J' A?5 fBi-.'V
I! hole Xo. 03 1.
Tarb
orouSJh (Edgecombe County, jr. 6J finiii-dup, ,tsj is, 1838
Vol. XIV Xo. 33.
ln uLi
The Tarborough Prcss
BY GEOKGG HOWAHD,
t , published weekly at Two Dollars and Fifhj
ffjfir, if paid in advance or, Three
)"' at the expiration of the subscription year.
v'r' m P'"J ,ess than a yoar' Twe,,,.v-flve
r lh per month. Subscribers are at liberty to
5i'.cnntinue at anytime, on giving notice thereof
A p-iviiir arrears those residing at a distance
iJU invariably pay in advaticc, or give a respon
se reference in this vicinity.
" jvertisements not exceeding a square will be
v- runl at One Dollar the first insertion, and 25
' ' for' every continuance. Longer advertiser-it's
i" 'ilie proportion. Court Orders and Ju
XcU advertisements '25 per cent, higher. Ad
visements must be marked the number of in
vrtions required, or they will be continued until
"tbtTwise ordered and charged accordingly.
Letters addressed to the Kditor must be post
paid or they may not be attended to.
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLICAN
IA meeting; of Ilpubln.ui members of
(lt. Senate an.i II Uepreentutve
), Id at the C t;ii l,.J l G, 1833, the Hon.
JOHN y MILES, of ( iiiinf.i -i ioii. and
h, H.,,, CHARLES E II YES, of
q h iim ' li.iirmen, a;id the lion.
Gkokgc M. Kkim, f Pennsylvania, and
,,. i j ) II. L I'uiin y, of Tennessee,
a, (;,,ir sis Secretaries, the Address to the
K ,ple of the IJ iited Stales was received,
a ,d lurltit-r considered; whereupon, oi mo
j,,,,, v( the, Hon. Hiram Gray, of New
Y ik, it was
solved, That the address be signed
a, i,; published by the committee who have
prfp-tred it in behalf of the Republican
members of Congress.
JOHN M. MILES, and )
CII VS E H YES,
Chairmen.
Geo. M. K,.M,ad Secreariefe
Hopkins L. I uhnky,
ADDRESS
To the People of the United States.
In a country advancing with llie rapidi
t . f ours, great changes, having a pow
erful control over its political relations and
future dealing , must not uufirq "emly oc
cur, which may make it the duty of those
intruded, for the time, with the manage
ment uf public aflVirss, in order to avoid
misapprehension, to publish an exposition
of iheir principles and purposes. Such
are the changes which have taken place
Wiihin the I st few yfars, and which have
already had great effect on the political
condition of the country, and are destined
still to have much greater hereafter.
Among these may be enumerated the final
payment of the public debt; the expiration
of the charter of the United Stales Hank,
without renewal; the fall of the misnamed
American system; the rise and progress of
abolition; and finally the stoppage of pay
ment by the banks, with the constqient
embarrassment to the community, and in
llir final action of the Government. Never
m sy short a period, since the commence
ni'iit of the Government, have so many
events, destined to effect so mighty a change
in our political condition, occurred. That
llinr first effect would be to unsettle public
opinion was to be expected; and according
ly there never wasa lime, when the politi
cal elements of the country were in a state
of ureaier confusion, and when it was
ni re important that those who are intrust
ed with the management of public affairs,
s'i uld recur to fiii principles, and give a
l"u'l and explicit expoitin of their views.
Aiiuiiifd by these considerations, the
Republican members of Congress, about
,() letiirn to their coiiiilneul, propose lo
lay lu-lore them a brief exposition of the
f'Huripl.-s by which they have been guided,
a" 1 intend hereafter to be governed, on
Some of ihe most important measures of
public p-diry acted on, and to be acted on,
,: 'be councils of the General Government.
are deeply sensible that too much
ha? J(Tii expected from the deliberations
' f roi)rrleisS numerous and powerful
Party lias induced a large portion of the
People to look alone to the Congress ol
United States for relief. They are
t;,"Hht to believe that from thence alone
c, i emanate the mpasures required to re
si re the country to peace, quiet, and hap
P'is, unmindful that we have a written
"iisiitution to control those w ho adminis
ter die various departments of the General
y )veriiinent. Many appear to think thai
touress can do any and every thing call
e 1 for at this novel crisis in the affairs ol
llle cout.try. T( guard against the further
Pr"t;ress of this fatal del usion, and to ex
"erate ourselves from unreasonable re
sPJnsibirnyt we propose, at the threshold
,l tins address, to present a concise history .
