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75
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Tarborough, Edgecombe County, J V. Saturday February 17, IS 14.
IU XX .To. 7.
TAMll(II)fEl)9
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MR. CALHOUN'S LET PER.
Fort Hi, Dec 21, 1S43.
Gentlemen: I herewith enclose you,
as the oran of th se who have nominated
me for the Presidency in this State, sub
ject to a convention fairly constituted, an
Address to my political fiirnds and suppor
ters, assigning my reason for not permit
ling mv name to go before the proposed
Convention to beheld in Baltimore in May
rrxt. I transmit it lo you, because I
deem it respectful and proper to make it
known to those to whom it is addressed,
through you, and in order to afford you an
opportunity to lake such tneasuies in re
lation to it, as vou may de-m nrooer. if
indeed, you' should di em any necessary
All I have to request is. that its publica
tion should not be unnecessarily delayed.
Willi great respect I am, &c. &c.
(Signed,) J. C. CALHOUN.
Hon. Jacob Bond I'On
and other members of the Committee.
The Address nf Mr. Calhoun to his
political friends and supporters.
I hive left it to you, mv friends and
supporters, through whose favorable esti
mate of my qualification, my name h s
bepn presented to the people of the Uni'ed
States for the office of Chief Magistrate to
conduct the canvass on such principles,
and in such manner, as you might think
best. But, in so doing, I did not waive
my right to determine, in my individual
responsibility, what course my duty might
co r.p-l me to pursue ultima'ely, nor have I
been an inattentive observer of the canvass
and the cour.-e you have taken.
It affords mepleasuieto be enabled to
eay, that on all leading questions, growing
out ot the canvass. I heartily concurred
with you, in the grounds you took, and es
pecially in those relating to the mode in
which the Delegates to Ihe proposed Con
venMon to he held in Baltimore, should be
appointed, and how thev should vote You
have, in my opinion, conclusively shown.
that they should be appointed bv District
and vole per capita; but your reasons, as
conclusive as they ar have proved in
vain. Already New York and someolhr
Stales have appointed Delegates en masse,
by State Conventions, and one State (Vir
ginia) his resolved that the votes of her
Delgttes should he given by the majority,
and be counted per cap ita Their course
would necessarily overrule thai which you
have so ably supported, should you go in
to Convention, and, would leave you no al
tet native, but to yield yours and adopt
theirs, however much you may be opposed
to it on principle, or to meet them on the
most unequal terms, with divided against
united and concentrated forces.
.'1 he question then is, what course, un
der such circumstances, should be adopted?
And that question, you will be compelled
speedily to. decide. The near approach of
the time for meeting of the proposed Con
vention will not admit of much longer de
lay. But as your course may depend in
some degree on that which I have decided ' States, after a long and doubtful struggle, : flnence of the larger Slates preponderates.
IP take, I dt em it due to ihe relation sub-j which threatened the loss of the Constitu- would nominate, and that the House, vo
listing hetwen us. to make mine known to lion iiself. The object of giving to the. ting by States, where their equality is pre-
sisting
you without fuMher delay.
1,' then, after the n)l careful and delib
er ite purvey of the whole ground, have de
cided, that I cannot permit my name to go
before ihe proposed Convention, constitu
tod as it must now he, consis'ently with
my principles, which have ever guided my
public conduct. My objections are insu
perable As it must be constituted, il is
repugnant to all the principles, on which,
in my .opinion, guch a Convention should
be formed. What those principles are, I
shall now proceed britfly lo state.
I hold, then; with you, that the Conven
tion should be so constituted, as to ut'er
fully au'd clearly the voice of the people
and not that of political managers, or office
holders and office seekers; and for that
purpose, I hold it indispensable, that the
delegates should be appointed directly by
the people, or lo use the language of Gen.
Jackson, should be 'fresh from ihe peo
ple," I also hold, that the only possible
made to fffect this, is for ihe people to
choose the Delegates by Districts, and that
they should vote per capita. Every oth
er mode of appointing would be controlled
by political machinery, and place the ap-
pointmenls in the hands of the few, who
work it.
