

# TARBORO' PRESS.

Whole No. 899.

Tarborough, (Edgecombe County, N. C.) Saturday, May 27, 1843

Vol. XIX—No 21.

## The Tarborough Press,

BY GEORGE HOWARD,

Is published weekly at Two Dollars and Fifty Cents per year, if paid in advance—or Three Dollars at the expiration of the subscription year. For any period less than a year, Twenty-five Cents per month. Subscribers are at liberty to discontinue at any time, on giving notice thereof and paying arrears—those residing at a distance, must invariably pay in advance, or give a responsible reference in this vicinity.

Advertisements not exceeding a square will be inserted at One Dollar the first insertion, and 25 cents for every continuance. Ledger advertisements in like proportion. Court Orders and Judicial advertisements 25 per cent. higher. Advertisements must be marked the number of insertions required, or they will be continued until otherwise ordered and charged accordingly.

Letters addressed to the Editor must be post paid or they may not be attended to

## VARIETY.



FOR THE TARBORO' PRESS

LINES.

Written in a pensive mood.

Ye gay illusions, that inspired my soul;  
Ye fond ideas, that bewitched my mind;  
Why have you lost your former blest control?

Where shall this fainting frame thy influence find?

Life to my languid heart retains no joy,  
But all this world appears a barren wild,  
A trifling bauble, or an empty toy,  
Formed to amuse an artless prattling child;  
The common rustic toiling for his bread,  
And by his daily labor earning food,  
Is happier far than him by dainties fed,  
On whom soft sensibilities intrude;

Not long emerg'd from childhood's happy state,

Not long elaps'd that season of delight;  
Yet sick'ning fancy paints the frowns of fate

And pictures future years a darksome night.

But why should fancy sicken at the view,  
And ever image heavy clouds of woe?  
Fortune ne'er heard me for her favors sue,  
For, fortune never yet appeared my foe:  
No, tis not for myself I heave the sigh,  
No, tis not for myself I start the tear;  
Tis for mankind, who on a thread rely,  
Yet live unbudd'd by a single fear:

You playful infant, who, with sportive smile,

Heeds not the storms nor feels the cares of life;

Poor helpless wretch, he little thinks of guile,

Nor future tempests of heart-breaking strife.

I once, like him, could sport, could smile and play,

Nor knew a care nor felt a single grief;

My life was then as jocund as the May.

And all my joys were creatures of belief.

Oh! how my heart in sorrow bleeds for thee,

How I compassionate thine helpless case;

Could but those sorrows, that afflicted me,  
Prevent a tear from flowing down thy face:

I'd warn thee of the frailties of my youth,

And every rock 'gainst which my bark had struck;

Of dark designs, beneath the mask of truth;

And baseness lurking in an honest look.

But ah! the beacon does not always guard,  
The cautious mariner, by temp'ris hurli'd;

Nor do the precepts of the pensive bard  
Preserve the stripling from a crafty world.

Have we not all, however few our years,  
Beheld our friends, like autumn leaves decay?

Have we not all in sable and in tears  
Follow'd the coffin o'er the church-yard way?

Ah! poor humanity! I pity thee,  
But pity cannot check the tears that flow;

Oh! could we soothe the sorrows that we see,  
Mis'ry would raise her eye and cheerful grow.

Yet there are transient hours in which we feel  
The thrills of pleasure and the charms of love;

For beauty's smile can all our sorrows heal,  
And yield a tincture of the joy's above.

Such are the hours that fly on golden wings,  
When ——'s converse cheers my drooping heart;

Such are the joys my charmer ever brings,  
Which she like magic ever can impart.

ALPHA.

17th Year Locusts.—It is said there will be dense swarms of locusts this year throughout all parts of the country. It has been 17 years since they inundated the land, and every 17 years they pay us a visit.—*Madisonian.*

## POLITICAL.



### THE PRESIDENCY.

The Indiana State Sentinel contains letters from Messrs. Calhoun, Johnson, Cass, Buchanan, and Van Buren, in reply to certain questions propounded to them by the Indiana Democratic Convention, touching the prominent political topics of the day, they are as follows.

### REPLY OF MR. CALHOUN.

Washington, January 26, 1843.

GENTLEMEN: I have been honored by your note of the 10th instant, covering a copy of the resolutions adopted by a convention of the Democratic party of the State of Indiana, held at Indianapolis on the 9th instant, requesting my views in reference to the different questions therein proposed to the individuals of the party who have been named as candidates for the Presidency and Vice Presidency. I have embraced the earliest opportunity which my other engagements permitted, to comply with your request.

