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By GEORGE HOWARD, JR.

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POETRY.

A SONG.

Should good old doctrines be forgot
In this auspicious day,
When scores of honest men and true,
Are rising from the Clay,
Are rising from the Clay, my boys,
Not having found relief,
In these two dollars for a day,
Plum pudding and roast beef.
The Government is deep in debt,
And the people feel it sore,
And shall we count in the amount,
Two hundred millions more—
Two hundred millions more, by boys,
By the figures and the dates,
In a new and general Bankrupt Law
For the speculating States?
Our currency is coming straight,
For the noble it has burst,
Blown by the Bank before it fell,
Corrupted and accurs'd,—
Corrupted and accurs'd my boys,
How then shall we sustain,
The man who tries e'er Jackson dies,
To give it life again?
The Treasury can barely meet
The debts upon its hands,
And yet the coins would take away
The proceeds of the lands—
The proceeds of the lands, my boys,
And squander them away,
With another tax upon your backs,
The whole amount to pay.
We have a right to Oregon,
And friends are there who pray
Their country's laws to shield them from
The troop of Hudson's Bay,
The troop of Hudson's Bay, my boys,
Who've carried off the spoil
Of skins and furs for many a day
And now they claim the soil.
And Texas too, we'll take her in,
When all hands shall agree,
And she has met her bonded debt,
And half her land is free,
And half her land is free, my boys,
So that the South shall fall
To change the checks and balances
That lie in either scale.
Hurrah! then for democracy,
Which claims for great and small,
The constitutional deserts,
The "Equal Rights" of all,—
The "Equal Rights" of all, my boys,
Upon your country's sod;
These are our principles, and this
The creed of Polk and Tod.

POLITICAL.

From the Madisonian.

TO MY FRIENDS THROUGHOUT THE UNION.

The reasons which influenced me in accepting the nomination for the Presidency, made by a convention of my friends in May last, at Baltimore, have lost much of their original force. I had been not only most violently assailed by the ultraists of both parties, but had been threatened with impeachment for having negotiated a treaty proposing the annexation of Texas to the Union, as a portion of its territory, and for having adopted precautionary measures clearly falling within the range of executive discretion, to ward off any blow which might have been seriously aimed at the peace and safety of the country in the event of the ratification of the treaty by the Senate. The opinion of a person, once ranked among the distinguished jurists of the country, found its way into the newspapers, apparently as the precursor of such proceeding. A report had also been made at a previous session of Congress, by a committee of the House of Representatives, which proceeded from the pen of a man who filled no limited space in the eye of the world, in which—because of the exercise of the veto power in arrest of the unconstitutional and pernicious measures of a United States bank, and a donation to the States of so much of the public revenue as was derived from the public lands, at a moment of great embarrassment to the treasury, and when loans were necessary to sustain the government—I was charged with the commission of grave offences in the above particulars, and with deserving all the pains and disgrace flowing from the high power of impeachment, a measure, as it was intimated, only not resorted to by the House because of a doubt entertained whether the proceeding would be sustained by public sentiment. I had, it is true, protested against that report as originating in wrong, and dictated by party rancor and malevolence; but my protest was refused a place on the journals of the House; and thus, in future

times, my name might have been tarnished by the fact of a solemn declaration, highly implicating my character, remaining uncontradicted and unreversed on the public journals. The party majority which had sanctioned a proceeding so unjust had, it is true, been swept out of existence by the elections which shortly afterwards followed; but, at the time of my acceptance of the nomination, although a large and overwhelming majority of the opposite party had been brought into power by the people as if for the express purpose of sustaining me in what I had done, yet that very party had made no public movement indicative of a friendly feeling, and a portion of its members, who seemed to control the rest, exhibited the bitterest hostility and the most unrelenting spirit of opposition. Under these circumstances there was but one course left to me consistent with honor, which was to maintain my position unmoved by threats and intimidations by denunciations. Those of my countrymen who had come to my support had done so in a self-sacrificing spirit, without the indulgence of any other expectation than that my character should be vindicated, and that the policy of my administration should be sustained; and I felt that it would better become me to abide the most signal defeat than to incur the disgrace of deprecating the action of a party, the chief object of whose leaders seemed to be to fasten upon me disgrace. I had also an indistinct hope that the great question of the annexation of Texas might, in some degree, be controlled by the position I occupied. These motives induced my acceptance of the nomination made by my friends. Before the close of the session of Congress, however, developments were so clearly and distinctly made as to the threatened impeachment, that no trace of such a measure was left. Mr. J. Q. Adams's report, implicating my motives and conduct in my vetoes of the bank and other bills, was deprived of all of its force and furive effect, by a report made by a committee, of which Mr. Ellis, of New York, was chairman, accompanied by resolutions, which passed the House of Representatives some few days before the close of the session by a large and commanding majority, not only rescuing my motives from all imputation, but justifying and upholding my policy. The voice of the people in the elections of 1842 was thus directly responded to by that of their representatives, and but little remained for me personally either to expect or desire. Since the adjournment of Congress the language of many of the leading presses of the country, and resolutions adopted by large assemblages of the people in their primary meetings, have still further endorsed the proceedings of the House in approbation of the acts of the administration. I could not, however, look exclusively to my own wishes, which would have led me immediately to retire from the contest which seemed no longer to be possessed of an object worthy of much further attention. But I was not at liberty to do so without first consulting with such of my most prominent and steadfast friends as I could most readily confer with; men who had shared with me in much of the abuse which I had encountered, and would partially have participated in all the obloquy, if any, which might in the future attach to me. So far as I have been able to consult them, they have yielded their assent to the course which my own judgment suggests as proper; and I now announce to them and the country my withdrawal from the presidential canvass.

