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MR. CLAY'S SPEECH.

IN SENATE, FEB. 5.
The Slavery Question.—Mr. Clay's Compromise.

WEDNESDAY, February 6, 1850.

The Senate being about to proceed to the consideration of the special order, bearing the resolutions submitted by Mr. Clay, Kentucky—

MR. MANGUM. I move, sir, that the resolution which was granted to the audience yesterday, during the remarks of the Senator from Kentucky, be extended to the ladies by a temporary suspension of the rules to-day. A young and gallant lady like this, I suppose, will be ready to accept this privilege at once. [Laughter.]

MR. HOUSTON. I second the motion. It was my intention, if the Senator from Kentucky had not anticipated me, to have made the motion myself.

THE VICE PRESIDENT. It is moved that the rules of the Senate be suspended, so as to admit the ladies from the galleries to the floor. It is one which requires unanimous consent for its adoption.

MR. FOOTE. A single remark, Mr. President. This motion addresses itself not only to the gallantry of the body, but to its sense of justice. The ladies were admitted yesterday, and participated in the intellectual banquet then spread for us. They were all dismissed before the adjournment, and I insist upon it that, in the name of justice, they should be admitted to hear the continuation of the speech of the Senator from Kentucky.

THE VICE PRESIDENT. The Chair hears no objection, and the motion will be considered as adopted.

[Ladies were accordingly admitted to the privileged seats, and to ladies the circular gallery was exclusively devoted.]

MR. CLAY. Mr. President, if there be in this vast assemblage of beauty, grace, intelligence, and affection, any who have come here under an expectation that the humble individual who now addresses you means to attempt any display, any use of ambitious language, any extraordinary ornament or decoration of speech, they will be utterly disappointed. The season of the year, and my own season of life, both admonish me to abstain from the use of any such ornaments; but above all, Mr. President, the awful subject upon which it is my duty to address the Senate and the country forbids my saying any thing but what pertains strictly to that subject; and my sole desire is to make myself understood by you and by those who think proper to listen to me.

When, yesterday, the adjournment of the Senate took place, at that stage of the discussion of the resolutions which I had submitted which related to Texas and her boundary, I thought I had concluded the whole subject; but I was reminded by a friend that perhaps I was not sufficiently explicit on a single point, and that is, the relation of Texas and the Government of the U. States, and that portion of the debt of Texas for which I think a responsibility exists on the part of the United States.—Sir, it was said that perhaps it might be understood, in regard to the proposed grant of three millions, or whatever may be the sum when ascertained, to Texas in consideration of the surrender of her title to New Mexico this side of the Rio Grande, that we granted nothing—that we merely discharged an obligation which existed upon the Government of the United States in consequence of the appropriation of the exports receivable in the ports of Texas whilst she was an independent Power.—But that is not my understanding, Mr. President. As between Texas and the United States, the obligation on the part of Texas, to pay her portion of the debt referred to, is complete and unqualified, and there is, as between these two parties, no obligation on the part of the United States to pay one dollar of the debt of Texas. On the contrary, by an express stipulation in the resolutions of admission, it is declared and provided that in no event do the United States become liable or charged with any portion of the debt or liabilities of Texas. It is not, therefore, any responsibility which exists to the State of Texas on the part of the Government of the United States, that I think provision ought to be made for that debt.

As between these two parties, the responsibility on the part of Texas is complete to pay the debt, and there is no responsibility on the part of the United States to pay one cent. But there is a third party, who was no party to the annexation whatever—that is to say, the creditor of Texas, who advanced the money on the faith of solemn pledges made by Texas to him to reimburse the United States for the duties levied on foreign imports; and he, and he alone, is the party to whom we are bound, according to the view which I have presented of the subject. Nor can the other creditors of Texas complain that provision is made only for a particular portion of the debt, leaving the residue of the debt unpaid for by the Government of the United States, because, in so far as we may extinguish any portion of the debt of Texas under which she is bound, in so far will it contribute to diminish the residue of the debts of Texas, and leave the funds derived from the public lands held by Texas, and what other resources she may have, applicable to the payment of these debts with more effect than if the entire debt, including the portion as well as the unpaid residue, was obligatory upon her, and

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she stood bound by it. Nor can the creditors complain, for another reason. Texas has all the resources, which she had when an independent power, with the exception of the duties receivable in her ports upon foreign imports, and she is exempted from certain charges, expenditures and responsibilities which she would have had to encounter if she had remained a separate and independent Power; for example, she would have had to provide for a certain amount of naval force and for a certain amount perhaps of military force, in order to protect herself against Mexico or against any foreign enemy whatever. But by her annexation to the United States she became liberated from all these charges, and of course, her entire revenues may be applicable to the payment of her debts, those only excepted which are necessary to the support and maintenance of the Government of Texas.