I object, then, to the proposed Conven
tion, because it will not be constitute'! in
conformity vith ihis fundamental article of
the Republican creed. The delegites to it
will be appointed from some o( ihe State,
no1 xn" people in Us nets, but as has
ben Stated, bv StateConventions en m isse.
composed of D legates appointed in all ca
SP, so far a, l ;m jnf,1Pm(,fi uv nmiI1, (11
District Conventions, and in some cases, if
not misinformed, these again composed of
delegates appointed bv still smaller divi
sions, or a few interested individuals In
stead then of being direct lv, or fiesh from
ihe people, the Delegates to ihe Bdtimore
Convention will be the Delegates of Dt le
gates; and of course removed, in all cass,
at least three, if not four degrees from the
people. At each successive remove, ihe
voice of the people will become less full
and distinct, until at last, it will he so faint
and imperfect, as not to be audible To
drop metaphor, I hold it impossible to form
a scheme more perfectly calculated lo anni
hilale the control of ihe people over the
ii :i i l i . . .
rreMcieniiai eieci ion, anu vesi : m tnose.
who make politics a trade, and who live or
expect lo live on the Government.
In this connection, I objct not less
strongly to th mode in which Virginia
has lesolved her Delegates shall vote
With all due respect. I must say, I can im
agine nothing moredirect.lv in conflict with
the principles of our fedetal system of gov
ernment, or lo use a broader expression.
the principles on which all confederated
communities have ever been united. I
hazard nothing in saying, that there is not
an instance in our political history, from
he meeting of th first revolutionary Con-gre-s
to the present day, of the Delega es
of any State voting by majority and co ant
ing per Cifpifa; nor do I believe an in
stance of the kind can he found in the his.
tory of any confederated community.
I here is indeed something monstrous in '
the idea of giv ing the majority the rght of
impressing the vole of the minority into
its service, and counting them as its own
The plain rule thai which has ever pre
vailed and which conforms to the dictates
of common sense, is, that where a State
votes as a Slate, bv a majority of its Dele
gates, the voles count one, be they few or
many, or the Slate large or small. Ot the
contrary, where the votes of all the Dele
gates are counted, ihcv vote individually
and independently, each for himself count
ing one. And it is to be noted, that wher
ever this latter mode of voting exists
among confederated States, it is in all ca
ses founded on compact, to which the con
sent of each State is required. In the ab
sence of compact the invariable mode of vo
ting in such States is, in all cases, by the
majority, their vote counting one The
course which Virginia has resolved to take,
is in viola' ion of ihi- pi tin and fundamental
rule, and if it should become a settled prac
tice, would be destructive of the founda
tion on which ihe whole structure of ihe
State Right doctrine is reared
I hold, in ihe next place, to be an indis
pensable principle, that the Convention
should he so constituted, as io give to each
State, in the nomination of a candidate, the
same relative weight, which' ihe Constitu
tion secures to ii in the election of ihe Pre
sident, making due allowance for its rela
tive party strength. By the election, I
mean the whole the eventual choice when
it goes into Ihe House of Representatives,
as well as ihe primary vote in the electoral
collpge. The one is as much a part of the
election as the other. The two make 'he1
whole. The adoption of the one, in the
Convention, which framed ihe Constitu
tion, depended on the adoption of the oth
er. Neither could possibly be adopted
alone The two were the result of com-
Ipromise between the larger and smaller
smaller States an equality with the larger,
in ihe eventual choice by ihe House, was
to counterpoise the preponderance of the
larger in ihe electoral college. Without
this, the smaller would have voted against
the whole provision, and its tejection would
have been the consequence. Even as it
stands, Delaware voted against it In con
firmation of what l. state, I refer to Mr.
Madison's report on the proceedings of the
Convention.
Having stated what I mean by the elec
tion, it will require but a few words to ex
plain my reasons for the principles I have
laid down. They are few and simple, and
res' on the ground, that Ihe nomination is
in reality the election, if concurred in, as
fir as the party is concerned. It is so in
tended to be. The leading reason assign
ed for making it, is to prevent a division of
the party, and thereby pievent the election
from going into the House, where ihe
smaller States would have ihe advantage
intended to be secured to them by the Con
stili-ition, by being placed on an equality
with ihe larger.
Such being the intended object and enect.
I now submit to every candid mind, whe
ther the Convention ought not to be so con-,
stituted, as to compensate in the nomina
tion for the important advantage in the
election, which the smaller States surren
der by going into a Convention. Would it
not be unfair a palpible- want of good
faith and subversive of the comp-omise of
the Constitution to withhold it? Or, if de
manded, would it be short of an insult to
refuse it? Can it be thought that the m ill
er Siates are so debased and absorbed in the
ptrty politics, of the day, as to permit
themselves to be thus indirectly stripped of
a right, which their high minded and patri
otic ancestors held so dear, as even to pre
fer the loss of '.he Constitution itself, rather
than surrender it.
