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By George Howard, Jr.

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POETRY.

From the Richmond Enquirer.

VIVE LA BAGATELLE.

A new Whig Song for the fourth Thursday in April.

"The above cut represents Henry Clay as he actually was in his early boyhood—a mill boy, riding to mill, almost literally in his shirt tail—a scape grace, in the way of truancy—stopping to fling at every squirrel or old hare that comes across him—it may be, to get down to take a round at boxing with some neighboring urchin—always overstaying his time at mill, and probably getting birched for it when he got home, and put supperless to bed."—*Richmond Whig, April 7.*

Young Harry Clay to the mill has gone,
By the roadside you'll find him,
The corn bag, white, he is perched upon,
And his shirt tail streams behind him.

"Old buck-hare," said the noble lad,
"Since nobody now sees me,
One fling at thee I'll have, by dad!
Tho' birch and willow tease me."

Old cotton tail like a bolt has flown,
Young Harry stands confounded:
For Ball is off, down the road has gone,
The meal bag lies now grounded.

Now Tommy Smith doth ride this way,
With whortleberry basket,
Of whom our doughty Harry Clay
Thus petulantly asked:

"You ticky scamp, with cross-eyed face,
My horse you let go by you;
Get down, you dirty scant-o'-grace,
And let your master try you."

When whortleberries all are ripe
In Old Hanover county!
If t'wards a man, your nose you wipe,
By dads! he'll quickly mount ye.

So Tommy Smith, chock full of fight,
Like bucks in rutting season,
On Harry leaped, poor breechless wight,
And seized him by the weasand.

Young Harry came off second best.
As oft since has befided—
So, of his horse, he went in quest;
And then to get cowhided.

Wherefore we all, my brother whigs,
Our President will make him;
For these and various other rigs,
The Locos, damned, shall take him.

"THE SAME OLD COON."

POLITICAL.

Abolition Petitions.

MR SAUNDERS'S SPEECH.

We copy from the Globe the following sketch of the Remarks made by Judge Saunders in Congress, on the 19 h ult. on the report of the Select Committee on the Rules.

Mr. Saunders took the floor, and commenced with a few preliminary remarks, in too low a tone to be heard. He then went on to say, that he should proceed at once to reply to the objections that had been urged to the 21st Rule. We have (said he) repeatedly asked those gentlemen who are opposed to the 21st rule, what it was they meant by the sacred right of petition, when they talked of its being violated? Where did it commence, and where did it end? If they said that the people had the right to petition when and where they pleased, and on any subject, for the redress of grievances, whether real or imaginary, then he would say that there was no necessity for their travelling up to Magna Charta to support that position, for no one questioned it. He would go one step farther than some of these gentlemen had done. He admitted that the people not only had the right to petition, but the right to an unqualified answer from this House. Even on his admission, he was prepared so sustain the 21st rule. What was the language of the Constitution, on which gentlemen relied in their opposition to the 21st rule? It was, that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech or of the press; of the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." Now, the rule passed by Congress, called the one hour rule, which limited the speeches of members to one hour's time, was an abridgment of the freedom of speech. But the advocates of that rule contended that there was an existing abuse impeding the transaction of the business of the House, which required correction, and the rule was passed for that purpose. The rule establishing the previous question was not only an abridgment of the freedom of speech, but a total suppression of it, as it cut off debate; but that was justified by argument that this rule was necessary for facilitating the business of the House.