With this explanation upon that part of the subject, I pass to the consideration of the next resolution in the series which I have had the honor to submit, and which relates, if I am not mistaken, to this District.

Resolved, That it is inexpedient to abolish slavery in the District of Columbia, whilst that institution continues to exist in the State of Maryland, without the consent of that State, without the consent of the people of the District, and without just compensation to the owners of slaves within the District.

Mr. President, an objection at the moment was made to this resolution, by some honorable Senator on the other side of the body, that it did not contain an assertion of the unconstitutionality of the exercise of the power of abolition. I said then, as I have uniformly maintained in this body, as I contended for in 1838, and ever have done, that the power to abolish slavery within the District of Columbia has been vested in Congress by language too clear and explicit to admit, in my judgment, of any rational doubt whatever. What, sir, is the language of the constitution? "To exercise exclusive legislation, in all cases whatsoever, over such district (not exceeding ten miles square) as may, by cession of particular States and the acceptance of Congress, become the seat of the Government of the United States." Now, sir, Congress, by this grant of power, is invested with all legislation whatsoever over this District. Not only is it invested, but it is exclusively invested with all legislation whatsoever over the District.—Can we conceive of human language more broad and comprehensive than that which invests a legislative body with exclusive power, in all cases whatsoever, of legislation over a given district of territory or country? Let me ask, sir, is there any power to abolish slavery in this District? Let me suppose, in addition to what I suggested the other day, that slavery had been abolished in Maryland and Virginia—let me add to it the supposition that it was abolished in all the States in the Union, is there any power then to abolish slavery within the District of Columbia, or is slavery planted here to all eternity, without the possibility of the exercise of any legislative power for its abolition? It cannot be invested in Maryland, because the power with which Congress is invested is exclusive. Maryland, therefore is excluded, and so all the other States of the Union are excluded. It is here, or it is nowhere.

This was the view which I took in 1838, and I think there is nothing in the resolution which I offered on that occasion incompatible with the view which I now present, and which this resolution contains. Whilst I admitted the power to exist in Congress, and exclusively in Congress, to legislate in all cases whatsoever, consequently in the case of the abolition of slavery within this District, if it deemed it proper to do so, I admitted on that occasion, as I contend now, that it is a power which Congress cannot, in conscience and good faith, exercise whilst the institution of slavery continues within the State of Maryland. The case, sir, is a good deal altered now from what it was twelve years ago, when the resolution to which I allude was adopted by the Senate. Upon that occasion Virginia and Maryland both were concerned in the exercise of the power; but, by the retrocession of that portion of the District which lies south of the Potomac, Virginia became no more interested in the question of the abolition of slavery within the residue of the District than any other slaveholding State in the Union is interested in its abolition. The question now is confined to Maryland. I said on that occasion, that, although the grant of power is complete, and comprehends the right to abolish slavery within the District, yet it was a thing which never could have entered into the conception of Maryland or Virginia that slavery would be abolished here whilst slavery continued to exist in either of those ceding States. I say, moreover, what the grant of power itself indicates, that, although exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever over the District was invested in Congress within the ten miles square, it was to make it the seat of government of the U. States. That was the great, prominent, substantial object of the grant, and that, in exercising all the powers with which we are invested, complete and full as they may be, yet the great purpose—that of the

