ar3 the only effectual one, of
securing to us justice, peace,
and "security, at home and a
broad, and "with them that na
tional power and renown, the
love of which Providence has
implanted, for wise purposes, so
deeply in the human heart; in
all of which great objects, eve
ry portion of our country, wide
ly extended and diversified as it
is, has a common and identical
interest. If we have the wis
dom to place a proper relative
estimate on these more eleva
ted and durable blessings, the
present and every other conflict
of like character, may be readi
ly terminated; but if, reversing
the scale, each section should
put a higher estimate on its im
mediate and peculiar gains; and
acting in that spirit, should push
favorite measures of mere poli
cy, without regard to peace,
harmony or justice, our section-
al con diets would then, indeed,
without some constitutional i
check, become interminable,
except by the dissolution of the
Union itself. That we have, in
fact, so reversed the estimate is
too certain to be doubted, and
the result is our present dis
tempered and dangerous condi
tion. The cure must com
mence in the correction of the
error; and not to admit that we
have erred, would be the worst
possible symptom. It would
prove the disease to be incura
ble, through the regular and or
dinary process of legislation;
and would compel, finally, a re
sort to extraordinary, but I still
trust, not only constitutional,
but safe remedies.
No one would more sincerely
rejoice than myself, to see the
remedy applied from the quar
ter where it could be most easi
ly and regularly done. It is the
only way by which those who
think that it is the only quarter
from which it can constitution
ally come, can possibly sustain
their opinion. To omit the ap
plication by the General Gov
ernment, would compel even
them to admit the truth of the
opposite opinion; or force them
to abandon our political system
in despair; while on the other
hand all their enlightened and
patriotic opponents would re
joice at such evidence of mode
ration and wisdom on the part
of the General Government, ns
would supersede a resort to
what they believe to be the high
er powers of our political sys
tem, as indicating a sounder
state of public sentiment than
has ever heretofore existed in
any country; and thus affording
the highest possible assurance
of the perpetuation of our glo
rious institutions to the latest
generation. For as a people
advance in knowledge, in the
same degree they may dispense
with mere artificial restrictions
in their government: and we
may imagine, (but dare-not ex-i
pect to see it,) a state of intelli
gence so universal and high,
that all the guards of liberty
may be dispensed with, except
an enlightened public opinion
acting through the right of suf
frage; but it pre-supposes a
state where every class and ev
ery section of the community
aro capable of estimntinrr the
effects of every measure, not on
ly as it may afFect itself, but ev
ery other class and section; and
of fully realizing the sublime
trutli, that the lushest and wis
est policy consists in maintain-
lug justice and promoting peace
ana harmony; and that comna
red to these, schemes of mere
gain are but trash and dross.
tear experience has already
proved that we arc far removed
from such a state, and that we
must consequently rely on the
old and clumsy, but approved
mode of checking power in or
der to prevent or correct abu
ses; but i do trust that though
far from perfect, we arc at least
so much so as to be capable of
remedying the present disorder
in the ordinary way; and thus to
prove that with us public opini
on is so enlightened, and our
political machine so perfect, as
rarely to require for its preser
vation, the intervention of the
power that created it. How is
this to be effected!
The application maybe pain
ful, but the remedy, I conceive,
is certain and simple. There
is but one effectual cure, an
honest reduction of the duties
to a fair system of revenue,
adapted to the just and consti
tutional wants of the Govern
ment. Nothing short of this
will restore the country to peace,
harmony and mutual aiieeuon
There is already a deep and
growing conviction in a large
section of the country, that the
imposts, even as a revenue sys
tem, is extremely unequal, and
that it is mainly paid by those
who furnish the means of pay
ing the forei-gn exchanges of
the country on which it is laid;
and that the case is not varied,
taking into estimate the entire
action of the system, whether
the producer or consumer pays
in the first instance.
I do not propose to enter for
mally into the discussion of a
point so complex and contest
ed; but as it has necessarily a
strong practical bearing on the
subject under consideration, in
all its relations, I cannot pass it
without a few general and brief
remarks.
If the producer in reality
pays, none will doubt but the
burden would mainly fall on the
section it is supposed to do.