I object, then, to the proposed Conven
tion, in this connection, because it makes
no compensation to the smaller States fo
the surrender of this unquestionable an im
portant constitutional right. .Instead of
'hat, its advocates peremptorily and indig
nantly refuse any, and treal with scorn ev;
ery attempt to secure it Some have even
gone so lar, as to deny, that the eventual
choice of the House constitutes any portion
ot the election, and to manifest open hos
ulity against the provision of the Constiiu
tion, which contains it.
If there was no other objection, the one
under consideration would be insuperable
with me. I differ utterly from the. adv
cacs of the proposed Convention, in ref
erence to this provision. I regard it as o ie
of the first importance, not because I desire
the election to go into the House, but be
caiHelbelieve.it to be an indispensable
means, in ihe hands of the smaller States,
of preserving their just and constitutional
weight in the Presidential election, and
thtough that, in the Executive 'Depirt merit
and the Government itself, which I believe
to be essential to the preservation of our
sublime federal system. I regard the ad
justment of the relative weight of the Sta'es
in the Government to be the fundamental
compromise of Ihe Constitution, and that
on which our whole political system de
pends. Its adjustment constituted the
great difficulty in forming the Constitution.
The principle on which it was finally effec
ted was, that, while due concession should
be made lo population, a piovision should
b" also made, in some form, to preserve
the original equality of the States in every
department of the Government. The
principle was easily carried out in constitu
ting the legislative department, by preser
ving ihe equality of the Stales in one
branch, (the Senate) and conceding to pop
ulation its full preponderance in the other
But the great ;nd difficult task of reducing
il to practice was. in the Executive Depart
ment, at the head of which there is but a
single officer. So great was it, that it oc
cupied the attention of the Convention,
from time lo time, during the whole session,
and was very near causing a failure at last
It would have been an easy task to consti
tute that department, either on the princi
ple of the equality of the states in the gov-
ernment, or that of population. To com
bine the two, in the election of a single offi
cer, was quite a different affair; but howev
er difficult, it had to be performed, at the
hazard of losing the Constitution.
It was finally accomplished, by giving to
the larger States nearly ihe same prepon
derance in the electoral college, as ihey
have in the House, and lo the smaller, in
the event of a choice by ! the House, ihe
same equalty ihey possess in the Senate;
thus following closely the analogy . of the
Legislative Department. To make it as
close as possible, it was at first proposed 'to
give the eventual choice lo the Senate, in
stead of the House, but it was altered
and the present provision adopted for rea
sons which did not affect the principle.
It was believed by the frame rs, the prac
tical operation of the provision would be,
. that the electoral college, in which the in
served, would elect who should he the Pre-
sident. To give it that operation in prac
tice, the provision, as it orignally stood in
the Constitution, was that each elector
should vote for two individuals, without
discriminating which should be President,
and if no one had a majority of the whole
votes, then out of the five highest, ihe
House voting by Slates, should elect one,
and the person not elected, .having the
highest number of vote, should be the
Vice President. It has been since altered,
so thai ihe electors should designate which
should be President.&whichVicePresidenl,
the selection of the House was limited to the
three highest, that if this; provision of
the Cons'itution had been left to operate by
itself, without the intervention of caucuses,
or parly conventions between the. peep'e
and the election, that the practical opera
tion would hare been such as 1 have slated,
and such as was clearly intended by the fra
oners' of the Constitution. ; ,;
The object intended is important.' The1
preservation of the relative weight of the
States,ias established by the ' Constitution
in all ihe Departments, is necessary-to the
Jsdccess and duration of our system of Gov
ernment: but it may be doubted, whether
the provision adopted to effect it in the Ex
ecutive Department, is not too refined lor
th-strong and I may add, corrupt p issions,
which the Presidential election will ev r
excite Certain it is, that it th practice of
nominating candidates for the Presidency,
by Co iven'ions constituted as ihev propo
sed, shill become the stablished usage, it
sv i i 1 utterly defeat the intention of the fia
mers of the Constitution, and would be fol
lowed b, n radical and dangerous chang--.
