

# THE CAROLINA WATCHMAN.

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Genl. Harrison.

NEW SERIES,  
NUMBER 39, OF VOLUME IV.

SALISBURY, N. C., THURSDAY, JANUARY 27, 1848.

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Subscription, per year, Two Dollars—payable in advance. But if not paid in advance, Two Dollars and fifty cents will be charged.  
Advertisements inserted at \$1 for the first, and 25 cts for each subsequent insertion. Court orders charged 50 per cent. higher than these rates. A liberal deduction to those who advertise by the year.  
Letters to the Editors must be postpaid.

## PEACE WITH MEXICO.

BY ALBERT GALLATIN.

CONCLUDED.

### VIII.—Terms of Peace.

I have said that the unfounded claim of Texas to the territory between the Nueces and the Rio Grande, was the greatest impediment to peace, and that there can be no doubt. For, if, relinquishing the spirit of military conquest, nothing will be required but the indemnities due to our citizens, the United States have only to accept the terms which have been offered by the Mexican Government. It consents to yield a territory five degrees of latitude, or near 350 miles in breadth, and extending from New Mexico to the Pacific. Although the greater part of this is quite worthless, yet the portion of California lying between the Sierra Nevada and the Pacific, and including the port of San Francisco, is certainly worth much more than the amount of indemnities justly due to our citizens. It is only in order to satisfy those claims that an accession of territory may become necessary.

It is not believed that the Executive will favor the wild suggestions of subjugation or annexation of the whole of Mexico, or of any of its interior provinces. And, if I understand the terms offered by Mr. Trist, there was no intention to include within the cessions required, the province of New Mexico. But the demand of both Old and New California, or of a coast of more than 1300 miles in length (from 23° to 42°) is extravagant and unnecessary. The Peninsula is altogether worthless, and there is nothing worth contending for south of San Diego, or about lat 32°.

In saying that, it conquest is not the object of the war and if the pretended claim of Texas to the Rio del Norte, shall be abandoned, there cannot be any insuperable obstacle to the negotiation of peace, it is by no means intended to assert that the terms heretofore proposed by either party are at this time proper. And I apprehend that the different views of the subject entertained by those who sincerely desire a speedy and just peace, may create some difficulty. There are some important considerations which may become the subject of subsequent arrangement. For the present, nothing is strictly *ante bellum*, or, in other words, to evacuate the Mexican territory, and to provide for the payment of the indemnities due to our citizens. The scruples of those who object to any accession whatever of territory, except terms unacceptable to the Southern States, might be removed by a provision, that would pledge a territory sufficient for the purpose, and leave it in possession of the United States until the indemnities had been fully paid.

Were I to listen to exclusively to my own feelings and opinions, I would say, that if the positions which I have attempted to establish are correct—if I am not mistaken in my sincere conviction that the war was unprovoked by the Mexicans, and has been one of iniquitous aggression on our part, it necessarily follows that, according to the dictates of justice, the United States are bound to indemnify them for having invaded their territory, bombarded their towns, and inflicted all the miseries of war on a people who were fighting in defence of their own homes. If all this be true, the United States would give but an inadequate compensation for the injuries they have inflicted, by assuming the payment of the indemnities justly due to their own citizens. Even if their purchase of territory should be convenient to both parties, it would be far preferable to postpone it for the present—among other reasons, in order that it should not have the appearance of being imposed on Mexico. There are also some important considerations to which I may not be improper to call at this time the public attention.

Our population may at this time be assumed as amounting to twenty millions. Although the rate of natural increase has already been lessened, from thirty-three to about thirty per cent, in ten years, the deficiency has been and will probably continue for a while, to be compensated by the prodigious increase of immigration from foreign countries. An increase of thirty per cent, would add to our population ten millions in ten, and more than eleven millions in twenty years. That the fertile uncultivated land, within the limits of the States admitted, or immediately admissible in the Union, could sustain three times that number indubitably. But the indomitable energy, the locomotive propensities and all the habits of the settlers of new countries are such, that even the united efforts of both Governments can or will prevent their occupying within twenty years, within ten years, every district, as far as the Pacific, and whether within the limits of the United States or Mexico, which shall not have previously been actually and *bona fide* occupied and settled by others. It may be said that this is justifiable by Natural Law; that, for the same reason, which sets aside the right of discovery, if not followed by actual occupation, within a reasonable time the rights of Spain and Mexico have been forfeited by their neglect, or inability, during a period of three hundred years, to colonize a country, which, during the whole of that period, they held undisputed by any other foreign nation. And it may, perhaps, be observed that, had the Government of the United States waited for the operation of natural and irresistible causes, these territories would have given them, without a war, more than they want at this moment.