cession having been made in order to create a suitable seat of government—ought to be the leading and controlling idea with Congress in the exercise of this power.—And it is not necessary, in order to render it a proper and suitable seat of government for the United States, that slavery should be abolished within the limits of the ten miles square. And inasmuch as at the time of the cession—when, in a spirit of generosity, immediately after the formation of this constitution—when all was peace, and harmony, and concord—when brotherly affection and fraternal feeling prevailed throughout this whole Union—when Maryland and Virginia, in a moment of generous impulse, and with feelings of high regard towards the members of this Union, chose to make this grant, neither party could have suspected that, at some distant future period, upon the agitation of this unfortunate subject, their generous grant without equivalent would be turned against them, and that the sword was to be uplifted, as it were, in their bosoms, to strike at their own hearts; thus implied faith, this honorable obligation, this necessity and propriety of keeping in constant view the great object of cession. These were considerations which in 1838 governed me, as they now influence me, in submitting the reasons which I have submitted to your consideration. Now, as then, I do not think Congress ought ever, as an honorable body, acting *bona fide* in good faith, and according to the nature and purposes and objects of the cession at the time it was made—and looking at the condition of the ceding States at the time, Congress cannot, without the forfeiture of all those obligations of honor which men of honor and nations of honor respect as much as if found literally in so many words in the bond itself—Congress cannot interfere with the institution of slavery in this District without violation of all these obligations, not in my opinion less sacred and less binding than if inserted in the constitutional instrument itself.

Well, sir, what does the resolution propose? The resolution neither affirms nor disaffirms the constitutionality of the exercise of the power of abolition in this District. It is silent upon the subject. It says it is inexpedient to do it but upon certain conditions. And what are these considerations? Why, first, that the State of Maryland shall give its consent; in other words, that the State of Maryland shall release the United States from the obligation of the implied faith which I contend is connected with the act of cession by Maryland to the United States. Well, sir, if Maryland, the only State now that ceded any portion of the territory which remains to us, gives to us her full consent; in other words, if she releases Congress from all obligations growing out of the cession with regard to slavery, I consider it is removing one of the obstacles to the exercise of the power, if it were deemed expedient to exercise the power. But it is removing only one of them. There are two other conditions which are inserted in this resolution. The first is the consent of the people of the District. Mr. President, the condition of the people of this District is anomalous. It is a condition in violation of the great principles which lie at the bottom of our own free institutions, and all free institutions, because it is the case of a people who are acted upon by legislative authority, without having any voice or representation in the taxing or legislative body. The Government of the United States, in respect to the people of this District, is a tyranny, an absolute Government—not exercised, tyrannically or arbitrarily; but it is in the nature of all arbitrary power, because, if I were to give a definition of arbitrary power, I would say that it is that power which is exercised by an authority over a people who have no voice, no representation in the assembly whose edicts or laws go forth to act upon the unrepresented people to whom I have referred. Well, sir, that being their condition, and this question of the abolition of slavery affecting them in all the relations which we can imagine—of prosperity, society, comfort, peace, and happiness—I have required as another condition, upon which alone this power should be exercised, the consent of the people of the District. But, sir, I have not stopped there. This resolution requires still another and a third condition, and that is, that slavery shall not be abolished within the District of Columbia, although Maryland consents, although the people of the District themselves consent, without the third condition of making compensation to the owners of the slaves within the District. Sir, it is immaterial to me upon what basis this obligation to compensate for the slaves who may be liberated by the authority of Congress is placed. There is a clause in the Constitution of the United States, in one of the amendments to the constitution, which declares that no private property shall be taken for public use without just compensation being made to the owner of the property. Well, I think, in a just and liberal interpretation of that clause, we are restrained from taking the property of the people of the District, in slaves, on considerations of any public policy, or for any conceivable or imaginable use of the public, without a full and fair compensation to the people of this District. But, with-

out the obligation of any constitutional restriction, such as is contained in the amendment to which I refer—without that, upon the principles of eternal justice itself, we ought not to deprive those who have property in slaves, in this District, of their property without compensating them for their full value. Why, sir, no one of the European powers, Great Britain, France, or any other of the powers which undertook to abolish slavery in their respective colonies, have ever ventured to do it without making compensation. They were under no obligation arising out of any written or other constitution to do it, but under the obligation to which all men ought to bow with homage—that obligation of eternal justice, which declares that no man ought to be deprived of his property without a full and just compensation for its value. I know it has been argued that the clause of the constitution which requires compensation for property taken by the public for its use, would not apply to the case of the abolition of slavery in the District, because the property is not taken for the use of the public. Literally, perhaps, it would not be taken for the use of the public; but it would be taken in consideration of a policy and purpose adopted by the public, as one which it was deemed expedient to carry into full effect and operation; and, by a liberal interpretation of the clause, it ought to be so far regarded as taken for the use of the public, at the instance of the public, as to demand compensation to the extent of the value of the property. If this is not a restriction as to the power of Congress over the subject of slavery in the District, then the power of Congress stands unrestricted, and that would not be a better condition for the slaveholder in the District than to assume the restriction contained in the amendment. I say it would be unrestricted by constitutional operation or injunction. The great restrictions resulting from the obligations of justice would remain, and they are sufficient to exact from Congress the duty of ascertaining, prior to the abolition of slavery, the value of the property in slaves in the District, and of making full, fair, and just compensation for that property.

