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# THE CAROLINA WATCHMAN.

J. J. BRUNER,  
Editor & Proprietor.

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Gen'l Harrison.

NEW SERIES.  
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SALISBURY, N. C., THURSDAY, APRIL 3, 1851.

## SPEECH OF MR. RAYNER, OF HERTFORD,

On the proposition to change the Constitution by Legislative enactment so as to extend to voters for members of the House of Commons the right to vote for members of the Senate. In the House of Commons, Dec. 19th and 20th, 1850.

[The majority of the Committee to whom the subject had been referred, having reported a bill to change the constitution by legislative enactment, so as to extend to all voters for members of the House of Commons, the right to vote for members of the Senate, and Mr. Rayner having offered a substitute, a bill to provide for taking the sense of the people of the State, on the proposed change of the constitution and for calling a convention limited to that one object and to no other, in case a majority of the people of the State should vote in favor of it—the question coming up on substituting Mr. Rayner's bill for the bill of the committee, Mr. R. spoke as follows:]

Mr. Rayner said he heartily concurred with what had been declared by other gentlemen who had addressed the House, in regard to the solemnity and importance of the work on which the House was engaged. We are (said Mr. R.) employed in no ordinary work of legislation. The usual work of legislative duty here can be as easily undone, as done. The people have but to pass on our acts, and if they do not approve, our successors can at the end of two short years, reverse our action. But in the serious business of changing one of the provisions of our fundamental law under which our fathers lived, and under which we have lived so securely and happily, the case is entirely different.—Our present action is intended for a long distant future—it is to affect the very frame work of our social organization—it is to operate for good or for evil, upon our posterity after we shall have left this busy theatre and our very names be forgotten. Serious and imposing then, and fraught with the most momentous consequences, is the work in which we are now engaged; and heavy indeed is the responsibility which rests upon us all.

I am decidedly opposed to amending the constitution by legislative enactment. I admit the amended constitution of 1835 provides for further amendments by the Legislature, but I think that a proper interpretation of that provision and one most in accordance with the theory of our institutions should confine such amendments to the exceptions just alluded to. Those exceptions are such as involve mere convenience of opinion in regard to the necessity of some slight change, in the mere machinery of the government—and when there is no great vital principle of the organic law involved. For instance, if it should be found by experience, that in order to avoid the inconvenience of a tie in the Senate, and for the prompt organization of that body, the office of Lieutenant Governor should be established in this State, then it would not only be more convenient, but eminently proper that the change should be effected by legislative enactment. So, in regard to allowing any one member to have the eyes and nose recorded in the Journal—if this should be found to work an inconvenience and a useless waste of time, and it should by some like a general concurrence be considered best to limit this to the call of one fifth as in most other legislative bodies, the change could and ought to be made by legislative provision. In both of the cases put no great principle of popular rights or of free government would be invaded—there would be nothing involved in the change conflicting with the settled habits of the people, nothing violative of the great principles which constitute the basis of the political fabric. Not so, however, in regard to those cardinal elements of our civil polity, which never have been a part and parcel of our social system—not so, in regard to questions which affect the rights of the citizens, which strike at the source and fountain of power.—This view of the subject seems to be in accordance with the history of the convention of 1835. An examination of the debates of that body will show that the distinguished men who composed it looked upon the compromises therein agreed upon, as a final settlement of the distracting questions and sectional jealousies which had for years disturbed the councils of the State. All the grievances then complained of were considered to have been settled. No new element of dispute, either of sectional interest or of popular privilege, seemed to be contemplated for the next half century. Read the debates of the convention, and you will see that it was with these cheering hopes that the members of that body terminated their labors. How then are we to understand that provision of the constitution providing for amendments by the Legislature?—Why, that it was intended to provide for those immaterial changes of the mere machinery of the government, without interfering with any great principle on which it was based. It was after this provision had been agreed on (in committee of the whole, if I recollect aright) that the able and lamented Mr. A. moved the additional provision which was also adopted, providing that no convention should be called, except by a vote of two thirds of all the members of both Houses. What are we to understand by this—but that he who moved it, and the convention that adopted it, foresaw that at some future time an attempt might be made, not merely to im-

prove the machinery of the government, but to change its organic principles, which could only be done properly by the people in convention—through a vote of a bare majority of the two Houses? Little did that convention suppose that in fifteen years their foresight and wisdom would be brought to the test of trial.