In answer to the first question, in which I am desired to state whether I am in favor of, or opposed to, the chartering of a national bank, or any other national institution, by whatever name it may be called, authorized to issue bills of credit for banking purposes, or to regulate exchanges,—with my views of the constitutionality and expediency of such an institution?—I reply, I am opposed to a national institution, be its name what it may, authorized to issue bills of credit for banking purposes, or to regulate exchanges, both on the ground of expediency and constitutionality. My reasons for both, in reference to a national bank, have been so fully stated in the various discussions on the subject, since the stoppage of payments in 1837, that it is not deemed necessary to repeat them on this occasion, as they must be well known to the community. As to a bank, or an institution of any kind to regulate exchanges, I hold that the objections to the expediency or constitutionality of a bank of issue are applicable to any such institution.

To the three next questions—whether I am in favor of, or opposed to, the distribution of the proceeds of the public lands among the several States of the Union? whether I am in favor of, or opposed to, a protective tariff? and, also, to an amendment of the Constitution of the United States, still further limiting the veto power?—I answer, I am opposed to each; and for my reasons, refer to my speeches delivered recently in the Senate on these subjects.

The fifth and last question is, whether I will abide by the decision of a national convention of the Democratic party, in the selection of a candidate for the Presidency; and whether I will give my support and influence to the nominee of said convention, if not myself nominated by said convention? This question seems to assume that I am a candidate, soliciting the office of President, and determining, by my individual judgment, the proper measures to be adopted to secure it. It is not the light in which I regard myself, or desire to be regarded by the public. My name has been presented for that high office by no agency or solicitation of mine; and it belongs to the friends who prefer me, and have presented my name to the people, to decide on the course proper to be adopted, in reference to this question. I have, however, no reason to doubt but that they will cheerfully abide by the decision of a convention, fairly called, and fairly constituted; that would allow ample time for the full development of public opinion, and would represent fully, equally, and fairly, the voice of the majority of the party.

With great respect, I am, &c.

J. C. CALHOUN.

Hon. Ethan A. Brown, John Law, Nathaniel West, John Pettit, Jesse D. Bright, and A. C. Pepper, Esquires, committee.

### REPLY OF MR. JOHNSON.

Frankfort, Ky., Feb. 6, 1843.

GENTLEMEN: Your letter of the 10th January was duly received. It gives me pleasure to make known my views upon any political subject connected with the office of President of the United States. The resolutions enclosed, of the Democratic convention of Indiana, embrace the bank of the United States, the distribution of the proceeds of the public lands among the States, a protective tariff, and a national convention. I will answer in the order in which you have presented your inquiries.

The charter of a bank of the United

States by Congress, I have always considered unconstitutional and inexpedient—having given my vote against it in 1811, and at each successive presentation of the subject since, up to the period of the 4th of March, 1841, when I retired from the public service of the United States, in accordance with the will of the people. It has been my constant practice and my disposition, to construe with strictness the powers delegated to the Federal Government, and to confine my action within the plain meaning of its constitutional provisions, carefully avoiding any enlargement of its authority. Notwithstanding the protracted investigations and elaborated discussions of this annoying question, I am confirmed in my first opinion, that Congress has no power, constitutionally, to charter a bank of the United States "authorized to issue bills of credit for banking purposes, or to regulate exchanges."

The Federal Constitution contains no specific grant of power to raise money to be distributed among the States. I look upon the act of Congress relative to this subject as a dangerous precedent, and injurious in its consequences. It is unquestionably a direct interference with the internal policy and domestic concerns of the States. If the Federal Government has the right to use a financial power for munificence, it surely possesses the power to exterminate evils which, in the opinion of Congress, may exist in the several States. This power would tend to consolidation, and degrade and impair the sovereignty of the States, by producing a dependence in them upon the Federal Government for the revenue necessary for their existence. The power vested in Congress to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises, must be understood as limited by the objects which are enumerated in the same sentence—to pay the debts, and provide for the common defence and general welfare of the States. A revenue raised for any other purpose than one which applies equally to all the States, would transcend the true boundary of the constitution. Imposts, which operate as burdens upon one section of the nation, and as bounties to another, would violate the spirit of the constitution. I am in favor of raising by duties on importations as much money as may be adequate, when added to the sales of the public lands, to pay the entire expenses of the Federal Government, economically administered, and no more. In fixing such a tariff, I think it good policy, and consistent with an equitable consideration for every interest, that due regard should be had to such agricultural commodities and productions and manufactured articles as can be fabricated in abundance and perfection, and which are of essential and general use.