I cannot omit to accompany this public announcement with a few remarks, addressed to the republican portion of what was called the whig party of 1840. I make no appeal to that other portion, which was formerly known during the early period of our political history as federalists, at a later day as national republicans, and now pass under the general appellation of whigs. Such an appeal would be wholly out of place, since their political principles are entirely at war with those I have advocated through life. I mean no imputation on their motives or their patriotism. I doubt not that the old federal party, in the lead of which stood the elder Adams, were as deeply and sincerely convinced of the necessity of the alien and sedition laws, as the present is that of a Bank of the United States, with other measures equally latitudinous, along with the abolition of the veto power, whereby to convert the government into a mere majority machine—to make it the government of a single nation, instead of what it is, a political compact between free, sovereign, and independent States, by which so much power, and no more, has been granted to a common agent of all the States, as they esteemed to be necessary for the promotion of their mutual happiness. No; to them I have nothing to say. If I have received their support a my time, it has not been from attachment to me or my political principles, but from some supposed influence which I might bring to bear, as a secondary agent, in advancing their purposes. All the obliga-

tions which I have received for such reasons have been more than counterbalanced by the untiring opposition which I have encountered at their hands since I attained my present station, and the constant and unmitigated abuse which their leaders have poured out in a torrent upon my head, designed, as I verily believe, in the first instance, to drive me from the government, and in the last to overwhelm me with obloquy and reproach. But I have a right to address myself to those who, like myself, co-operated with them in the contest of 1840; who were, and always had been, the advocates of the principles of the old republican party; whose strenuous efforts have always been directed to preserving the compact of union unbroken and inviolate; who have sustained at all times the principles of the republican party of 1798-99; who have participated, from time to time, in all republican triumphs; whose fathers were victorious over the elder Adams in the election of Mr. Jefferson, as they themselves were over the younger in the election of General Jackson. To this portion of the whig party of 1840 I feel that I have a full right to address myself; and I now seriously put it to them to say whether any expectation of good to the country which they had formed in the election of General Harrison and myself to the presidency and vice presidency has been disappointed? Many of us had been thrown into opposition to General Jackson during his last term; having voted for him upon his first and second election because of certain doctrines put forth in his proclamation, and because of certain measures which followed that celebrated State paper. Our opposition proceeded from no spirit of faction, but from what we esteemed it to be, a sacred regard to the high and essential principles of the republican party, and regarding his successor as in a great degree identified with what we esteemed as errors in General Jackson's administration, our opposition was continued to him. The state and condition of the country also seemed to require change in the general administration. Have you been disappointed in the reform which you promised yourselves by going into that contest? You demanded a rigid economy to be observed in the public expenditures. Have you in this been disappointed? You required accountability on the part of all public agents. Has it not been fulfilled? Let the fact that a defaulter has become almost unknown for the last three years answer the question. You asked that a course of policy should be adopted which should purify and reform the currency. Was the currency of the country ever in a better condition? Let the rate of the exchanges between all parts of the country answer the inquiry. Has the day ever been when the currency was sounder or the rates of exchange lower? You sought once more to put the mechanical arts in active operation, and to relieve commerce from the blight which had fallen upon it. The first has arrived, and the last has unfurled its sails, which now whiten almost every sea. The paralysis which had fallen on public credit, to an extent so great as the poor sum of \$5,000,000 of government stock was offered to European and American capitalists without our being able to find for it a purchaser, has passed away, and a well supplied exchequer gives evidence not only of the expansion of trade, but of the stable basis on which rests the public credit. The very stock for which no bidders could at one time be found now readily commands in the market an advance of fifteen or twenty dollars in the hundred. In the mean time I submit it to you to say whether the principles of the republican party have not been closely observed in all that has been done. Did those principles require that we should recommence a new cycle of twenty years, the predecessor of which a bank of the United States had fulfilled in 1836? Beginning by increasing the derangements of business for years, attended in its mid career with comparative prosperity, then resorting to efforts by all its large means to force a recharter, and ending its existence amid the curses and denunciations of the many it had ruined. Most of you had, like myself, through all time, pronounced the bank to be unconstitutional. Had your opinions on this subject undergone a change in 1840, and did you contemplate that General Harrison and myself—who during the whole contest avowed our opinions to be unchanged in that respect, in numerous addresses to the public—would be deserving of denunciation if either of us should refuse to perjure ourselves by sanctioning a bank charter which, believing it to be unconstitutional, our solemn oath of office required us to vote against or veto? Tell me, moreover, brother republicans of 1840, had you then brought yourselves to the conclusion that even admitting a possible abuse of the veto power, it was proper to erase from the constitution that great barrier and check to unconstitutional and highly inexpedient legislation, thereby making the will of Congress supreme and installing the majority of that body in the full possession of all the powers of govern-