Am I not therefore warranted in saying that this attempt to change one of the great fundamental principles of the constitution by legislative action, is not only contrary to the spirit and purpose of the provision of the convention of '35, in regard to amending the constitution—but that it is also repugnant to the very theory of the government itself? The very first great cardinal maxim of free and representative government laid down in the "declaration of rights," which is declared to be a part of the constitution, is this, "that all political power is vested in and derived from the people only." Here is a great question of political power affecting for all time those from whom we derive our brief tenure of authority, with which we cannot rightfully interfere, except by making provision to consult those whose servants we are, with which we were not sent here to interfere, and with which we dare not interfere, unless we assume to ourselves a prerogative which the people have reserved to themselves. This assuming to know what are the people's rights better than they do themselves, although resting on the affection of great love for the people, is anti-republican and contrary to the doctrine of constitutional freedom. This doling out favors to the people by piece-meal, is constituting ourselves their masters instead of their servants.—The gentleman from Burke, (Mr. Avery,) said that it was evident, the convention of '35 intended that all specific amendments not involving an entire overthrow of the organic law, should be by legislative enactment. The proposed change does involve a radical alteration of the organic law in one particular. What is more important, what more safely guarded, what more intimately interwoven with the frame-work of civil liberty than the question of suffrage? And the change contemplated proposes an entire abandonment of a system that has been commensurate with our history as a people, under which the glorious deeds of our revolutionary history were achieved, under which the people have lived contented and happy, which was never heard of in the catalogue of complaints to redress which the convention of '35 was called. Or did the gentleman from Burke mean that the provision in the constitution for calling a convention was not designed for an amendment of the constitution, but for the framing of an entire new one to suit a new system of government upon an entire overthrow of the present republican form? If so, a moment's reflection will teach the gentleman the absurdity of his position. Such an overthrow as he speaks of could be nothing but revolutionary, which disregards constitutions as well as ordinary laws. An amendment of a constitution presupposes that the great principles which constitute its organic existence are to remain unchanged. "An entire overthrow of the organic law," for which the gentleman from Burke thinks the provision for calling a convention was designed, would involve an overthrow of that very provision as well as all others, and would throw us back upon the original elements of social organization; and being revolutionary in its nature would not be likely to regard the barriers against the popular will, by requiring a vote of two thirds.

Another objection to changing the constitution by legislative enactment, is its great convenience, which will render it habitual and thus destroy the confidence of the people in the stability of their institutions. This is the trying ordeal through which the people of the several States of this Union are now passing and from destructive evils of which nothing but the conservative, cohesive character of Anglo Saxon institutions can preserve them. Constitutions or rather the elementary principles of constitutions, should be permanent. I am one of those who have no faith in the adaptability of certain defined fundamental principles of what is commonly termed liberty to the wants and conditions of any and every people. France for the last sixty years has given us the best practical illustration of the utopianism of constitutional tinkers. The best constitution for any people is that which secures most happiness to the citizen consistently with the power of the government to make itself respected and to preserve its stability.—When the great Athenian law-giver was asked if he had given his countrymen the best possible system of laws—he answered that they were the best Athenian people were then capable of enjoying the blessings of. Solon showed his wisdom as much, by adapting his laws to the peculiar wants and conditions of his countrymen, as in the intrinsic excellence of the laws themselves. Where any people are sufficiently enlightened, or where its enjoyment has accustomed them to its blessings, civil liberty will of course enter more largely into their happiness than any other element of government, and when a constitution secures this, the only change to which the people should accustom themselves to look, is a mere adap-

tion of its machinery to the wants and developments of the age. In this lies the strength and power and harmonious working of the English constitution. From 1688 to the present time, its great cardinal landmarks and elementary principles have in the main, continued the same. It has from time to time, been merely modified to adapt it to the exigencies of the spirit of the age, and only then with the most extreme caution and deliberation. Nothing is better proven by experience than that permanence and stability are necessary in order to secure the affection of the people for the government and to insure peace and quiet and contentment in the community. Industry and enterprise have, no stimulus to exertion without it. All the impulses of a patriotic ambition, all the high and noble incentives to professional fame, to scientific and literary renown, all social ties of kindred and home, best flourish and prosper under the consciousness of stability and firmness in the institutions under which we live. Consequently, the public mind instead of being accustomed to look to constant changes in their fundamental law, as the panacea for every temporary ill, should rather view with jealousy every attempt to unsettle its long established principles; and if, as in our case, it be the work of an illustrious ancestry, instead of being derided for its antiquity, it should be venerated on account of the associations which marked its formation. I fear if we now set the precedent of changing the constitution by legislative provision, that the character which North Carolina has so long enjoyed for conservatism and stability will be gone forever. Fault-finding is one of the commonest ingredients in man's nature. Every moral, social and political evil will be traced to some defect in the organic law—the General Assembly, instead of attending to the duties for which they were chosen, and of striving to promote the honor and character of the State, will be session after session, engaged in solving constitutional problems, and endeavoring to show how much wiser they are than were our fathers—until that venerated instrument, which has so long been our boast and pride, will have finally disappeared forever.