Taxes collected indirectly by commerce are least felt, and most cheerfully paid; and if they can be so regulated as to evolve great national resources, and rear up skillful artificers and manufacturers, the patriot's hope would be consummated. It is the true Democratic doctrine, as far as I understand it, to give this incidental protection to agriculture and manufactures, and thus give universal satisfaction to all liberal-minded men, by extending a general advantage, equally regarding every interest and every section of this great extended confederacy. If I know myself, I am equally the friend of all, and the enemy of none; and as far as I have capacity to judge, I have, and ever shall act upon this great principle of equal devotion to every section and every interest of our common country.

The Constitution of the United States was brought into being at a time and under circumstances peculiarly adapted to ensure the greatest wisdom in the enactment of laws, and impartiality in the administration of them. The Senate and House of Representatives—the one representing the sovereignty, and the other the people of the several States—are checks upon each other; and to make a law, both must concur. The President has a check upon both, as the representative of the sovereignty of the whole people of the several States, uninfluenced by sectional feelings or local interests. My opinion is, that the qualified veto which the President possesses in legislation, is beneficial and conservative; and I am opposed to an amendment of the Constitution of the United States, still further limiting the veto power.

I will abide by the decision of a national convention of the Democratic party, in the selection of a candidate for the Presidency of the United States, and will give my support and influence to the election of the nominee of said convention, if not myself nominated by said convention.

The Democratic convention of the State of Kentucky, on the 9th ultimo, nominated and recommended me as the candidate for the Presidency in 1844; and, among other things, put forth my political principles, embracing the enquiries made by you. In addition to this responsive letter, I refer to that address as containing a correct view of my sentiments upon these and other subjects.

With sentiments of high consideration

and respect, I am, truly and sincerely, your obedient servant,

RH. M. JOHNSON.

Messrs. Ethan A. Brown, John Law, Nathaniel West, John Pettit, Jesse D. Bright, and A. C. Pepper, Committee.

### REPLY OF MR. CASS.

Columbus, Ohio, Feb. 8, 1843.

GENTLEMEN: Your letter enclosing the resolutions of the Democratic Convention of the State of Indiana, was addressed to me at Washington, but did not reach that city till after I had left there. It was then forwarded to me at this place; and, in consequence of having stopped upon the route, considerable delay has occurred in its receipt. I make this explanation to account for that delay.

I shall now proceed to answer the questions proposed by the convention, briefly, but frankly; satisfied it will be more agreeable to yourselves, and your colleagues of the convention, that I should be led into tedious dissertations.

With respect to a national bank, I have to remark that I have always entertained doubts of the power of Congress to charter such an institution. The indirect process by which this power is deduced from a very general provision of that instrument, has never been satisfactory to me. But there is the less necessity for entering more in detail into the constitutional question, as it seems to me the public voice has pronounced itself, and justly, against the incorporation of any national bank by Congress. No such institution should, in my opinion, be established.

In answer to the second question, which relates to the distribution of the proceeds of the public lands among the several States, I reply, that I think no such distribution should be made. I will state, in a few words, the ground of this opinion. The necessary revenue for the support of the Government of the United States must come from the people; and it must be supplied by direct or indirect taxation, or by the sale of public property. The general sentiment is opposed to direct taxation by the General Government, in time of peace; and, of course, there are left but the other two sources of supply to meet its expenses. Their proceeds must constitute the revenue of the country; and, if one of them is abstracted or diminished, an additional burden is thrown upon the other. Whatever sum the necessary expenses of the Government may require, if the proceeds of the public lands make no part of it, the whole must be raised by taxation. If they make part of it, then the amount of taxation is diminished by the sum supplied by these proceeds. It follows that any proposition to divert the proceeds of these lands from the support of the Government is, in fact, but a proposition to lay taxes upon the people. If a permanent annual revenue of eighteen millions of dollars is necessary for an economical administration of the Government, and if two millions of these are produced by the sale of the public lands, let the source of this supply be diverted to some other object, and the two millions must be provided by the imposition of taxes. All this is too clear to need further illustration. A proposition, then, to distribute the proceeds of the public lands among the several States, is, in effect, but a proposition to increase the taxation of the people of the United States, through the medium of the General Government, in order that the amount, thus increased, may be paid into the treasuries of the respective States. To me, it appears perfectly clear, that whatever may be the annual sum produced by the sale of lands, that sum is a part of the revenue of the country; and that it is just as competent for Congress to take any other two millions (supposing that to be the amount) from the public treasury, and divide them among the States, as to select for that purpose the dollars actually produced by the land sales. It seems to me that such a course of action would be injurious in practice, dangerous in principle, and without warrant in the Constitution of the United States. The theory of our political institutions is familiar to us all. The Government of the Confederation, and the Governments of all the confederated States, have their respective rights and duties clearly defined; and each, within its proper sphere, is independent of the others; each raises and expends its revenue, and performs all the necessary functions of a sovereign State. What right has one to interfere with another, unless in cases marked out by the Constitution itself? If the General Government can provide a revenue for the respective States, and does provide one, it is clear that one great distinctive feature of our political system will disappear; and that the relations between the Confederation, as such, and the individual States composing it, will be wholly changed. Human sagacity cannot foretell what would be the entire result of this state of things; but it is easy to predict that this new application of the money power would give to the Government of the United