However plausible all this may appear, it is nevertheless certain, that it will be an acquisition of territory for the benefit of the people of the United States, and in violation of solemn treaties. Not only collisions must be avoided, but the renewal of another illicit annexation must be prevented; but the two countries must consider their relative position; and what portion of territory, not actually settled by the Mexicans, and of no real utility to them, may be disposed to cede, must be acquired by a treaty freely assented to, and for a reasonable compensation. But that is not the subject of the discussion of a proper final arrangement. We must wait till peace shall have been declared, and angry feelings shall have subsided. At present the only object is Peace, and no acquisition of territory, but such as may be sufficiently necessary for attaining the great object in view. The most

simple terms, those which will only provide for the adjustment of the Texas boundary and for the payment of the indemnities due to our citizens, and in every other respect, restore things as they stood before the beginning of hostilities appear to me the most eligible. For that purpose I may be permitted to wish, that the discussion of the terms should not be embarrassed by the introduction of any other matter. There are other considerations, highly important, and not foreign to the great question of an extension of territory, but which may, without any inconvenience or commitment, be postponed, and should not be permitted to impede the immediate termination of this lamentable war.

I have gone farther than I intended. It is said that a rallying point is wanted by the friends of peace. Let them unite, boldly express their opinions and use their utmost endeavors in promoting an immediate termination of the war. For the people, no other banner is necessary. But their Representatives in Congress assembled, are alone competent to ascertain, alone vested with the legitimate power of deciding what course should be pursued at this momentous crisis, what are the best means for carrying into effect their own views, whatever these may be. We may wait with hope and confidence the result of their deliberations.

I have tried in this essay, to confine myself to the questions at issue between the United States and Mexico. Whether the Executive has, in any respect, exceeded his legitimate power; whether he is, for any of his acts, liable to animadversion, are questions which do not concern Mexico.

There are certainly some doubtful assumptions of power, and some points on which explanations are necessary. The most important is the reason which may have induced the President, when he considered the war as necessary and almost unavoidable, not to communicate to Congress, which was all that time in session, the important steps he had taken till after hostilities, and indeed actual war had taken place. The substitution, for war contributions, of an arbitrary and varying Tariff, appears to me to be of a doubtful nature; and it is hoped that the subject will attract the early attention of Congress. I am also clearly of opinion that the provisions of the law respecting volunteers which authorize them to elect their officers, is a direct violation of the constitution of the United States, which recognize no other land force than the army and militia, and which vests in the President and Senate the exclusive power of appointing all the officers of the United States, whose appointments are not otherwise provided for in the constitution itself. [With respect to precedents, refer to the act of July 6, 1812, chap. 461. (xxxviii) enacted with due deliberation, and which repeals, in that respect the act on same subject of February 6, 1812.]

## SPEECH OF MR. CALHOUN,

OF SOUTH CAROLINA,

On his Resolutions in reference to the War with Mexico, January 4, 1848.

Resolved, That to conquer Mexico and to hold it, either as a province or to incorporate it in the Union, would be inconsistent with the avowed object for which the war has been prosecuted; a departure from the settled policy of the Government; in conflict with its character and genius; and in the end, subversive of our free and popular institutions.

Resolved, That no line of policy in the further prosecution of the war should be adopted which may lead to consequences so disastrous.

Mr. CALHOUN said: in offering, Senators, these resolutions for your consideration, I am governed by the reasons which induced me to oppose the war; and by which I have been governed since it was sanctioned by Congress. In alluding to my opposition to the war, I do not intend to touch on the reasons which governed me on that occasion, further than is necessary to explain my motives upon the present.