Well, Mr. President, I said yesterday there was not a resolution, except the first, (which contained no concession by either party) that did not either contain some mutual concession by the two parties, or did not contain concessions altogether from the North to the South.

Now, with respect to the resolution under consideration. The North has contended that the power exists under the constitution to abolish slavery. The South, I am aware, has opposed it, and most, at least a great portion of the South, have contended for the opposite construction. What does the resolution do? It asks of both parties to forbear urging their respective opinions, the one to the exclusion of the other, but it concedes to the South all that the South, it appears to me, upon this subject ought in reason to demand, in so far as it requires such conditions as amount to an absolute security for property in slaves in the District; such conditions as will probably make the existence of slavery within the District coeval and co-extensive with its existence in any of the States out of and beyond the District.—But, sir, the second clause of this resolution provides "that it is expedient to prohibit within the District the trade in slaves brought into it from States or places beyond the limits of the District, either to be sold therein as merchandise or to be transported to other markets."—Well, Mr. President, if the concession be made that Congress has the power of legislation, and exclusive legislation, in all cases whatsoever how can it be doubted that Congress has authority to prohibit what is called the slave trade in the District of Columbia? Sir, my interpretation of the constitution is this: that, with regard to all parts of it which operate upon the States, Congress can exercise no power which is not granted power. That is the rule for the action of Congress in relation to its legislation upon the States, but in relation to its legislation upon this District the reverse. I take it to be the true rule that Congress has all power over the District which is not prohibited by some part of the constitution of the U. States; in other words, that Congress has a power within the District equivalent to, and co-extensive with, the power which any State itself possesses within its own limits. Well, sir, does any body doubt the power and the right of any slaveholding States in this Union to forbid the introduction, as merchandise, of slaves within their limits. Why, sir, almost every slaveholding State in the Union has exercised its power to prohibit the introduction of slavery as merchandise. It was in the constitution of my own State; and, notwithstanding all the excitement and agitation upon the subject of slavery which occurred during the past year in the State of Kentucky, the same principle is incorporated in the new constitution. It is in the constitution, I know, of Mississippi. That State prohibits the introduction of slaves within its limits as merchandise. I believe it to be in the constitution or in the laws of Maryland—in the laws of Virginia—in the laws of most of the slaveholding States. It is true that the policy of the different slaveholding States upon this subject has somewhat vacillated—sometimes they have adopted it and sometimes excluded it—but there has been no diversity of opinion, no departure from the great principle, that every one of them has the power and authority to prohibit the introduction of slaves within their respective limits if they choose to exercise it. Well, then, sir, I really do not think that this resolution, which proposes to abolish that trade, ought to be considered as a concession by either class of the States to the other class. I think it should be regarded as a common object, acceptable to both, and conformable to the wish-

es and feelings of both; and yet, sir, in these times of fearful and alarming excitement—in these times when every night that I go to sleep and am awake up in the morning, it is with the apprehension of some new and fearful tidings of this agitating subject—I have seen in the act of a neighboring State, amongst the various contingencies which are enumerated, upon the happening of any one of which delegates are to be sent to the famous Convention which is to assemble at Nashville in June next, that amongst other substantive ground for the appointment of delegates to that Convention—of delegates from the State to which I refer—one is, that if Congress abolish the slave trade in the District of Columbia, that shall be cause for a Convention; in other words, it is cause for considering whether this Union ought to be dissolved or not. Is it possible to portray a greater extent of extravagance to which men may be carried by the indulgence of their passions?

Sir, the power exists; the duty, in my opinion, exists; and there has been no time—as I may say, in language coincident with that used by the honorable Senator from Alabama—there has been no time in my public life when I was not willing to concur in the abolition of the slave trade in this District. I was willing to have done it when Virginia's portion of the District was retroceded, that lying south of the Potomac. There is still less ground for objection to doing it now, when the District is limited to the portion this side of the Potomac, and when the motive or reason for concentrating slaves here in a depot, for the purpose of transportation to distant foreign markets, is lessened with the diminution of the District, by the retrocession of that portion to Virginia.

