandoned the protective policy, by their votes for the Compromise Act of the 2d of March, 1833. It is my duty to defend these, my old associates in the public councils, against so unjust an accusation; and that duty becomes peculiarly imperative upon me, when inquiries are constantly addressed to me, as they have been of late, in regard to the true character of the votes which they gave on that memorable occasion. I cannot answer all these inquiries by letter. I will, therefore, this day, attempt to answer them here; for I see "A chief's among us takin' notes; And, faith, he'll prent em."

I have reason to hope that his report of what I am about to say may reach those who have addressed these inquiries to me. I was in the Senate at the time of the passage of the Compromise Act, was a member of the committee which reported it, and had the best possible opportunity of knowing the motives, and objects of Mr. Clay, in the introduction and passage of that measure. His aim was not only to prevent a civil war and the dissolution of the Union, but to save the protective policy. I am convinced that, but for the passage of that act, the protective system would have been substantially repealed, more than ten years ago, and every manufacturer in the country dependent upon it stricken down. I know that nothing is more common than for us to hear certain individuals, who are utterly ignorant of the real circumstances which existed in the early part of the year 1833, in a spirit of idle bravado, boasting bravely they would have defied the threats of the Nullifiers—how resolute they would have proved themselves, had the opportunity been offered them, in hanging up all the leaders of that faction, and how rejoiced they would have been in administering, through the swiftly willing agency of General Jackson, a salutary castigation to what they term "the imbecile arrogance and bullying of South Carolina." These and similar remarks are generally made for the purpose of introducing a condemnation of Mr. Clay for his agency in the passage of the Compromise Act, which they say was a sacrifice of the protective principle to prevent a war with the nullifiers. Without doubting the courage or the sincerity of those who thus often boast of the superior firmness and more manly bearing which they would have exhibited, at that crisis, I will endeavor, briefly, to show you that these gentlemen are ignorant both of the effect and meaning of the act, as well as of the objects sought to be secured by its author. It is quite a common error, that the act itself proposes a horizontal Tariff of 20 per cent. on all articles of importation, as the minimum rate of duties, and the final resting place at which the reduction of duties, proposed by the act, shall cease, and stand unchanged and unchangeable forever. At this day, gentlemen of intelligence, professing to understand and discuss the legal effect of this act, often speak of it as a law, the great object of which was, by a system of gradual diminution, to reduce the duties as they stood under the act of 1832, to an universal levie of 20 per cent., at the expiration of nine years and four months. In other words, regarded the Compromise Act as fixing one rate for all dutiable articles from and after the 30th of June, 1842, that rate being 20 per cent. ad valorem; and as containing certain binding stipulations or pledge on the part of the authors of that law, that no higher rate of duty should ever, after that day, be collected by the general government. This supposition, preposterous as it is, you have doubtless observed, is an opinion quite commonly expressed, and that too, by grave legislators on the floors of Congress. That the enemies of Mr. Clay should have so expressed themselves, is a matter to be regretted; but when the friends of the Tariff, and the very men who profess the most confidence in the rectitude and consistency of that great statesman, fall into the same error, it is high time their mistake should be corrected.

