

and the only effectual one, of securing to us justice, peace, and security, at home and abroad, and with them that national power and renown, the love of which Providence has implanted, for wise purposes, so deeply in the human heart; in all of which great objects, every portion of our country, widely extended and diversified as it is, has a common and identical interest. If we have the wisdom to place a proper relative estimate on these more elevated and durable blessings, the present and every other conflict of like character, may be readily terminated; but if, reversing the scale, each section should put a higher estimate on its immediate and peculiar gains; and acting in that spirit, should push favorite measures of mere policy, without regard to peace, harmony or justice, our sectional conflicts would then, indeed, without some constitutional check, become interminable, except by the dissolution of the Union itself. That we have, in fact, so reversed the estimate is too certain to be doubted, and that it is mainly paid by those who furnish the means of paying the foreign exchanges of the country on which it is laid; and that the case is not varied, taking into estimate the entire action of the system, whether the producer or consumer pays in the first instance.

The application may be painful, but the remedy, I conceive, is certain and simple. There is but one effectual cure, an honest reduction of the duties to a fair system of revenue, adapted to the just and constitutional wants of the Government. Nothing short of this will restore the country to peace, harmony and mutual affection. There is already a deep and growing conviction in a large section of the country, that the imposts, even as a revenue system, is extremely unequal, and that it is mainly paid by those who furnish the means of paying the foreign exchanges of the country on which it is laid; and that the case is not varied, taking into estimate the entire action of the system, whether the producer or consumer pays in the first instance.

I do not propose to enter formally into the discussion of a point so complex and contested; but as it has necessarily a strong practical bearing on the subject under consideration, in all its relations, I cannot pass it without a few general and brief remarks. If the producer in reality pays, none will doubt but the burden would mainly fall on the section it is supposed to do. The theory that the consumer pays in the first instance, renders the proposition more complex, and will require, in order to understand where the burden in reality ultimately falls, on that supposition to consider the protective, or, as its friends call it, the American System, under its three-fold aspect of taxation, of protection, and of distribution; or, as performing at the same time the several functions of giving a revenue to the government, of affording protection to certain branches of domestic industry, and furnishing the means to Congress of distributing large sums through its appropriations; all of which are so blended in their effects, that it is impossible to understand its true operation, without taking the whole into the estimate. Admitting then, as supposed, that he who consumes the article pays the tax in the increased price, and that the burden falls wholly on the consumers, without affecting the producers as a class, (which, by the by, is far from being true, except in the single case, if there be such a one, where the producers have a monopoly of an article, so indispensable to life, that the quantity consumed cannot be affected by any increase of price,) and that considered in the light of a tax merely, the impost duties fall equally on every section in proportion to its population, still when combined with its other effects, the burden it imposes, as a tax, may be so transferred from one section to the other, as to take it from one and place it wholly on the other. Let us apply the remark first to its operation as a

system of protection. The tendency of the tax, or duty, on the imported article is, not only to raise its price, but also, in the same proportion, that of the domestic article of the same kind, for which purpose, when intended for protection, it is in fact laid; and of course, in determining where the system ultimately places the burden in reality, this effect also must be taken into the estimate. If one of the sections exclusively produces such domestic articles, and the other purchases them from it, then it is clear that, to the amount of such increased prices, the tax or duty on the consumption of foreign articles, would be transferred from the section producing the domestic articles to the one that purchased and consumed them, unless the latter in turn, be indemnified by the increased price of the objects of its industry, which none will venture to assert to be the case with the great staples of the country, which form the basis of our exports, the price of which is regulated by the foreign and not the domestic market. To those who grow them, the increased price of the foreign and domestic articles both, in consequence of the duty on the former, is in reality, and in the strictest sense, a tax, while it is clear that the increased price of the latter acts as a bounty to the section producing them, and that as the amount of such increased prices, on what it sells to the other section, is greater or less than the duty it pays on the imported articles, the system will in fact operate as a bounty or tax; if greater, the difference would be a bounty; if less, a tax.

Again, the operation may be equal in every other respect, and yet the pressure of the system, relatively, on the two sections, be rendered very unequal by the appropriations or distribution. If each section receives back what it paid into the treasury, the equality if it previously existed will continue; but if one receives back less, and the other proportionably more than is paid, then the difference in relation to the sections will be to the former a loss, and to the latter a gain; and the system in this aspect would operate to the amount of the difference, as a contribution from the one receiving less than it paid to the other that receives more. Such would be incontestably its general effects, taken in all its different aspects, even on the theory supposed to be most favorable to prove the equal action of the system, that the consumer pays in the first instance the whole amount of the tax.