Why should slave-traders, who buy their slaves in Maryland or Virginia, come here with their slaves in order to transport them to New Orleans or other Southern markets? Why not transport them from the States in which they are purchased? Why are the feelings of citizens here outraged by the scenes exhibited and the corteges which pass along our avenues of manacled human beings, not collected in our own District, not collected at all in our own neighborhood, but brought from distant parts of neighboring States? Why should they be outraged? And who is there, that has a heart, that does not contemplate a spectacle of that kind with horror and indignation? Why should they be outraged by a scene so inexcusable and detestable as this?

Sir, it is no concession, I repeat, from one class of States nor from the other. It is an object in which both of them, it seems to me, should heartily unite, and in which the one side as much as the other should rejoice in adopting, inasmuch as it lessens one of the causes of inquietude and dissatisfaction which is connected with this District. Abolish the slave-trade in this District; re-assert the doctrine of the resolution of 1838, that by an implied assent on the part of Congress slavery ought not to be abolished in the District of Columbia whilst it remains in the State of Maryland; re-assert the principle of that resolution, and adopt the other healing measures, or similar healing measures—for I am not attached to any thing that is the production of my own hand, if any thing better should be offered by any body else—adopt the other healing measures which are proposed, and which are required by the distracted condition of the country, and I venture to say that, as we have had peace and quiet for the last thirty years, since the termination of the Missouri controversy, we shall have, in all human probability, peace for a longer period to come upon this unhappy subject of slavery.

The next resolution is: "That more effectual provision ought to be made by law, according to the requirement of the constitution, for the restitution and delivery of persons bound to service or labor in any State who may escape into any other State or Territory in the Union."

Now, Mr. President, upon that subject, I go with him who goes farthest in the interpretation of that clause in the constitution. In my humble opinion, sir, it is a requirement by the Constitution of the United States which is not limited in its operation to the Congress of the United States, but extends to every State in the Union; and I go one step further, it extends to every man in the Union, and devolves upon them all an obligation to assist in the recovery of a fugitive from labor who takes refuge in or escapes into one of the free States. And, sir, I think I can maintain all this by a fair interpretation of the constitution. It provides:— "That no person held to service or labor in one State under the laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in consequence of any law or regulation therein, be discharged from such service or labor, but shall be delivered up on claim of the party to whom such service or labor may be due."

It will be observed, Mr. President, that this clause in the constitution is not amongst the enumerated powers granted to Congress, for, if that had been the case, it might have been urged that Congress alone could legislate to carry it into effect; but it is one of the general powers, or one of the general rights secured by this constitutional instrument, and it addresses itself to all who are bound by the constitution of the United States. Now, sir, the officers of the General Government are bound to take an oath to support the constitution of the United States. All the officers are required by the constitution to take an oath to support the constitution of the United States; and all men who love their country and are obedient to its laws, are bound to assist in the execution of those laws, whether they are fundamental or derivative. I do not say that a private individual is bound to make the tour of his State in order to assist an owner of a slave to recover his property, but I do say if he is present when the owner of a slave is about to assert his rights and endeavor to obtain possession of his property, every man present, whether he be an officer of the General Government or the State Government, or a private individual, is bound to assist, if men are bound at all to assist in the execution of the laws of their country. Now what is this provision? It is that such fugitives shall be delivered up on

claim of the party to whom such service or labor may be due. As has been already remarked, in the course of the debate upon the bill upon this subject which is now pending, the language used in regard to fugitives from criminal offenses and fugitives from labor is precisely the same. The fugitive from justice is to be delivered up, and to be removed to the State having jurisdiction; the fugitive from labor is to be delivered up on claim of the party to whom such service is due. Well, has it ever been contended on the part of any State that she is not bound to surrender a fugitive from justice upon demand of the State from which he fled? I believe not. There have been some exceptions to the performance of this duty, but they have not denied the general right; and if they have refused in an instance to give up the person demanded, it has been upon some technical or legal ground, not at all questioning the general right to have the fugitive surrendered, or the obligation to deliver him up as intended by the constitution.

I think, then, Mr. President, that with regard to the true interpretation of this provision of the constitution there can be no doubt. It imposes an obligation upon all the States, free or slaveholding; it imposes an obligation upon all officers of Government, State or Federal; and, I will add, upon all the people of the United States, under particular circumstances, to assist in the surrender and recovery of a fugitive slave from his master.