I suppose I need scarcely insist on what will be admitted on all hands, that all changes or modifications of the fundamental law should be free from the baneful influences of party-spirit. In such a work of wisdom as that of making or revising a constitution under which posterity is to live, the minds of those engaged in it should be divested of not only partisan jealousy and bitterness, but of all those other distracting and unhappy associations which must necessarily attach to those selected for the business of ordinary legislation. The various questions of a local character, the agitating subjects of State policy, the conflicting interests of rival sections, together with all the other exciting elements that enter into the ordinary contests of the hustings, are calculated to disturb that spirit of harmony and compromise, and to prevent that calm and dispassionate consideration, so absolutely necessary in affixing the landmarks of the constitution. This is a matter better understood by the great body of our people, than some gentlemen seem to suppose. Call a convention to revise the Constitution, and Delegates will be selected with an especial view, to that object alone. Men will be selected with reference to their wisdom, their experience, their patriotism. Can this be expected of an ordinary legislature? Agitate any question of constitutional amendment as much as you may, and yet can you expect the elections to turn upon it alone? In these times of high party excitement, can you expect a legislature that will readily sacrifice party allegiance to the public good? In most of the counties, the election of members of the General Assembly turns upon party politics—in some upon questions of State improvement. Can you expect a legislature thus elected, to reflect the popular voice upon an abstract question of constitutional reform? This method, then, of amending the constitution by legislative enactment, is not only anti-republican, inasmuch as it is calculated to prevent, a fair expression of the popular will—but the very influences which usually prevail in the elections of members, are calculated to prevent that calm, unbiased, and patriotic action, requisite in so important a work.

I do not wish to allude to the circumstances under which this proposed amendment of the constitution, first came to be agitated, or to the influences which have thus far marked its progress—lest I might be considered by some as violating that rule which I have laid down for myself, not to introduce party in this discussion. I indulge in no partisan crimination, when I say, that the history of the agitation of this subject is calculated to alarm every conservative North Carolinian, more especially, if the project now on foot succeeds. Violent as have been our party contests heretofore, yet the constitution has escaped the contagion. With one accord we had all agreed to leave to popular opinion and the developments of time the regulation of the organic law. The provision complained of had existed, without complaint, ever since the first establishment of free government among us. The people were satisfied with it, no demand for change proceeded from them. But in a heated political canvass, one of our candidates for Governor in this State nominated by a party convention as the organ

and exponent of a partisan creed, introduces this new weapon of political warfare. The people are told that their revolutionary fathers, in pretending to frame for them a system of free government, had cheated and deceived them. That jealousy, on account of power, no matter for what good reasons withheld, which is a striking characteristic of man, is appealed to, and the people of all sections and all parties are called on to rally around "the poor man's friend." And because he who was the hero of this movement has, owing to a peculiar train of circumstances, been finally elected, we are now called on in the common parlance of the time, to carry out the popular will. By the way, do not gentlemen of the dominant party here see the absurdity of their position? In one breath they tell us, that the gubernatorial election in this State turned upon this question, and say that is a reason why we should make the change. And then again, we have it said, and echoed by the party press that the election was the result of a change in the public mind in regard to party politics—and hence they claim it as a party triumph. But it is not on account of the party relations of this question, that I look on it with such misgiving. It is the precedent likely to be set by it. Our constitution is to become the mere loot-ball of party. Constitutions are limitations upon those exercising power. In republican governments, the people put restraints upon themselves. Every one knows how easy a matter it is, by appealing to the weak and the bad passions of man's nature, to make generation dissatisfied with the limitations, a preceding one may have put on their exercise of power. This has been the business of demagogues from the days of the Gracchi to the present time. If we countenance this attempt to make the constitution the mere stalking-horse of party, where is the matter to end? As soon as this question shall have answered its ends, some other Solomon will discover that the people have for 75 years, been sleeping over other grievous wrongs—and just as often as the ordinary appliances of party can not avail for success, some other provision of the constitution will be held up as the relic of feudal tyranny, or some new amendment proposed as a cure for all social ills.—Carry out this movement by legislative enactment and a horde of demagogues will overrun the land. Yes, that pestiferous brood—whose calling ever is to delude the unwary, for their own selfish ends ever now keep in retirement many of the best and purest patriots in the land. But consummate this measure in the spirit in which it was commenced, and the reign of these harpies will, I fear become interminable.