Congress (said the Constitution) should not have power to abridge the freedom of the press, and yet laws were made on that subject, with which the House was familiar. But it was said this rule violated the right of petition, because it did not allow petitions to be deliberated upon. In this there was a great error. A collegue of his had said the House could not know whether the petitions prayed for a constitutional or an unconstitutional act, or indeed for an improper act, unless the petitions were heard; and a gentleman from Ohio [Mr Duncan] had said that the inhabitants of this District could not petition for the abolition of slavery in this District, unless this rule was repealed. In all this there was great fallacy. The House knew what the rule was. It was that no petition, memorial, resolution, or other paper praying the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia, or any State or Territory, or the slave trade between the States or Territories of the United States in which it now exists, shall be received by the House, or entertained in any way whatever. That was the rule which the Speaker, as the presiding officer of this House, was required to enforce; and he could not enforce that rule until the agent of the petitioners had announced the purport of the petition which he rose to present. The House was then informed of the purport of such petitions, and the petitioners were then shown by that rule, that the House had considered the subject and given its judgment. Here, then, the facts were ascertained, the prayer was heard, and it was then met by the Speaker, as the presiding officer, who interposed this rule as the judgment of the House thereon. He illustrated this point in various ways, and then came to the question whether this rule was right and proper. He understood the gentleman from New York [Mr. Beardsley] to say, the other day, that a petition asking the House to interfere with slavery in the States, was to ask Congress to do that which it could not do; and that he would not receive such petition. Why? Because it asked for an unconstitutional thing. But the same gentleman said, when a petition asked Congress to abolish slavery in the District of Columbia, that that was a different question, and it then became a matter of expediency whether the petition should be received and acted upon. Now, he intended to meet the gentleman from New York on that proposition. Who was to decide on the constitutionality or unconstitutionality of the subject prayed for? It must be done by a majority of the members of this House. Now he (Mr. S.) asserted that Congress possessed no power to abolish slavery in the District of Columbia. Congress could not expend the public money for such a purpose. The right of the owners of slaves to that species of property was admitted to be as conclusive as the right to any other property. The right to this property was recognised in Maryland in 1715—Maryland being then a colony. He showed what were the laws on this subject in eleven slaveholding States, and replied to some remarks made by the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr Hudson] on this branch of the subject; and he proceeded to say that the Constitution expressly provided that Congress should not take private property unless it were for public uses, and then only on making compensation to the owners of the property. The gentleman from New York admitted that slaves were private property; he said, likewise, that Congress might emancipate the slaves; but he did not say whether Congress should make compensation for those slaves. He dodged that question. But he (Mr. S.) contended that Congress could not take the public money for any such purposes. The eighth section of the 1st article of the Constitution contained an enumeration of the powers of Congress; but no gentleman could tell him that it contained any such powers.

The honorable gentleman went into a long argument to prove the position he assumed; in the course of which, he took occasion to show what had been done by Congress heretofore in relation to this class of petitioners, and how the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. Adams] had voted thereon. He read various resolutions of the House adopted in the year 1836 & 1838.

How stood the question in 1838? Then they had the famous resolution declaring that Congress had no power to interfere with slavery in the States, and that such interference would be a breach of public faith.

Mr. Beardsley said the gentleman had mis-apprehended him upon this question. He had not said that all he desired was that these petitions should be received and laid upon the table. He had added a qualification that, if the House was ready to act upon them, as he himself had always been in such case, he cared not whether they were laid upon the table or not, the mere reception was sufficient to meet the requirements of the Constitution. He had added that, in his opinion, the expedient and proper course was to send them to the committee most favorable to the prayer of the petition, to the end that they might see what such committee would advise the country to do under the circumstances.

Mr. Saunders said he understood the gentleman now to say that he had made up his mind that slavery ought not to be abolished.

Mr. Beardsley said he had so declared, perhaps a hundred times.

Mr. Saunders said he was glad to find that he was not misrepresenting the gentleman. All that the gentleman desired was that the petitions should be received and laid upon the table; he did not desire that they should be considered. Why? Because his mind was made up upon the subject. To what? Not to abolish slavery. He admitted, that if the majority there thought that they ought to abolish slavery, they ought to receive and consider the petitions; but it was because the majority were not in favor of the abolition of slavery that the 21st rule ought to be established. When the petition was laid upon the table, it was an answer, and showed that the prayer of the petition was refused. Suppose a petition were presented to that House asking to apply the torch of destruction to the capitol: ought such a petition to be received? No; because it was asking to commit a felony. And did not these petitions ask the destruction of the temple of liberty itself? Where was the difference, therefore, between receiving such a petition as he had alluded to, and receiving abolition petitions, which pray for a thing which all admit ought not to be done? The 21st rule, so far from being wrong, was, in fact, perfectly right in itself. It was the judgment of the House upon the subject; and so far from being productive of injury, it had been productive of good: why? Because it had kept off that continual clamor which would otherwise have prevailed, about the abolition of slavery. He must be permitted to say to the gentleman from New York, in good feeling, that he was deceiving himself by supposing that the discussion which was going on there produced no mischief elsewhere. Yes, the very proclamation which the gentleman from Massachusetts had made, that he had triumphed upon this question, was already producing mischief elsewhere. As soon as the colored population were led to believe that they would receive especial encouragement and protection from the Congress of the United States, they would be ready for almost any act of insubordination.

From the Raleigh Standard.

We promised last week, and now publish, the remarks of Mr. BROWN, of Tennessee, delivered in the House of Representatives on the subject of abolition petitions. Mr. Brown takes the right ground, and he makes his position impregnable to the assaults of the fanatics. Let every man read it.