It is perfectly true, that the first section of the act fixes 20 per centum ad valorem as the lowest rate at which dutiable articles should be admitted, after the 30th of June, 1842; but the third section of the act provides, that, from and after that day, "duties upon imports shall be laid for the purpose of raising such revenue as may be necessary to an economical administration of the government;" and also that such duties shall be assessed on the home valuation and payable in cash. The leading principles established by the act were, first, that after the 30th of June, 1842, a sufficient revenue should be raised from import duties alone to defray the expenses of the Government;—secondly, that no more revenue should be so collected than should be demanded by an economical administration of the Government; thirdly, that the best possible guards against frauds on the Tariff should be established by the adoption of the new system of assessing the duties on the home, instead of the foreign value, and making those duties payable in cash.—Whether these duties, from which all the revenue for the support of government was to be derived, should be fixed at 20 per cent., or at 50 per cent., or any other rate, was, of course, a subject left for the future consideration and action of Congress, whenever it should be discovered that the minimum rate of 20 per cent., adopted by the first section of the bill, was insufficient for the support of government. Nothing was further from the intention of those who passed this law than to attempt to prevent further legislation, discriminating with a view to Home Labour, in the contingency of a defect of revenue from duties of 20 per cent. I have ever regarded the Tariff passed by the Congress of 1842, as a substantial compliance, in most respects, with this pledge in the Compromise Act, with this exception only—that law, while it levies duties on imports to support the government looks to the proceeds of the sales of the public lands as an auxiliary for that purpose; while the Compromise Act gave, to me, as I thought when I voted for it, and to every other friend of the protection system, at the same time, a solemn assurance, that, after the 30th of June, 1842, the Land Fund should cease to be regarded as a source of revenue, and that all the real wants of the government should be supplied exclusively from duties on imports, assessed so as to prevent frauds, and payable in cash. To understand this subject, as it really was understood by those friends with whom I acted in the passage of the Compromise Act, it is necessary to recur to some other proceedings contemporaneous with it. Mr. Clay's bill to distribute the proceeds of the sales of the Public Lands among the States, which passed both Houses of Congress about the same time with the Compromise itself, was by us regarded as part and parcel of one great revenue and financial system, which we desired to establish for the benefit of the whole country. While temporarily surrendering the Land Fund to the States, to which it rightfully belonged, in the judgment of the Congress of 1833, we provided, in the Compromise Act, that there should be a day fixed at which, in accordance with a suggestion previously made by General Jackson himself, the Land Fund should forever cease to be regarded as a source of revenue by the General Government. It is true, that we should have acted more wisely, as the event proved, by incorporating the provisions of a Distribution Bill in the Compromise itself. But who could have supposed, at that day, that President Jackson would have vetoed a bill which carried out his own suggestion? Nevertheless, he defeated that great and salutary measure of Distribution, by means which no end can ever justify. He refused to return the bill with his objection to the House in which it originated—unquestionably because he had reason to believe, that had he complied with this, his constitutional duty, each branch of Congress stood ready, by a vote of two-thirds, to make the bill a law, in spite of his veto. I have said, that the Tariff of 1842, in my view, a substantial compliance, in most respects, with the principles of the Compromise Act, and the pledges given in that act on the subject of the regulation of duties from and after the 30th of June, 1842. But it was not a compliance in all respects. In my humble judgment, had the Tariff of 1842 been passed strictly in the spirit of the Compromise itself, it would have been a better Tariff for protection than the law in force. It would have better guarded the revenue against frauds in the foreign valuation; and it would more effectually have checked excessive importation, which is one of the greatest curses of our country. The distribution of the Land Fund among the States, contemplated by the Compromise, and temporarily provided for by the Land Bill, would have put an end to the agitation of the question of protection for ever; and the principle avowed and sustained by Mr. Clay, that, in laying duties for revenue, discrimination should always be made in favor of protection, as an incident to revenue, would have been the settled doctrine of the country.