There has been confusion, and, I think, some misconception on this subject, in consequence of a recent decision of the Supreme Court of the United States. I think that a decision has been entirely misapprehended. There is a vast difference between imposing impediments and affording facilities for the recovery of fugitive slaves. The Supreme Court of the United States has only decided that all laws of impediment are unconstitutional. I know there are some general expressions in the opinion to which I have referred—the case of Maryland against Pennsylvania—that seem to import otherwise; but I think, when you come attentively to read the whole opinion, and the opinion pronounced by all the judges, especially if you take the trouble of doing what I have done, to converse with them as to what their real meaning was, you will find that the whole extent of the authority which they intended to establish was, that any laws of impediment enacted by the States were laws that were forbidden by the provision of the constitution to which I refer; that the General Government had no right, by an act of the Congress of the United States to impose obligations upon State officers not imposed by the authority of their own constitution and laws. It is impossible the decision could have been otherwise. It would have been perfectly extrajudicial. The court had no right to decide the question whether the laws of facility were or were not unconstitutional.—The only question before the court was the law of impediment passed by the Legislature of Pennsylvania; and if they had gone beyond the case before them, and undertaken to decide upon a case not before them, or a principle which was not fairly comprehended within the case before them, it would be what the lawyers term an *obiter dictum*, and is not binding either on the court itself or any other tribunal. I say it was not possible that, with the case before the court, of a law for giving facility to the holder of the slave to recover his proper again, it was utterly impossible that any tribunal should pronounce a decision that such aid and assistance rendered by the authority of the State under this provision of the constitution of the United States, is unconstitutional and void. The court has not said so, or if they had said so, they have transcended their authority, and gone beyond the case which was before them. Laws passed by States, in order to assist the General Government, so far from being laws repugnant to the constitution, would every where be regarded as laws carrying out, enforcing, and fulfilling the constitutional duties which are created by that instrument.

Why, sir, as well might it be contended that if Congress were to declare war—and no one will doubt that the power to declare war is vested exclusively in Congress; no State has the right to do it—no one will contend seriously, I apprehend, that after the declaration of war it would be unconstitutional on the part of any of the States to assist in the vigorous and effective prosecution of that war; and yet it would be just as constitutional to lend their aid to the successful and glorious termination of the war in which we might be embarked, as it would be to assist in the performance of a high duty which addresses itself to all the States and all the people of all the States.

Mr. President, I do think that that whole class of legislation beginning in the Northern States and extending to some of the Western States, by which obstructions and impediments have been thrown in the way of the recovery of fugitive slaves, is unconstitutional, and has originated in a spirit which I trust will correct itself when those States come calmly to consider the nature and extent of the federal obligations. Of all the States in this Union, unless it be Virginia, the State of which I am a resident suffers most by the escape of their slaves to adjoining States. I have very little doubt, indeed, that the extent of loss to the State of Kentucky, in consequence of the escape of her slaves, is greater, at least in proportion to the total number of slaves which are held in Virginia. I know full well, and so does the honorable Senator from Ohio know, that it is at the utmost hazard, and insecurity to life itself, that a Kentuckian can cross the river and go into the interior to take back his fugitive slave to the place from whence he fled. Recently an example occurred even in the city of Cincinnati, in respect to one of our most respectable citizens. Not having visited Ohio at all, but Covington, on the opposite side of the river, a little slave of his escaped over to Cincinnati.—He pursued it; he found it in the house in which it was concealed; he took it out, and it was rescued by the violence and force of a negro mob from his possession, the police of the city standing by, and either unwilling or unable to afford the assistance which was requisite to enable him to recover his property.

Upon this subject I do think that we have just and serious cause of complaint against the free States. I think they fail in fulfilling a great obligation, and the failure is precisely upon one of those subjects which in its nature is the most irritating and inflaming to those who live in the slave States.

Now, sir, I think it is a mark of no good neighborhood, of no kindness, of no courtesy, that a man living in a slave State cannot now, with any sort of safety, travel in the free States with his servants, although he has no purpose whatever of stopping there longer than a short time. And on this whole subject, sir, how has the legislation of the free States altered for the worse within the course of the last twenty or thirty years? Why, sir, most of those States