Mr. A. V. Brown said there were three distinct propositions now to be decided by the House. The first one was, *not* to receive abolition petitions; The second, *to receive*, but not to refer, report, or debate upon them; the third, to receive them, and, treating them like other ordinary petitions, to refer them to a committee, to report upon them, and to debate them.

Mr. B. said he had always voted for the first of those propositions; he was prepared to vote for it now, and to vindicate and maintain that vote here, and every where.

What objection, said he, is urged to the 21st rule excluding these petitions. I ask not what the raving fanatic out of this House has said, but what honorable members here have told us in this very debate.

They tell us this 21st rule has *violated the* great constitutional right of petition. I deny it.—They tell us that it has turned these petitions *out of doors*, and driven them with *scorn and contempt* from these halls. I deny it. The gentleman from New York has said it; the gentleman from North Carolina has said it; the gentleman from Massachusetts has said it; others have said it. I deny it; and stand here to day to defy them, one and all, to defy them—to what? To the proof.

Where is that proof? It lies on our table.—It is in the public records of this House. Well, what do they tell us? Take that petitition, as it was said, with *fifty* thousand signatures; or take that *huge roll* that adorned the table of the gentleman from Massachusetts last session; or take that one for the dissolution *of the Union*: or that one from New York, praying to be *separated* from the institutions of slavery;—take any one or all of these, and let us see if we either violated the right of petitioners, or turned them, unheard, scornfully from our doors.

1st The people assembled peaceably. Did we violate that right; 2d They petitioned for the redress of real or imaginary *grievances* Did we prevent that? 3d. They sent them to their own selected agents. Did we prevent that? 4th. That agent brought them within these halls, and *presented* them to this House. Did we prevent that?

What next did that agent do? he rose up in his place; and, when all eyes were turned upon him, and all ears open to his voice, he informed this House who they were, what they complained of, how they reasoned on the subject, and what redress they prayed for.

These are the facts; the record proves them and gentlemen know them. Now the question is, *have* we thrown down the right of petition? Have we driven the petitioners with scorn from our door? No we have not. We have heard them by their own selected agent. They did not come themselves—they came by their agent. We received that agent. He spoke for them, and made known to us their prayer. The moment their prayer was heard; their right of petition was perfected. Their *right* was to petition—our duty was to *hear*. When we did hear them, through their agent, their right was ended. All *after* that was *our* right.—To decide at once, or to go through the tedious formalities of legislation, was for us to determine. Under the 21st rule, we decided promptly—at once—what these gentlemen nearly all say we ought finally to have done. Let me explain all this by a domestic illustration, which none can fail to understand. The mother, with her darling child, busied as she may be in her ordinary pursuits, is yet bound to hear all the complaints of that child—the child has a *right* to be heard.—But, being heard, what next? If the request be unreasonable or impossible she may answer promptly, No! If she be doubtful, she may answer, I will consider of it, or I will tell you by-and-by.

In a case like this, whatever the child might think of the impatience or unkindness of the decision, it could never say, My parent refused to hear me.

This is the 21st rule, and this the practice under it, which has been so much misrepresented and misunderstood.

Gentlemen may tell me that the fact of its being so much misunderstood is a ground for its abandonment. Why, then, was not a rule reported, clearing up this misconception, *by declaring on its face* that these petitions should be *received*, but going no further? Why did not the gentleman from New York, [Mr. Beardsley,] propose to go *that far?* And because that was all that the right of petition could require, why did he not stop there? Stopping *there*, the South, if not satisfied, would yet have been safe—safe in the enjoyment of her constitutional rights, and perhaps safe from the fire of insurrection. Stopping there, too, the people of the North would have been safe in the enjoyment of their constitutional right of petition; and more than this, the Democratic North would have been safe from the imputation of her enemies, that she sought the alliance or the propitiation of the abolitionary fanaticism of the day.

What do gentlemen tell us in favor of the total abandonment of this rule? Why, they tell us that it is the most effectual way to put down abolition. They had as well tell us that the best way to save a city, is to pull down all her fortifications; that the surest way to repel invasion, is to surrender all the mountain passes and strongholds where you might overcome the enemy. Put down the abolitionist by granting four out of five of the very things they ask for; first, they ask you to receive their petitions; second, to refer them; third, to report on them; fourth, to let them be debated; and fifth, to abolish the institution of slavery.

These are the five things asked for; and the argument is, to put them down by granting four out of five of them.

Why refer them? Do you doubt? No. Why report on them? Do you mean to pass them? No. Why debate them? Why, you say that you are all of one mind. Why, then, all this round of legislative formality? Is it done in hypocrisy? I will not say it, nor think it. Is it done to propitiate, by showing respect to the abolitionists? I will not say it, because I do not feel it.