To show that this opinion is well founded, let us suppose that Congress, on the 30th of June, 1842, had resolved to make a tariff strictly in pursuance of the compromise. The latter directed, that, after that day, and not until after that day, duties should descend by a rapid reduction, not of 10 per cent., but of the last half of the whole excess above 20 per cent., left after the 31st of Dec. 1839, and that reduction be 20 per cent. on the home value of the imports, unless at that time, the revenue from rate of duty should be inadequate to support the administration of the Government. Now how stood the facts on that day? We had actually incurred a national debt of more than \$20,000,000, at that very time, under the operations of a higher tariff than 20 per cent., and that, too, with the aid of all the land fund, and bank stocks and bank dividends besides. Our revenue had sunk so low that the credit of the nation, was at that very moment, in the most deplorable condition. We had borrowed on that credit till foreigners would not lend us another dollar, and in our own market, the 6 per cent. certificates of the loan redeemable in twenty years, could not be sold to any considerable amount, for any thing like their par value. We had approached the very verge of national bankruptcy, and but for the Whig revolution of 1840, which had elected a Whig Congress to decide our fate, we should at that moment have been in imminent peril of national repudiation. The depressed state of public credit was one of the contingencies anticipated by the friends of Mr. Clay, at the passage of the compromise, and we now know we are right. We foresaw that the duties never could descend to 20 per cent., if that pledge to raise the duties to the standard of the wants of the Government, given in the act, should be fulfilled; and our hope—our belief was that before they could descend, by the operation of the law, to 20 per cent., men of all parties, seeing that the Government could not be supported on that principle, would confess old errors, and join with us under happier auspices, in so adjusting the tariff as that, while the wants of government would be supplied from import duties, ample protection, as incident to the revenue, would be freely accorded to us, without further strife. If, then, Congress had, at that time, raised the duties to the standard then fixed by the compromise, we should have had a tariff which would more effectually have protected home labor than the act of 1842; because, although the duties would have been for revenue, with only incidental protection, (the very principle of the act of 1842,) yet those duties, without the aid of other sources of revenue, would have been still higher than those of 1842, and their collection better guarded against frauds. But the compromise act caused a gradual reduction of duties until the 30th of June, 1842, and the question remains to be answered—"why did the friends of protection to home labor consent to such a reduction even for a limited period?" The answer might be a very short one. Under the circumstances in which we were then placed, it was palpable to the minds of those who voted for the Compromise, that, unless we accepted that, we should have to submit to the speedy destruction of the whole manufacturing interest. But it is due to the subject, that, in the answer to this question, the circumstances to which I have alluded should be briefly explained. At the time of the passage of this law, the violent opposition of many of our fellow-citizens in the South, and of not a few elsewhere, to the whole protective policy was unparalleled in the history of this country. South Carolina, by her ordinance of Nullification, had openly defied the General Government, and resolved that no duties should be collected within her limits. It is easy, at this day, after the storm has passed over to speak of her resistance as a thing which could have been easily crushed by the exhibition of a little firmness. I have never doubted, nor do I believe that Mr. Clay or any of his friends ever doubted, that the power of this government was amply sufficient to enforce for the time the collection of the duties on imports, in despite of all the threatened hostility of South Carolina, and all other enemies of the protective policy. But it is due to truth to say, that, at that time, South Carolina had many sympathizers, and not a few adherents, in other parts of the country. We were, every day, in danger of a collision, which might terminate in bloodshed; and, in that event, any man tolerably acquainted with the American character, could anticipate, quite as well as I can now describe, the imminent danger of a protracted and bloody contest, which, if it did not endanger the Union, as I firmly believe it would have done, must have rendered the protective system hateful to our countrymen, as the exciting cause of a civil war, and incapable of being maintained, except by the butchery of American citizens by American hands. I never did, and do not now, believe, that any such system can be long maintained in a government like ours, if it cannot be upheld without a civil war. The friends of the Compromise, in the firm belief that the protective policy was entitled to the confidence and support of the American people, and would grow up and establish itself in their affections, if a violent civil strife could be avoided, desired, of all things, time—time for reason to resume her empire—time for the violent passions of men, then inflamed to the very verge of insanity, to subside; and they consented to a gradual reduction of duties for a limited period, with a

view to the ultimate safety of the protective principle itself, as well as to avert the horrors of a civil conflict, and to save the excited and deluded men who were rushing into these extremities, from the consequences of their own folly. In the midst of all these considerations, then pressing upon the attention of the friends of protection, there was another starting up in the face, which is too often forgotten or overlooked. At the very commencement of the session of that Congress which passed the act, President Jackson, in his annual message, threw off the cloak of a "judicious" tariff, and openly arrayed the whole power of the executive against the protective. Then, for the first time, we heard from him the declaration, that "experience, our best guide on this, as on other subjects, made it doubtful whether the advantages of this system are not counterbalanced by many evils, and whether it did not tend to beget, in the minds of a large portion of our countrymen, a spirit of discontent and jealousy dangerous to the stability of