There is a palpable inconsistency in the purposes professed by those who favor this amendment of the Constitution by legislative enactment, and the means by which they propose to accomplish their purpose. This extension of the right to vote for Senators to all qualified to vote in the Commons is advocated as a great principle of popular liberty. If this really be so—if this is a privilege which the people have a right to demand—and the withholding which is in conflict with republican institutions—then of course, the change should be made as speedily as the frame-work of our government will possibly admit of. If the freemen of the State have, through either the design or the oversight of those who have heretofore been entrusted with the modeling or remodeling of the organic law, been defrauded of their rights, then, in the name of liberty, in the name of justice, repair the wrong at the earliest possible day, yes, at the earliest possible hour. By the method proposed, how long will it be before the people obtain their rights? In the first place the proposition must obtain the votes of three-fifths of the whole number of both Houses at this session. Suppose it to receive this vote now, which is a matter of very considerable doubt, it must again be submitted to the next Legislature, and must then receive two thirds of the whole number of the members of both Houses, and must still further be ratified by a majority of all these hazards and all this delay even supposing it pass safely through such a trying ordeal. This great and precious boon, which the professed advocates of popular rights affect to have so much at heart, can not, even under the most favorable circumstances, be enjoyed before 1854—if we are to wait for the slow and tedious process of amending the Constitution by legislative enactment. Whereas, by the passage of my bill, the people will be first consulted, and that within a few months, as to whether they desire the change; their delegates will soon assemble, and it will require but three or four days to make the alteration; the matter will be accomplished, and at the very next election for members of the General Assembly in 1852, all persons will alike vote in both Senate and Commons—instead of having to wait till 1854. Why, sir, if this be a matter of as much importance as some gentlemen pretend, then I say they are trifling with the people, mocking and insulting them, thus to dally with them, and subject to such risk and delay, their rights as freemen.

We are told the people will have time to reflect and pass on this question in the next election for members of the Legislature—and the gentleman from Burke (Mr. Avery) asks what is the difference betwixt consulting the people then, and consulting them now—lor, says he, the people can then elect their Representatives with reference to their views on this subject. How can gentlemen use such an argument as this, when they see that year after year our elections turn mainly upon party politics, and not on questions of State policy.—"This is one of my strongest objections to amending the Constitution by the Legislature. You cannot obtain a reflexion of public opinion upon the merit of any specific proposition; because there are so many other more exciting elements that enter into the contest. Party politics, internal improvements peculiar views in regard to southern rights, and numberless questions of a local nature, are calculated to divert the public mind from one isolated question. How little will the public mind of this State be prepared to decide upon a great question of constitutional reform, at the polls in 1852. We shall then be in the excitement and confusion of a Presidential election; our minds thoroughly agitated and inflamed by all

the issues involved in such a contest. Is it reasonable to suppose, under such circumstances that we are likely to obtain the quiet and reflective judgment of the public mind on the question of free suffrage? But pass my bill—and call upon the people to elect Delegates, to make the proper change in the Constitution, and there will be but one naked question presented for consideration, unnumbered and untrammelled by any conflicting issues. The public decision can not be mistaken, for it will be narrowed down to but one object. And of all questions on which the representatives of any people are called on to pass, that of amending their constitution should be in accordance with the unprejudiced judgment of the popular mind.