I then opposed the war, not only because it might have been easily avoided; not only because the President had no authority to order a part of the disputed territory in possession of the Mexicans to be occupied by our troops; not only because I believed the allegations upon which Congress sanctioned the war untrue, but from high considerations of policy; because I believed it would lead to many and serious evils to the country, and greatly endanger its free institutions. But, after the war was declared, by authority of the Government, I acquiesced in what I could not prevent, and which it was impossible for me to arrest; and I then felt it to be my duty to limit my efforts to giving such direction to the war as would, as far as possible, prevent the evils and danger with which it threatened the country and its institutions. For this purpose, at the last session, I suggested to the Senate the policy of adopting a defensive line, and for the same purpose I now offer these resolutions. This, and this only, is the motive which governs me on this occasion. I am moved by no personal or party considerations. My object is neither to strengthen the opposition, nor to discharge an important duty to the country. In doing so, I shall express my opinion on all points with the freedom and boldness which becomes an independent Senator, who has nothing to ask from the Government or from the People. But when I come to notice those points on which I differ from the President, I shall do it with all the decorum, which is due to the Chief Magistrate of the Union.

I suggested a defensive line because, in the first place, I believed that the only certain mode of terminating the war successfully was to take indemnity in our own

hands by occupying defensively, with our military force, a portion of the Mexican territory, which we might deem ample for indemnity; and, in the next, because I believed that it was the only way we could avoid the great danger to our institutions against which these resolutions are intended to guard. The President took a different view. He recommended a vigorous prosecution of the war—not for conquest—that was emphatically disavowed—but for the purpose of conquering peace—that is, to compel Mexico to sign a treaty ceding sufficient territory to indemnify to claims of our citizens and of the country for the expenses of the war. I could not approve of this policy. I opposed it, among other reasons, because I believed there was no certainty that the object intended to be effected would be accomplished, let the war be ever so successful. Congress thought differently, and granted simple provisions, in men and money, for carrying out the policy recommended by the President. It has now been fully tested under the most favorable circumstances. It has been as successful as the most sanguine hope of the Executive could have anticipated.—Victory after victory followed in rapid succession, without a single reverse.—Santa Anna repelled and defeated with all his forces at Buena Vista—Vera Cruz, with its castle, captured—the heights of Cerro Gorda triumphantly carried—Jalapa, Perote, and Puebla occupied—and after many triumphant victories under the walls of Mexico, its gates opened to us, and put us in possession of the Capital. But what has all these splendid achievements accomplished? Has the avowed object of the war been attained? Have we conquered peace? Have we compelled Mexico to sign a treaty? Have we obtained indemnity? No. Not a single object contemplated by the campaign has been effected; and what is worse, our difficulties are greater now than they were at the commencement, and the objects sought more difficult to be accomplished. To what is this complete failure to be attributed? Not to our army. It has done all that skill and gallantry could accomplish. It is to be attributed to the policy pursued. The Executive aimed at indemnity in a wrong way. Instead of taking it into our own hands, when we had territory in our possession, ample to cover the claims of our citizens and the expenses of the war, he sought it indirectly through a treaty with Mexico. He thus put it out of our own power, and under the control of Mexico, to say whether we should have indemnity or not, and thereby enabled her to defeat the whole object of the campaign by simply refusing to treat with us. Owing to this mistaken policy, after a most successful and brilliant campaign, involving an expenditure not less, probably, than forty millions of dollars, and the sacrifice, by the sword and by disease, of many valuable lives, probably not less than six or seven thousand, nothing is left but the glory which our army has acquired.

But as an apology for all this, it is insisted that the maintenance of a defensive line would have involved as great a sacrifice as the campaign itself. The President and the Secretary of War have assigned many reasons for entertaining this opinion. I have examined them with care. This is not the proper occasion to discuss them, but I must say, with all due deference, they are, to my mind, utterly fallacious; and to satisfy your minds that such is the case, I will place the subject in a single point of view.

The line proposed by me, to which I suppose their reasons were intended to be applied, would be covered in its whole extent, from the Pacific ocean to the Passo del Norte, on the Rio Grande, by the Gulf of California and the wilderness peopled by hostile tribes of Indians, through which no Mexican force could penetrate. For its entire occupancy and defence, nothing would be required but a few small vessels of war stationed in the Gulf, and a single regiment to keep down any resistance from the few inhabitants within.—From the Passo del Norte to the mouth of the river, a distance of a few hundred miles, a single fact will show what little force will be necessary to its defence. It was a frontier between Texas and Mexico, when the former had but an inconceivable population—not more than an hundred and fifty thousand at the utmost, and but very few irregular troops; yet for several years she maintained this line without any, except slight occasional intrusion from Mexico, and that too when Mexico was far more consolidated in her power, and when revolutions were not so frequent, and her money resources were far greater than at present. If, then, Texas alone, under such circumstances, could defend that frontier for so long a period, can any man believe that now, when she is backed by the whole of the United States, now that Mexico is exhausted, defeated, and prostrated—I repeat, can any man believe that it would involve as great a sacrifice to us of men and money, to defend that frontier, as did the last campaign? No. I hazard nothing in asserting, that, to defend it for an indefinite period, would have required a less sum than the interest on the money spent in the campaign, and fewer men than were sacrificed in carrying it on.