t'l'ichit u,e character of the Federal Con
Ell,tion, and the origin of the two greai
Pitical parties which have divided, and
probably forever divide, the American
People,
There were radical differences of opin
ion , the convention which formed the
Const.lution. They laid the foundation of
those parties which have at intervals ever
since agitated, and at this moment deeply
agitate, the whole country.
A poniou 0f the convention, from a
strong partiality for the Hi itili form of
Government, desired to approximate as
near thai system as public opinion in Ame
rica would allow. From them came pro
positions fur a President and Senate for
life, elections for long terms, and other
fundamental arrangements, which should
remove the Government as far as possible
from popular control. Another portion,
having more confidence in the intelligence
and virtue of the people, advocated the
principle of making the executive and le
i?ilative brant nes elective for short terms.
fter the Constitution was formed, those
two parties dsff-red widely in the views
they took of the tendency of the Govern
ment; the one believing that it was towards
consolidation, and the other to disunion;
and the one accoidingly believing that the
danger was despotism in the head, and the
other anarchy in the members. Hence
the diff-'ieut light in which the two parties
vieweil the character ol the system. The
Uepublican paity held it to be federative
in its character, and firmed by the States
in their sovereign capacity, and adopted
for their mutual security and happiness;
while many of their adversaries regarded
it as a great national Kepublic, formed bv
the American people in the aggregate, to
promote the interest of the majoi iiy, instead
of the several Slates composing it.
When the Government was put in ope
ration under the new Constitution, each
party adopted rules of construction calcu
lated to secure their peculiar objects, and
advance their cherished principles, in its
practical operation.
Unfortunately , the execution of certain
vital parls of ihe system was entrusted to
men who had no faith in its stability, with
out essentia! changes, removing it further
from the influence ol the people and the
States; and they immediately set themselves
to work to accomplish, by a broad con
struction that which was, in their opinion,
essential to the continued existence ol" the
Government, but was unattainable through
a direct appeal to the Stales and people
for amendments to the Constitution. Out
of this design grew the funding system ol
the first. Secretary of the Treasury, and
other measures intended to create an im
proper action of the Government.
The other party maintaining their faith
in the Constitution as it is, insisted that the
( 'onstili tion should be construed strictly,
according to its honest meaning as adopt
ed by the States; and that changes in the
system, when lound necessaiy. should lie
sought through applications for amend
ments, rather than throuuh new, vague,
and latitudinous con-lruciions which, in
effect, would accumulate unlimited powers
ma Government noioi ionsly limited by
those who had creaud it. The rapid and
resolute enci oai hmeuts of a few years
greatly alai med and roused lo energetic
action the liiend of a limited, purt Go
vernment, controlled by the public will
They organized themselves lor constitu
tional resistance, proportioned to the char
acter and extent T actual and threatened
usurpations, and threw out, fiom the ablest
pens ol that day, luminous expositions ol
the real origin, true character, and ulti
mate objects of our Constitution. Afier a
fearful sliuggle, success crowned their ef
forts; the Government was wrested from
the hands of those whose principles were
monarchical and arislocratical; the letter
of the Constitution, and the honest mean
ing of those who adopted ii, became ihe
practical rule of construction; and public
opinion, expressed by the unbiassed repre
sentatives of the people and the Slates,
through the different brain hes of the Go
vernment, was recognised as the only le
gitimate governing power.
We adhere to the constitutional doc
trines of the Uepublican party of 179S 9;
we adopt ihe rule of strict construction
they maintained, as the only true and safe
one, applicable to our Constitution; we re
ject the assumption that the people have
not the requisite intelligence and virtue to
choose competent managers of public af
fairs, and direct them when necessary.
These are the principles upon which we
would have our Government administered,
and a reference to our views upon the great
and agitating topics of the day will, we
trust, show that we are disposed to carry
these principles into practice by our public
acts. '
The leading question which now divides
die two parties of the country is, the re-es-.ablishment
of a Bank of ihe United Slates.