But I have one conclusive and irresistible argument to show that this is not the way to put down the abolitionists: *you have tried it.* On the same speech which was made by the gentleman from New York, (if not word for word, certainly on the same arguments,) the Pinckney resolutions were passed. The petitions were received; they were referred, and reported upon in the most dignified and respectful manner. Did this satisfy abolitionists, or allay excitement? No; the very next session the gentleman from Massachusetts came walking into this hall with fifty thousand petitioners at his heels. Under that resolution, the cry was raised. Now is the time—the doors of Congress stand wide open; put all your machinery in motion; bring out your candidates—men that will not vote for a slaveholding Speaker—men that will be safe to trust on the committees—men who will be able in debate to espouse and sustain our cause: if those who have befriended us thus far will not go farther—if he of Massachusetts—if Slade and Clark and Gates shall falter in their course, down with them; everything for our cause, and nothing for men.

This, sir, was the abolition cry, and we were forced to retrace our steps—to resort to the Atherton resolutions; from them we were forced to the 21st rule; and now we are told we must surrender all.

I wish now to tell the gentlemen of the North why we of the South are so much opposed to referring these petitions. If you refer you must report; if you report, you must debate; if you debate, you annually question our title. This must finally diminish, if not destroy, the value of our property. An annual suit for a tract of land—suit after suit—is brought; will not the land become valueless, and the owner ready to surrender it forever? It will keep the South in perpetual excitement. And lastly, you kindle the fires of insurrection. The words of the gentleman from Massachusetts, uttered here, have often fallen on the ears of the South like the toll of the fire bell at night. Gentlemen surely do not understand what is going on in the South. Hundreds and thousands of our slaves have learned to read with our children, under a relaxation prompted by the noblest humanity; hence our annual debates here could not fail to be known to them there. The address of the abolitionist to their masters is there—the address of the abolitionist to themselves there; they are read by the flickering light of a midnight fire. They, are told, in a latter address, not to kill, not to shed innocent blood, but to take horses money and clothes, and whatever else may facilitate their escape, and flee to the free States, where friends are waiting to conduct them to Canada. But what they may do I know not when they shall read (as read they will) the celebrated Pittsburg letter. There *a new idea* is presented.

Little does that gentleman perhaps know what mischief may flow from that address. "He believed the abolition of slavery would be effected in some way either peaceably or by blood; but in whatever way, *he was for it.*" Where did he get that idea from? Not from the abolitionists, for they only said, *steal* and fly? Did he get it from the bloody scene of San Domingo, where they shed the blood of a sleeping infant, and stuck a pole through its yet warm and quivering body, and under that standard marched, with the torch in one hand and the sword in the other?

These are some of the consequences which prompt me earnestly to appeal to the true and sincere friends of the Constitution; to let this report go back to the committee. Let the whole committee be present, and perhaps they may report back to us the 21st rule. I think they ought to do so. I will vote for it again, as I have often done before. But if they will not, then let them report some modification of the rule, which will put the right of petition out of all cavil & dispute. But if they will do neither of these; if they still persist in not only *receiving*, but referring, reporting, and debating these petitions, then I say let the South know it at once. Let her know her true friends, and who are her false and deceitful ones. Let her know the worst, and prepare for the worst.

A Log cabin Crush—Terrible Accident—Ominous!—The Richmond Enquirer of yesterday, says:—We sincerely regret to announce a melancholy event, which occurred at the Whig Club house at sunset last evening. The house was just finished, and about 100 persons had clustered together on the ridgepole of the roof, which was about 40 or fifty feet from the ground—an individual had taken off his hat, and about to proclaim that the Rally would take place to day, when a large portion of the roof fell in, carrying down the whole crowd of persons. We have not been able to gather the particulars—but understand that the following are the names of the persons who were the greatest sufferers: Doct. Lemoso; badly; Ed. Allen, very badly; W. Pearson, leg broke, W. H. Redwood, leg broke; Mr. Walsh, arm broken in two places; Mr. Adie, arm broken in two places; Mr Pemberton, thigh broken; Hugh Fry and son, badly; Robert Maynard, ancle broke; Mr. Mays, arm broken; young Crouch, badly.

Some of the boys suffered very much. A son of Mr. S. H. Myres had an arm broken in two places. A son of Mr. Græme, also, had an arm broken. Two sons of Mr. Walsh were much injured; one having his leg broken, the other considerably hurt. Others, whose names we have not been able to learn, were much injured, though not very dangerously.

The New Orleans Picayune says that there is a fellow in that city so lazy that he writes Andrew Jackson thus—&ru Jaxn.