So much for the past. We now come to the commencement of another campaign, and the question recurs, what shall be done? The President, in his message, recommends the same line of policy—a vigorous prosecution of the war—not for conquest, that is again emphatically disavowed; not to blot Mexico out of the list of nations; no, he desires to see her an independent and flourishing community, and assigns strong reasons for it; but to obtain an honorable peace. We hear no more of conquering peace, but I presume that he means by an honorable peace the same thing; that is, to compel Mexico to agree to a treaty, ceding a sufficient part of her territory, as an indemnity for the expenses of the war, and for the claims of our citizens.

I have examined, with care, the grounds on which the President renews his recommendation, and am again compelled to dissent. There are many and powerful reasons, more so, even, than those that existed at the commencement of the last campaign, to justify my dissent. The sacrifice in money will be vastly greater. There is a bill for ten additional regiments now before the Senate, and another for twenty regiments of volunteers has been reported, authorizing in all the raising of an additional force of something upwards of thirty thousand. This, in addition to that already authorized by law, will be sufficient to keep an effective army in Mexico, of not much, if any, less than seventy thousand men, and will raise the expenses of the campaign to probably not less than sixty millions of dollars.

To meet so large an expenditure, would involve, in the present and prospective condition of the money market, it is to be apprehended, not a little embarrassment. Last year money was abundant, and easily obtained. An unfortunate famine in Europe created a great demand for our agricultural products. That turned the balance of trade greatly in our favor, and specie poured into the country with a strong and steady current. No considerable portion of it passed into the Treasury, through the duties, which kept it full, in spite of the large sums remitted to meet the expenses of the war. The case is different now. Instead of having a tide flowing in, equal to the drain flowing out, the drain is now both ways. The exchanges now are against us, instead of being in our favor, and instead of specie flowing into the country from abroad, it is flowing out. In the mean time the price of stocks and Treasury notes, instead of being at or above par, have both fallen below, to a small extent. The effects of the depreciation of Treasury notes will cause them to pass into the Treasury in payment of the customs and other dues to the Government, as the cheaper currency, instead of gold and silver; while the expenses of the war, whether paid for by the transmission of gold and silver direct to Mexico, or by drafts drawn in favor of British merchants or other capitalists there, will cause whatever specie may be in the vaults of the Treasury to flow from it, either for remittance direct on account of the ordinary transactions of the country, or to pay the drafts which may be drawn upon it, and which, when paid in the present state of exchanges, will be remitted abroad. But this process of paying in Treasury notes instead of gold and silver, and gold and silver flowing out in both directions, cannot continue long without exhausting its specie, and leaving nothing to meet the public expenditures, including those of the war, but Treasury notes. Can they under such circumstances preserve even their present value? Is there not great danger that they will fall lower and lower, and finally involve the finances of the Government and the circulation of the country in the greatest embarrassment and difficulty?

Is there not great danger, with this prospect before us, and with the necessity of raising by loans near forty millions, even possibly a suspension by the banks? I wish not to create panic; but there is danger, which makes a great difference, in a financial and money point of view, between the state of things now and at the commencement of the last session.—Looking to the future, it is to be apprehended that not a little difficulty will have to be encountered in raising money to meet the expenses of the next campaign, if conducted on the large scale which is proposed. Men may raise, but money will be found difficult to obtain. It is even to be apprehended that loans will have to be negotiated on very disadvantageous terms for the public. In the present state of things, if they grow no worse, there can be no resort to Treasury notes. They cannot be materially increased without a ruinous depreciation; and a resort must be had exclusively, or almost entirely, to borrowing. But, at the present prices of stocks, to borrow so large a sum as will be necessary can only be done at a greatly increased rate of interest on the nominal amount of stock. In a recent conversation with a gentleman well informed on this subject, he said that, in his opinion, if forty millions are required, a loan could not be had for more than ninety for one hundred, which would be about at the rate of seven per cent.