not only in the , Executive D 'pariment.
but in the Government it-elf
Pile danger was eaily foreseen, and 'o
avoid it, some of the wisest and most ex
p"rien ed statesman of former days s
strongly objected to Congressional caucus
s s lo nominate candidates fjr the Presi
dency, that the) never could he induced to
attend them; among them it will be suffi
cient to name Mr. Macon and Mr. Lown
des Others, believing that ihis provis
ion of the Constitution was too refined for
practice, were solicitous to amend it, hut
without impairing ihe influence of the
smaller States in the election. Among
these I rank myself. Wiih that obj- ct. re
solution were introduced, in lsi2S. in
the Senate by Col. Benton, and in
the House by Mr. McDuffie, provi
ding lor districting..- the St.des, ami lot
iderriog the election back to the people
in cas: there should be no choice, to elect
one from the two highest candidates ; The
principle which governed in the amend-
in ml prop sed, was to give a for compen
sation to ihe smaller Si ,tes for ihe surren
der of" their, advantage in J tie eventual
choice by the House and at the same tim
to make Ihe mode of electing the Preiden'
more strictly in conformity with the pi'm
ciples of our popular institutions and to be
less liable to corruption, than. the- existing
provision. They received ihe geneial
support of the patty, but w r objected to
by a few, as not. being a full quiva!ent
to the smaller States The principle em
braced is identical with that on which von
proposed io constitute ihe Baltimore-Con
veniion, but which has been so dictatorial
ly objected to by some, who then, look so
prominent a pait in its favor. If you have
not succeeded, there is al least some conso
lation in reflecting that if nthets have since
changed, you- now stand where you then
did, in the purer and belter days of ihe par
ty I was in favor of it then, as I am now,
not because I consider the resolutions as
perfect, theoretically, as the 'XHting provi
sions of the Constitution, but because I b-
lieve it ' would in practice more certainly j lying contiguous and not far from the cen
accomplish what the framer of the Consti-j ne ( f ihe Union, lo control the nomina
lutinn intended. But while the provision ! tion, and through that the election, by con
stands as it does. I would regard myself as ; cen rating their united votes in the Con
little short of a traitor to that sacred indention. Give them the power of doing
strument, should I give my assent, direct-' so. and it would not long lie dormant.
Iv or indirectly, lo any practice which What may be done by combination, where
would have ihe effect of divt sting the small- the temptation is so great, will be sure ere
er States of the due weight which it secures ( long to be done To combine and conquer,
to th-m in the Presidential election, whe- j is not less true as a maxim, where power is
ihr designed or not And here let me concerned, than lo "Divide and conquer."
add, that as objectionable as I think a ''on-) Nothing is belter established, than that the
gressional caucus for nominating a Presi 'desi e for power can bring together and
dent, it is in my opinion far less so, than a j unite ihe mot discordant materials.
Convention constituted as is proposed. J Rut Ihp tendency lo centralization will
The former had indeed many things to re- J not stop there. The appointments of dele
commend it. lis members consisting of' gate? en-masse by Slate Conventions,
Senators atul Representatives, were ihe im-1 would tend, al the same time and . even
mediate organs of the State Legislatures, or! with greater force, to centralize this control
Ihe people; were responsible to them, re-; in the hands of the few who make politicsa
spectively, and were for ihe most part of . trade. The farther ihe Convention is re
high character, standing aod talents They j moved from the people, the more certainly
voted per capita, and what is very import- ihe control over it will be placed in the
anl, they represented fairly the nlaive , hands of the inteicsled few, and when re
strength of the prty in iheir respeciive j moved three or four degrees, as has been
States In all these important particulars, (shown il will be, where the appointment
it was all that could be desired for a nomi-!is by Stale Conventions, ihe power of the
nating body, and formed a striking contrast
lo the ' proposed Convention; and yet, it
could not he borne by the people in the
then purer days ol the Republic. I, act
ing with Gen. Jackson and most of the lea -
tiers of the parly al the time, contributed
to put it down, because we believed it to
be liable to be acted on and influenced by
the patronage of the Government an ob
jection far more applicable to a Convention
cons ittHed as the one proposed, than to a
Congressional caucus . Far however was
it fiom my intention in aiding lo put that
down, to substitute in its place what I re
gard as an hundred'time- more objectiona
ble in every point of view Indeed, if
thee must he an intermediate body be
tween the people and the election, un
known to ihe Con-tiuition, it may be wi i
questioned whether a better than the old
plan of a Congressional caucus can be devi
sed. In taking the ground I have, in favor of
maintaining Ihe right secured to ihe small
er Siaies by the compromise of the Consti
tution, I am actuated by no partisan feeling
or de.-ire to conciliate ll eir good op nion
If the case was reversed, and the right ol
the larger, instead ol the small r, weie. in
vaded, I . would with equal readiness an''
firmness, stand up in their defence. I am
the partisan of neither oi.e, nor ihe other,
but simply a supporter of 'the' Constitution,
and what I believe to be just and fair. I
regard the Cons' itution, .as the only arko
safely for all, and 1 bclive that in defend-
;ng it. I defend the inlet est and safety of
each and all the greater, as well as the
smaller the States invading the right of
the others, as well as the Stales whose
rights are invaded.