ment? Or did you, or do you now still cling to the opinion in which the qualified veto originated, that a government without checks and forms is the worst form of oligarchy, and that too many guards, in order to secure public liberty, cannot be thrown over its different departments? If, indeed, you are advocates of a change so vital as that proposed, then may not only the Garrison and Tappans of our own country rejoice, but a shout should ascend from the abolition convention "of the whole world" at the fact that our federal system had given way before the power of a consolidated government, whose will, uttered forth by sectional majorities, was absolute, admitting of no check or resistance from any quarter whatever. If, indeed, these be your opinions, then have I most grievously disappointed the hopes you indulged in connection with my election and my administration. I must, nevertheless, most solemnly aver that had I been aware that such would have been expected and required of me—if I could have believed that you, whose candidate I was peculiarly considered, and to conciliate whom I was nominated for the vice presidency, would have required of me in the contingency which unhappily occurred, that I should commence my administration with an act of perjury, and sanctioned measures abhorrent to every principle of my past life and at war with the prosperity of the country and the continuance of liberty, I would not have suffered my name, humble as it was, to have been treated in the canvass. No; I claim the proud privilege of an American citizen to think for myself on all subjects, and to act in pursuance of my own convictions; and it would require a total change of my nature in order to convert me into a mere instrument of party, or of party dictation.

I would appeal not only to yourselves, but to all my countrymen, to say whether, in the matters appertaining to our foreign affairs, they anticipated more success in the adjustment of difficulties and in the formation of highly important treaties than it has been my province to cause to be negotiated. Long-standing difficulties have been adjusted—difficulties which threatened most seriously the peace of the country. Nor has any opportunity been lost for enlarging the commerce of the country, and giving new markets to our agricultural and manufactured products. If the country has not reaped full fruition of benefit from all the treaties thus negotiated, it surely has not been the fault of the administration. The loss of two of those treaties through the action of the Senate, cannot but be deplored by me as great public calamities. By the treaty with the German States, we had opened the way to a more extended commerce with 27,000,000 of people, in our cotton, tobacco, rice, and lard; at duties on tobacco, rice, and lard greatly reduced, and with a stipulation for the free admission of cotton; while we had agreed to receive at somewhat reduced duties, articles from those States which entered into the most limited competition, if at all, with a few articles of American product. The treaty was particularly interesting from the fact that, for the first time, after repeated struggles on the part of my predecessors to accomplish a reduction of duty on tobacco, the government had succeeded in doing so. It was negotiated under resolutions originating with the tobacco States, and with the presumed sanction of Congress, who had raised, as it is believed, the mission to Vienna from a second to a first rate mission, with direct reference to the tobacco interest, and had also appropriated a sum of money some years ago to enable the executive to employ an agent in Germany to acquire information as to the tobacco trade, the services of which agent had only ceased a short time prior to the negotiation of the treaty. My hope still however is, that the benefits of the treaty and the treaty itself may not be lost to the country. I think it proper to add that there was no design to deprive the House of Representatives of any rightful and constitutional action over the subject which it might properly exercise. It was, on the contrary, my intention to have submitted the treaty, and all papers calculated to elucidate it, to the House of Representatives, if it had been ratified by the Senate, for such action as they might have deemed it proper to adopt—a course pursued in all cases in which the action of the House is required to vote supplies of money, or fulfil any other object falling within the scope of their power.