To show how, on this supposition, the burden and advantages of the system would actually distribute themselves between the sections, would carry me too far into details; but I feel assured, after full and careful examination, that they are such as to explain what otherwise would seem inexplicable, that one section should consider its repeal a calamity and the other a blessing; and that such opposite views should be taken by them, as to place them in a state of determined conflict in relation to the great fiscal and commercial interests of the country. Indeed were there no satisfactory explanation, the opposite views that prevail in the two sections, as to the effects of the system, ought to satisfy all of its unequal action. There can be no safer, or more certain rule, than to suppose each portion of the country equally ca-

pable of understanding their respective interests; and that each is a much better judge of the effects of any system of measures on its peculiar interest, than the other can possibly be. But whether the opinion of its unequal action be correct or erroneous, nothing can be more certain than that the impression is widely extending itself, that the system, under all its modifications, is essentially unequal; and if to that be added a conviction still deeper, and more universal, that every duty imposed for the purpose of protection, is not only unequal, but also unconstitutional, it would be a fatal error to suppose that any remedy, short of what I have stated, can heal our political disorders.

In order to understand more fully the difficulty of adjusting this unhappy contest on any other ground, it may not be improper to present a general view of the constitutional objection, that it may be clearly seen how hopeless it is to expect that it can be yielded by those who have embraced it. They believe that all the powers, vested by the Constitution in Congress, are not only restricted by the limitations expressly imposed, but also by the nature and object of the powers themselves. Thus though the power to impose duties on imports be granted in general terms, without any other express limitations but that they shall be equal, and no preference shall be given to the ports of one State over those of another, yet as being a portion of the taxing power, given with the view of raising revenue, it is from its nature restricted to that object, as much so as if the Convention had expressly so limited it; and that to use it to effect any other purpose, not specified in the Constitution, is an infraction of the instrument in its most dangerous form; an infraction by perversion, more easily made, and more difficult to resist than any other. The same view is believed to be applicable to the power of regulating commerce, as well as all the other powers. To surrender this important principle, it is conceived, would be to surrender all power, and to render the government unlimited and despotic; and to yield it up, in relation to the particular power in question, would be in fact to surrender the control of the whole industry and capital of the country to the General Government; and would end in placing the weaker section in a colonial relation with the stronger. For nothing are more dissimilar in their nature, or may be more unequally affected by the same laws, than different descriptions of labor and property; and if taxes, by increasing the amount and changing the intent only, may be perverted, in fact, into a system of penalties and rewards, it would give all the power that could be desired to subject the labor and property of the minority to the will of the majority, to be regulated without regarding the interest of the former, in subordination to the will of the latter. Thus thinking it would seem unreasonable to expect, that any adjustment based on the recognition of the correctness of a construction of the Constitution, which would admit the exercise of such a power, would satisfy the weaker of the two sections, particularly with its peculiar industry and property, which experience has shown

may be so injuriously affected by its exercise. Thus much for one side.

The just claims of the other ought to be equally respected. Whatever excitement the system has justly caused, in certain portions of our country, I hope, and believe, all will conceive that the change should be made with the least possible detriment to the interests of those who may be liable to be affected by it, consistently with what is justly due to others and the principles of the Constitution. To effect this, will require the kindest spirit of conciliation, and the utmost skill; but, even with these, it will be impossible to make the transition, without a shock greater or less; though I trust, if judiciously effected, it will not be without many compensating advantages. That there will be some such cannot be doubted. It will, at least, be followed by greater stability, and will tend to harmonize the manufacturing with all of the other great interests of the country, and bind the whole in mutual affection. But these are not all. Another advantage of essential importance to the ultimate prosperity of our manufacturing industry will follow. It will cheapen production; and in that view, the loss of any one branch, will be nothing like in proportion to the reduction of duty on that particular branch. Every reduction will, in fact, operate as a bounty to every other branch, except the one reduced; and thus the effect of a general reduction will be to cheapen, universally, the price of production, by cheapening living, wages and materials; so as to give, if not equal profits after the reduction, profits by no means reduced proportionally to the duties; an effect which, as it regards the foreign market, is of the utmost importance.

(continued on the last page.)

Incendiary Publications.—The excitement produced a few months since, in the Southern country, by the discovery of several copies of the notorious "Walker Pamphlet," is doubtless still fresh in the recollection of most of our readers. Notwithstanding the pointed rebukes which the publishers of that inflammatory production received from many of the well disposed and reflecting part of our northern brethren, it appears that some misguided and deluded fanatics are still bent on exciting our colored population to scenes at which the heart sickens on the bare recital, and which, instead of improving their moral or physical condition, cannot fail to overwhelm the actors in ruin, and curtail the privileges of all the others. Let them view the first fruits of their diabolical projects in the Southampton massacre, and pause—An awful retribution awaits them. A letter from a gentleman in Washington City, dated 29th ult. to the Postmaster at this place, says: "An incendiary paper, 'The Liberator,' is circulated openly among the free blacks of this city; and if you will search, it is very probable you will find it among the slaves of your county. It is published in Boston or Philadelphia by a white man, with the avowed purpose of inciting rebellion in the South; and I am informed, is to be carried through your country by secret agents, who are to come amongst you under the pretext of peddling, &c. Keep a sharp look out for these villains, and if you catch them, by all that is sacred you ought to barbecue them. Diffuse this information amongst whom it may concern."



TARBOROUGH.

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 6, 1831.