The gentleman from Burke, (Mr. Avery,) says that those who support my amendment are evidently opposed to free suffrage. That the gentleman merely assumes to be so; but if it were true, the being reminded of it is no argument against the propriety of my bill. So far as regards the choice betwixt my bill and the bill before the House, it is not the merits of free suffrage, that is in issue—but the question is, shall this Legislature undertake to decide upon what sort of a Constitution the people need, or shall we consult the people as to what sort of a Constitution they desire. The question is, shall the Legislature from time to time dole out privileges to the people, or shall we make the legal provision for the people to elect their own delegates to make effective their own will. Suppose it to be true, as suggested by the gentleman from Burke, that I and those who concur with me, are opposed to free suffrage—yet how much better friends to popular freedom do we show ourselves to be, than he and those who act with him! We are opposed to free suffrage (as assumed by the gentleman,) in principle; but yet, recognizing this as a free government, where the people have a right to alter their institutions if they desire it, we are willing to consult the people, to leave the decision of this matter to them, and if they decide against us, we are willing to submit.—But the gentleman and those who agree with him are in favor of free suffrage—they desire to see the change made—but they not willing to leave it to the people; being in favor of it and being members of the Legislature, they insist on carrying out their own wishes, without first ascertaining whether it will be agreeable to the people or not. I am not in the habit of dealing in professions of great love for the people, and am now led to make these remarks in reply to what we have so often heard here about the people's rights being withheld from them. Now let the gentleman from Burke reflect and consider, who is the greatest friend to the people—he, who is for carrying out his views, without consulting the people, or I, who am willing to submit the question to the people and to acquiesce, if they decide against me?

As to my own individual opinions, in regard to the merits of Free Suffrage, as an isolated question, I have no hesitation in avowing them, although that has nothing to do with the question now under consideration. If this were an original question, if we were now engaged in making a new constitution, I should not object to the principle of free suffrage. I do not believe that the Senate is any more conservative in its character, by virtue of the election of its members by the fifty acre free holders—albeit it was no doubt so designed to be, by those who originally made the constitution. My objection to making the change now is, first, because of the circumstances under which it was first brought forward, it was introduced as an element of party strife, to prop up a minority party and a weak candidate. And if we yield to the behest of party, that which should have been demanded by public opinion, in order to entitle it to respect; we set a precedent, the evil consequences of which no one can foresee. If we yield now to the clamor of party rage, we are but encouraging every demagogue in the land, who may hereafter attempt to divert the public mind from the party issues of the day, by presenting himself as the great champion of the constitutional reform.—*Asta principibus*, should be our motto. When the progress of mind and the developments of time, prove some change in the fundamental law to be necessary, and that change is demanded by a conservative and patriotic public opinion, every friend of republican government should quietly yield, if he cannot conscientiously object. But when an effort is made to make the organic law the mere playing of faction, to identify great questions of constitutional law with the discords and tumults of party strife, every friend of liberty should resist it at the threshold. The evil is not so much in the change itself, as in the temptations offered for still more violent and radical reforms. It is cheapening the constitution to allow it to become an element of party. I object to this change at this time, in the second place, because it is entirely delusive in its character.—It affects to bestow equal privileges on all, when in fact it does no such thing. In what consists the value of the right of suffrage? It is not the mere privilege of depositing in the ballot-box a strip of paper, with the name of A or B or C on it. That of itself confers no substantial power and but for the results that are to follow, is a mere idle and unmeaning ceremony. The value of the right of suffrage does not consist in voting for A to please a friend, or in voting against B to spite an enemy. That would be converting a high and solemn duty into the mere gratification of private feeling. The real value and importance of the right of suffrage consists in the extent of the power exercised, in selecting those who are to control the government and to direct its operations. Suffrage, then, to be uniformly equal, must be so regulated as to give every voter in the State an equal power in the government of the State, at least in its legislative branch.—Will free suffrage do this? Certainly not.—Suppose you allow every man to vote in the Senate, does that make every man's power equally felt in the Senate? Certainly not. In the County of Hertford, some 600 men would elect a Senator. If equality of power is what you desire by free suffrage, are not every 600 men in Guilford also entitled to elect a Senator, and in the latter County it will require

some 2500 men to elect a Senator. It is not perfectly apparent then, that all this talk about free suffrage is not to give any man more real power in the Government than he has now, but to delude the ignorant with the idea, that the right of suffrage has answered all its ends, when a slip of paper has been deposited in the ballot-box, by which a friend has been gratified or an enemy punished, or the purposes of party been accomplished? Sir, it is an insult to the understanding of the people, it is a mockery of their privileges, it is a slur at free government itself, to suppose that the people look upon the right of suffrage, not as a great privilege secured to them by their fathers, by which their influence in the government is felt—but as consisting in the mere ceremonial of the ballot box and the indulgence of personal feeling.