States a strength never contemplated by the American people, and irreconcilable with our constitutional organization; and that it would lead to a habit of dependence on the part of the States, by which their efficiency to resist any encroachments of the General Government would be paralyzed. Without pushing these considerations further, I conclude this branch of the subject by repeating, that, in my opinion, no distribution of the proceeds of the public lands should be made.

The subject of a protective tariff has been so long and ably discussed, that it would be useless for me to do more than to give you the result of my views. I think, then that the revenue of the Government ought to be brought down to the lowest point compatible with the performance of its constitutional functions; and that in the imposition of duties necessary, with the proceeds of the public lands, to provide this revenue, incidental protection should be afforded to such branches of American industry as may require it. This appears to me not only constitutional, but called for by the great interests of the country; and if a protective tariff, upon this principle, were wisely and moderately established, and then left to its own operation, so that the community could calculate upon its reasonable duration, and thus avoid ruinous fluctuations, we might look for as general acquiescence in the arrangement, as we can ever expect in questions of this complicated kind, when local feelings have been enlisted, which a prudent Legislature must consult, more or less, and endeavor to reconcile.

A proposition to amend the Constitution of the United States is one which I should always receive with great caution. There is already in our country too great a disposition to seek, in changes of the laws and constitutions, remedies for evils to which all societies are more or less liable; instead of leaving them to find their own cure in the operation of the ordinary causes which act upon communities. It is often better to suffer a partial inconvenience than rashly to alter the fundamental principles of a political system. Stability is better than change, when change is not decidedly called for. I am not aware that the exercise of the veto power has, for many years, produced any injury to the public service; on the contrary, I think in those cases where it has been recently interposed, it has been properly applied, and that its action has been approved by a great majority of the people. I see, therefore, no practical evil which demands, in this respect, a change in the Constitution of the United States. Should cases of that nature occur, it will then be time to seek the proper remedy.

Your last questions regard the obligations which the nomination of a national Democratic convention should impose upon those persons whose names have been brought forward in connexion with the Presidency of the United States. In the summer of 1841, in answer to an application from a committee appointed by a Democratic meeting in the city of Philadelphia, I stated my determination not to suffer my name to be used in this matter, unless nominated by the national Democratic convention. To that declaration I yet adhere; and I add, in the terms of your question, that I shall give my support and influence to the nominee of that convention. I beg leave, however, to remark, as the subject has excited discussion in respectable quarters, that I am firmly impressed with the belief that no portion of the Democratic party will weaken its strength, or hazard the favorable result we have a right to expect, by precipitating the period of the meeting of the convention. The great object is a union of views, to prevent the efforts of the party from being rendered useless by divisions; and this union is best attained by that process which shall best ascertain the public will—the only legitimate source of authority. To effect this, the representatives at the convention should come from the people, and should assemble to exercise their functions in as short an interval before the presidential election as may be compatible with the preparatory arrangements and investigations with such a great object requires. The people should have all the time possible to express their latest will in the nomination of the candidate to be submitted for their support. Nothing can be gained, and much may be lost, by undue haste. It may wear the appearance of distrust of the people, or of an unwillingness to leave their proper cause in their own hands. There, however, it should be left till the last reasonable moment; and then the convention will be the fair exponents of the will of their constituents at the time the delegated trust is to be exercised. I do not suffer myself to doubt but that these views will meet the approbation of the great Democratic party.

With great respect, gentlemen,  
I have the honor to be,  
Your obedient servant,  
LEWIS CASS.  
To Ethan A. Brown, John Law, Nathaniel West, John Pettit, Jesse D. Bright, and A. C. Pepper, Esquires.