These are formidable objections, but they are not the only ones that are more so than they were at the commencement

of the last campaign. I hold that the avowed object for the vigorous prosecution of the war is less certain of being realized now than it was then; and, if it should fail to be realized, it will leave our affairs in a far worse condition than they are at present. That object, as has been stated, is to obtain an honorable treaty; one which, to use the language of the President, will give indemnity for the past and security for the future—that is, a treaty which will give us a cession of territory not only equal to our present demand for indemnity, but equal to the additional demand; equal to the entire expenses to be incurred in conducting the campaign, and a guaranty from the Government of Mexico for its faithful execution. Now, Senators, I hold that, whether the war is successful or unsuccessful, there is not only no certainty that this object will be accomplished, but almost a certainty that it will not be. If the war be unsuccessful; if our arms should be baffled, as I trust and believe they will not be; but if, from any unfortunate accident, such should be the case, it is clear that we shall not be able to negotiate a treaty that will accomplish the object intended. On the contrary, if the war should be successful, it is almost equally certain that, in that case, the avowed object for prosecuting the war vigorously will not be accomplished. I might take higher ground, and maintain that the more successful the war is prosecuted the more certainly the object avowed to be accomplished will be defeated, while the objects disavowed would as certainly be accomplished.

What is the object of a vigorous prosecution of the war? How can it be successful? I can see but one way of making it so, and that is by suppressing all resistance on the part of Mexico; overpowering and dispersing her army, and utterly overthrowing her Government. But if that should be done; if a vigorous prosecution of the war should lead to that result, how are we to obtain an honorable peace? With whom shall we treat for indemnity for the past and security for the future? War may be made by one party, but it requires two to make peace. If all authority is overthrown in Mexico, where will be the power to enter into negotiation and make peace? Our very success would defeat the possibility of making peace. In that case, the war would not end in peace, but in conquest; not in negotiation, but in subjugation; and defeat, I repeat, the very object you aim to accomplish, and accomplish that which you disavow to be your intention, by destroying the separate existence of Mexico, overthrowing her nationality, and blotting out her name from the list of nations, instead of leaving her a free republic, which the President has so earnestly expressed his desire to do.

If I understand his message correctly, I have his own authority for the conclusion to which I come. He takes very much the same view that I do as to how a war ought to be prosecuted vigorously, and what would be its results, with the difference as to the latter resting on a single contingency, and a remote one. He says that the great difficulty of obtaining peace results from this, that the people of Mexico are divided under factious chieftains, and that the chief in power dare not make peace, because for doing so he would be displaced by a rival. He also says, that the only way to remedy this evil and to obtain a treaty is to put down the whole of them, including the one in power as well as the others. Well, what then? Are we to stop there? No. Our Generals are, it seems, authorized to encourage and to protect the well disposed inhabitants in establishing a republican government. He says they are numerous, and are prevented from expressing their opinions and making an attempt to form such a government only by fear of those military chieftains. He proposes, when they have thus formed a government, under the encouragement and protection of our army, to obtain peace by a treaty with the government thus formed which shall give us ample indemnity for the past and security for the future. I must say I am at a loss to see how a free and independent republic can be established in Mexico under the protection and authority of its conquerors. I can readily understand how an aristocracy or a despotic government might be, but how a free republican government can be so established, under such circumstances, is to me incomprehensible. I had always supposed that such a government must be the spontaneous wish of the people; that it must emanate from the hearts of the people, and be supported by their devotion to it, without support from abroad. But it seems that these are antiquated notions—obsolete ideas—and that free popular governments may be made under the authority and protection of a conqueror.

But suppose these difficulties surmounted, how can we make a free Government in Mexico? Where are the materials? It is to be, I presume, a confederated government like their former. Where is the intelligence in Mexico for the construction and preservation of such a government? It is what she has been aiming at for more than twenty years, but so utterly incompetent are her people for the task, that it has been a complete failure from first to last. The great body of the intelligence and wealth of Mexico is concentrated in

the priesthood, who are naturally inclined to that form of government, to reside, for the most part, are the owners of the haciendas, the larger plantations of the country, but they are without energy and destitute of the means of forming such a government. But if it were possible to establish such a government, could not stand without the protection of our army. It would fall as soon as we withdrew.