My bill is objected to by some because it proposes to limit the action of the convention, if called, to the sole object of amending the constitution so as to extend to all voters in the Commons the right to vote for Senators. And we have been told that such a limitation is based on a distrust of the people, who have the right to frame their fundamental law just as they desire. This inference is by no means a legitimate one. I admit the people of North Carolina have the right to amend their constitution as they wish, provided it is left republican in its character; but then, the Legislature, on whom devolves the duty of taking the initiatory steps of providing for the legal and constitutional assemblage of a convention of the people, should follow, rather than attempt to lead public opinion on all questions of constitutional reform. I mean, of course, in reference to those great cardinal principles of popular government which appertain to the nature of free institutions—and not to those slight and immaterial changes, which time and experience have proven to be necessary in carrying on the mere machinery of the government, which as I have already said, it was the design of the convention of 1835, to leave to legislative enactments. The limitation contemplated by my bill is not imposed on the people by the legislature as contended for by some; my bill simply proposes to put the question to the people, whether they will themselves call a convention limited to this one object. If the people call the Convention, they impose the limitation, and not we. But it is asked, why not consult the people, as to whether they desire a convention without limitation? For the reason that this question of free suffrage, as it is called, is the only one which has been generally agitated, and on which the public mind has been generally excited. I presume it will be admitted by all that it is not the part of wisdom, for the legislature to put itself in advance of popular opinion, on the great question of constitutional reform. It is a very easy matter for agitators and mischief makers to inflame the public mind and to render people dissatisfied with the institutions under which they live. If the people are wronged, they are apt to find it out soon enough. I do not think any one on this floor, can say conscientiously, that there is any other great question of constitutional amendment, that has been sufficiently agitated as to leave it doubtful whether a majority of the people of the State desire a change. I dare say there are many questions on which active politicians might produce discontent and the desire of change; but "sufficient unto the day, is the evil thereof." On other questions the popular mind is now quiet, and for one am not disposed to disturb it. On this question of free suffrage, the public mind has been agitated, it is doubtful on which side the majority inclines, and I am willing to leave its decision to the tribunal of the ballot-box. I occupy the true republican platform on this question. I shall not attempt to lead public opinion, in regard to altering the constitution; neither will I attempt to carry out my views, regardless of the wish of the people; but I am willing to leave this matter to them, and no matter what may be my view as an individual, yet I am willing to submit to the decision of the majority of the people.

(Concluded next week.)

## MISSOURI vs. THE NASHVILLE CONVENTION.

The substance of certain resolutions recently passed by the Legislature of Missouri, condemnatory of the Nashville Convention and its proceedings, was briefly stated in a paragraph copied into this paper a day or two ago. Since then we have received a copy of the resolutions, as follows:

Resolved, That in the opinion of this House the practice of convening such bodies as the late Nashville Convention is dangerous in its tendencies, calculated to foster sectional jealousies, and to weaken the bond of the Union. The people of Missouri will co-operate with no organized body, be it North or South, the apparent object of which may be to foment national discord, to alienate one portion of the Confederacy from another, or to diminish the veneration of the people for the union of the States.

Resolved, That the House emphatically denounces the doctrine of secession as maintained by Southern statesmen, and dissents from the resolution of the Nashville Convention, as enclosed in his Excellency the Governor, by the Hon. C. J. McDonald, of Georgia, and the Governor is respectfully requested to return the resolutions to Mr. McDonald, with a copy of these resolutions.

## MR. WHIT'S APPOINTMENTS.

We have been requested to give the following as a list of appointments of Philip S. White, Esq., in his visit to the different Divisions of the Sons of Temperance in this section of the State. Mr. White is an able lecturer and is rendering the cause of Temperance efficient service.

- At Rocky River on the 10th of April.
- At Philadelphia on the 11th "
- At Charlotte on the 12th "
- At Davidson College on the 14th "
- At Hopewell on the 15th "
- At Dallas on the 16th "
- At Lincolnton on the 17th "

Charlotte Journal.

Deep Water.—Mr. A. D. Bache, of the U. S. Coast survey, says that Lt. Goldsborough, U. S. Navy, during the passage from the Rio de Janeiro to Cape of Good Hope, made soundings to the depth of three and a half miles! and brought up bottom. The sounding apparatus was a 32 pound shot, attached to a line strong enough to bear sixty pounds weight.