The Hi st bank was a measure of that par
ty, which deemed it necessary lo devise
other means than public opinion and ihe
Ftjflrages of the people, to secure a stable!
UOVerilflient. It was condemned hv ihe
people, and was required to wind up, after
living out its chartered exisientQ Far dif
ferent were the considerations which led to
ihe establishment of a second bank. It
was thought lo be necessary, perhaps from
conclusions too hastily drawn, as an in
strument lo compel the State banks to re
sume specie pay mentsjand as a fiscal agent,
to ketp and transfer the funds of the Uui
ted Slates. This bank was also condemn
ed by the people, and its charter suffered
to expire without renewal. The question
is, shall we have a third bank, alier two
have been established by the public autho
rities, and condemned by the people?
There are many of us who have always
believed a Bank of the United Stales lo be
unconstitutional. They look upon the
power to create corporations, except in and
for the District of Columbia, as a substan
tive power reserved wholly to the Slates.
They find that the convention w hich form
ed the Constitution, refused lo insert clauses
delegating lo Congress the general power
to create corporations. In the discussions
of ihe friends and foes of the Constitution,
through the press of the country, and in
the State conventions prior lo its adoption,
they do not find it alledged on either side,
thai it conferred such a power on Con
gress. Ihey think that the absence ol
any grant of power in ihe Constitution
ought, itself, to be conclusive; bui when, in
addition to this, it has been proved by ihe
developments ol late years (hat ihe propo
sition was actually voted down in conven
tion, and thai both parlies were ihencefor
ward silent on the subjectjit seems lo them
impossible to doubl that the power was not
granted, but was purposely withheld.
They believe that Congress has no con
stituiional power to ngulale credil in any
of the Slaies; that the right of each citizen,
and of any association of citizens, lo use
their ciedit, is not derived originally from
the laws, but is an incident to property in
the social stale; that the citizens of ihe
Slates possessed it in ihe most plenary
manner; ud thai each or any of them, sin
gly or associated, could issue their notes,
without limitation, until the right was ta
ken away by the laws of the Slates against
prhute banking; that, to restore ihe right,
nothing is necessaiy bul ihe repeal ol
those laws; and thai the granting of bank
charters is but a rtsioralion of the light lo
the favored individuals, in a modified
form. They maintain that the General
Government, having had no agency ol
right, or in fad, in restraining the use of
credit, or forbidding private banking with
in the Stales, has no power to tesiore the
light, in either a general or modified
loim, the power belonging exclusively to
the States which look il away. And ihey
think Congress has as rightful power
to abrogate all the Stale laws against
banking, and restore the right to every
citizMi without restraint, as they have to
restore il in a qualified shape under the
conditions of a bank charier.
These, and many other arguments of
great force, may be employed to prove
the unconstitutionality of a Bank of the
United Slates. Bul whatever may have
been, or are now, our several conclusions
upon that point, we unanimously concur
in the opinion that the re-establishment of
a Bank of the United States is unnecessary ,
inexpedient, and dangerous to the public
liberty.
A few years experience has given much
additional force lo the arguments origi
nally urged against such au institution. A
leading argument in lavor of it is, that the
Slate banks, of themselves, are incompe
tent lo manage their affairs prudently, or
to maintain specie payments and preserve
a sound currency; and that a Bank of the
United Slates is necessary to check and
control them. Do those who use this ar
gument rtflect lhat itis an argument against
popular government itsell? The people
constitute the governing power in ihe Uni
ted Stales, and il is by their authority that
ihe Stale banks are created. This aigu
ment assumes lhat ihe people are incompe
tent to check and control a class of institu
tions which they create, and that a new
agent, unknown lo ihe States and irrepon
sible to them or lo the people, must be in
troduced, to save them from the disastrous
consequences of their own acts.
Is this a Republican doctrine? On the
contrary, is it not the leading argument in
favor of monopoly and absolute power
throughout the world? Why do kings
reign, and princess exercise absolute do
minion, but because ihe people are assumed
to be incompetent to act wisely, and pro
led themselves against the evil consequen
ces of their own ignorance and error.