If it be determined to have a treaty, it would be a far preferable course, as it appears to me, to abstain from attacking and destroying the Government now existing in Mexico, and to treat with it, if possible, it be capable of forming a treaty, which it could maintain and execute. Upon that point I do not profess to have any information beyond that derived from conversations with those who have been in Mexico; but from all that I can hear, it is doubted whether we have not been pushed what is called a vigorous prosecution of the war, so far as not to leave sufficient power and influence in the Government to enter into a treaty which would be respected when our forces are withdrawn. Such I know to be the opinion of intelligent officers. They are thinking that the existing Government, Queretaro, if it should enter into a treaty in conformity with the views expressed by the Executive, would be overthrown, and that we should be compelled to defend that portion of Mexico which we require for indemnity, defensively, or compelled to return and renew the prosecution of the war. If such is its necessity, it may be apprehended that now, without pushing the vigorous prosecution of the war further, we are exposed to the danger which these resolutions are intended to guard against, that it requires great discretion and protection on our part to avoid it.

But, before leaving this part of the subject, I must enter my solemn protest, as one of the representatives of a State of this Union, pledging protection to any Government established in Mexico under our countenance and encouragement. It would inevitably be thrown as soon as our forces are withdrawn, and we would be compelled, in fulfillment of pledged faith, implied or expressed, to again overturn and again reestablish, and should be compelled to take the government to our own hands just as the English have compelled again and again to do in Hindostan under similar circumstances, until it has its entire conquest. Let us avoid falling into an example which we have been condemned far back as my recollection extends.

The President himself entertains whether the plan of forming a Government in the manner which I have been considering, treating with it for indemnity, may not, in that case, he agrees that the very course which I have said the vigorous prosecution of the war will inevitably lead must be taken. He says, after having attempted to establish such a government—after having employed best efforts to secure peace—if all fail, must hold on to the occupation of the country, we must take the full measure of indemnity to our own hands, and enforce such terms to the honor of the country demands.—These are his words. Now, what is this? Is it an acknowledgment that, if he fails to establish a Government with which he can treat in peace—after putting down all resistance in the existing Government, we must make a conquest of the whole country, and hold it subject to our control? Can words be stronger? "Take the full measure of indemnity—no defensive line—no treaty—enforce terms." Terms on whom? On the Government? No, no, no. To enforce on the people individually; that is to establish a government over them in the form of a province.

The President is right. If the vigorous prosecution of the war should be successful, the contingency on which he expects to obtain a treaty fails, there will be no retreat. An argument against calling back the army making a defensive line will have double force, having spent sixty millions of dollars to acquire the possession of the whole of Mexico, and the interests in favor of keeping peace would be much more powerful than those of the army itself will be larger. Those who live by the war, the numerous contractors, merchants, the speculators, the gold and mines, and all who are profiting indirectly by its prosecution, will be holding their ground, and will swell the cry of holding our conquests. They constitute an invulnerable body of vast influence, who are growing what is impoverishing the rest of the people.

It is at this stage that the President of taking the indemnity into our own hands. But why delay it until the whole country is subdued? Why not take it now? A part of Mexico would be a better indemnity now than the whole of Mexico would be at the end of the next campaign, when sixty millions of dollars will be added to the present expenditure, would indeed acquire a control over a larger portion of her population, but we never be able to extort from them, by forms of taxation to which you can resort sufficient to pay the force necessary to them in subjection. That force must be one, not less certainly than forty thousand, according to the opinion of the Senator from Mississippi, (Mr. DAVIS) who must be secured as a competent judge upon this point, stated in debate the other day that the number there, exceeding that number, was larger; and urged, on that account, the passage of the bill to raise ten regiments. This subject it is as well to speak on at once. We shall never obtain indemnity for the expenses of the war. They must come out of the pockets of the people of the United States, and the longer the war is continued, the more numerous our army, the greater will be the debt, and the heavier the burden imposed on the country.

If these views be correct, the end of the policy recommended by the President, if contemplated or not, will be to force the Government to adopt one or the other alluded to in these resolutions. With the impression I cannot support the policy he recommends, for the reasons assigned in the solution. The first of these is, that it is inconsistent with the avowed object for which the war has been prosecuted. That it is so is apparent from what has already been said. Since the commencement of the war, the intention of conquering Mexico