the Union;"—that a tariff designed for perpetual protection had entered into the minds of but few of our statesmen, and that the most they had anticipated was a temporary protection;" and "that those who took an enlarged view of the condition of our country, must be satisfied that the policy of protection must be ultimately limited to those articles of domestic manufacture which are indispensable to our safety in time of war." These and many other declarations against the existing Tariff in the President's Annual Message, almost instantaneously arrayed the mass of his party against the protective policy throughout the whole country. It required no gifted seer to predict its fate, if some conciliatory measure were not speedily adopted by its friends to allay the existing excitement. The President's Message against the Tariff was communicated to Congress, at that session on the 4th of December; and with such expedition did his party in the House of Representatives act on that occasion, in pursuance of his suggestions, that on the 28th of the same month, the Committee of Ways and Means reported a bill to repeal the existing Tariff, and in lieu thereof to collect a revenue of but \$12,500,000 by all imposts on foreign merchandise, the average duty on which as proposed in the bill was about 10 per cent., and that to be assessed on the foreign valuation. This bill, which was sometimes called Mr. Yerplanck's bill, but which was really a measure emanating from the Executive, was actually advanced on its passage in the House, at the time the Compromise was under consideration in the Senate; and its final passage in the House, was no longer problematical. It was a measure which, if successful, could not fail to prove an immediate death-blow to the whole protective policy. Its passage had been forced through the Committee of the Whole on the State of the Union, after an ineffectual effort by the friends of American industry to impede its progress; when, on the 23d of February, 1833, the friends of Protection in the Senate made the last effort in their power to arrest its downward tendency, and to stay for so long a time as possible, the hand which was extended for its destruction. At that critical moment, the question for them to consider was, NOT WHETHER HOW MUCH PROTECTION WAS NECESSARY FOR HOME LABOR, BUT HOW MUCH OF IT COULD BE SAVED. The bill in the House, backed as it was by the power of the Executive, and the public sentiment in its favor, daily increasing, in consequence of the President's denunciations of the then existing tariff, might be temporarily arrested by the action of a few Senators; but those very Senators saw, that unless some compromise could be effected, while they retained their slender and very precarious majority in the Senate, the ultimate triumph of the destructive system, and that, too, at no distant day, was inevitable. Time can never efface my vivid remembrance of the anxious responsibility felt by myself and those who acted with me at that moment. I did not rely upon my own judgment alone, nor upon that of any associate in the Senate, for the course I should adopt. I sought the advice of one who was a citizen of my own State, and who stood, at the time, at the head of the manufacturing interest of the country,—a man whose extensive and minute acquaintance with the whole subject of the tariff was not exceeded by that of any other man in the nation—one who had embarked largely in manufactures himself, and who was deeply interested for other manufacturers, and, withal, one whose exalted character as a man of pure, patriotic, and honest purpose was unsurpassed. I refer to the late E. J. Du Pont, of the Brandywine. At my solicitation, he came to Washington to advise with me on the subject, and, after fully weighing all the circumstances which surrounded us, anxiously advised me to accept the Compromise, and to exert myself to procure its passage. He expressed strong apprehensions that we could carry the Compromise, in the face of the rival measure, which offered better terms to the enemies of protection in the House; and when I represented to him that those who had been threatened with a rope by the President, would prefer our bill to the bill in the House, on account of the paternity of the latter, the possibility that we might for a time arrest the passage of any bill in the Senate,—and the deep solicitude felt by the Nullifiers to procure some measure of immediate relief, to save them from the consequences of their own folly! He expressed the highest gratification at the prospect of the passage of the Compromise, as the only means left of preserving the principle, to the maintenance of which he had devoted a great part of his own useful life. His judgment on the subject confirmed my opinions; and I owed him while he lived a debt of gratitude for his assistance on that occasion, which, although I never had it in my power to repay, yet have I never failed, either before or since his lamented death, to acknowledge. Thus assured, my feeble aid was freely given to that great measure; which while it saved the manufacturing interest from sudden and utter destruction, soothed and conciliated the angry passions of men, then ready to rush upon revolution and bloodshed; and gave ample time to the friends of the protective policy to rally in its support, before the dearest interests of the country could be fatally affected. Any attempt to withstand and repel the flood then rushing upon us, would have been fruitless. It was clear that we should be swept away by the torrent. We preferred to divide, to divert, and to retard it. And I then thought, and still think, that the mighty effort of Mr. Clay, on that occasion, to save his favorite measure from the danger which threatened it from every quarter, was the most triumphant act of his life. After a most exciting debate on the merits of the bill, a great part of which was never publish-