Assume ibal the Slate banks are incom
petent to ihe ends for which they are crea
ted, and will necessarily Vim into periodi
cal excesses, entailing great evils upon the
country, to what source would a ttepubii-
can JooU lor a remedy? Would he say
ihai the people cannot be trusted to amend
their own institution nm ili:ii wh mnsl
have an irresponsible corporation to pre
vent these evils? Would he noi rather
justly conclude lhat ihe banking system it-
sell was defective, and undertake lorefonn
it, so as to bring it under ihe control of
the people, through their constitutional or
gans, rather than to assume that'll cannot
be regulated otherwise than by ihe intro
duction of a pow er competent lo contend
for mastery with the Government itself?
We reject both the premises and ihe
conclusions. We believe our representa
tive and popular Governments in the Stales,
who created ihese instituiious, fully com
petent to modify and reform them, and to
impose all those checks and restraints
upon them which ihe banking system is ca
pable of receiving. ,
To awaken the people to a due sense ol
ihe magnitude of that power which the ad
vocates of a Bank of ihe United Stales
would create, let us look al ihe amount in
"men and money" which ihey propose to
make dependant upon one institution.
The number of State banks and branch
es now, is 629. The number of presidents,
directors, and other officers, is not overes
limated al eight thousand two hundred.
The number of stockdohk rs may be safely
estimated at three hundred and twenty
thousand; and ihe number of debtors, ex
clusive of stockholders, at six hundred and
fifty thousand. The aggregate of these
is near a million of persons, whose busi
ness relations and pecuniary interests are
directly involved. The capital of all the
banks is $'317,036,770; and the amount c.l
their loans about $485,631, 8G7. litre,
then, we have a mass of about one million
ol persons, and money and credit to an
amount exceeding five bundled millions of
dollars, whic h are, in a greal degree, de
pendant upon ihe opci atiuus of this bank
credit system.
Left in be governed by the general laws
of trade and credit, these elements of pow
er may continue lo be comparatively harm
less in iheir effects upon our political in
stitutions; bul what does the Opposition
parly proposer
It proposes, by the establishment of a
National Bank, lo increase, concentrate,
and combine those elements in one corpo
ration. The project is not merely to es
tablish a new bank, with an immense ca
pilal, bul il is also to give a head and ma
uager to the million of persons and five
hundred millions of dollars embraced in
the existing Slate banks.
W hen ihe first Bank of the Uui ed
States was created, with eleven millions of
capital, the number of State banks did not
exceed four, and their capital was not over
two million five hundred thousand dollars;
yel the Republicans of lhat day dieaded
its power. When the second Bank was
established, with a capital of thirty five
millions, the number of Stale banks did
not exceed 134; and their capital was not
over $89,822,422. Patriotic fears of its
dangerous power were iheu also entertain
ed. If there was any cause for fear on
those occasions, how ought Republicans lo
feel now, when il is proposed lo pui near
one million of individuals, and more than
$500,000,000. under ihe substantial do
minion of one corporation? The presi
dent of ihe late Bank cf ihe United Stales
testified, upon a public occasion, thai there
were few of the State banks which il could
not have crushed had it been so disposed
The power of the proposed new Bank w ill
be greater, and every new Stale bank
which has been or may be established, will
add lo its power by increasing the number
of its dependants, and enlarging the sphere
of its influence.
What, under such a system, is to become
of the independence of the several States,
and their right and power lo regulate and
control iheir own institutions? Will the
Slate banks be governed by the Slates
which created them, or will they look for
iheir superior to ihe monarch of the great
bank credit system, on whom the inexora
ble and inevitable laws of credit and of
trade confer the power to crush or caress
them, according to his uncontrollable will?
Every year increases the danger of es
tablishiug such an institution; for every
year adds lo ihe number of State banks,
which must of necessity be its subordinates
and dependants. If it ever be established,
every bank within the Stales will, neces
sarily, become ihe ally and ciladel of this
central power. Surely it is enough lhat
the unchangeable laws of ciedit and trade
subject the distant State banks lo ihe influ
ence of one common centre. That con
sequence is inevitable, and unless trade
should be more extensively diffused, must
be borne.