The theory that the consumer
pays in the first instance, ren
ders the proposition more com
plex, and will require, in order
to understand where the burden
in reality ultimately falls, on that
supposition to consider the pro
tective, or, as its friends call it,
the American Svstem, under its
three-fold aspect of taxation, of
protection, and of distribution;
or, as performing at the same
time the several functions of
giving a revenue to the govern
ment, of affording protection to
certain branches of domestic in
dustry, and lurmshiii" the
means to Congress of distribu
ting large sums through its ap
propriations; all of which are so
blended in their effects, that it is
impossible to understand its
true operation, without taking
the whole into the estimate
Admitting then, as supposed,
that he who consumes the arti
cle pays the tax in the increased
price, and that the burden falls
wholly on the consumers, with
out affecting the producers as a
class, (which, by the by, is far
rom being true, except in the
single case, if there be such a
one, where the producers have
a monopoly of an article, so in
dispensable to lite, that the
quantity consumed cannot be
affected by any increase of
price,) and that considered in
the light of a tax merely, the
impost duties tall equally on ev
ery section in proportion to its
population, still when combined
with its other effects, the bur
den it imposes, as a tax, may be
so transferred from one section
to the other, as to take it from
one and place it wholly on the
other. Let us apply the re
mark first to its operation as a
system ot protection.
The tendency of the tax, or
duty, on the imported article is,
not only to raise its price, but al
so, in the same proportion, that
of the domestic article of the
same kind, for which purpose,
when intended for protection, it
is in fact laid; and of course, in
determining where the system
ultimately places the burden in
reality, this effect also must be
taken into the estimate. If one
of the sections exclusively pro
duces such domestic articles,
and the other purchases them
from it, then it is clear that, to
the amount of such increased
prices, the tax or duty on the
consumption of foreign articles,
would be transferred from the
section producing the domestic
articles to the one that purcha
sed and consumed them, unless
the latter in turn, be indemni
fied by the increased price of the
objects of its industry, which
none will venture to assert to be
the case with tho great staples
of the country, which form the
basis of our exports, the price
of which is regulated by the fo
reign and not the domestic
market. To those who grow
them, the increased price of the
foreign and domestic articles
both, in consequence of the du
ty on the former, is in reality,
and in the strictest sense, a tax,
while it is clear that the increa
sed price of the latter acts as a
bounty to the section producing
them, and that as the amount
of such increased
price:
on
what it sells to the other sec
tion, i3 greater or less than the
duty it pays on the imported ar
ticles, the system will in fact
operatc as a bounty or tax; ifjther, yet as being a portion of
greater, the difference would be
a bounty; if less, a lax.
Again, the operation may be
equal in every other respect, and
yet the pressure of the system,
relatively, on the two sections,
be rendered very unequal by
the appropriations or distribu
tion. If each section receives
back what it paid into the trea
sury, the equality if it previous
ly existed will continue; but if
one receives back less, and the
other proportionally more than
is paid, then the difference in re
lation to the sections will be to
the former a loss, and to the lat
ter a gain; and the system in
this aspect would operate to the
amount of the difference, as a
contribution from the one re
ceiving less than it paid to the
other that receives more. Such
would be inconteslibly its gene
ral effects, taken in all its differ
ent aspects, even on the theory
supposed to be most favorable
to prove the equal action of the
system, that the consumer pays
in the first instance the whole
amount of the tax.
To show how, on this suppo
sition, the burden and advanta
ges of the system would actual
ly distribute themselves between
the sections, would carry me too
far into details; but I feel assu
red, after full and careful exam
ination, that they are such as to
explain what otherwise would
seem inexplicable, that one sec
tion should consider its repeal
a calamity mid the other a bles -
sing; and that such opposite
pposite
views should be taken by them,
as to place them in a state of
determined conflict in relation
to the great fiscal and commer
cial interests of the country.
Indeed were there no satisfac
tory explanation, the opposite
views that prevail in the two
sections, as to the effects of the
system, ought to satisfy all of
its unequal action. There can
be no safer, or more certain
rule, than to suppose each por
tion of the country equally ca-
pablc of understanding their re
spective interests; and that each
is a much better judge of the ef
fects of any system of measures
on its peculiar interest, than the
other can possibly be.
But whether the opinion of its
unequal action be correct or er
roneous, nothing can be more
certain than that the impression
is widely extending itself, that
the system, under all its modi
fications, is essentially unequal;
and if to that be added a con
viction still deeper, and more
universal, that every duty impo
sed for the purpose of protec
tion, is not only unequal, but
also unconstitutional, it would
be a fatal error to suppose that
any remedy, short of what I
have stated, can heal our politi
cal disorders.
In order to understand more
fully the difficulty of adjusting
this unhappy contest on any oth
er ground, it may not be impro
per to present a general view of
the constitutional objection, that
it may be clearly seen how
hopeless it is to expect that it
can be yielded by those who
have embraced it.