In negotiating the treaty for the annexation of Texas, which was rejected by the Senate, motives have been ascribed to the administration which had no place in its mind or heart. One gentleman, occupying a prominent place in the democratic party, whether for good or for evil it does not become me to say, has assigned, in an address recently delivered in Missouri, two prominent motives for its negotiation: 1st. Personal ambition; and 2ndly, a purpose to dissolve the Union. Mr. Clay also, in a recent letter written to the editor of a

newspaper in Alabama, has called the treaty *infamous*, and ascribed to it, in its origin, *sinister objects*. I repel both their assaults upon the treaty and its negotiators. What object of mere personal ambition in any way connected with office, could have influenced the administration in negotiating the treaty? The public archives furnished the strongest reasons to believe that the treaty would have met the unqualified approval of both Mr. Clay and Mr. Van Buren. While the one was Secretary of State to Mr. Adams, and the other to General Jackson, each in his turn attempted to obtain the annexation of Texas. Mr. Clay's negotiation was carried on with Mexico in the third year of her revolutionary struggle, while Spain regarded her as a revolted province, and her armies were in possession of many of the strongholds of the country. What reason, then, could I have had for supposing for an instant that a treaty with Texas, after eight years of actual independence, with no Mexican soldier within her territory, and subject only to occasional border interruptions, could or would have met with opposition from him or his friends? and meeting with no such opposition on the part of either Mr. Van Buren or Mr. Clay, and their friends, it would puzzle a sounder casuist than I profess to be to conceive in what possible way it could have interrupted the relations of those two gentlemen, who stood, at the moment, at the head of their respective parties, and were looked upon by all as competitors for the presidency. It is well known that, when the negotiation for the acquisition of Texas was commenced, and up to a period succeeding the signing of the treaty, it was my confident conviction, expressed to many, that it would, from the circumstances I have stated, receive the support both of Mr. Clay and Mr. Van Buren, so that neither would be affected by its negotiation.

If it had been charged that the administration was prompted by the ambition of securing the greatest boon to the country, and the whole country in the acquisition of a territory so important in itself and so inseparably connected with the interests of every State in the Union, and every interest of the Union, I would have pleaded guilty without a moment of hesitation. I confess I felt ambitious to add another bright star to the American constellation. It would have been a source of pride to me, if that measure had been carried, to have witnessed from the retirement that awaits me, the annual expansion of our coastwise and foreign trade, and the increased prosperity of our agriculture and manufactures, through the rapid growth of Texas which would have followed the ratification of the treaty. Yes, I freely confess that this would have furnished me an unending source of gratification to the end of my life. I should have seen, also, the union of the States becoming stronger and stronger through their reciprocal affection; local jealousies suppressed, and fanatical schemes and schemers alike prostrate. I should have witnessed the blessed results of federative system as it embraced the finest country in the world, and brought under its influence a people devoted like ourselves to the maintenance and preservation of free government. This was the kind of ambition which prompted the negotiation of the treaty. Its ratification was the sole honor I coveted, and all that I now desire. *Sinister motives* could have originated the negotiation at this time that did not exist in 1827? What was there now to have rendered a treaty *infamous* which did not exist then? If it be said that we had a treaty of limits with Mexico, that if, in 1827, we had not also a treaty of limits with Spain? We had recognized the independence of Mexico, and there was virtually claimed that we had a perfect right to treat with her for the annexation of Texas, and, in fact, if we had so pleased, for Mexico entire. Eight years ago we recognised Texas as independent; and surely our right to negotiate with her implied no worse faith than in 1827 to negotiate with Mexico for her. The idea that because of the existence of a treaty of limits with any nation, we must forever thereafter deny to all parts of the territory of such nation the right of revolution or change, can only excite, with an American citizen, a smile. Was it deemed necessary in 1827 to consult the States, to consult the Senate, or to consult the House of Representatives, or the people? Was it considered necessary to obtain the assent of every State, as would seem now to be proposed, before forming a treaty of annexation? If the assent of every State is necessary, then may we bid adieu to the prospect of annexation now or hereafter. The constitution devolves the treaty-making power on two thirds of the States through their Senators, and it is altogether a new doctrine that a treaty should not be negotiated without the assent of all. Danger to the Union through the exercise of the power of a constitutional majority in the making of a treaty, is a doctrine for the first time advanced, and having no foundation in point of fact.