But, as friends of the rights and inde
pendence of the States, can we desire to
s-e this subjection made more absolute and
degrading by artificial regulations? Least
of all, can we desire to see ihe adminis
tration of the laws of ciedit and trade
placed in hands which are not only inde
pendent of the States, bul of all lhat is po
pular in the General Government? When
a guarantee can be discovered against ihe
frailties ol our nature, mankind may be
safe under absolute dominion. When di
rectors of banks can be selected from a
superior race, then the existence of a Bank
of the United Slates may be compatible
wiih ihe rights of the Slates, and ihe liber
ty, prosperity, and happiness of the Ameri
can people.
Thai there are some advantages lo be
derived from a Bank of the United Slates
cannot be denied. A species of paper,
answering the purposes of money, and so
nearly uniform in value as lo be available
at par throughout ihe Union, is, for many
purposes, a greal public convenience
But what Republican would purchase il at
the hazard of his liberty, especially w hen
he Sees lhat an effective substitute may be
obtained without it? Ii may be doubted
whether such a bank could now be of any
eal utility in equalizing domestic exchan
ges. Thai which is now very generally called
the difference of exchange, is, in reality,
bul a difference in the value of the prevail
ing paper currency at differntt points.
To put an end to lhat, requires no Bank
of the United Slates. Il is now vanishing
as fasl as the banks resume specie pay
ments, and, we trust, will soon cease
throughout the Union, without ihe agency
of any coercive power whatsoever. The
real difference of exchange will ihen re
main, consisting of ihe cost of transporting
specie or specie funds from one place lo
another. In this business there has been
heretofore, and will soon be again, vast
competition, which will reduce the expense
lo ihe lowest amount for which the opera
tion can be performed. For the country,
this is ihe safest basis on which it can rest.
If a great National Bank be established,
having as il must, the mastery of the
w hole banking system of ihe Union, it w ill
be strong enough to prescribe the rates of
exchange, and drive competition out cf the
market, not by reducing the price, but by
a wave of its sceptre.
If il were lo indicate to the State banks
that exchange was considered in its own
appropriate harvest field, in which it was
not agreeable lo have a competitor, they
must necessarily submit to the will of this
legal superior, and withdraw from ihe bu
siness. Would il be safer to have exchan
ges regulated, and the price fixed by the
president of a bank, whose first objeel is
to make as much money as possible, than
by the general laws ! trade, which kne w
no selfishness, and have no favorites? Not
only would il be nmie safe, bul il can
scarcely be doubted that a geneial compe
tition among bat ks and individuals, now
lhat the whole piocess and ihe necessary
machinery is well understood, would se
cure lo ihe country lower rates.
The same slate t f thtngs'ierders a Bank
less useful to the Coven meri, as au agent
to transfer its funds from one set lit u of Ihe
Union to another; than it was when the
late Bank of the United Stale was estab
lished, and for many years afterwards.
Competent agents for this purpose may
now be found in ihe State banks and in
private bankers; and ihese facilities are
multiplying even more rapidly lhan ihe
growth of our country. This argument
in favor of a National Bank has, there
lore, ceased io have the weight lo which
it was lormeilv entith cl, and goes but a lit
tle way to counterbalance the it. any fatal
oljeclions lo such an institution. Il can
n!y be said, wilh truth, lhat it would
ave some trouble to the c fficrrs arid cU t Us
ol the Treasuiy D pai trt.enl ; and thai is
the only just extent of the argument.
The same reasons which oppose ihe es
tablishment of a Bank of the United Stale?,
are equally hostile to a Treasury Bank, or
any machinery in the naiuie ol a bank,
attached lo the Treasuiy Dcpaitment
The lot mi r would he the rnalion ol an
independent and irresponsible power in
the country, whose inclination and inter
est would generally prompt it lo support a
iriendly Kxecutive, and whose p aver
would ;dmosl certainly be gnat enough to
ovu throw one which was not The lat
ter would al all limes act in concit with
the Executive, with power to give him
strength in proportion 10 its capilal and
the txlentol its machin ry. B lb alike
are calculated lo eiilaig Executive power;
ind although a Treasury Bank would, in
theory, at least, be more contn llahle by
h popular w ill, constituting pari ol Ihe
Government, both aie io be c'leaiUd and
rejected alike by lhc.e who vvcu!d pre
Jxve the simplicity and purity ol i ur in
stitutions. 13"' as we do not know ol any
advocate?, in the Republican paily, of a
i