They believe that all the pow
ers, vested by the Constitution
in Congress, are not only re
stricted by the limitations ex
pressly imposed, but also by the
nature and object of the powers
themselves. Thus though the
power to impose duties on im
ports be granted in general
terms, without any other ex
press limitations but that they
shall be equal, and no prefer
ence shall be given to the ports
of one State over those of ano-
the taxing power, given with
the view of raising revenue, it
is from its nature restricted to
that object, as much so as if the
Convention had expressly so
limited it; and that to use it to
effect any other purpose, not
specified in the Constitution, is
an infraction of the instrument
in its most dangerous form; an
an infraction by perversion,
more easily made, and more
difficult to resist than any other.
The same view is believed to
be applicable to the power of
regulating commerce, as well
as all the other powers. To
surrender this important princi
ple, it is conceived, would be to
surrender all pow er, and to ren
der the government unlimited
and despotic; and to yield it up,
in relation to the particular
power in question, would be in
fact to surrender the control of
the whole industry and capital
of the country to the General
Government; and would end in
placing the weaker section in a
colonial relation with the stron
ger. For nothing are more dis
similar in their nature, or may
be more unequally affected by
the same laws, than different
descriptions of labor and prop
erty; and if taxes, by increasing
the amount and changing the
intent only, may be perverted,
in fact, into a system of penal
ties and rewards, it would give
an tiie power that could be de
sired to subject tho inhnr nml
1 property of the minority to the
I will of the mi
of the majority, to be regu
lated without regarding the in
terest of the former, in subser
viency to the will of the latter.
Thus thinking it would seem
unreasonable to expect, that
any adjustment based on the
recognition of the correctness
of a construction of the Consti
tution, which would admit the
exercise of such a power, would
satisfy the weaker of the two
sections, particularly with its
pecuuar industry and property,
which experience has shown
may be so injuriously affected
by its exercise. Thus much fur
one side.
The just claims of the other
ought to be equally respected
Whatever excitement the sys
tem has justly caused, in certain
portions of our country, 1 i,0pc
and believe, all will conceit
that the change should be made
with the least possible detri
ment to the interests of those
who may be liable to be affect
ed by it, consistently with what
is justly due to others and the
principles of the Constitution
To effect this, will require the
kindest spirit of conciliation,
and the utmost skill; but, even
with these, it will be impossible
to make the transition, without
a shock greater or less; though
I trust, if judiciously effected, it
will not be without many com
pensating advantages. That
there will be some such cannot
be doubted. It will, at least
be followed by greater stability,
and will tend to harmonize the
manufacturing with all of tho
other great interests of the coun
try, and bind the whole in mu
tual affection. But these are
not all. Another advantage of
essential importance to the ulti
mate prosperity of our manu
facturing industry will follow.
It tcilt cheapen production; and
in that view, the loss of any one
branch, will be nothing like in
proportion to the reduction of
duty on that particular branch.
Every reduction will, in fact,
operate as a bounty to every
other branch, except the one
reduced; and thus the effect of
a general reduction will be to
cheapen, universally, the price
of production, by cheapening
living, wages rvnd materials; so
as to give, if not equal profits
after the reduction, profits by
no moans reduced proportion
ally to the duties; an effect
which, as it regards the foreign
market, is of the utmost impor
tance. continued on the last page.)
TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 6, 1S31.
In cen d ia ry Publico tic ns. The
excitement produced a few months
since, in ihe Southern country, by
the discovery of several copies of the
notorious viaiKer x-ampniei, is
doubtless still fresh in the recollection ,
of most of our readers. Notwith
standing the pointed rebukes which
the publishers of that inflammatory
production received from many of
the well disposed and reflecting nart
of our northern brethren, it appears
that some misguided and deluded fan
atics are still bent on excitinjr our co
lored population to scenes at which
the heart sickens on the bare recital,
and which, instead of improving their
moral or physical condition, cannot
fail to overwhelm the actors in ruin,
and curtail the privileges of all the
other?. Let them view the first fruits
of their diabolical projects in the
Southampton massacre, and pause:
an awful retribution awaits them. A
letter from a gentleman in Washing
ton City, dated 29th ult. to the Post
master at this place, says:
"An incendiary paper, "The Libe
rator," is circulated openly among
the free blacks of this city; and if you
will search, it is very probable you
will find it among the slaves of your
county. It is published in Boston or
Philadelphia by a white man, with
the avowed purpose of inciting rebel
lion in the South; and I am informed,
is to be carried through your country
by secret agents, who are to come
amongst you underline pretext of
peddling, &c. Keep a sharp look out
for these villains, and if you catch
them, by all that is sacred 'ou ought
io barbacue them. Diffuse this inform
ation amongst whom it may concern. "