I have laid down the principle, on which
I rest the objection in .question, with .the
limitation, that the relative weight of the
Sta'es should be maintained, making due
allowance tor their relative parly strength.
The propriety of the limitation is so appa
r ni, th t bui a few words, i i illustration,
will be requited. The Convention is a
pirty Con v ent ion, and professedly intend
ed to lake the sense of ihe parly, which
cannot be done fairly, if States, having but
li'tle party strength, are put on an equality
wnh th se wJvch have much II that were
lone, the result 'might be, that a small por
tion ol the nattv Irom Slates the least
und, politically, and which could give
but liitle support in Congnss, might select
the candidate, and make ihe President,
against a great majoiity of the soundest,
and on which ihe Prr sident and his admin
istration would have to rely for support.
All this is clearly too unfair and improper
to be denied. I here may be a great diffi
culty in annlving a remedy in a Conven
tion, but I do not feel myself called upon
lo say how it can be done or by what stan
datd the relative paity strength of ihe re-
Siicitive States she old be determined; per
haps the best would be their relative
stiengih in Congress al the time. .Maying
d iwn the principle, 1 added the limitation
for ihe sake of accuracy, and lo show how
imperfectly the parly must be represented,
v hen il is overlooked. 1 see no provision,
m the proposed Convention lo meet it. .
But. in order to realise how the Conven
'ion will operate, it will be necessary to
v.ew the combined t fleets of the objections
which I have made Thus viewed, it. will
he found, that a Convention so constituted,
ends irresistibly to centralization cen
tralization of ihe control over ihe Presiden
tial election, in the hands of a few of the
central, large Ma4es, al first, and finally in
political managers, office holders and office,
seeker; or to express it differently in that:
portion of the community, who live, or ex
pect to live on the, Government in contra
distinction to Ihe great mass, who expect
lo live on their own means, or thtii hjii
cst indus ry; and who maintain the Gov
ernment, and politically speaking, emphati
cally the people.
That such would be the case, may be in
ferred f:pm the fact, that it would afford
the means to some six or seven States
: peopk will cease, and the seekers of Exec
ulive favor willbecome supreme.. At
that stage, an active, trained and combined
corps will be formed in the party, whose
, wli e time and attention will be directed
to politics. It will be thir sole business.
Into their hands the appointments of dele
gates in all the stag's will fall, and they
will lake special caie that none but them
selves or their humble and obedient depen
dants shall be appointed. The central and
State Conventions will be filled by the
most expe ienced and cunning, and after
nominating the President, ihey will take
gootl care to divide the pattonage and offi
ces both of the tieneral and Slate Govern
ments, among themselves and their depen
dants. But why say will? Is it not fl
ready the case? Have there not been ma
ny ins'ances of Ste Conventions being
fit led '-by office holders and office-seekers,
vt ho, after making ihe nomination, have
divided ihe offices in ti e State, among
themselves and their partisans, and joined
in recommending io the candidate, whom
thev have just nominated to appoint them
to the offices to which they have been res
pectively allotted. Ifsuch.be the case in
the infancy of. the systeni. it, must end,
if such conventions .should become the es
tablished usage, in the President nomina-.
ting hi suet esg-ir. . When it comes to that
it will -no' be long before the snord will
take the place of the Constitution.. . ;
. :Such,ar(e ntv objections to ,i,h.e ,rnode - jc .
Which the propoieJCuuveniion La to b